LIBRARY 

Univer         of 

California 

Irvine 


U7 


PAN-GERMANISM 


"2 

PAN-GERMANISM 


BY 
ROLAND  G.  USHER,  PH.D. 

Associate  Professor  of  History 
Washington  University,  St.  Louis 


"The  patriotism  of  nations  ought  to  be  selfish." 

MADAME  DE  STAEL,  OJ  Germany. 


BOSTON  AND   NEW  YORK 
HOUGHTON  MIFFLIN  COMPANY 


COPYRIGHT,   1913.  BY  ROLAND  G.  USHER 
ALL  RIGHTS  RISK RV ED 

Pubiisked  Fd>r*ary  1913 


TO 

THAT   ENERGETIC,   CAPABLE  ADMINISTRATOR 
THAT   ENTHUSIASTIC   STUDENT   OF   CONDITIONS 

THAT   BEST  OF   COMRADES 

THAT   DEAREST   OF  FRIENDS 

MY  WIFE 


CONTENTS 

I.  THE  CAUSES  OF  GERMAN  AGGRESSION  .      1 

II.  THE  MYTH  OF  ENGLISH  PREPONDERANCE 

IN  EUROPE 19 

III.  THE  FATAL  WEAKNESS  OF  IMPERIAL  ENG- 

LAND   37 

IV.  FRANCE  AND  RUSSIA  AS  THE  GERMAN  SEES 

THEM 48 

V.  THE  STRENGTH  OF  IMPERIAL  GERMANY    63 

VI.  ENGLAND   AND   FRANCE   AS  THEY   SEE 

THEMSELVES 73 

VII.  THE  GERMAN  VIEW  OF  THE  ECONOMIC 

SITUATION 88 

VIII.  PREREQUISITES  OF  SUCCESS        .      .      ,  101 
IX.  FIRST  STEPS 116 

X.  THE    SIGNIFICANT     POSITION    OF    THE 

UNITED  STATES 139 

XI.  FIRST  DEFEATS 157 

XII.  VICTORY  FROM  DEFEAT:    THE  TRIPOLI- 
TAN  WAR 174 

XIII.  THE   AFTERMATH    OF   THE  TRIPOLITAN 

WAR 187 

vii 


CONTENTS 

XIV.  THE    GREAT    REPULSE:     THE    BALKAN 

CRISIS 203 

XV.  THE  JUSTIFIABILITY  OF  PAN-GERMANISM  230 

XVI.  THE  PROBABILITY  OF  THE  SUCCESS  OF 
PAN-GERMANISM.  I.  INTERNAL  WEAK- 
NESSES   251 

XVII.  THE  PROBABILITY  OF  THE  SUCCESS  OF 
PAN-GERMANISM.  II.  EXTERNAL  WEAK- 
NESSES   271 

APPENDIX 

THE  SPEECH  OF  PREMIER  BORDEN  OF 
CANADA,  ADVOCATING  A  NEW  NAVAL 
POLICY,  WITH  THE  OFFICIAL  MEMORAN- 
DUM OF  THE  ENGLISH  ADMIRALTY  ON 
ENGLAND'S  NAVAL  POSITION  .  .  .  285 

BIBLIOGRAPHY  .  .  309 


PAN-GERMANISM 


PAN-GERMANISM 

CHAPTER  I 

THE  CAUSES  OP  GERMAN  AGGRESSION 

FOR  some  years  those  at  all  familiar  with  cur- 
rent international  affairs  have  known  that 
it  was  the  custom  in  the  German  navy  to  drink 
a  toast,  "To  the  day."  Many  people  have 
hugged  to  themselves  with  glee  the  "secret"  in- 
formation that  the  officers  were  drinking  to  the 
day  when  war  should  be  declared  against  Eng- 
land, but  few  indeed  seem  to  have  realized  the 
splendor  of  the  vision  now  before  German  eyes, 
or  the  ideas  of  the  international  situation  which 
makes  victory  seem  so  near  as  to  send  German 
blood  coursing  swiftly  in  the  anticipation  of  tri- 
umph. The  Germans  aim  at  nothing  less  than 
the  domination  of  Europe  and  of  the  world  by 
the  Germanic  race.1  One  of  the  fundamental 

1  "To  Germany,  a  [fleet]  is  merely  a  means  to  an  end,  and  that 
end  —  if  the  Pan-Germans  may  be  believed  —  is  the  destruction 
of  the  British  Empire,  the  disruption  of  the  French  Republic,  and 
the  domination  of  the  world."  Archibald  Kurd  in  the  Fortnightly 
Review,  xci,  New  Series,  785.  Any  one  who  will  compare  this  article 
with  the  official  Memorandum  of  the  Admiralty  prepared  for  the 
Dominion  of  Canada  will  have  little  doubt  that  it  was  "inspired." 

1 


PAN-GERMANISM 

errors,  of  which  idealists  and  advocates  of  peace 
have  been  often  guilty,  is  to  treat  this  vast  pro- 
ject as  an  unreality.  In  fact,  it  is  already  half 
accomplished.  An  equally  mistaken  view  declares 
it  the  conception  of  an  individual  which  chances 
to  find  for  the  moment  a  response  in  the  German 
people,  or  a  scheme  which  depends  for  its  exist- 
ence upon  the  transient  personal  influence  of  a 
few  men.  No  doubt,  a  few  men  only  know  the  full 
details  of  the  plans  for  the  realization  of  this  stu- 
pendous enterprise,  but  the  whole  nation  is  none 
the  less  fired  by  their  spirit  and  is  working  as  a 
unit  in  accordance  with  their  directions.  It  is 
literally  true  that  Germany  has  "become  Bis- 
marckian.  His  heavy  spirit  has  settled  upon  it. 
It  wears  his  scowl.  It  has  adopted  his  brutality, 
as  it  has  his  greatness.  It  has  taken  his  criterion 
of  truth,  which  is  Germanic;  his  indifference  to 
justice,  which  is  savage;  his  conception  of  a  state, 
which  is  sublime."  "This  nation  has  forgotten 
God  in  its  exaltation  of  the  Germanic  race." 
Bombastic  as  such  phrases  are,  they  do  convey 
some  notion  of  the  militant  spirit  which  has 

Mr.  Ilurd  quotes  the  following  sentences  from  the  speech  of  the 
Imperial  Chancellor  in  the  Reichstag  on  November  10,  1912:  "For 
months  past  we  have  been  living,  and  we  are  living  now,  in  an  atmos- 
phere of  passion  such  as  we  have  perhaps  never  before  experienced 
in  Germany.  At  the  root  of  this  feeling  is  the  determination  of  Ger- 
many to  make  its  strength  and  capability  prevail  in  the  world." 
See  also  the  note  at  the  end  of  this  chapter. 

2 


THE  CAUSES  OF  GERMAN   AGGRESSION 

roused  that  nation.  When  Li  Hung  Chang  first 
learned  from  Bismarck  the  magnitude  of  these 
plans,  he  was  skeptical.  But  before  his  brief  stay 
in  Germany  was  over,  he  wrote  in  his  diary: 
"From  all  that  I  have  seen,  I  am  more  than  ever 
convinced  that  the  Kaiser  and  Prince  Bismarck 
meant  what  they  said  when  they  averred  that  the 
German  Empire  was  destined  to  become  a  dom- 
inant factor  in  Europe." 

The  magnitude  of  the  conception,  the  degree 
of  success  already  attained,  the  probability  of  its 
complete  realization,  the  grave  dangers  which  it 
involves  to  other  nations,  are  most  clearly  demon- 
strated by  the  alarm  manifested  by  the  latter. 
England's  foremost  soldier,  Lord  Roberts,  has 
publicly  declared  that  she  has  never  been  in  all 
her  history  in  a  position  of  greater  peril.  The 
leader  of  the  Opposition  in  the  House  of  Commons 
as  solemnly  affirmed  the  truth  of  his  statement. 
Ten  years  ago,  he  said,  England  had  command  of 
every  sea;  now  she  held  control  only  of  the  North 
Sea.  Ten  years  ago  her  fleet  was  so  strong  that 
she  could  have  confidently  expected  to  emerge 
victorious  from  a  struggle  of  the  magnitude  of  the 
Napoleonic  wars;  to-day  there  was  no  such  prob- 
ability. The  ex-Premier  of  France,  M.  Clemen- 
ceau,  said  in  public:  "When  I  look  towards  the 
boundary  of  a  territory  which  was  French  when 

3 


PAN-GERMANISM 

I  was  young,  and  when  I  see  there  the  massing  of 
lines  of  bayonets,  I  cannot  dream  of  disarming." 
A  crisis  of  the  utmost  gravity  is  thus  facing 
Europe,  and  may  at  any  moment  result  in  a  war 
whose  consequences  would  be  felt  alike  by  the 
farmers  in  North  Dakota,  the  operators  in  Lan- 
cashire cotton  mills,  and  the  savages  in  the  heart 
of  Africa.  At  the  very  least,  it  will  overthrow 
political  boundaries  whose  permanence  has  been 
thought  assured;  at  the  worst,  it  may  involve  the 
actual  destruction  of  the  prosperity  and  happiness 
of  two  or  three  of  the  largest  countries  in  Europe 
and  inflict  untold  misery  upon  the  countless  thou- 
sands dependent  upon  European  rule  in  Africa 
and  Asia. 

The  vital  factor  in  the  modern  international 
situation  is  the  aggression  of  Germany,  her  deter- 
mination to  expand  her  territories,  to  increase  her 
wealth  and  power.  Three  centuries  ago,  Prussia 
was  a  tiny  state  whose  many  parts  were  separated 
from  each  other  by  the  lands  of  her  neighbors. 
Cut  off  from  the  sea  on  all  sides,  pushed  hither 
by  the  oncoming  Russian,  dragged  thither  by  the 
encroaching  French,  surrounded  by  tiny  incom- 
petent states,  her  rulers  saw  in  aggression  the 
only  possible  method  of  preserving  the  national 
life.  To  prevent  her  absorption  by  her  neighbors, 
she  must  grow  faster  than  they;  she  must  rob 

4 


THE  CAUSES  OF  GERMAN  AGGRESSION 

them  instead  of  waiting  for  them  to  rob  her.  By 
war,  she  secured  access  to  the  Baltic;  by  war,  she 
obtained  the  coveted  Silesia;  by  war,  she  annexed 
much  of  Poland;  by  war,  she  spread  her  aegis  over 
the  whole  of  northern  Germany.  The  humiliation 
of  conquest  she  knew  under  Napoleon,  and  she  has 
never  forgotten  nor  ever  will  that  no  natural  bar- 
riers stand  between  her  and  the  invader.  Poverty- 
stricken,  still  recovering  from  the  ravages  of  the 
wars  of  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries, 
menaced  on  all  sides  by  powerful  enemies,  her 
only  safety,  Bismarck  saw,  lay  in  aggression,  her 
only  chance  of  victory  depended  upon  striking 
the  first  blow.  By  this  policy,  she  has  built  up 
one  of  the  most  powerful  states  in  the  world  and 
one  of  the  most  populous  and  prosperous.  But 
she  has  reached  the  boundaries  of  Germany;  fur- 
ther expansion  means  the  acquisition  of  what 
other  nations  now  own. 

The  logic  of  facts,  proving  the  necessity  of 
expansion,  is,  to  such  Germans  as  General  Bern- 
hardi,  unanswerable.  The  population  has  in- 
creased so  rapidly  that  it  is  already  difficult  for 
efficient,  well-trained  men  to  secure  any  employ- 
ment. Not  only  is  the  superficial  area  of  the 
country  suitable  for  cultivation  practically  ex- 
hausted, but  intensive  scientific  agriculture  is 
speedily  limiting  the  possibilities  of  the  employ- 

5 


PAN -GERMANISM 

ment  of  more  hands  on  the  same  acres  or  the  fur- 
ther increase  of  the  produce.  Industry  has  grown 
at  a  stupendous  rate,  and  the  output  from  Ger- 
man factories  is  enormously  in  excess  of  the  needs 
of  even  the  growing  population.  Her  exports 
per  capita  are  $24  a  year,  as  against  England's 
$40,  and  France's  $25,  and  she  has  not  their  ex- 
clusive colonial  markets.  Unless  some  outlet  can 
be  found  for  the  surplus  population,  and  a  new 
and  extensive  market  discovered  for  this  enor- 
mous surplus  production,  prosperity  will  be  in- 
evitably succeeded  by  bankruptcy.  There  will  be 
more  hands  than  there  is  work  for,  more  mouths 
than  there  is  food,  and  Germany  must  either  get 
rid  of  the  surplus  mouths  and  hands  or  swell  the 
surplus  product  by  employing  them  at  home, 
which  cannot  be  done  without  entailing  national 
ruin.  Expansion  is,  therefore,  the  only  alterna- 
tive, for  the  German  considers  equivalent  to  ruin 
the  reduction  of  the  pressure  of  population  by 
emigration,1  and  the  avoidance  of  overproduction 

1  In  1881,  nearly  five  per  cent  of  the  total  population  emigrated, 
and  in  the  two  succeeding  years  the  number  was  scarcely  smaller. 
Most  of  them  came  to  the  United  States.  German  emigration  at 
present  is  almost  negligible.  The  name  Pan-Germanism  at  first 
denoted  a  movement  for  the  creation  of  a  greater  national  unit  out 
of  these  emigrants  and  the  Germans  at  home.  It  aimed  at  main- 
taining the  emigrants'  devotion  to  the  Fatherland  by  preserving 
their  language  and  German  habits,  and  at  preventing  their  amal- 
gamation, so  far  as  possible,  into  the  nation  to  which  they  had  mi- 
grated. Its  hope  was  eventually  to  draw  them  back  to  the  Father- 


THE  CAUSES  OF  GERMAN  AGGRESSION 

by  the  proportionate  reduction  of  output.  For 
Germany  to  be  thus  forced  to  remain  static  in 
population  and  in  wealth,  while  her  neighbors 
continue  to  expand,  England  in  her  colonies, 
France  in  Morocco,  Russia  in  Siberia  and  Turkes- 
tan, means  that  the  date  of  her  annihilation  will 
be  fixed  by  the  rate  of  their  growth.  And  such 
action  on  her  part  would  compel  her  in  fact  to 
be  an  accessory  to  her  own  destruction,  for  her 
emigrants  must  strengthen  her  rivals  both  in  the 
field  and  in  the  factory.  To  ask  a  German,  there- 
fore, whether  the  expansion  of  Germany  is  desir- 
able, is  merely  to  ask  him  whether  he  believes  it 
desirable  from  any  point  of  view  for  the  German 
nation  to  survive. 

Already  the  boundaries  of  Germany  in  Europe 
have  been  pushed  to  their  furthest  extent;  more 
territory  can  be  added  only  at  the  expense  of  other 
nations,  either  of  her  powerful  rivals,  France  and 
Russia,  or  of  her  weaker  neighbors,  Belgium, 
Holland,  Denmark,  and  Sweden.  Nor  would  the 
accession  of  such  territory  solve  the  difficulty. 
All  European  nations  are  already  experiencing  to 

land  or  to  provide  for  them  new  homes  under  the  German  flag 
elsewhere.  The  methods  employed  were  mainly  educational,  by 
means  of  German  newspapers,  active  German  departments  in 
American  universities,  German  societies,  frequent  visits  to  the 
great  German  "  colonies  "  by  German  authors  and  professors.  This 
movement,  however,  was  soon  merged  into  and  dwarfed  by  the 
greater  scheme  now  known  as  Pan-Germanism. 

7 


PAN-GERMANISM 

some  degree  the  necessity  of  an  outlet  for  their 
surplus  population  and  manufactures.  A  war  for 
expansion  in  Europe  would  be  without  purpose 
and  could  only  be  detrimental  to  all.  Germany 
must  find  some  territory  suitable  for  development 
by  her  own  people  which  is  not  already  choked 
with  men  and  women.  She  is  seeking  the  coun- 
terpart of  the  fertile  plains  of  western  Canada, 
of  the  rich  valleys  of  northern  Africa,  where  her 
people  may  build  a  new  Germany  whose  existence 
will  strengthen  her  and  not  her  rivals.  But  such 
a  promised  land,  tenanted  only  by  native  races, 
is  not  to  be  found.  Every  really  available  spot  is 
held  by  England,  France,  or  Russia.  Germany 
can,  therefore,  obtain  colonies  suitable  for  her 
purposes  only  at  the  expense  of  these  last.  This 
is  what  is  meant  by  the  oft-reiterated  statements 
that  England,  France,  and  Russia  are  by  their 
very  existence  inimical  to  Germany's  welfare, 
that,  if  she  is  to  escape  rum,  she  must  fight  them. 
The  alternative  to  colonies  is  access  to  some 
new  market  for  her  products,  so  vast  in  extent 
and  so  unlimited  in  its  capacity  of  continued  ab- 
sorption, that  her  surplusage  of  population  can 
be  provided  with  work  at  home,  and  thus  pro- 
sperity and  the  increase  of  the  national  strength 
indefinitely  insured.  The  total  annual  imports 
into  her  own  colonies  she  knows  to  be  well  under 

8 


THE  CAUSES  OF  GERMAN  AGGRESSION 

ten  millions  of  dollars;  the  exports  from  England 
to  the  English  colonies  alone  she  knows  to  total 
several  hundred  millions  of  dollars.1  Such  a  mar- 
ket she  is  determined  to  have,  cost  what  it  may. 
One  other  fact  marks  England  as  the  greatest 
obstacle  in  the  path  of  her  legitimate  growth. 
The  English  Channel  is  the  only  available  safe 
passageway  for  her  merchant  fleets.  The  voyage 
round  the  British  Isles  is  long  and  during  the 
whiter  months  positively  dangerous  even  for 
steamships.  Natural  conditions,  therefore,  by 
compelling  Germany  to  use  the  Channel,  force 
her  to  expose  her  commerce  to  the  assaults  of  the 
English  fleet  so  long  as  the  latter  controls  the 
Channel.  Even  if  she  should  acquire  colonies  and 
a  great  market,  she  cannot  really  possess  them 
until  she  acquires  a  highroad  to  them  safe  from 
the  attacks  of  her  enemies.  Short  of  conquering 
England  and  France,  she  can  never  free  her  com- 
merce from  actual  danger;  without  a  great  fleet 
in  the  North  Sea,  strong  enough  to  terrify  England 
into  inaction,  she  cannot  even  be  assured  of  the 
continuance  of  her  present  freedom  of  passage.2 

1  The  leading  customers  of  England  in  1910  were  in  millions  of 
pounds:  India,  45  millions;  Germany,  37  millions;  the  United  States, 
31  millions;  Australia,  27  millions;  France,  22  millions;  Canada,  19 
millions.  England's  exports  to  these  three  colonies  were  91  millions 
and  her  exports  to  the  three  nations  were  90  millions. 

2  The  preface  of  the  German  Naval  Bill  of  1900  stated:  "For  the 
protection  of  our  oversea  trade  and  our  colonies,  there  is  only  one 

9 


PAN-GERMANISM 

Her  fleet,  therefore,  seems  to  her  merely  the 
guarantee  of  her  present  position,  and  it  will  con- 
tinue to  be  a  guarantee  only  as  long  as  its  size 
makes  it  formidable.  Merely  to  retain  what  she 
now  has,  Germany  is  condemned  to  increase  her 
navy  at  any  pace  the  English  see  fit  to  set.  Some- 
thing more  will  be  absolutely  essential  if  the  din* 
consequences  of  an  economic  crisis  are  not  to  im- 
poverish her  and  pave  the  way  for  her  ultimate 
destruction  at  the  hands  of  her  hereditary  enemies, 
France  and  Russia. 

To  secure  a  share  of  the  world's  trade  in  some 
fashion  which  will  not  expose  her  to  the  attacks  of 
the  English  fleet,  and  which  will  create  an  empire 
less  vulnerable  in  every  way  than  she  believes  the 
British  Empire  to  be,  an  overland  route  to  the  East 
must  be  found.  The  Germans  consider  perfectly 
feasible  the  construction  of  a  great  confederation 
of  states  including  Germany,  Austria,  Hungary, 

means:  a  strong  fleet.  Under  the  present  circumstances,  the  only 
means  for  protecting  Germany's  oversea  trade  and  colonies  is:  Ger- 
many must  possess  a  fleet  of  such  strength  that  a  war,  even  with  the 
strongest  naval  power,  would  involve  such  risks  as  to  jeopardize  the 
position  of  that  power.  For  that  purpose,  it  is  not  absolutely  neces- 
sary that  the  German  fleet  be  as  strong  as  the  fleet  of  the  greatest 
naval  power,  for  a  great  naval  power  will  not  generally  be  in  a  posi- 
tion to  concentrate  all  its  forces  against  Germany.  But,  even  if  the 
greatest  naval  power  should  succeed  in  meeting  us  with  a  fleet  of 
superior  strength,  the  defeat  of  a  strong  German  fleet  would  so  greatly 
weaken  its  own  power,  that,  notwithstanding  its  victory,  its  own 
position  on  the  seas  would  no  longer  be  secure." 

10 


THE  CAUSES  OF  GERMAN  AGGRESSION 

the  Balkan  States,  and  Turkey,  which  would  con- 
trol a  great  band  of  territory  stretching  southeast 
from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Persian  Gulf.  A  railway 
from  Constantinople  to  Baghdad  would  effectually 
tie  the  great  trunk  lines,  leading  from  the  Rhine 
and  Danube  valleys,  to  Constantinople  and  the 
Persian  Gulf,  and  so  establish  a  shorter  route  to 
India  than  that  via  Suez.  Egypt,  Syria,  Arabia, 
Persia,  India  herself,  the  mother  of  nations,  would 
fall  into  German  hands  and  be  held  safe  from  con- 
quest by  this  magnificent  overland  route  to  the 
East.  Pan-Germanism  is,  therefore,  in  the  first 
place,  a  defensive  movement  for  self-preserva- 
tion, for  escaping  the  pressure  of  France  and 
Russia,  both  bent  on  her  destruction.  It  is,  in  the 
second  place,  an  offensive  movement  directed 
against  England,  its  object,  the  conquest  of  the 
English  possessions  in  the  Mediterranean  and  in 
Asia.  She  expects  thus  to  obtain  an  outlet  for 
her  surplus  population  and  manufactures  and  to 
create  an  empire  as  little  vulnerable  politically, 
economically,  or  strategically  as  any  the  world  has 
yet  seen. 

In  reply  to  the  outcries  from  other  nations,  de- 
nouncing these  plans  as  unprovoked  aggression 
and  lacking  in  morality,  as  a  reversion  to  the  forc- 
ible methods  of  bygone  centuries  whose  brutali- 
ties the  world  long  ago  outgrew,  the  Germans 

11 


PAN-GERMANISM 

derisively  point  to  the  presence  of  the  English  in 
India,  of  the  French  in  Morocco,  of  the  Russians 
in  Manchuria,  of  the  United  States  in  Panama. 
They  insist  that  their  aims  and  methods  are  ab- 
solutely identical  with  those  their  detractors  have 
so  long  employed.  Now  that  the  latter's  work  is 
complete  and  their  own  futures  assured,  they  are 
no  doubt  eager  to  establish  "moral,"  "ethical," 
and  "legal"  precepts  whose  acceptance  by  other 
nations  would  insure  them  the  undisturbed  pos- 
session of  all  they  now  hold.  This,  the  Germans 
admit,  is  but  natural  and  not  blameworthy;  but 
they  ought  not  to  expect  other  nations  to  sub- 
scribe to  such  principles  from  motives  of  love  or 
admiration.1  General  Bernhardi,  a  man  whose 
undoubted  attainments  and  learning  compel  the 
respect  of  his  enemies,  and  whose  following  in 
Germany  is  large  in  numbers  and  influential  in 
character,  declares  openly  that  might  is  right,  and 
that  right  is  decided  by  war.  He  scoffs  at  such 
ideas  of  ethics  and  morality  as  his  critics  repre- 
sent, and  insinuates  that,  if  war  happened  to 

1  "  That  any  one  should  act  in  politics  out  of  complaisance  or  from 
a  sentiment  of  justice,  others  may  expect  from  us,  but  not  we  from 
them.  .  .  .  Every  government  takes  solely  its  own  interests  as  the 
standard  of  its  actions,  however  it  may  drape  them  with  deductions 
of  justice  or  sentiment.  .  .  .  My  belief  is  that  no  one  does  anything 
for  us,  unless  he  can  at  the  same  time  serve  his  own  interests."  Bis- 
marck, Reflections  and  Remimxencea,  English  translation,  A.  J. 
Butler.  New  York  and  London,  1899,  respectively,  pp.  178,  ITS.  202. 

12 


THE  CAUSES  OF  GERMAN  AGGRESSION 

promise  other  nations  at  this  moment  as  many 
advantages  as  it  does  Germany,  they  would  hold 
views  similar  to  his  upon  that  subject. 

With  him,  the  Germans  as  a  whole  refuse  to 
admit  the  validity  of  any  theoretical  notions 
whose  application  would  in  any  way  restrict  or 
interfere  with  Germany's  "full  share  in  the  mas- 
tery of  the  world."  Do  they  not  see  about  them 
the  splendidly  tangible  results  of  the  investment l 
of  the  huge  war  indemnity  paid  by  France  to 
ransom  her  lands  from  the  German  army?  Do 
they  not  know  that  the  indemnity  created  modern 
Germany?  As  a  prominent  German  manufacturer 
said  to  the  writer  two  years  ago,  "Next  time  we 
will  ask  five  times  as  much."  In  the  face  of  the 
undeniable  territorial  gains,  equal  hi  amount  to 
several  times  the  area  of  Prussia  and  Branden- 
burg combined  in  1640,  in  the  face  of  that  five 
billions  of  francs  which  they  have  invested  and 
reinvested  with  such  brilliant  success  for  forty 
years,  how  can  the  Germans  be  expected  to  believe 
that  the  fruits  of  peace  are  greater  than  those 

1  The  indemnity  was  nominally  spent  in  defraying  the  cost  of  the 
war  and  in  improving  the  army  and  fortifications.  It  was  indirectly 
distributed  to  the  nation  and  to  individuals;  for  the  army  was  the 
nation  in  arms,  the  debts  were  mostly  owed  to  Germans,  the  labor 
and  materials  employed  on  the  new  works  were  German.  However 
the  transaction  was  recorded  formally  on  the  books  of  the  state,  the 
nation  itself  received  the  money  either  in  wages  or  by  the  remission 
of  taxes. 

13 


PAN-GERMANISM 

of  war?  Is  not  the  very  existence  of  Imperial 
Germany  due  to  war?  Could  it  conceivably  have 
been  created  by  anything  else?  Will  anything  less 
preserve  it?  They  deny  the  validity  of  any  par- 
ticular set  of  ethical  notions  of  right  and  wrong 
to  decide  issues  vital  to  the  continued  existence 
of  the  Germanic  race.  If  such  considerations  are 
to  be  dragged  into  the  discussion,  the  notion  of 
the  relativity  of  truth,  the  doctrine  that  moral  and 
ethical  standards  are  not  fixed  but  merely  reflect 
the  stage  of  progress  each  particular  age  has 
reached,  the  Darwinian  doctrine  of  the  survival 
of  the  fittest,  all  seem  to  them  infinitely  more 
satisfactory  theoretical  grounds  for  action  than 
what  Bismarck  sneeringly  called  "the  English 
phrases  about  humanity.'* 

The  most  significant  question  now  before  the 
Anglo-Saxon  race,  therefore,  is  the  truth  or  fal- 
sity of  those  notions  of  strategical  geography,  of 
military  and  naval  organization,  of  finance  and 
commerce  upon  which  these  vast  schemes  are 
based.  If  the  factors,  on  which  the  Germans  rely, 
are  what  they  think  they  are,  the  domination  of 
the  world  by  Germany  and  her  allies  can  be  only 
a  question  of  time.  If  they  are  not  valid,  the 
world  will  certainly  develop  along  different  lines. 
So  widely  do  the  economic  and  political  hit  crests 
ramify,  so  completely  are  all  sections  of  the  globe 

14 


THE  CAUSES  OF  GERMAN  AGGRESSION 

influenced  by  them,  that  nothing  can  happen, 
from  this  moment  until  the  final  decision  of  the 
issue,  which  will  not  vitally  affect  it  or  be  vitally 
affected  by  it.  The  Boer  War,  Morocco,  the 
strangling  of  Persia,  the  war  in  Tripoli,  the  Bal- 
kan crisis  are  only  incidents  in  this  gigantic  strug- 
gle in  which  the  very  pawns  are  kingdoms  and  the 
control  of  the  entire  globe  the  stake.  Indeed,  the 
forces  at  the  disposal  of  the  combatants  are  so 
comprehensive  that  navies  and  armies  might  al- 
most be  called  incidental  factors,  which  it  may  or 
may  not  be  necessary  to  employ,  and  which  might 
not  indeed  be  decisive  for  victory  or  defeat. 

Naturally,  even  to  sketch  the  history  of  the 
world  in  its  relation  to  the  modern  crisis,  even  to 
enumerate  the  multifold  phases,  political,  con- 
stitutional, economic,  military,  which  it  neces- 
sarily displays,  is  an  impossibility  in  anything 
briefer  than  a  series  of  volumes.  An  attempt  to 
describe  merely  the  features  and  factors  essential 
to  a  comprehension  of  the  most  significant  phases 
of  Pan-Germanism  alone  will  require  the  omission 
of  much  that  is  important  and  will  make  im- 
possible any  account  at  all  of  the  narrative  of 
recent  history.  What  has  happened,  what  is  hap- 
pening, is  of  infinitely  less  consequence  than  the 
scope  and  character  of  the  German  plans.  The 
most  vital  fact  for  the  Anglo-Saxon  race  to  grasp 

15 


PAN-GERMANISM 

at  present  is  the  German  view  of  European  his- 
tory, of  European  life  and  ideals,  their  estima- 
tion of  the  comparative  strength  of  political,  eco- 
nomic, and  ethical  forces.  From  a  grasp  of  these 
points,  and  from  it  alone,  can  we  hope  to  under- 
stand the  apparently  inexplicable  and  inconsist- 
ent ideas  upon  which  has  been  based  the  most 
audacious  attempt  yet  made  consciously  to  direct 
through  a  long  term  of  years  the  evolution  of  a 
nation  and  the  fate  of  the  world.1  The  following 
chapters,  therefore,  will  attempt  to  describe  Eu- 
rope and  Germany,  as  the  Germans  see  them,  as 
the  necessary  prelude  to  a  brief  statement  of  the 
progress  Germany  has  made  toward  a  realization 
of  her  scheme  and  a  description  of  the  attempts 
of  her  "victims"  to  frustrate  it.  Then,  there  will 

1  The  extent  to  which  the  German  nation  as  a  whole  is  conscious 
of  the  existence  of  Pan-Germanism  is  not  demonstrable.  There  can 
be  no  doubt  that  the  Government  has  consistently  attempted  to 
shape  public  opinion  in  favor  of  it.  Bismarck's  notion  of  public  opin- 
ion is  enlightening.  He  said  to  Crispi:  "Public  opinion  is  but  a  great 
river  formed  by  a  quantity  of  small  streams,  one  of  which  is  the 
Government  stream.  If  the  Government  would  but  swell  its  waters 
sufficiently,  it  would  have  a  determinative  influence  upon  the  great 
public  current.  If,  on  the  contrary,  the  Government  wants  to  meas- 
ure the  strength  of  all  the  other  streams,  which,  separately,  are  less 
powerful  than  its  own,  it  must  be  overwhelmed  by  the  union  of  their 
forces.  A  Government  acting  thus  would  be  guilty  of  unpardonable 
neglect  of  precautions."  Crispi,  Memoirs,  n,  163,  London,  1912. 

In  the  Fortnightly  Renew,  xci.  New  Series,  785,  Archibald  Hard 
states:  "A  section  of  powerful  politicians  and  vested  interests,  with 
the  support  of  the  Emperor  and  the  Marine  Amt,  under  Grand- 
Admiral  von  Tirpitz,  have  obtained  control  of  the  Government  and 
the  most  influential  newspapers,  and  dominate  German  policy." 

16 


THE  CAUSES  OF  GERMAN  AGGRESSION 

be  an  opportunity  to  weigh  the  scheme  in  the  bal- 
ance, to  point  out  its  elements  of  strength  and 
weakness,  and  thus  to  arrive  at  some  approxima- 
tion of  the  probability  of  its  success  or  failure. 


NOTE 

The  following  testimony  was  given  under  oath  in  a 
court  of  law  by  the  editor  of  the  Rheinisch-Westfdlische 
Zeitung  in  a  political  libel  suit  instituted  by  him 
against  the  editor  of  the  Grenzboten.  It  was  printed 
only  [so  far  as  can  be  learned]  by  the  Rheinisch-West- 
fdlische  Zeitung  and  the  Tdglische  Rundschau,  but  was 
not  denied  by  the  gentlemen  named  in  it,  and  seems  to 
have  been  suppressed  so  far  as  was  possible.  The  fol- 
lowing translation  is  taken  from  a  semi-official  article 
hi  the  Fortnightly  Review,  xci,  New  Series,  462.  Whether 
or  not  the  words  credited  to  the  important  personages 
quoted  were  ever  used,  they  express  sentiments  which 
are  widely  believed  to  represent  their  views.  After  all, 
it  is  not  so  much  the  truth  itself,  but  what  intelligent 
and  sincere  men  believe  to  be  the  truth,  which  influ- 
ences the  trend  of  human  events. 

"Mr.  Class,  the  President  of  the  Pan-Germanic 
League,  is  prepared  to  state  upon  oath  before  this  court l 
that  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Herr 
von  Kiderlen  Wachter,  writing  to  him  from  Kissingen, 
requested  Mr.  Class  to  meet  him  at  the  Hotel  Pfalzer 
Hof  in  Mannheim.  During  the  interview,  which  occu- 
pied several  hours,  Herr  von  Kiderlen  Wachter  stated: 
'The  Pan-Germanic  demand  for  the  possession  of 
Morocco  is  absolutely  justified.  You  can  absolutely 
1  The  italics  are  not  in  the  original. 
17 


PAN-GERMANISM 

rely  upon  it  that  the  Government  will  stick  to  Morocco. 
Monsieur  Cambon  is  wriggling  before  me  like  a  worm. 
The  German  Government  is  in  a  splendid  position. 
You  can  rely  upon  me  and  you  will  be  very  pleased 
with  our  Morocco  policy.  I  am  as  good  a  Pan-German 
as  you  are.' l  On  the  1st  of  July,  Mr.  Class  called  at  the 
German  Foreign  Office,  and,  failing  to  find  Herr  von 
Kiderlen  Wachter,  was  received  by  Herr  Zimmermann, 
the  Under-Secretary.  Mr.  Zimmermann  told  him: 
'You  come  at  an  historic  hour.  To-day  the  Panther 
appears  before  Agadir  and  at  this  moment  (12  o'clock 
mid-day)  the  Foreign  Cabinets  are  being  informed  of 
its  mission.  The  German  Government  has  sent  two 
agents  provocateurs  to  Agadir  and  these  have  done  their 
duty  very  well.  German  firms  have  been  induced  to 
make  complaints  and  to  call  upon  the  Government  hi 
Berlin  for  protection.  It  is  the  Government's  intention 
to  seize  the  district  and  it  will  not  give  it  up  again. 
The  German  people  require  absolutely  a  settlement 
colony.  Please  prevent,  wherever  in  the  Press  you  have 
influence,  the  raising  of  claims  for  compensation  else- 
where. Possibly  France  will  offer  us  the  Congo.  How- 
ever, the  German  does  not  want  compensation  else- 
where, but  a  part  of  Morocco.' " 

1  The  italics  are  not  in  the  original 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  MYTH  OF  ENGLISH  PREPONDERANCE  IN 
EUROPE 

ENGLAND,  with  all  her  bluster  and  show," 
said  Bismarck  to  Li  Hung  Chang,  "has  a 
hundred  weak  points,  and  she  knows  that  a  con- 
flict with  a  power  nearly  her  equal  will  mean  her 
undoing."  A  vital  part  of  the  German  scheme 
for  the  control  of  the  world  depends  upon  the 
belief  that  power  is  not  absolute,  but  comparative. 
Not  alone  Germany's  strength,  but  her  rivals' 
weakness,  will  be  significant  factors  for  victory 
or  defeat.  To  Germans  it  is  an  error  to  suppose 
that  England  is  decadent.  The  fundamental  mis- 
conception is  to  suppose  that  England  ever  was 
strong.  She  has  been  strong  by  reason  of  others' 
weakness,  by  the  use  of  others'  resources,  by  the 
spoils  of  conquest.  She  has  not  less  cohesion  than 
before,  not  fewer  vital  interests  in  common  with 
her  dependencies.  The  British  Empire  has  never 
possessed  cohesion;  never  has  had  a  common, 
vital  economic,  or  geographical  interest;  has  al- 
ways been  a  sham,  a  figment  of  the  imagination, 
a  glittering  generality  whose  unreality  has  re- 

19 


PAN-GERMANISM 

malned  concealed  only  by  reason  of  the  inability 
of  other  nations  to  perceive  it.1 

England's  naval  power  has  been  the  result  of 
accident,  not  of  genius,  think  the  Germans,  and 
has  rested  chiefly  upon  the  accidents  of  geography 
and  geology.  The  formation  of  the  British  Isles, 
the  meeting  of  strong  oceanic  currents  to  the  north 
of  them,  made  the  narrow  passageway  between 
England  and  Europe  the  most  important  single 
bit  of  water  in  the  world.  The  commerce  of  north- 
ern Europe  was  forced  to  pass  through  the  Channel 
because  it  could  not  safely  go  round.  The  naviga- 
tion of  this  safer  passage  was  made  exceedingly 
difficult  for  wooden  sailing  ships  by  the  peculiar 
formation  of  the  shores  and  by  the  treacherous 
tides,  winds,  and  currents.  Chance  had,  more* 
over,  placed  most  of  the  natural  harbors  on  th£ 
English  side.  There  was,  indeed,  between  Brest 
and  Hamburg  but  one  spot  on  the  continental 
side  which  might  serve  as  a  base  of  operations  for 
a  great  fleet,  the  district  now  known  as  the  Neth- 

1  The  author  begs  his  readers  to  bear  carefully  in  mind  that  he  is 
attempting  in  the  following  chapters  to  expound  the  German  view 
of  the  situation  rather  than  what  he  believes  to  be  the  truth.  Natu- 
rally, a  view  of  the  international  situation,  upon  which  a  great  nation 
of  intelligent  people  is  willing  to  base  a  policy  on  whose  success  maj 
depend  their  national  future,  will  contain  many  factors  whose  trull 
b  not  to  be  denied  by  any  impartial  student.  The  general  conclu- 
sions, derived  from  considering  these  obviously  true  facts,  may,  how- 
ever, be  vulnerable. 

20 


MYTH  OF  ENGLISH  PREPONDERANCE 

erlands.  The  constant  use  of  the  Channel  neces- 
sarily involved,  therefore,  the  use  of  English  har- 
bors as  a  refuge  from  storms.  Nor  were  the  diffi- 
culties of  navigation  limited  to  the  passage  of  ships 
through  the  Channel.  To  sail  across  that  narrow 
way,  especially  with  a  fleet,  was  literally  an  almost 
impossible  feat  except  from  one  or  two  points  on 
the  European  shore,  the  more  favorable  of  which 
was  the  Netherlands.  The  natural  barriers  to 
invasion  thus  furnished  by  the  Channel  so  limited 
the  possibilities  of  assault  that  its  defense  became 
comparatively  simple.  Invasion  after  invasion, 
decade  after  decade,  was  defeated  because  the 
unfavorable  weather,  continuing  for  weeks  at  a 
time,  made  it  impossible  for  the  enemy  to  leave 
Europe.  These  natural  barriers  are  gone  forever, 
destroyed  by  the  steamship,  which  is  not  limited 
in  the  time  of  its  departure  nor  in  its  course  by 
winds  and  waves.1  Never  again  can  an  English 

1  The  German  Navy  League  issued  in  1912  a  book  entitled, 
Deutschland  Sei  Wach,  in  which  this  statement  was  made  prominent: 
"The  maintenance  of  Great  Britain's  naval  supremacy  which  has 
been  kept  unimpaired  during  the  last  century,  has,  through  the  rela- 
tive strength  of  the  German  fleet,  become  impossible  in  the  future. 
That  is  the  great  historic  process  which  we  are  seeing.  It  is  no  more 
to  be  imagined  that  England  can  destroy  the  German  fleet  without 
seriously  compromising  her  own  supremacy."  At  the  end  of  the  vol- 
ume in  the  very  largest  of  type  stands  the  following:  "Germany 
must  be  strong  on  land,  so  strong  that  she  can  vanquish  every  oppo- 
nent, but  she  must  also  be  so  strong  at  sea  that  she  need  not  fear  any 
opponent,  because  the  risk  of  a  naval  war  would  be  so  great  that  it 
would  appear  too  great  even  to  the  strongest  naval  Power." 

21 


PAN-GERMANISM 

fleet  adopt  Nelson's  tactics  of  allowing  the 
weather  to  guard  the  Channel  while  he  crushed 
the  enemy  elsewhere.  Napoleon,  waiting  at 
Boulogne,  once  truly  said  that  seven  hours  of 
darkness  and  a  fair  wind  would  change  the  fate  of 
the  world.  In  the  next  war  the  invader  will  not 
need  to  pray  for  either. 

The  Germans  also  correctly  appreciate  the  fact 
that  the  English  control  of  the  Baltic  —  the  only 
considerable  source  of  naval  stores  from  which 
wooden  fleets  might  be  built  or  maintained  — 
was  a  vital  factor  in  their  naval  supremacy.  Not 
only  did  they  possess  a  superior  fleet;  they  pos- 
sessed the  chief  supply  of  materials  from  which 
rival  fleets  could  be  built.  Trafalgar  gave  England 
supremacy  on  the  sea,  not  so  much  because  she 
won  the  battle,  as  because  her  control  of  the 
sea  prevented  Napoleon  from  obtaining  the  ma- 
terials out  of  which  alone  he  might  rebuild  his 
shattered  fleet.  This  monopoly  is  gone  forever. 
Ships  are  now  built  of  a  material  of  which  no 
nation  has  a  monopoly,  and  of  which  England 
does  not  even  control  one  of  the  chief  sources  of 
supply. 

The  peculiar  strategical  geography  of  northern 
Europe  the  Germans  also  hold  responsible  for 
England's  power.  The  land  on  either  side  of  the 
mouth  of  the  Rhine  is  the  key  to  northern  Europe. 

22 


MYTH  OF  ENGLISH  PREPONDERANCE 

Belgium  controls  the  shortest  route  to  Paris; 
Holland  is  the  only  point  of  departure  from  which 
an  invasion  of  England  is  likely  to  be  successful; 
both  countries  hold  between  them  the  door  of  the 
Rhine  valley,  the  gateway  to  the  heart  of  Ger- 
many. Their  possession  by  any  one  of  the  three 
nations  nearest  them  would  give  her  immediately 
a  most  deadly  offensive  weapon  against  the  other 
two.  To  possess  them  has  been  the  dream  of  all; 
to  secure  them  half  the  wars  in  European  history 
have  been  fought.  Those  two  tiny  states  are  now 
independent  because  England,  France,  and  Ger- 
many cannot  permit  each  other  to  control  them. 
To  the  east  lies  the  gateway  between  France 
and  Germany,  Alsace-Lorraine,  through  whose 
fair  fields  pass  the  roads  to  Cologne  and  Berlin, 
to  Frankfort,  Leipzig,  and  Dresden,  to  Basel, 
Switzerland,  and  Italy,  to  the  Danube  valley  and 
Vienna.  Its  possession  permits  France  to  enter 
the  heart  of  Germany;  its  possession  puts  Ger- 
many at  the  very  doors  of  France;  it  is  a  potent 
weapon  of  offense  or  defense  and  enables  its  holder 
to  begin  a  war  with  tremendous  advantages.  For 
its  possession,  France  and  Germany  have  struggled 
for  fifteen  hundred  years.  The  existence  of  these 
strategic  points  has  made  England  important. 
If  France  assailed  the  Rhine  from  Lorraine,  Ger- 
many would  ally  with  England,  who  could  assail 

23 


PAN-GERMANISM 

Paris  from  the  north  through  Belgium.  If  Ger- 
many threatened  France  from  the  east,  the  Eng- 
lish might  be  induced  to  invade  Germany  from 
the  Netherlands.  Should  either  country  obtain 
the  cooperation  of  England  against  the  other,  the 
most  disastrous  results  were  probable.  These 
conditions  made  England  a  factor  in  politics 
during  the  Middle  Ages,  out  of  all  proportion  to 
her  actual  strength  as  compared  with  France  or 
Germany.  She  was  in  a  position  to  deliver  a  deadly 
flank  attack  on  either;  the  Channel  effectually 
prevented  retaliation;  she  could  have  consum- 
mated the  dynastic  ambitions  of  either;  she  pre- 
ferred to  thwart  the  aims  of  both.  When  the 
Netherlands  fell  into  Spanish  hands  hi  the  six- 
teenth century  and  the  power  of  the  Hapsburgs 
threatened  to  absorb  all  Europe,  the  cooperation 
of  the  islanders,  who  controlled  the  stormy  Chan- 
nel and  who  could  so  easily  invade  the  Nether- 
lands, was  seen  by  every  one  to  be  the  controlling 
factor  in  a  complex  situation.  Their  assistance 
would  almost  certainly  decide  the  war  in  favor 
of  France  or  Spain.  Not  England's  strength,  but 
the  fact  that  her  position  made  her  valuable  to 
stronger  nations,  gave  her  a  voice  in  the  days  of 
Henry  Vlll  and  Elizabeth.  Not  her  strength, 
but  the  evenness  of  the  balance  of  power  in 
Europe,  the  rivalry  of  Bourbon  and  Hapsburg, 

24 


MYTH  OF  ENGLISH  PREPONDERANCE 

their  fear  of  each  other,  gave  her  the  casting 
vote.1 

Until  the  nineteenth  century,  France  was  the 
only  strong,  organic  nation  on  the  continent  of 
Europe:  Spain,  Italy,  and  Germany  were  geo- 
graphical expressions,  whose  weakness  and  fear  of 
France  forced  them  to  call  on  England  for  aid. 
No  doubt  immense  significance  ought  to  be  at- 
tached to  England's  own  condition  during  these 
same  centuries.  She  attained  in  the  days  of 
William  the  Norman,  in  the  eleventh  century, 
a  territorial  unity  which  Spain  did  not  attain 
until  the  fifteenth  century,  France  until  the  six- 
teenth century,  Germany  and  Italy  until  the 
nineteenth  century.  Her  strong  centralized  mon- 
archy, certainly  the  most  powerful  feudal  govern- 
ment in  Europe,  the  strong  Tudor  monarchy  in 
later  years  were  able  to  throw  into  the  European 
balance  the  whole  force  of  a  territorial  and  eco- 
nomic unit.  England,  united  and  ruled  by  a  single 
king,  easily  able  to  suppress  local  uprisings,  was 

1  "England  has  always  caused  one  Power  to  destroy  another 
Power.  Herein  lies  England's  profit."  "  The  great  Wars  of  Religion 
in  Germany  made  it  possible  for  England  to  become  a  sea  power. 
During  the  time  when  Germany  was  torn  and  enfeebled,  England 
could  destroy  the  Hanseatic  League.  Prussia's  Seven  Years'  War 
enabled  England  to  oust  the  old  Colonial  Powers  and  to  seize  French 
Canada.  .  .  .  The  final  conquest  of  the  New  World  succeeded  only 
because  Frederick  the  Great  held  down  France  in  Europe."  Eng- 
land's Weltherrschaft  und  die  Deutsche  Luxusflotte,  von  Lookout. 
Berlin,  February,  1912.  Fourteen  editions  were  sold  in  a  few  weeks. 

25 


PAN-GERMANISM 

actually  stronger  than  a  vastly  more  populous 
and  wealthy  state,  like  France,  Germany,  or 
Spain,  whose  international  strength  was  limited 
to  such  force  as  could  be  exerted  by  that  one  of  her 
princes  who  had  been  able  to  secure  the  ascen- 
dency for  the  time  being,  and  who  was  invariably 
hard  pressed  at  home  by  ambitious  rivals  scarcely 
less  powerful  than  he.  The  strategical  position 
of  the  continental  nations  laid  them  open  to  inva- 
sion from  so  many  quarters  that  they  must  be 
continually  withholding  from  their  offensive  army 
in  one  place  enough  men  to  insure  safety  in  others. 
Not  so  England,  whom  the  Channel  enabled  to 
concentrate  her  forces  at  one  point  without  fear 
of  invasion  elsewhere.  England  fought  with  her 
whole  strength  those  who  had  not  yet  finished 
fighting  among  themselves.  The  number  of  years 
during  which  England  has  been  the  scene  of  actual 
warfare  are  astonishingly  few.  Since  the  days  of 
Henry  Vlll,  there  has  been  domestic  peace  except 
for  the  civil  wars  of  the  seventeenth  century. 
Such  a  record  no  other  nation  can  show.  Nor  were 
the  wars  which  did  take  place  on  English  soil 
as  disastrous  or  destructive  as  the  wars  on  the 
Continent.  When  the  Continent  was  almost  laid 
waste,  England  could  husband  or  utilize  her  full 
economic  strength  at  will.  Not  alone,  therefore, 
because  of  her  position  and  the  rivalries  of  others 

26 


MYTH  OF  ENGLISH  PREPONDERANCE 

has  England  played  the  controlling  part  in  inter- 
national affairs.  Compared  to  any  individual 
nation,  her  strength  has  been  great. 

The  growth  during  the  nineteenth  century  of 
Prussia,  Austria,  and  Italy  has  given  England  as 
rivals,  in  place  of  the  old  decentralized,  inefficient, 
quarreling  federations  of  tiny  states,  strong  cen- 
tralized governments,  larger  than  she  in  area,  with 
more  numerous  populations,  with  greater  re- 
sources. She  has  lost  her  old  position,  despite  the 
fact  that  she  was  never  more  prosperous  or  better 
governed  than  she  is  at  present,  because  of  the 
proportionately  more  rapid  development  of  her 
rivals.  Nor  can  she  longer  claim  a  more  efficient 
use  of  her  resources  than  they.  For  a  strong  king, 
has  been  substituted  a  ministry;  for  the  rapidity, 
vigor,  and  secrecy  of  the  king's  unhampered  dis- 
cretion, has  been  substituted  the  less  rapid  and  effi- 
cient direction  of  a  many-headed  executive  whose 
actions  are  hampered  and  hindered  by  the  House 
of  Commons.  However  admirable  the  results 
of  parliamentary  government  have  been  for  the 
individual  Englishman,  it  can  scarcely  be  denied 
that  the  new  democratic  government  is  compara- 
tively less  efficient  than  the  old  centralized  mon- 
archy, and  that,  from  the  international  point  of 
view,  England  has  lost  immensely  in  offensive 
strength. 

27 


PAN-GERMANISM 

In  the  Government,  too,  exist  the  gravest  dis- 
sensions. The  assumption  has  always  been  that 
there  would  be  a  clear  majority  in  the  House  of 
Commons  in  favor  of  one  of  two  policies;  that  the 
Ministry  would  represent  this  majority,  and  from 
its  unity  and  strength  would  derive  support  for 
the  exercise  of  the  discretionary  authority  neces- 
sary for  all  emergencies.  Yet,  for  twenty  years, 
the  English  parties  in  the  House  of  Commons 
have  both  remained  almost  constant  in  size,  and 
the  decision  has  usually  rested  with  the  Irish  and 
labor  members,  who  have  entertained  views  highly 
inconsistent  with  policy  as  the  great  majority  of 
the  English  people  have  conceived  it.  And  these 
two  parties,  thus  fortuitously  placed  in  so  com- 
manding a  position,  have  more  than  once  given 
clear  expression  to  their  determination  to  use 
the  exigencies  of  the  occasion  to  extort  from  the 
reluctant  English  the  consent  necessary  for  the 
attainment  of  then*  own  aims.  In  fact,  it  is  not 
Ireland  but  England  that  needs  home  rule.  The 
constitutional  development  of  the  nineteenth 
century  has,  for  the  time  being,  made  difficult  the 
efficient  use  of  English  resources.  Lord  Esher 
recently  gave  public  expression  to  the  opinion 
that  the  difficulty  of  coordinating  the  offensive 
and  defensive  forces  of  the  nation  made  imprac- 
ticable the  adoption  by  the  military  authorities  in 

28 


MYTH  OF  ENGLISH  PREPONDERANCE 

England  "of  a  plan,  Napoleonic  in  scope  and  de- 
sign, and  resting  upon  a  centralized  basis." 

During  these  same  decades,  precisely  the  op- 
posite type  of  development  has  taken  place  in 
Europe.  The  decentralized  administration,  which 
so  long  rendered  impotent  the  great  resources  of 
Germany,  Austria,  and  Italy  in  men  and  money, 
was  replaced  in  each  country  by  a  centralized 
monarchy  whose  efficiency  made  the  prompt 
utilization  of  every  resource  a  certainty.  Where 
in  England  the  direction  of  policy  passed  from 
the  hands  of  a  few  into  the  hands  of  many,  in 
Germany,  Austria,  and  Italy  it  passed,  from  the 
hands  of  many  princes,  with  various  antagonistic 
aims,  into  the  hands  of  a  few  men  whose  ideas 
were  essentially  the  same.  The  fact  that  such 
development  could  not  be  foreseen  does  not  alter 
its  significance.  England  no  longer  possesses  as 
much  strength  as  she  used  to  have;  relatively  to 
her  rivals,  she  has  suffered  even  more  seriously, 
for  while  she  has  gone  backward,  they  have  gone 
forward.  Compared  to  what  she  used  to  be,  she  is 
actually  administratively  weaker;  compared  with 
her  rivals,  she  is  relatively  not  twice  but  four 
times  less  strong  than  she  used  to  be. 

Her  "control  of  the  sea"  has  also  been  vitally 
changed  by  the  development  of  Europe  during  the 
last  three  centuries.  The  offensive  power  of  the 


PAN-GERMANISM 

English  fleet  naturally  must  depend  upon  the  pos- 
sibility of  injuring  the  enemy  either  by  the  de- 
struction of  his  warships  or  by  the  cutting  of  lines 
of  communication  vital  to  his  commerce.  In  the 
old  days,  the  absence  of  good  roads  compelled  the 
transportation  of  bulky  goods  by  water,  and  the 
extent  of  the  facilities  for  water  communication 
was  the  measure  of  the  size  of  that  country's  trade. 
In  northern  Europe,  merchandise  necessarily 
traveled  down  a  series  of  parallel  rivers  into  the 
English  Channel,  the  North  Sea,  and  the  Baltic, 
through  which  it  proceeded  to  its  destination. 
Goods  could  be  shipped  from  Cologne  to  Ham- 
burg only  through  the  Channel  and  the  North 
Sea.  Most  of  the  internal  trade  between  different 
parts  of  Germany  or  France  was  thus  exposed  in 
transit  to  the  operations  of  the  English  fleet.  All 
commerce  by  sea  between  northern  Europe  and 
the  Mediterranean  or  the  East  was  forced  to  go 
through  the  English  Channel,  exposed  to  the 
English  fleet  and  the  Channel  weather.1  But  the 

1  "On  every  one'of  the  world's  trade  routes,  like  an  ancient  robber 
knight  in  full  armor,  lance  in  hand,  stands  England.  All  nations 
must  run  the  gauntlet  of  England.  .  .  .  The  domination  of  the 
world  on  the  sea  enables  the  supreme  naval  Power  to  inflict  the  most 
terrible  crises  upon  other  nations.  Every  nation  must  combat  this 
predominance  for  the  sake  of  its  future.  .  .  .  All  nations  have  be- 
come tributary  to  the  city  of  London,  some  more,  some  less.  Ger- 
many would  find  existence  at  England's  sufferance  unbearable." 
England's  Weltherrtchaft  und  die  Deutsche  LuxusfloUe. 

30 


MYTH  OF  ENGLISH  PREPONDERANCE 

coming  of  the  railway  in  the  nineteenth  century 
destroyed  for  all  time  this  phase  of  England's  sea 
power.  The  internal  trade  of  Germany,  and,  in- 
deed, much  of  her  international  trade,  goes  over- 
land by  rail  and  is  thus  entirely  freed  from  the 
menace  of  English  assault.  Even  with  the  Far 
East,  trade  is  possible  by  rail,  and  the  coming 
decade  will  undoubtedly  see  a  further  develop- 
ment of  transcontinental  trunk  lines.  The  import- 
ance, therefore,  of  the  Channel  as  the  chief  means 
of  intercommunication  in  northern  Europe  has 
disappeared,  and  with  it  has  gone  England's 
control  of  the  trade  of  northern  Europe. 

Further,  England's  prosperity  in  the  eighteenth 
and  nineteenth  centuries  was  due  in  no  small  de- 
gree to  her  control  of  the  chief  or  only  supplies  of 
sugar,  tobacco,  tea,  coffee,  cotton  goods,  and  all 
those  varied  products  supplied  by  the  East  and 
West  Indies.  For  those  the  Continent  depended 
upon  her,  as  Napoleon  discovered  when  the 
imposition  of  the  Continental  System  excluded 
English  goods  from  the  European  market.  The 
men  actually  seemed  to  resent  far  more  the  loss  of 
their  tobacco,  and  the  women  the  deprivation  of 
their  tea,  than  they  had  the  destruction  of  the 
political  units  to  which  they  had  formerly  owed 
allegiance.  The  Continental  System  failed  to 
bankrupt  England  because  Europe  absolutely 

31 


PAN-GERMANISM 

refused  to  do  without  English  goods.  Another  trade 
monopoly,  far  more  fundamental,  was  due  to 
England's  industrial  revolution  of  the  eighteenth 
century.  The  smelting  of  iron  with  coal,  the  blast 
furnace,  the  steam  hammer  revolutionized  the 
working  of  metals;  the  new  spinning  and  weaving 
machinery,  the  stationary  steam  engine  and  the 
factory  revolutionized  all  industry;  the  breeding 
of  cattle,  the  use  of  the  turnip,  of  manure,  and  of 
selected  seeds  revolutionized  agriculture.  Such 
significant  economic  changes  had  not  been  seen 
since  man  began  to  record  his  own  doings.  For 
more  than  a  generation,  England  enjoyed  the 
exclusive  monopoly  of  these  processes  and  the 
consequent  benefits.  English  goods  commanded 
higher  prices  because  they  were  more  uniform; 
English  profits  were  again  larger  than  European 
to  the  extent  that  machinery  was  cheaper  than 
the  old  hand  processes.  England  was,  therefore, 
economically  doubly  more  powerful  than  any 
other  nation  in  Europe,  because  she  alone  con- 
trolled the  supply  of  commodities  which  Europe 
insisted  upon  having,  and  because  she  alone  pos- 
sessed the  secret  of  the  improved  processes.  But 
her  advantage  in  these  respects  has  disappeared. 
Sugar  cane  from  Louisiana  and  Hawaii,  Ameri- 
can cotton,  Brazilian  coffee,  and  the  complete 
utilization  by  her  chief  rivals  of  all  modern  invenr 

33 


MYTH  OF  ENGLISH  PREPONDERANCE 

tions  has  robbed  her  of  the  unique  economic  posi- 
tion she  held  in  1815. 

In  fact,  to  the  German,  England's  economic 
strength  has  been  changed  into  fatal  economic 
weakness.  She  no  longer  produces  sufficient  food 
to  supply  her  population  for  a  month;  her  supplies 
of  coal  and  wood  are  diminishing  at  a  rate  which 
causes  serious  reflection;  the  raw  material  needed 
to  supply  her  looms  and  factories  she  does  not  pro- 
duce; the  raw  material  to  build  or  maintain  a  fleet 
she  cannot  produce.1  The  area  of  land  under  cul- 
tivation has  steadily  diminished.  Population  on 
the  soil  is  decreasing  at  a  more  rapid  rate  and  is 
drifting  into  the  cities,  where  it  further  compli- 
cates the  serious  economic  and  administrative 
problems  which  worry  her  rulers.  Every  family 
moved  from  the  land  into  the  factory  means  so 
many  less  individuals  who  supply  themselves  with 
the  necessities  of  We,  so  many  more  dependent 
upon  the  perfect  operation  of  a  complicated  eco- 
nomic machinery  for  feeding  them.  Suppose  now 
that  the  German  fleet  could  secure  control  of  the 
Channel  for  a  brief  tune  only,  would  not  England 

1  "  Were  it  possible  to  cut  off  Great  Britain's  supply  of  food,  in  less 
than  six  weeks  the  inhabitants  would  die  of  starvation.  Britons  are 
fully  aware  of  the  danger,  and  all,  from  the  noble  lord  to  the  laborer, 
are  convinced  that  it  is  the  most  important  duty  of  the  State  to  keep 
open  and  secure  the  broad  highway  of  the  ocean."  Die  Flotte  alt 
notwendige  Erganzung  unserer  nationalen  Wehrmackt,  by  A.  Schrbder, 
a  book  written  for  the  German  secondary  schools. 

33 


PAN-GERMANISM 

be  starved  into  submission,  would  not  her  looms 
soon  stop  from  the  lack  of  material  to  feed  them, 
would  not  her  whole  artisan  class  be  thrown  out  of 
work,  would  not  she  be  bankrupted  as  a  nation  in 
the  most  fundamental  fashion  by  the  simple  loss 
of  the  control  of  the  sea?  Once  the  English  fleet 
were  beaten,  could  she  ever  obtain  material  with 
which  to  rebuild  it,  as  long  as  the  German  fleet 
existed?  Disaster  on  the  sea  would  infallibly  mean 
for  England  economic  destruction  at  the  hands  of 
elemental  foes  far  more  potent  than  armies.  And 
ft  would  be  irretrievable !  Each  decade,  moreover, 
brings  it  nearer  and  nearer,  by  diminishing  the 
number  of  mouths  that  feed  themselves  and  in- 
creasing the  number  to  be  fed  by  the  fleet;  nearly 
every  year  shortens  the  length  of  time  which  the 
Germans  must  control  the  Channel  in  order  liter- 
ally to  destroy  England  by  means  of  the  economic 
weapons  which  control  of  the  Channel  would  en- 
able them  to  wield. 

Furthermore,  the  Germans  believe  that  so 
many  years  of  peace,  otherwise  so  fruitful  of 
advantages,  have  produced  the  most  serious  re- 
sults upon  the  temper  of  the  people.  They  are  no 
longer  warlike.  They  are  unwilling  to  bear  the 
burdens  of  taxation  which  the  preparation  for 
a  great  war  renders  inevitable.  The  spreading 
among  them  of  humanitarian  notions  has  actually 

34 


MYTH  OF  ENGLISH  PREPONDERANCE 

deprived  them  of  morale,  rendered  them  supine, 
and  apt  material  for  conquest.1  Not  only  has  Eng- 
land no  army  worth  considering,  but  she  has  not 
the  human  stuff  out  of  which  great  armies  are 
made,  for  her  people  are  not  as  a  whole  willing 
to  cooperate  in  the  creation  of  the  only  sort  of 
army  of  any  avail  hi  modern  warfare.  In  fact,  the 
German  notion  of  England  is  not  so  seriously 
exaggerated  by  such  words  as  these:  "Look  at 
England  —  fat  and  fifty,  overfed,  short  of  breath, 
thickening  in  girth,  deepening  in  brain.  .  .  .  Eng- 
land, entering  upon  her  inevitable  period  of  physi- 
cal decadence,  boasting  of  conquests,  like  a  middle- 
aged  man  with  rheum  in  his  eye,  the  clog  of  senility 
under  his  waistcoat,  stiffness  in  his  joints,  and  the 
red  lights  of  apoplexy  bright  upon  his  throat  — 
who  throws  out  his  chest  among  his  sons  and 
pants  that  he  is  *  better  than  ever,  e'gad!'  Eng- 
land, sensuous  in  the  home,  crowding  her  homes 
like  a  squirrel's  nest  in  the  frosts;  an  animated 
stomach,  already  cultivating  and  condimenting 
her  fitful  but  necessary  appetites;  wise  and  crafty 
in  the  world,  but  purblind  to  her  own  perversions 


1  "During  many  decades  German  university  professors,  school- 
masters, and  publicists  have  taught  the  doctrine  that  Englishmen 
were  too  selfish  and  too  cowardly  to  defend  their  country,  and  that 
England,  like  Carthage,  was  bound  to  fall  through  the  lack  of  patri- 
otism among  the  people  and  their  reliance  upon  hired  soldiers." 
Fortnightly  Review,  xci,  New  Series,  456. 

35 


PAN-GERMANISM 

and  lying  in  the  rot  of  them  —  England,  who  will 
not  put  away  boyish  tilings  and  look  to  God.  .  .  . 
She  is  draining  India  as  Rome  drained  Gaul,  as 
Spain  drained  Mexico,  and  accelerating  the  bes- 
tiality that  spells  ruin  —  with  the  spoils." 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  FATAL  WEAKNESS  OF  IMPERIAL  ENGLAND 

TO  the  German,  the  grandeur  and  splendor  of 
Imperial  England  which  has  so  long  been 
impressed  upon  the  world  is  nothing  but  bluster 
and  show,  masking  congenital  weakness  of  the 
most  serious  description.  Some  have  not  scrupled 
to  say  that  Imperial  England  is  nothing  but  a 
trading  monopoly,  a  chain  of  forts,  a  great  fleet, 
and  a  monumental  impudence.  That  the  English 
won  their  empire  by  force  of  arms,  the  Germans 
deny.  It  is  hardly  likely  that  a  few  thousand  men, 
even  headed  by  a  beardless  clerk  who  turned  out 
to  be  a  genius,  could  conquer  by  strength  or  craft 
the  teeming  millions  of  Hindus.  Miracles  are  no 
longer  common,  and  such  miracles  as  fill  the 
annals  of  the  history  of  the  building  of  the  Eng- 
lish Empire,  as  told  by  Englishmen,  have  never 
happened.  The  Empire  is  not  a  reality;  it  is  a 
sham. 

The  Germans  quote  with  satisfaction  such  state- 
ments regarding  the  position  of  the  English  in 
India  as  Lord  Curzon's  remark  that  the  English 
are  only  a  bit  of  froth  upon  an  unfathomable 

37 


PAN-GERMANISM 

ocean.  That,  they  deem  to  be  no  mere  rhetorical 
flourish,  as  the  English  believe  it  to  be,  but  the 
bare  statement  of  the  literal  truth  regarding  the 
strength  of  the  English  hold  on  India.  Really,  the 
English  never  have  conquered  India.  The  Hindus, 
with  the  assistance  of  the  English,  conquered  each 
other.  Had  it  not  been  for  the  existence  in  India  of 
many  races,  many  languages,  many  religions,  and 
those  multitudinous  jealousies  and  antipathies 
which  grew  out  of  them  and  filled  the  annals  of 
that  unhappy  country  with  a  record  of  discord 
and  treachery,  the  English  would  not  even  be  at 
this  moment  the  froth  tossing  on  that  restless  sea. 
They  continue  to  rule  by  reason  of  those  same 
factors  which  lay  at  the  bottom  of  their  so-called 
conquest  and  which  make  unity  of  the  native 
races  impossible.  The  Germans,  nevertheless,  do 
not  fail  to  appraise  at  its  true  value  the  skill  and 
tact  which  they  have  displayed  in  utilizing  these 
factors.  Knowing  that  physical  force  of  their  own 
could  never  maintain  their  authority  or  impose 
upon  the  really  powerful  native  rulers  regulations 
not  to  their  liking,  they  have  taken  the  greatest 
care  to  do  what  the  Hindus  would  permit,  rather 
than  what  they  themselves  felt  to  be  desirable. 
A  single  native  state  —  the  only  alternative  to 
united  rule  by  the  English  —  has  always  been 
impossible  of  realization  because  of  the  variety 

38 


THE  FATAL  WEAKNESS  OF  ENGLAND 

of  races  forced  by  the  exigencies  of  the  past  to 
dwell  together  in'the  great  plains  of  the  Himalayas. 
In  fact;  the  English  have  succeeded  to  that  shad- 
owy authority  known  in  the  olden  time  as  the 
Sovereignty  of  the  Emperor,  and  have  correctly 
interpreted  it  to  confer  upon  them  the  right  of 
direction,  of  suggestion,  of  assistance,  not  of  con- 
trol. Undoubtedly  they  have  helped  the  Hindu 
rulers  by  the  businesslike  administration  of  their 
estates;  by  showing  them  better  methods  of  col- 
lecting the  taxes,  of  utilizing  their  revenues,  of 
administering  justice.  The  condition  of  the  peas- 
ants has  been  vastly  improved,  and  has  not,  as  the 
rajahs  feared,  reduced  their  authority  or  dimin- 
ished the  loyalty  of  their  subjects.  But  could  not 
Germans  also  do  as  much?  Do  the  English  give 
the  Hindu  anything  which  the  Germans  could  not 
give  as  well?  Have  the  English  ever  earned  the 
enduring  gratitude  of  the  Hindu? 

The  English  power  in  India  has  to  no  small 
degree  depended,  the  Germans  think,  upon  that 
obvious  fact  that  they  have  had  no  competitors 
for  the  exercise  of  their  overlordship  in  India  since 
the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century.  Their  su- 
premacy on  the  sea,  which  rested  upon  their  con- 
trol of  the  Channel,  upon  their  wonderful  seaman- 
ship, upon  their  practical  monopoly  of  the  naval 
stores  in  the  Baltic,  enabled  them  to  keep  far  from 

39 


PAN-GERMANISM 

India  any  possible  European  rival.  The  whole  of 
the  Atlantic  and  Indian  Oceans  lay  between  India 
and  any  nation  who  wished  to  challenge  England's 
rights  there.  Furthermore,  there  was  no  overland 
route  to  India  sufficiently  practical  for  military 
purposes,  nor  was  there  in  Europe  any  nation  ex- 
cept France  strong  enough  and  sufficiently  well 
organized  to  undertake  so  colossal  a  feat  as  the 
invasion  of  India.  In  fact,  the  English  have  re- 
mained in  India,  as  they  say,  supreme  for  a  cen- 
tury and  a  half,  solely  because  they  have  pre- 
vented the  natives  from  uniting  against  them,  and 
have  yet  to  defend  themselves  from  a  determined 
assault  from  without.  Now  that  the  old  suprem- 
acy on  the  sea  is  vitally  altered  in  character,  that 
the  strategical  position  of  the  Channel  and  the 
monopoly  of  the  naval  stores  have  disappeared, 
that  the  Baghdad  Railroad  is  nearly  finished,  that 
a  Russian  railroad  is  within  striking  distance  of 
Herat,  the  isolation  of  India  has  practically  van- 
ished. A  very  little  force  from  without,  a  little 
discord  within,  and  the  waves  will  swallow  up  that 
bit  of  froth. 

In  the  Mediterranean  the  English  Empire  has 
rested  upon  similar  forces.  The  native  races  were 
at  odds  with  themselves  and  with  each  other;  the 
other  Mediterranean  powers  were  weak  or  hope- 
lessly divided,  and  were  unable  to  create  in  the 

40 


THE  FATAL  WEAKNESS  OF  ENGLAND 

Mediterranean  a  fleet  to  cope  with  England  with- 
out first  bringing  their  materials  through  the 
Channel  which  she  controlled.  These  conditions 
have  so  vitally  changed  that  the  rule  of  the  Eng- 
lish in  Egypt  can  now,  say  the  Germans,  scarcely 
be  considered  as  more  than  a  transient  phase  in 
the  long  line  of  Egyptian  administrative  failures. 
For  some  decades  England  practically  controlled 
Greece,  Turkey,  and  the  Balkans,  exercising  a 
very  intangible  and  shadowy  suzerainty  exceed- 
ingly difficult  to  define,  without  effective  powers 
for  controlling  or  directing,  to  say  nothing  of  utiliz- 
ing, the  resources  of  those  countries.  England  pos- 
sessed whatever  degree  of  authority  she  had,  not 
for  administrative  reasons  of  significance  or  value 
to  the  countries  themselves,  but  to  keep  other 
nations  at  a  distance.  Turkey  was  not  so  much  to 
obey  England's  behests  as  to  frustrate  Russia's 
designs.  The  same  factors  which  have  elsewhere 
sapped  the  peculiar  structure  of  the  English  Em- 
pire have  here  also  performed  deadly  work.  There 
are  now  other  strong  powers  possessed  of  fleets  in 
the  Mediterranean,  able  to  equip  and  maintain 
them  from  their  own  resources,  and  possessed  of 
the  will  to  contest  the  control  of  the  Mediterra- 
nean with  her. 

The  long  list  of  strategic  points  in  England's 
hands  does  not  frighten  the  Germans.  It  is  little 

41 


PAN-GERMANISM 

to  them  that  England  holds  the  Mediterranean, 
the  Red  Sea,  the  Indian  Ocean,  and  controls  the 
passageway  between  the  Indian  Ocean  and  the 
Yellow  Sea,  Magellan  Strait,  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope,  and  the  most  advantageous  coaling-sta- 
tions on  all  these  routes.  Such  a  chain  of  forts 
and  islands  would  be  useful  as  the  bases  for  the 
action  of  a  fleet  of  the  old  type,  operating  against 
similar  fleets  in  a  war  between  England,  as  she 
was,  against  her  enemies,  as  they  were.  To  pro- 
tect so  long  a  chain,  England  must  keep  a  "  mask- 
ing fleet"  at  each  threatened  point.  The  work  of 
science  in  creating  steel  ships,  moved  by  steam, 
has  compelled  England  to  concentrate  her  fleet  in 
the  North  Sea,  has  built  up  powerful  rivals  whose 
operations  are  not  restricted  by  the  considerations 
of  a  century  ago,  and  has  forced  her  to  leave 
undefended  all  but  a  few  points.  It  is  doubtful 
whether  England  can  be  again  defended  at  Tra- 
falgar, or  India  saved  at  Aboukir.  Every  chain  is 
as  strong  as  its  weakest  link,  and  the  chain  of 
English  strategical  positions  seems  to  the  Ger- 
mans certain  to  yield  to  an  attack  in  force  deliv- 
ered at  any  point. 

There  can,  furthermore,  be  no  doubt  that  in  all 
parts  of  the  English  Empire  the  old  condition 
upon  which  England's  rule  of  the  native  races 
depended,  the  supineness  and  inefficiency  of 

42 


THE  FATAL  WEAKNESS  OF  ENGLAND 

native  administration,  has  given  way  before  the 
ambitions,  of  at  least  the  educated  natives,  for 
autonomy.  The  democratic  impulse  which  has  so 
strongly  manifested  itself  in  Europe  has  also  ap- 
peared in  the  Mediterranean  and  in  the  East. 
Already  the  Egyptian,  the  Persian,  and  the  Hindu 
are  dreaming  of  a  new  land  from  which  foreigners 
shall  be  excluded,  of  a  splendid  nation  composed 
solely  of  natives  administering  their  own  country 
in  their  own  interests,  paying  tribute  to  no  one, 
independent  of  all.  English  rule  is  hardly  likely, 
the  Germans  think,  to  be  permanent,  even  if  the 
forces  at  present  at  work  are  allowed  to  develop 
in  their  normal  way.  The  chief  thing,  in  fact,  which 
helped  the  English  was  the  natives'  lack  of  initia- 
tive and  desire  to  rule  themselves.  The  English 
undertook  the  burden  of  government  which  the 
native  did  not  want.  Now  that  the  native  is 
aroused  by  a  sense  of  the  possibilities  of  self-gov- 
ernment, and  has  come  to  believe  himself  capable 
of  securing  for  himself  the  sort  of  administration 
the  English  have  given  him,  he  is  hardly  likely  to 
acquiesce  much  longer  in  English  rule.  Would 
it  not  now  be  easy  for  a  nation  to  secure  from 
all  England's  subjects  the  exclusive  right  to 
trade  with  them  in  exchange  for  a  little  assist- 
ance in  putting  the  government  of  their  own 
country  into  their  own  hands,  and  for  promises 

43 


PAN-GERMANISM 

to  protect  them  in  future  from  outside  inter- 
ference ? 

While  not  the  most  apparent,  the  most  vital 
weakness  of  the  Empire  lies  in  its  own  size.  Eng- 
land in  one  way  or  another  controls  to  some  ex- 
tent territory  in  every  quarter  of  the  globe.  There 
is  scarcely  a  nation  at  whose  doors  there  does 
not  lie  some  valuable  English  dependency  which 
she  would  be  glad  to  have.  The  extent  of  the 
booty  is  the  measure  of  England's  enemies.  There 
is  too  much  to  be  divided,  should  she  fall,  for  her 
to  survive  long,  assert  the  Germans.  The  cupidity 
of  too  many  nations  is  already  aroused  to  make 
possible  any  adequate  assistance  hi  propping  up 
the  frail  and  worthless  fabric.  Where  literally  the 
whole  world  has  something  to  gain  which  England 
alone  will  lose,  is  it  not  likely  that  one  defeat  in 
any  part  of  the  world  would  so  shake  English  pres- 
tige and  so  instantly  reveal  the  rottenness  of  her 
imperial  fabric  as  to  cause  a  rush  for  the  plunder 
similar  to  that  which  marked  the  downfall  of  the 
Napoleonic  Empire  in  1814  ? 

The  bond  between  England  and  her  self-govern- 
ing colonies  is  even  weaker,  say  the  Germans,  and 
has  infinitely  fewer  factors  of  fundamental  import- 
ance to  keep  it  in  existence.  Canada  is  separated 
from  England  by  the  width  of  the  Atlantic;  South 
Africa  by  the  whole  length  of  the  Atlantic,  a 

44 


THE  FATAL  WEAKNESS  OF  ENGLAND 

distance  nearly  equal  to  the  length  of  the  globe; 
Australia  is  more  than  twelve  thousand  miles 
from  Liverpool;  and  these  enormous  distances 
effectively  prevent  these  colonies  from  possessing 
an  economic  interest  in  common  with  the  mother 
country.  Nor  is  it  probable  that  any  strong  inter- 
est could  possibly  be  created.  Despite  the  pro- 
gress of  steam  navigation,  the  voyage  to  them  is 
still  so  long  as  to  prevent  any  real  cooperation  in 
time  of  peace,  or  any  effective  assistance  in  time 
of  war.  There  is  no  natural  geographical  basis  for 
the  British  Empire.  Such  enormous  tracts  of  land, 
so  thinly  populated,  so  far  distant  from  each  other, 
have  nothing  but  the  accident  of  their  discovery 
and  settlement  by  men  of  the  same  race  to  give 
them  even  that  appearance  of  unity  and  common 
interest  that  they  do  possess.  Unquestionably, 
the  concentration  of  the  English  fleet  in  the 
North  Sea  and  in  the  Mediterranean  has  deprived 
her  colonies  of  the  only  thing  they  could  have 
been  expected  to  value.  While  it  is  not  likely  that 
any  of  them  will  require  the  services  of  a  fleet  to 
protect  them  from  any  enemies  who  would  nor- 
mally attack  them,  England  can  certainly  no 
longer  promise  them  such  protection.  They  pos- 
sess no  privilege  in  England,  or  as  a  result  of  their 
connection  with  England,  which  the  Germans 
themselves  do  not  have.  No  trading  privileges  in 

45 


PAN-GERMANISM 

England,  or  with  England,  are  theirs.  If  they  were 
to  declare  their  complete  independence  to-mor- 
row, nothing  would  be  changed.  Indeed,  it  is 
literally  true,  and  the  English  themselves  admit  it, 
that  the  Empire  has  been  held  together  in  name 
during  the  last  century  by  resolutely  sacrificing 
its  reality. 

Why  should  the  colonies  fight  for  the  mainten- 
ance of  an  empire  whose  existence  is  not  of  benefit 
to  them  and  whose  destruction  could  not  injure 
them?  How  could  they  furnish  England  any 
effective  assistance  in  a  war  fought  in  the  North 
Sea,  the  Mediterranean,  or  the  Near  East?  Even 
should  they  send  troops  or  supplies  so  far,  their 
population  is  not  large  enough  nor  their'resources 
sufficient,  think  the  Germans,  and  above  all  their 
military  organization  is  not  enough  perfected,  to 
make  such  support  decisive  for  victory.  Besides, 
Canada  would  expose  herself  to  assault  from  the 
United  States,  a  danger  which  the  Germans  seem 
to  think  sufficiently  real  to  detain  the  Canadian 
regiments  at  home;  Australia  would  be  exposed  to 
the  Japanese,  of  whom  the  Germans  think  they 
stand  in  daily  fear;  in  Africa,  the  English  confed- 
eration is  exposed  to  the  much  more  real  danger  of 
an  attack  from  German  East  or  West  Africa,  and 
besides  is  sufficiently  imperiled  by  the  disparity 
in  numbers  between  the  whites  and  the  natives. 

46 


THE  FATAL  WEAKNESS  OF  ENGLAND 

Indeed,  it  is  conceivable  that  in  Africa  the  English 
colonies  would  be  in  such  danger  from  the  out- 
break of  a  war  with  Germany  that  they  would  be 
compelled  in  self-defense  to  sever  their  connec- 
tion with  the  Empire.  The  loyalty  of  the  colonies 
as  a  whole  has  been  verbal,  personal,  a  matter  of 
sentiment,  with  which  interests  have  never  been 
allowed  to  clash.  That  it  will  stand  the  strain 
of  real  sacrifice,  the  Germans  believe  highly  im- 
probable. 

The  boasted  millions  of  population,  the  count- 
less acres  of  territory,  the  stupendous  wealth  of 
the  British  Empire  are  real  —  but  they  are  not 
England's.  They  belong  to  peoples  more  widely 
sundered  in  race,  language,  and  interests  than  are 
the  English  and  the  Germans.  Indeed,  there  are 
many  vital  facts  common  to  the  latter  which  the 
English  colonies  utterly  lack,  and  which  they  can 
never  possess.  The  English  Empire  has  never 
been  a  reality,  nor  ever  will  be.  Its  weakness 
merely  needs  to  be  made  apparent. 


CHAPTER  IV 

FRANCE    AND    RUSSIA    AS    THE   GERMAN   SEES 
THEM 

ENGLAND,  Germany  hates,  disdains,  and  de- 
spises. For  France  and  Russia  she  possesses 
a  wholesome  respect  mingled  with  fear,  but  not 
with  love.  France,  she  considers  a  strong  man 
who  has  run  his  race  and  is  now  beginning  to 
reach  senility;  Russia,  she  looks  upon  as  an  un- 
couth stripling  not  yet  conscious  of  his  strength, 
not  yet  skillful  enough  to  use  the  strength  of  which 
he  is  conscious,  and  not  yet  intelligent  enough  to 
avoid  being  easily  deceived.  There  are,  perhaps, 
no  more  characteristic  pages  in  Bismarck's  me- 
moirs than  those  in  which  he  discusses  the  com- 
parative ease  of  deceiving  the  English,  French, 
and  Russians. 

The  strategic  position  of  Germany  renders  her 
singularly  open  to  attack  from  France  and  Rus- 
sia. The  three  nations  occupy  the  vast  plain  slop- 
ing to  the  Atlantic  Ocean  and  the  Baltic  from  the 
crests  of  the  Jura  and  the  Alps,  a  great  plain  with 
no  natural  barriers  separating,  one  from  another, 
the  different  peoples  who  occupy  it.  There  is  no 

48 


GERMAN   VIEW  OF  FRANCE  AND  RUSSIA 

special  reason  for  placing  the  German  boundary 
at  one  spot  rather  than  another;  France  has  in- 
variably claimed  the  Rhine  as  her  natural  bound- 
ary; Russia  looks  upon  the  whole  Baltic  as  her 
especial  property  of  which  she  is  most  unfairly 
deprived.  The  ambitions  of  both  nations  are  of 
vital  import  to  Germany,  for  France  can  obtain 
her  natural  boundary,  or  Russia,  in  Peter  the 
Great's  expressive  words,  can  open  her  windows 
only  at  Germany's  expense.  Certainly,  there  can 
be  little  doubt  that  the  expansion  of  either  France 
or  Russia  means  economic  and  political  death  for 
Germany  by  depriving  a  large  section  of  her  ter- 
ritory of  the  control  of  the  natural  highways. 
There  are,  furthermore,  no  mountains,  no  deep 
rivers  demarking  the  present  lines  between  her 
and  her  neighbors.  Her  only  fortifications  are  the 
regiments  of  the  German  army.  At  the  same  time, 
if  Germany  is  open  to  attack,  the  door  also  stands 
open  for  her  to  assault  her  enemies.  No  natural 
barriers  prevent  her  from  annexing  land  either 
along  the  Rhine  or  in  Poland.  Her  expansion  in 
Europe,  therefore,  is  possible,  but  it  means,  in- 
evitably, that  she  must  take  from  her  two  power- 
ful neighbors  or  absorb  the  smaller  nations,  Bel- 
gium, Holland,  and  Denmark,  whose  existence 
her  rivals  regard  as  necessary  to  their  own  safety. 
Germany,  fully  realizing  the  seriousness  of  the 
49 


PAN-GERMANISM 

situation,  at  the  same  time  confidently  expects 
to  turn  it  to  her  own  advantage.  It  is  perfectly 
true  that  she  stands  between  France  and  Russia; 
but  the  central  position,  deadly  to  a  weak  nation, 
will  afford  so  strong  a  nation  as  she  an  enviable 
opportunity  for  the  offense.  Her  armies  can  sup- 
port each  other  without  severing  their  communi- 
cations, can  deliver  an  attack  in  force  on  either 
side  with  equal  facility,  while  the  most  that  her 
rivals  can  hope  to  do  is  to  deliver  a  simultaneous 
attack  from  two  sides.  Actual  cooperation  be- 
tween them,  the  massing  of  forces  at  the  same 
time,  at  the  same  spot,  is  so  difficult  as  to  be  prac- 
tically impossible. 

Again,  she  already  holds  the  most  important 
ports  on  the  Baltic,  and  by  the  cutting  of  the 
Kiel  Canal  through  the  Danish  peninsula  has 
robbed  Denmark  of  much  of  her  strategic  im- 
portance and  has  united  the  Baltic  with  the  At- 
lantic Ocean  by  a  passageway  which  she  exclu- 
sively controls.  Could  she  now  secure  possession 
of  Denmark,  she  would  not  only  possess  freedom 
of  passage  for  herself,  but  she  could  close  the 
Baltic  to  Russia  and  England.  She  already  holds 
Alsace-Lorraine,  and  stands  on  the  very  borders 
of  France  with  many  strategic  posts  of  the  ut- 
most importance  in  her  hands.  On  the  northwest 
she  impinges  upon  the  French  frontier  at  many 

50 


GERMAN  VIEW  OF  FRANCE  AND  RUSSIA 

points  so  near  Paris  that  she  is  confident  of  an 
entry  into  the  French  capital  a  few  days  after  the 
beginning  of  the  campaign.  The  Russian  fleet  in 
the  Baltic  is  not  sufficiently  powerful,  she  thinks, 
to  be  dangerous.  The  French  fleet  is  not  enough 
of  a  factor  in  the  Atlantic  to  frighten  her.  She 
fears  their  armies,  not  their  fleets.  She  does  not 
underestimate  the  strength  of  their  position,  the 
size  of  their  population,  their  wealth,  or  their 
patriotism.  She  does  not  believe  them  suffi- 
ciently well  organized  to  utilize  to  the  full  their 
resources,  and  she  is  confident  that  nothing  short 
of  a  complete  utilization  of  every  resource  can 
make  them  really  dangerous  to  her. 

The  most  vital  weakness  in  France,  say  the 
Germans,  is  the  Republic.  French  administra- 
tion, by  the  admission  of  French  publicists  them- 
selves, is  inefficient,  failing  to  secure  the  best  men 
for  office,  failing  to  keep  competent  men  in  office, 
failing  to  keep  out  of  vitally  important  offices 
ignorant  and  corrupt  appointees.  Democracy  in 
France  has  not  worked  well.  It  has  not  failed, 
perhaps,  to  benefit  the  individual  so  much  as  it 
has  to  organize  the  State,  which  lacks  the  power 
of  vigorous  initiative,  and  which  is  incapable  of 
the  consistent  policy  absolutely  indispensable  to 
prepare  the  nation  to  meet  a  great  crisis.  Surely, 
the  destruction  of  more  than  one  first-class  battle- 

51 


PAN-GERMANISM 

ship  has  proved  with  sufficient  clearness  the  la- 
mentable deficiency  of  her  naval  administration. 
The  Dreyfus  case  proved  the  organization  of  the 
army  to  be  singularly  open  to  a  type  of  influence 
which  would  be  only  too  likely  to  be  fatal  in  time 
of  war.  Merit,  and  merit  alone,  can  be  in  the  long 
run  the  proper  test  in  all  military  and  adminis- 
trative appointments.  It  is  in  the  selection  of  offi- 
cials that  democracy  has  everywhere  most  con- 
spicuously failed.  It  could  have  scarcely  failed 
in  anything  more  vital  to  the  protection  of  the 
State. 

France,  too,  is  no  longer  united.  The  people 
are  courageous,  unquestionably  loyal,  filled  with 
ambition,  but  they  have  been  growing  apart  as 
steadily  as  the  Germans  have  been  growing  to- 
gether. The  German  believes  the  forces  hostile 
to  the  Republic  were  never  stronger  than  at  the 
present  moment.  The  administration  has  recently 
succeeded  in  alienating  the  Royalists,  the  Church, 
and  the  Socialists;  and  their  strength  makes  all 
three  dangerous.  Especially  is  this  true  in  the 
difficulties  raised  by  the  quarrel  with  the  Pope. 
The  French  have  always  been  peculiarly  devoted 
Catholics,  and  have  more  than  once  followed 
their  Church  rather  than  the  State.  The  growth 
of  Socialist,  Syndicalist,  and  Anarchistic  notions 
certainly  augurs  ill  for  the  solidarity  of  the  com- 

52 


GERMAN  VIEW  OF  FRANCE  AND  RUSSIA 

ing  generation,  or  its  loyalty  to  the  Republic. 
A  violent  intestinal  quarrel  in  France  would  cer- 
tainly rob  her  of  most  of  her  offensive  power,  if 
not  of  her  defensive  strength.  The  Germans  be- 
lieve that  the  Republic  has  alienated  large  classes 
of  the  community,  whose  support  will  be  far  less 
warm  in  moments  of  danger  than  it  would  have 
been  ten  years  ago. 

France  is  growing  physically  weaker  each  dec- 
ade. The  birth  rate  has  long  been  declining,  and 
of  late  the  number  of  births  has  shown  not  alone 
a  proportional  but  an  actual  decrease.  Emigra- 
tion does  not  account  for  this  decrease  in  the  total 
population,  which  becomes  steadily  more  serious 
each  year.  The  most  alarming  aspect  of  the  situ- 
ation lies,  however,  in  the  very  rapid  increase  of 
illegitimacy  and  juvenile  crime.  The  Apaches  of 
Paris  were  never  so  bold  as  now,  and  they  and 
the  juvenile  criminals  frankly  declare  their  pre- 
ference for  a  life  of  crime  with  a  frequency  and 
abandon  truly  astonishing.  It  seems,  therefore, 
as  if  the  newer  generation  which  is  growing  up  in 
France  is  hardly  likely  to  furnish  strong,  steady, 
capable  men  to  take  the  place  of  the  generations 
who  are  passing. 

Her  colonial  power,  like  England's,  hangs  by  a 
thread.  She  has,  indeed,  but  one  valuable  colony, 
northern  Africa,  where  the  Germans  believe  the 

53 


PAN-GERMANISM 

natives  to  be  so  clearly  dissatisfied  with  her  rule 
as  to  render  its  continuance  highly  problematical; 
her  commercial  monopoly  in  her  colonies  is  purely 
political;  and  if  freedom  of  trade  were  permitted, 
Germany  could  undersell  her  in  her  own  field  with- 
out the  slightest  difficulty.  Her  political  control, 
therefore,  being  unstable,  her  commercial  mono- 
poly depending  upon  it,  the  Germans  do  not  con- 
sider it  a  matter  of  insuperable  difficulty  to  filch 
from  her  the  really  valuable  privilege  of  hold- 
ing Morocco  at  all.  The  excellence  of  Colonel 
Mangin's  troops  and  his  own  skill  and  bravery 
the  Germans  do  not  underestimate,  but  they 
count  upon  the  blunderers  in  Paris  to  upset  all 
his  dispositions. 

The  extent  of  Russia's  possessions,  her  enor- 
mous population,  her  astonishing  growth  in  the 
last  two  centuries,  the  Germans  fully  appreciate. 
They  well  know  that  her  population  was  twelve 
millions  in  1700  and  was  one  hundred  and  fifty 
millions  in  1900;  that  her  revenue  of  five  million 
dollars  in  1700  had  become  one  billion  dollars 
by  1900;  that  whereas  she  controlled  in  1700  an 
area  not  much  larger  than  Germany  herself,  she 
now  controls  one  seventh  of  the  land  surf  ace  of  the 
globe.  Men  and  money  she  has  lavishly  spent  in 
the  ruthless  pursuit  of  those  same  ambitions  which 
she  has  to-day.  To  secure  the  Baltic  cost  Russia 

54 


GERMAN  VIEW  OF  FRANCE  AND  RUSSIA 

seven  hundred  thousand  lives.  Her  territory  on 
the  Black  Sea  cost  the  same.  In  the  eighteenth 
century  she  sent  five  million  men  into  the  field, 
and  a  similar  number  into  the  wars  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  and  did  this  with  a  population 
only  a  fraction  of  that  she  can  now  command. 
There  is  small  chance  that  she  will  not  exert  the 
same  proportional  amount  of  effort  in  the  coming 
century  in  the  same  ruthless  pursuit  of  the  same 
aims.  Above  all,  the  Germans  know  that  nothing 
stands  between  them  and  these  multitudes  of 
men  but  their  own  army. 

They  know  at  the  same  time  that  a  nation's 
strength  is  not  what  she  possesses,  but  what  she 
can  effectively  use,  and  German  diplomats  are 
still  of  Bismarck's  opinion  that  Russia's  interna- 
tional value  depends  upon  "a  single  pair  of  eyes," 
in  other  words,  upon  the  Tsar  himself.  Russia, 
they  claim,  is  too  autocratic  to  be  dangerous  in 
proportion  to  her  strength;  the  Tsar  can  make 
the  alliance  and  with  equal  rapidity  and  ease  be 
persuaded  to  break  it;  Russia's  actions  depend 
too  entirely  upon  the  personal  opinion  of  her 
rulers  and  too  commonly  lack  support  in  the 
opinion  of  the  nation  to  make  her  a  very  valuable 
ally  or  a  very  dangerous  enemy.  The  adminis- 
tration is  overladen  with  red  tape,  nor  can  the 
confusion  and  inefficiency  be  lessened  while  her 

55 


PAN-GERMANISM 

rulers  insist  upon  directing  from  St.  Petersburg 
the  details  of  administration  in  so  enormous  an 
empire.  Russia,  in  other  words,  is  so  large  that 
centralized  government  is  inefficient.  The  hier- 
archy in  St.  Petersburg  cannot,  in  the  very  nature 
of  things,  possess  enough  knowledge  about  the 
different  localities  they  govern  to  direct  their 
subordinates  successfully;  they  are  necessarily 
thrown  upon  the  mercy  of  the  subordinates  them- 
selves, from  whom  they  must,  perforce,  derive 
the  great  bulk  of  their  information  about  condi' 
tions  in  the  district,  and  the  conduct  of  affairs 
Such  a  government  is  necessarily  blind,  slow,  cum- 
brous, hesitating,  incapable  of  acting  promptly, 
or  of  executing  ably  the  details  of  a  complex 
scheme  of  offense. 

The  Russian  people  are,  in  the  opinion  of 
Germans,  too  numerous,  too  widely  separated,  to 
have  a  truly  national  consciousness  obtained  by 
common  experience  in  thought  and  action,  even 
were  they  all  of  the  same  race,  and  even  if  they 
were  all  enthusiastically  in  favor  of  the  Govern- 
ment. The  educated  class  in  Russia  is  capable 
but  small,  and  its  numbers  and  character  have 
both  been  vitally  influenced  by  the  policy  of  the 
Tsars  in  restricting  education  to  non-political  sub- 
jects. In  order  to  limit  the  forces  against  them, 
in  order  to  limit  the  possible  leaders  of  the  sub- 

56 


GERMAN   VIEW  OF  FRANCE  AND  RUSSIA 

ject  nations,  and  the  possible  leaders  of  the  Rus- 
sian people  in  the  war  upon  the  dynasty,  they 
have  systematically  opposed  the  extension  of 
education  and  training,  and  have  thus  conserved 
the  dynasty  at  the  price  of  a  very  real  loss  to  the 
nation  in  vital  strength.  Underneath  the  nobles 
are  the  educated  and  the  administrators,  and 
underneath  the  somewhat  larger  merchant  class 
is  the  great  bulk  of  the  people,  of  whom  those 
who  are  not  too  miserable,  ignorant,  and  down- 
trodden to  have  thoughts  beyond  existence  itself, 
are  mostly  irreconcilables  who  hate  the  govern- 
ment with  an  energy  almost  beyond  conception. 
Their  numbers  are  considerable  and  include  such 
vitally  important  districts  as  Finland  and  Poland, 
where  Germany  might  easily  receive  important 
assistance  by  instigating  a  popular  revolt.  In- 
deed, Russia's  power  can  never  be  more  than 
potential  until  she  has  pacified  and  consolidated 
her  own  people. 

Financially,  Russia  is  bankrupt,  think  the 
Germans,  despite  her  enormous  resources,  for  the 
revenues  which  succeed  in  reaching  St.  Peters- 
burg (certainly  a  fraction  only  of  the  taxes  col- 
lected from  the  people)  are  for  the  most  part 
pledged  to  the  payment  of  the  interest  and  cap- 
ital of  the  Japanese  War  loans.  Certainly,  it  is 
widely  believed  that  the  money  for  another  great 

57 


PAN-GERMANISM 

war  could  not  be  raised  in  Russia  and  would  not 
be  supplied  by  foreign  capitalists  without  more 
securities  than  Russia  has  left  to  pledge.  Where 
so  enormous  a  proportion  of  the  population  still 
exists  upon  an  essentially  primitive  type  of  agri- 
culture, where  manufactures  are  as  yet  in  their 
infancy,  where  the  vast  mineral  resources  are  still 
largely  undeveloped,  the  available  resources 
within  Russia  herself  for  the  prosecution  of  the 
war  are  really  inconsiderable  compared  to  her 
ostensible  strength. 

The  army  the  Germans  do  not  consider  dan- 
gerous. The  Japanese  showed  clearly  how  easily 
the  Russian  generals  could  be  outmanoeuvred,  and 
how  incapable  the  Russians  were  of  holding  even 
strong  positions  against  a  determined  assault 
directed  by  real  tacticians.  The  greatest  difficul- 
ties which  the  Russian  generals  had  to  meet  arose 
from  the  quality  of  the  human  material  with 
which  they  had  to  deal.  The  men,  and  even  the 
non-commissioned  officers,  only  too  often  lacked 
sufficient  intelligence  to  execute  any  movement 
requiring  something  more  than  obedience  to  the 
letter  of  the  orders  issued  them.  Blind  courage, 
the  capacity  to  suffer  hunger  and  cold  which 
would  have  caused  the  German  army  to  mutiny, 
the  dull  qualities  of  the  brute,  these  the  Russian 
troops  possessed;  intelligence,  discretion,  capabil- 

58 


GERMAN  VIEW  OF  FRANCE  AND  RUSSIA 

ity,  and  initiative,  all  these,  and  more,  vital  to 
so  complex  an  organization  as  the  modern  army, 
the  rank  and  file  did  not  possess  at  all.  An  army, 
insist  the  Germans,  is  not  a  machine  composed 
of  a  certain  number  of  parts,  but  an  organization 
of  men  which  must  be  intelligent  to  be  effective. 
It  is  in  the  army,  especially,  that  the  inefficiency 
of  Russian  administration  and  the  lack  of  intelli- 
gence in  the  rank  and  file  of  the  Russian  people 
produce  the  most  striking  results  for  evil. 

Russia's  real  destiny,  the  Germans  believe,  is 
in  Asia,  not  in  Europe.  Her  people  are  more 
closely  allied  to  the  Asiatic  than  to  the  European; 
her  methods  in  government  are  those  of  the  East, 
not  of  the  West;  her  religion  is  Oriental,  not 
Occidental.  She  is  placed  so  as  to  command 
ready  entrance  into  the  very  heart  of  China  and 
India,  where  native  administrations  less  efficient 
than  hers  rule  a  people  still  more  ignorant. 
Sooner  or  later,  Russia,  think  the  Germans,  will 
realize  this  and  renounce  her  foolish  ambitions 
in  Europe.  Needless  to  add,  the  Russians  have 
not  the  slightest  intention  of  doing  anything  of 
the  kind. 

The  existence  of  France  and  Russia,  dangerous 
as  it  is  to  Germany,  is  not  without  its  compensa- 
tions, for  their  positions  bind  to  her  firmly  her 
allies,  Austria  and  Italy,  without  whose  help  the 

59 


PAN-GERMANISM 

great  scheme  of  Pan-Germanism  would  be  im- 
possible of  execution.  To  be  sure,  if  France  and 
Russia  did  not  exist,  the  great  scheme  might  not 
be  necessary,  but  it  is  certainly  fortunate  that 
their  existence  makes  simple  the  securing  of  aid. 
Austria,  as  well  as  Germany,  lies  in  the  path  of 
Russian  progress,  not  so  much  because  of  her 
territory  in  Austria  proper  as  because  of  her  own 
determination  to  expand  into  Poland  and  to  reach 
the  sea  through  the  Adriatic  and  the  JEgean. 
Austria,  therefore,  depends  for  the  realization  of 
her  dynastic  aims  upon  obtaining  possession  of 
the  Balkans.  If  she  should  do  so,  the  Russian 
plans  for  obtaining  control  of  the  Black  Sea  and 
for  securing  an  exit  into  the  Mediterranean 
through  the  Bosphorus  and  the  Dardanelles 
would  become  impossible  of  execution,  for  even 
if  Austria  permitted  Russia  to  obtain  Constan- 
tinople and  the  Straits,  her  own  possession  of 
Macedonia  and  the  great  port  of  Saloniki  would 
effectively  prevent  Russia  from  controlling  the 
^Egean.  Austria,  therefore,  whose  assistance  Ger- 
many vitally  needs  in  the  North,  equally  needs 
the  help  of  Germany  to  prevent  Russia  from  tak- 
ing possession  of  the  Balkans  and  thus  ending 
for  once  and  all  her  own  hopes  of  expansion.  The 
ambition  of  Russia  makes  Germany  and  Austria 
permanent  allies. 

60 


GERMAN  VIEW  OF  FRANCE  AND  RUSSIA 

Italy,  without  fears  of  absorption  by  Russia  and 
without  vital  fear  of  invasion  from  France,  never- 
theless finds  the  assistance  of  Germany  impera- 
tive for  the  realization  of  her  own  plans  of  expan- 
sion in  the  Mediterranean.  It  is  obvious  that  to 
obtain  colonies  in  Africa  she  must  either  take 
them  with  the  consent  of  England  and  France,  or 
fight  the  latter  for  them,  a  proceeding  hardly 
possible  in  view  of  the  preponderance  of  the  Eng- 
lish and  French  fleets  in  the  Mediterranean. 
Germany  and  Austria,  therefore,  can  alone  en- 
able her  to  obtain  a  position  in  the  Mediterran- 
ean in  the  face  of  the  opposition  of  France  and 
England;  Germany  by  her  threats  of  attack  upon 
the  English  fleet,  Austria  by  actual  assistance  in 
the  Mediterranean  itself.  In  addition,  Italy  is 
well  situated  to  assist  Germany  in  her  struggle 
against  France  by  an  attack  upon  the  French  rear 
through  the  passes  of  the  Alps.  She  would  also 
be  in  admirable  position  to  fight  Russia  in 
the  Balkans,  should  the  latter  succeed  in  pene- 
trating so  far,  while  her  navy  would  be  of  the 
utmost  importance  in  the  Mediterranean.  In- 
deed, the  position  of  Sicily,  the  great  ports  at 
Naples  and  Messina,  would  be  of  paramount 
importance  in  depriving  Malta,  the  key  of  the 
English  defense,  of  much  of  its  strength;  and  from 
Genoa,  the  Austrian  and  Italian  fleets  might  to- 

61 


PAN-GERMANISM 

gether  easily  contest  with  the  French  at  Toulon 
the  possession  of  the  western  Mediterranean,  and 
the  Italian  fleet  alone,  mobilized  at  Genoa,  might 
prevent  the  cooperation  of  the  French  and  Eng- 
lish fleets  by  forcing  the  French  to  remain  behind 
to  protect  their  naval  base.  Should  they  sail,  the 
Italian  fleet  could  menace  the  rear,  or  might 
actually  destroy  Marseilles,  if  not  Toulon.  In 
short,  if  the  Triple  Alliance  should  ever  propose 
to  contest  the  supremacy  of  the  Mediterranean 
with  England  and  France,  the  cooperation  of 
Italy  would  be  indispensable.  Austria  and  Italy 
could  in  all  probability  be  depended  upon  to  keep 
Russia  and  France  occupied  while  Germany 
dealt  with  England. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  STRENGTH  OF  IMPERIAL  GERMANY 

WHILE  well  aware  of  the  fact  that  the  cen- 
tral position  is,  from  a  military  point  of 
view,  one  of  weakness  for  a  power  compelled  to 
defend  herself,  or  not  prepared  to  take  the  offen- 
sive, Germany  is  equally  aware  of  the  undeniable 
fact  that  the  central  position,  for  a  power  which 
proposes  to  take  the  aggressive,  possesses  enor- 
mous advantages.  She  can  attack  either  France  or 
Russia  with  equal  ease;  her  army  is  equally  ready 
to  defend  her  against  both  at  the  same  time,  thus 
affording  her  the  maximum  opportunity  for  util- 
izing her  men  to  advantage.  In  addition,  she  holds 
the  great  strategic  points  of  northern  Europe,  — 
Alsace-Lorraine,  the  door  to  France;  the  Kiel 
Canal,  giving  her  access  to  the  Baltic  without 
exposing  herself  to  the  necessity  of  utilizing  the 
Sund;  her  allies  hold  the  Swiss  passes  and  the  vital 
points  affording  passage  into  Russia  and  the  Bal- 
kans. Everything  vital  to  her,  indeed,  everything 
she  owns,  forms  a  compact  territorial  unit  which 
can  be  defended  by  the  minimum  force  with  the 
maximum  ease.  She  has  no  long  chain  of  forts  or 

63 


PAN-GERMANISM 

islands  to  guard,  no  great  stretches  of  land  in 
Africa  or  Asia  to  protect,  no  subject  races  to 
pacify  like  the  Hindus  or  Moroccans.  She  con- 
siders, therefore,  that  her  strategic  position,  far 
from  possessing  the  weakness  which  her  enemies 
believe  it  has,  is  one  of  such  strength  that  it  affords 
her  advantages  which  might  almost  be  called 
conclusive  in  the  sort  of  a  struggle  in  which  she 
proposes  to  engage.  She  is  not  vulnerable  to  attack 
from  a  fleet;  England's  greatest  offensive  weapon 
is  useless  against  her;  for,  while  the  English  fleet 
could  stop  the  passage  of  German  commerce 
through  the  English  Channel,  it  is  powerless  to 
undertake  any  offensive  movements  which  could 
endanger  her  existence.  Nor  could  it  stop  her 
trade  overland,  a  trade  already  great  in  volume, 
steadily  expanding,  and  which  would,  with  the  out- 
break of  war  and  the  consequent  exclusion  from 
Europe  of  English  manufactured  goods,  attain 
unsuspected  dimensions.  Indeed,  the  outbreak 
of  war  might  conceivably  permit  German  mer- 
chants to  take  from  the  English  their  whole  mar- 
ket on  the  Continent  by  the  very  simple  fact  that 
war  would  certainly  close  the  harbors,  while  Ger- 
man goods  could  still  cross  the  frontiers  by  rail. 
Such  an  eventuality  the  Germans  consider  some- 
thing more  than  a  possibility. 

Germany,  however,  looks  with  greatest  pride 
64 


THE  STRENGTH  OF  IMPERIAL  GERMANY 

at  her  economic  strength.  She  feels  that  she  occu- 
pies in  the  economic  world  a  truly  extraordinary 
position,  as  one  of  the  few  nations  who  are  still 
literally  self-sufficing,  who  can  even  feed  and 
clothe  themselves.  When  she  compares  her  popu- 
lation with  that  of  England  and  France,  she  de- 
rives solid  satisfaction  from  the  knowledge  that, 
in  an  area  equal  in  size  to  France,  she  has  nearly 
fifty  per  cent  more  people,  and  in  an  area  more 
than  one  third  larger  than  England's,  she  has  a 
population  one  fourth  larger.  The  number  of 
men  on  whom  she  can  call  for  active  service  in 
time  of  war  will  be  naturally  to  that  extent 
greater  than  those  at  her  rivals'  disposal.  She  is, 
therefore,  not  surprised  to  find  that  her  standing 
army,  ready  to  go  to  the  front  at  a  moment's 
notice,  is  twice  as  large  as  the  English  army  on 
paper  and  almost  four  times  as  large  as  the  French. 
When  she  adds  her  reserve  army,  nearly  equal 
in  size  and  efficiency  to  her  standing  army,  she 
wonders  how  England  and  France  can  seriously 
consider  opposing  her  wishes,  and  looks  upon  the 
outcome  of  any  possible  conflict  with  supremest 
confidence.  The  density  of  her  population  is  301 
units  as  against  England's  367,  and  France's  190; 
her  revenue  per  capita  is  $10,  while  England's  is 
$15,  and  France's  is  $20,  proving  the  ease  with 
which  her  people  have  borne  and  are  bearing  the 

65 


PAN-GERMANISM 

cost  of  a  military  and  naval  expansion  unparalleled 
thus  far  in  German  history.  It  is,  however,  when 
she  looks  at  her  public  debt  and  compares  its 
size  with  that  of  her  rivals,  that  she  feels  most 
confident  of  the  outcome  of  war.  Her  public  debt 
per  capita  is  something  over  $15,  while  England 
owes  $80  per  individual,  and  France  carries  the 
enormous  burden  of  $150  per  person.  Germany, 
therefore,  not  only  has  more  people  and  more 
acres,  but  has  been  able  to  accomplish  vastly 
more  with  the  imposition  of  much  smaller  burdens 
upon  her  population.  Agriculture  has  reached  a 
state  of  high  perfection  in  Germany;  manufac- 
tures have  undoubtedly  made  great  progress. 
Indeed,  her  great  economic  efficiency  is  clear  from 
her  success  in  competition  with  other  nations  in 
every  field  of  industry;  she  has  even  beaten  them 
in  then*  own  markets.  The  proof  of  the  degree  of 
her  prosperity  and  the  extent  to  which  she  is  self- 
sufficing  the  Germans  see  in  the  fact  that,  while 
her  exports  per  capita  are  $24,  her  imports  are 
about  $30,  whereas  England  exports  $40  per 
capita  and  imports  $65.  *  Germany,  therefore,  is, 
like  England,  a  creditor  nation,  and  is  clearly 
producing  far  hi  excess  of  the  ability  of  her  people 

1  These  figures  are  only  approximate;  no  really  accurate  figures 
are  possible  because  no  definitive  figure  can  be  given  for  the  popula- 
tion except  in  a  census  year.  That  figure,  too,  is  always  inaccurate 
by  the  time  it  has  been  compiled. 

66 


THE  STRENGTH  OF  IMPERIAL  GERMANY 

to  consume.  This  economic  efficiency  rests  upon 
the  solid  basis  of  the  possession  within  her  own 
borders  of  a  fairly  adequate  supply  of  most  raw 
materials  required  to  keep  her  factories  at  work, 
and,  what  is  perhaps  more  essential,  of  all  those 
materials  peculiarly  necessary  for  the  mainten- 
ance of  an  army  and  a  fleet,  not  excepting  the 
most  essential  of  all,  food  and  iron.  Nor  is  she  at 
the  mercy  of  England,  as  most  other  nations  are, 
from  the  lack  of  a  merchant  marine  of  her  own  to 
distribute  her  products  to  the  rest  of  the  world. 
While  her  merchant  fleet  is  new  and  does  not 
upon  paper  compare  favorably,  either  in  number 
of  ships  or  in  registered  tonnage,  with  the  English 
merchant  marine,  at  the  same  time  no  one  doubts 
that  in  actual  efficiency  it  can  seriously  be  com- 
pared with  England's. 

Her  vast  resources  Germany  is  prepared  to  util- 
ize to  the  full.  Her  government  is  admittedly  one 
of  the  most  efficient  in  the  world.  Her  capable 
bureaucracy,  her  local  government  conducted 
purely  on  scientific  and  business  principles,  her 
centralized  imperial  administration,  provide  her 
with  the  most  advantageous  methods  of  accom- 
plishing the  greatest  results  without  wasting  a 
man  or  a  mark.  The  motto  of  German  govern- 
ment has  invariably  been  efficiency,  the  securing 
of  the  greatest  results  with  the  least  expenditure  of 

67 


PAN-GERMANISM 

energy.  To  be  sure,  this  has  involved  an  amount  of 
interference  with  individual  rights  and  privileges 
which  has  in  some  cases  almost  amounted  to  the 
ordering  of  the  individual's  life  by  the  government, 
and  which  has  been  sneeringly  called,  by  other 
nations,  paternalism,  less,  as  most  Germans  think, 
because  other  nations  dislike  the  results  than 
because  they  despair  of  obtaining  them.  The 
average  German  is  supremely  satisfied  with  his 
government,  and  is  above  all  pleased  with  the 
results.  He  feels  that  only  jealousy  can  cause 
others  to  criticize. 

The  advantages  of  centralized  government  he 
feels  to  be  great  in  times  of  peace,  merely  from 
the  point  of  view  of  obtaining  the  most  favorable 
results  in  internal  administration.  But  the  real 
benefits  of  centralized  administration  will  be  most 
apparent  in  time  of  war.  Indeed,  without  such  a 
centralized  administration,  the  execution  of  any 
such  gigantic  scheme  as  Pan-Germanism,  extend- 
ing necessarily  over  a  long  series  of  years  and  re- 
quiring continuity  of  policy  and  careful  prepara- 
tions for  eventualities  known  of  necessity  only  to 
a  few,  would  be  utterly  impossible.  In  England 
and  in  France,  power  is  distributed  in  too  many 
hands  to  make  continuity  of  policy  and  vigor 
of  administration  really  possible;  in  Russia,  the 
country  itself  is  too  large  to  be  directed  efficiently 

68 


THE  STRENGTH  OF  IMPERIAL  GERMANY 

by  a  single  head;  in  Germany,  the  happy  mean  is 
found.  The  certainty,  therefore,  of  the  complete 
utilization  of  every  ounce  of  the  national  strength 
in  the  struggle  approaching,  with  nations  whose 
governments  are  not  able  to  utilize  the  whole  of 
their  strength,  makes  the  Germans  supremely 
confident  of  success.  They  are  certain  that  they 
are  stronger  than  England  under  any  circum- 
stances; they  are  sure  that  their  resources  are 
considerable  enough  to  cope  with  France  and 
Russia  combined;  and  they  believe  that  they  are 
stronger  than  all  three  nations  in  the  amount  of 
force  which  they  are  capable  of  actually  exerting. 
The  efficiency  of  administration,  the  possibility 
and  necessity  of  continuity  of  policy,  is  most  ap- 
parent in  the  rapidity  with  which  the  Germans 
have  developed  then*  army  and  navy  to  the  present 
point  of  high  efficiency  and  size.  They  realize, 
certainly  to  a  degree  no  other  nation  does,  the 
extent  of  the  preparation  necessary  for  participa- 
tion in  modern  warfare,  and  the  number  of  years 
of  preparation  indispensable  to  success.  War, 
indeed,  is  too  terrible  to  be  invoked  without  the 
certainty  of  success,  especially  by  a  nation  stra- 
tegically situated,  as  Germany  is,  between  two 
enemies  thirsting  for  her  destruction.  The  Ger- 
mans realize  that  a  successful  war  must  be  prose- 
cuted by  a  highly  organized  machine,  equipped 

69 


PAN-GERMANISM 

with  exceedingly  expensive  apparatus,  officered 
by  men  whose  training  must  necessarily  consume 
years,  during  which  they  and  the  troops  they  are 
instructing  must  be  supported  by  the  State  and 
allowed  to  devote  then*  whole  time  to  learning  the 
game  of  war.  The  Germans  learned  long  ago  that 
a  citizen  army  drawn  from  farms  and  counting- 
houses  at  the  outbreak  of  war  cannot  be  expected 
to  understand  manoeuvring.  It  is  a  difficult  thing 
for  a  hundred  men  to  do  something  together; 
it  is  a  much  more  difficult  thing  for  a  hundred 
thousand  men  to  manoeuvre  without  getting  in 
each  other's  way;  but  when  a  million  men  are  to 
be  transported  to  a  certain  spot,  equipped,  offi- 
cered, fed,  and  expected  to  execute  a  complicated 
attack  with  efficiency  and  dispatch,  nothing  short 
of  a  most  complicated  organization  can  even  put 
such  an  army  into  a  field,  and  nothing  short  of 
years  of  practice  can  possibly  make  it  efficient. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Germans  realize  that 
a  weapon  of  this  sort  is  not  to  be  successfully  re- 
sisted by  anything  less  highly  trained.  To-day  an 
army  to  repel  an  invader  can  no  longer  be  garnered 
from  the  countryside  as  the  invader  advances, 
armed  with  weapons  taken  from  the  wall  of  each 
man's  house,  officered  by  the  nobility  and  gentry, 
and  by  them  hastily  organized  into  companies. 
The  same  elaborate  preparations  which  were 

70 


THE  STRENGTH  OF  IMPERIAL  GERMANY 

essential  to  its  undertaking  will  be  required  to 
meet  invasion.  War  is  also  expensive,  not  alone 
because  of  the  length  of  time  the  men  must  be 
in  training,  but  because  the  apparatus  which  they 
must  learn  to  use  is  expensive  to  create  and  ex- 
pensive to  practice  with.  A  gun  crew,  that  is  to 
be  called  upon  in  time  of  danger  to  hit  a  moving 
mark  at  the  distance  of  several  miles,  a  mark 
invariably  out  of  sight,  must  have  had  consider- 
able practice  in  time  of  peace  to  be  able  to  hit  any- 
thing in  the  excitement  of  battle.  The  expense 
of  firing  a  twelve-inch  rifle  is  in  the  neighborhood 
of  a  thousand  dollars,  and  gun  crews  usually  are 
instructed  to  see  how  many  times  they  can  fire 
the  gun  in  so  many  minutes.  Preparedness  for  war 
at  this  rate  means  that  the  nation  must  pay  for  it 
gradually,  which  means  in  turn  that  the  money 
must  be  spent  over  a  long  series  of  years.  The 
Germans  are  certain  that  no  other  nation  in 
Europe  has  spent  the  same  amount  of  money  or 
exercised  the  same  amount  of  forethought  or  pos- 
sessed the  same  degree  of  belief  in  the  necessity 
for  preparation  that  they  have.  Why,  then,  doubt 
of  success?  In  fact,  the  preparedness  for  war  bears 
to-day  so  inevitable  and  obvious  a  relation  to  the 
result  of  the  combat  that  actual  fighting  is  likely 
to  occur  only  between  forces  that  are  apparently 
equal  in  size  and  efficiency.  The  Germans  hope 

71 


PAN-GERMANISM 

to  make  their  army  so  large  and  so  competent 
that  it  can  decide  contests  without  appearing  in 
the  field. 

Germany's  greatest  strength,  however,  lies,  as 
her  rulers  think,  in  the  hearty  cooperation  of  the 
German  people  in  the  great  scheme.  They  seem 
all  to  be  willing  to  sacrifice  and  suffer  whatever 
may  be  necessary  for  the  realization  of  the  great 
vision  which  has  already  enthused  the  nation  for 
so  many  years.  The  government  will  be  able  to 
count  on  the  active,  willing  cooperation  of  the 
whole  people  in  the  prosecution  of  any  plans 
which  may  be  deemed  necessary  for  the  prepara- 
tion or  the  execution  of  this  project.  The  Social- 
ists, despite  their  hostile  theories  and  speeches, 
have  pledged  themselves  to  play  their  part  like 
men  when  "the  day"  dawns.  Indeed,  the  very 
things  which  make  expansion  necessary  for  Ger- 
many's future  are  those  things  which  will  be  her 
greatest  assets  in  promoting  the  war  and  the  most 
certain  gauges  of  her  success.  Her  rapidly  grow- 
ing population,  her  busy  factories,  the  swelling 
volume  of  product,  these  are  the  very  tools  with 
which  Pan-Germanism  is  to  be  built.  They  are 
the  pledges  fortune  has  given  Germany  of  its 
realization;  their  existence  furnishes  Germans 
with  all  necessary  proof  of  the  expediency  and 
morality  of  the  course  they  have  adopted. 


CHAPTER  VI 

ENGLAND  AND  FRANCE  AS  THEY  SEE 
THEMSELVES 

WHILE  it  is  hardly  expedient  to  interrupt 
the  exposition  of  Pan-Germanism  in  order 
to  interject  a  complete  consideration  of  the  factors 
upon  which  England  and  France  are  depending 
for  their  own  salvation,  it  is  indispensable  to  make 
clear  at  this  point  some  facts  of  their  national 
development  which  give  them  confidence,  and, 
above  all,  to  describe  in  detail  their  economic 
position,  for  it  is  upon  what  they  consider  to  be 
the  elements  of  its  greatest  strength  that  Germany 
is  counting  to  compass  their  downfall.  In  their 
own  eyes,  England  and  France  have  had  a  truly 
glorious  past.  They  have  been  for  at  least  three 
centuries  the  leading  nations  of  Europe,  France 
being  the  model  during  the  seventeenth  and 
eighteenth  centuries  for  language,  literature, 
fashions,  to  say  nothing  of  administration;  Eng- 
land becoming  in  the  nineteenth  century  the 
model  upon  which  the  rest  of  the  world  diligently 
strove  to  form  itself.  The  Napoleonic  Adminis- 
tration and  the  Napoleonic  Code  have  had  an 

73 


PAN-GERMANISM 

extensive  influence,  say  the  French,  in  the  forma- 
tion of  modern  Germany;  the  English  point  out 
that  the  centralized  government  of  which  Ger- 
mans are  so  proud  is,  after  all,  nothing  but  an 
adaptation  of  the  English  parliamentary  system. 
France  feels  that  but  for  her  support  the  Catholic 
Church  would  hardly  be  what  it  is  in  Europe 
to-day;  the  English  are  more  than  positive  that 
their  support  alone  kept  Protestantism  alive. 
In  science  and  literature  they  consider  themselves 
not  less  preeminent.  Surely,  say  the  English,  the 
doctrine  of  evolution  is  the  most  significant  ele- 
ment in  modern  thought  and  the  most  purely  Eng- 
lish; truly,  say  the  French,  Voltaire,  Rousseau, 
and  the  Encyclopaedists  directed  the  thought  of 
the  world  into  new  channels  which  it  has  not  yet 
found  inadequate.  The  industrial  revolution,  the 
new  agriculture,  the  factory  system,  trade-union- 
ism were  all  begun  in  England.  If  Germany  is 
great,  her  greatness  rests  upon  foundations  laid  by 
England  and  France.  They  ask  the  Germans  to 
point  out  one  conspicuous  achievement  in  which 
they  have  not  at  least  shared.  Nor  do  they  fail 
to  derive  comfort  and  satisfaction  from  the  con- 
templation of  the  extension  of  their  policy  in  the 
modern  world.  England  controls  one  fifth  of  the 
total  land  area  of  the  globe,  one  fifth  of  its  total 
population;  hah*  of  North  America,  a  quarter  of 

74 


ENGLAND  AND  FRANCE 

Asia,  and  nearly  half  of  Africa  are  under  her  flag; 
while  France  may  point  with  pride  at  the  posses- 
sion of  a  dominion  in  Africa,  vast  in  extent  and 
rich  in  resources.  Certainly,  there  are  no  two 
nations  in  the  world  which  control  so  large  a  share 
of  its  surface,  its  population,  or  its  resources. 
Compared  to  what  they  hold,  the  Steppes  of 
Russia  and  the  vast  frozen  dominion  of  Siberia 
are  valueless.  In  addition,  the  whole  world  gov- 
erns itself  on  the  English  model;  the  whole  world 
wears  French  clothes;  the  only  two  languages 
which  have  any  claims  to  universal  use,  since 
Latin  ceased  to  be  the  language  of  the  learned, 
are  French  and  English.  Even  if  they  should 
grant  the  truth  of  every  statement  made  in  pur- 
suance of  German  greed  as  to  their  strength  and 
position,  these  great  cardinal  facts  must  make  it 
evident,  they  feel,  that  the  German  argument 
possesses  some  flaw  which  will  not  be  less  fatal 
because  it  is  not  obvious. 

England  and  France  feel,  however,  that,  even 
if  they  were  politically  and  strategically  as  weak 
as  Germany  believes  them  to  be,  they  have  still  a 
tower  of  strength  in  their  economic  supremacy, 
based  upon  natural  advantages  whose  potency 
cannot  be  denied.  The  conspicuous  features  of  re- 
cent economic  growth  have  been  the  interdepend- 
ence of  nations,  the  extension  of  the  credit  sys- 

75 


PAN-GERMANISM 

tern,  of  international  trade,  and  the  rise  of  such 
huge  aggregates  of  capital  as  the  Rothschild  for- 
tune. The  growth  of  the  nineteenth  century  has 
made  commercial  development  depend  on  the 
production  of  something  which  others  need,  which 
one  nation  makes  better  than  others  or  produces 
more  easily,  and  which  that  nation  can  exchange 
for  those  products  naturally  and  easily  produced 
by  others.  The  old  ideal  of  a  people  entirely  self- 
sufficing  has  disappeared,  not  because  it  was  bad 
in  its  effects  upon  the  people,  but  simply  because 
it  has  become  clear  that  no  single  people  can  pro- 
fitably devote  their  time  to  producing  everything 
they  need.  The  economic  interdependence  of  the 
world  has  progressed  with  such  rapid  strides 
because  it  has  proved  more  profitable  to  all  na- 
tions than  the  earlier  system.  The  truly  progres- 
sive nation  to-day  will,  therefore,  not  expect  to 
be  self-sufficing,  and  will  abandon  the  industries 
in  which  it  is  not  specially  fitted  to  surpass  by 
natural  conditions  or  by  its  skill. 

The  credit  system  of  international  exchange, 
by  which  vast  transactions  are  accomplished  with- 
out the  passing  from  hand  to  hand  of  even  tokens 
of  value,  has  entirely  altered  the  methods  of 
transacting  the  world's  business  and  has  in- 
creased the  extent  and  profitableness  of  this  inter- 
dependence. Moreover,  out  of  the  factory  sys- 

76 


ENGLAND  AND  FRANCE 

tern  and  modern  industry  have  grown  huge  aggre- 
gations of  capital,  available  for  immediate  use 
and  controlled  by  comparatively  few  men.  There 
are  individuals  in  the  world  to-day  who  them- 
selves control  revenues  greater  than  those  of 
many  nations,  whose  incomes  annually  at  their 
disposal  are  as  large  as  most  of  the  fortunes  of 
antiquity.  They  thus  may  wield  stupendous 
power  in  the  development  of  nations.  Indeed, 
modern  business  depends  upon  the  possibility  of 
utilizing  such  enormous  aggregations  of  capital 
for  the  promotion  of  single  enterprises.  The 
English  and  the  French  make  no  idle  boast  when 
they  claim  that  the  modern  economic  structure, 
national  as  well  as  international,  has  been  largely 
their  creation  and  is  now  largely  in  their  hands. 
Of  certain  staple  materials,  like  wool,  fur,  fish, 
they  practically  possess  a  monopoly;  in  London 
and  Paris  are  the  centres  of  the  world's  exchange 
and  credit  system;  to  London  and  Paris  bankers 
accrue  the  profits  of  handling  the  world's  business. 
Nothing  short  of  a  financial  panic  of  the  first 
magnitude,  accompanied  perhaps  by  the  disloca- 
tion of  all  business  traditions,  can  fail  to  result, 
they  think,  from  the  disarranging  of  these  disposi- 
tions. The  English  yearly  produce  an  enormous 
bulk  of  manufactured  goods  which  has  steadily 
increased  in  volume  at  the  rate  of  from  ten  to 

77 


PAN-GERMANISM 

twenty  per  cent  each  decade.  England  is  stead- 
ily growing  richer  and  not  poorer,  as  the  Germans 
insinuate.  The  French  monopoly  on  such  luxu- 
ries as  jewelry,  dress  goods,  and  most  articles  of 
personal  apparel  is  as  complete  to-day  as  it  ever 
was.  The  world's  carrying  trade  is  practically  In 
English  hands  and  its  profits  are  no  small  share 
of  the  English  national  wealth.  Any  one  who 
supposes  that  the  English  merchant  marine  could 
be  annihilated  without  dislocating  the  commerce 
of  the  world  is  either  exceedingly  misinformed  or 
intentionally  blind.  London  and  Paris  are,  fur- 
thermore, the  distributing  centre  for  Eastern  and 
African  goods,  for  which  the  demand  was  never 
greater  than  it  is  at  present.  How  is  it  possible, 
say  the  English  and  the  French,  for  the  world  to 
get  along  without  us?  Is  it  in  any  degree  cred- 
ible that  Germany  can  take  our  place,  can  rear- 
range the  whole  financial  and  commercial  struc- 
ture of  the  world,  without  causing  an  amount  of 
suffering  to  herself  which  would  more  than  coun- 
terbalance any  possible  benefits  she  might  receive  ? 
Indeed,  the  English  and  the  French  are  not  alto- 
gether unreasonable  in  supposing  themselves  at 
present  indispensable  to  the  economic  welfare  of 
the  world. 

The  interdependence  of  the  world,  moreover, 
which  is  so  profitable  to  every  one  concerned,  is 

78 


ENGLAND  AND  FRANCE 

absolutely  contingent  upon  the  continuance  of 
peace.  Every  one  will  be  injured  by  the  inability 
to  exchange  what  they  produce  for  what  they 
need.  Anything  like  a  general  war  will  necessarily 
entail  financial  loss,  and  not  improbably  personal 
suffering,  upon  the  individuals  of  practically 
every  community  in  the  world.  It  is,  therefore, 
the  peace  advocates  strenuously  insist,  to  prac- 
tically every  one's  economic  advantage  to  mam- 
tain  peace.  The  number  of  individuals,  to  say 
nothing  of  nations,  who  would  be  likely  to  gain 
by  the  outbreak  of  war  are  too  few  to  be  regarded, 
and  consist,  they  claim,  chiefly  of  those  who 
make  the  materials  or  the  weapons  needed  by 
armies  and  navies.  These  facts,  indeed,  are  suf- 
ficiently apparent  to  furnish  a  solid  basis  for  great 
organized  movements  in  favor  of  international 
arbitration  or  conciliation,  whose  propaganda  is 
so  active,  and  whose  logic  and  statistics  are  so 
unassailable,  as  to  have  convinced  the  great  ma- 
jority of  every-day  people  in  all  nations  of  the  in- 
expediency of  war.  Unquestionably,  such  move- 
ments and  arguments,  tending  to  the  maintneance 
of  a  status  quo,  are  greatly  to  the  advantage  of 
England  and  France,  in  whose  hands  lies  the  pre- 
sent control  of  the  financial  world. 

The  greatest  economic  strength  of  England 
and  France  comes  from  their  possession  of  the 

79 


PAN-GERMANISM 

greatest  individual  aggregations  of  capital  in  the 
world.  The  vast  Rothschild  fortune,  known  in 
Europe  as  The  Fortune,  is  one  twentieth  of  the 
total  wealth  of  the  French  nation,  and  is  not,  like 
so  many  American  fortunes,  the  estimated  value 
on  the  stock  market  of  certain  securities  which, 
in  case  of  a  financial  panic,  might  almost  lose  all 
value,  but  consists  of  houses,  land,  railways,  solid 
tangible  assets  which  could  be  destroyed  only  by 
the  destruction  of  France.  In  London,  there  is 
a  group  of  individuals  who  between  them  con- 
trol nearly  as  considerable  and  almost  as  solid 
fortunes.  There  are  no  doubt  in  Germany  and 
Austria  wealthy  men.  There  are  no  such  fortunes 
as  these.  In  fact,  the  London  and  Paris  bankers 
can  almost  control  the  available  resources  of  the 
world  at  any  one  moment,  and  can  therefore  prac- 
tically permit  or  prevent  the  undertaking  of  any 
enterprise  requiring  the  use  of  more  than  a  hun- 
dred million  dollars  actual  value.  Many  schemes 
nominally  more  considerable  than  this  have  been 
floated  independently,  but  the  actual  value  of  the 
assets  behind  the  scheme  was  a  mere  tithe  of  their 
value  on  paper. 

Modern  warfare  means  that  the  degree  of 
preparation  essential  to  success  is  impossible 
without  the  use  of  immense  resources,  and  that 
the  nation  can  safely  invest  enough  money  in 

80 


ENGLAND  AND    FRANCE 

armies  and  navies  to  make  them  effective  only 
when  it  boasts  vast  reserves  of  capital.  The  Eng- 
lish and  French  consider  it  almost  impossible  for 
any  nation  to  invest  such  a  sum  in  war  without 
straining  its  resources  far  beyond  the  danger 
point,  or  without  somehow  borrowing  it  from 
them,  and  they  will  certainly  not  loan  it  to  their 
enemies.  Therefore,  they  conclude,  if  Germany  is 
thus  investing  her  surplus,  the  time  will  come 
when  her  armies  will  cost  her  more  than  they  are 
worth,  —  indeed,  more  than  the  utmost  success  in 
war  could  ever  enable  her  to  repay.  Actually  to 
mobilize  a  modern  army  requires  vast  sums  in 
ready  money,  and  the  English  and  French  do  not 
believe  any  nation  can  go  to  war  without  procur- 
ing the  ready  money  from  them.  The  conclusive 
proof  of  this  supposition  they  found  in  the  event 
following  the  appearance  of  the  German  warship 
Panther  at  Agadir.  It  seems  that  the  Emperor 
would  have  been  willing  at  any  rate  to  mobilize 
the  German  army  and  sought  the  German  bank- 
ers with  a  request  for  a  loan  to  the  Government. 
The  bankers  informed  him  that  they  had  no 
money  with  which  to  meet  their  own  pressing 
obligations  and  that  the  nation  as  a  matter  of 
fact  stood  on  the  verge  of  bankruptcy.  Not  only 
could  it  not  go  to  war,  it  was  doubtful  even 
whether  it  could  continue  to  do  business  for  an- 

81 


PAN-CERMANISM 

other  week.  No  one  seems  to  have  realized  in 
Germany  the  sum  total  of  the  private  loans  made 
in  London  and  Paris.  When  war  seemed  probable, 
a  concerted  movement  by  the  London  and  Paris 
bankers  for  the  recalling  of  all  loans  practically 
stripped  Germany  of  ready  money,  and  the  sale 
of  securities  on  the  Berlin  Bourse  to  meet  these 
demands  almost  precipitated  a  panic  of  the  ut- 
most seriousness.  It  transpired  that  Germany 
was  conducting  nearly  ninety  per  cent  of  current 
business  upon  borrowed  money  subject  to  recall 
at  a  moment's  notice.  By  the  use  of  their  eco- 
nomic weapons,  England  and  France  rendered 
Germany  helpless  and  made  war  impossible.  It 
is  clear  that  in  the  present  era  there  are  weapons 
stronger  than  armies. 

Not  only  does  the  credit  system  of  the  world 
centre  in  London  and  Paris,  but  the  world's  sup- 
ply of  the  only  tangible  basis  for  international 
exchange  is  also  in  their  hands.  From  South 
Africa  comes  a  large  share  of  the  world's  gold;  in 
the  London  and  Paris  banks  are  probably  the 
world's  greatest  accumulations  of  com  and  bul- 
lion, while  probably  there  are  in  France  greater 
sums  of  cash  in  the  hands  of  the  nation  itself  than 
in  any  other  country  in  the  world.  When  the 
close  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War  imposed  upon 
France  a  war  indemnity  so  heavy  that  the  Prus- 

82 


ENGLAND  AND  FRANCE 

sians  exulted  openly  upon  their  success  in  crip- 
pling France  for  a  generation,  the  French  nation 
produced  the  entire  sum  from  its  savings,  and 
paid  the  indemnity  with  a  rapidity  which  as- 
tounded the  world.  The  French  are  undoubt- 
edly more  capable  of  repeating  such  a  feat  to-day 
than  they  were  in  1870.  Such  financial  strength 
rightly  inspires  the  French  and  English  with  con- 
fidence in  then'  ultimate  ability  to  cope  with 
Germany. 

It  is  an  astounding  fact,  of  whose  truth  the 
average  man  is  gradually  becoming  conscious, 
that  England  and  France  own  probably  the  major 
part  of  the  bonded  indebtedness  of  the  world. 
Russia,  Turkey,  Egypt,  India,  China,  Japan,  and 
South  America  are  probably  owned,  so  far  as  any 
nation  can  be  owned,  in  London  or  Paris.  Pay- 
ment of  interest  on  these  vast  sums  is  secured  by 
the  pledging  of  the  public  revenues  of  these  coun- 
tries, and,  in  the  case  of  the  weaker  nations,  by 
the  actual  delivery  of  the  perception  into  the 
hands  of  the  agents  of  the  English  and  French 
bankers.  In  addition,  a  very  large  share,  if  not 
the  major  part,  of  the  stocks  and  industrial  securi- 
ties of  the  world  are  owned  by  those  two  nations 
and  the  policies  of  many  of  the  world's  enter- 
prises dictated  by  their  financial  heads.  The 
world  itself,  in  fact,  pays  them  tribute;  it  actually 

83 


PAN-GERMANISM 

rises  in  the  morning  to  earn  its  living  by  utilizing 
their  capital,  and  occupies  its  days  in  making 
the  money  to  pay  them  interest  which  is  to  make 
them  still  wealthier.  Such  facts  as  these  are  of 
transcendent  importance  in  evaluating  the  condi- 
tions in  the  world  which  make  war  possible  or  im- 
possible. In  the  estimation  of  the  statesmen  in 
London  and  Paris,  Germany  is  not  economically 
strong  enough  to  utilize  what  she  thinks  is  politi- 
cally and  strategically  an  advantageous  position 
without  involving  an  injury  to  herself  which 
might  ultimately  destroy  her  prosperity. 

In  fact,  they  find  it  difficult  to  believe  that 
Germany  possesses  any  economic  strength.  The 
factors  which  the  Germans  consider  favorable  to 
them,  the  English  and  French  consider  their 
greatest  weakness.  Germany's  imports  somewhat 
exceed  her  exports  and  create  the  impression  to 
the  superficial  observer,  say  English  and  French 
experts,  that  she  is  a  creditor  country  like  Eng- 
land, receiving  more  than  she  gives,  and  therefore 
undoubtedly  solvent.  In  this  case  the  statistics 
are  misleading.  Germany's  imports  are  not  really 
the  insignia  of  wealth  at  all,  but  are  the  proof  of 
national  poverty.  The  balance  hi  international 
trade,  as  every  economist  knows,  is  paid  in  goods 
and  not  in  money.  The  English  imports  are  vastly 
in  excess  of  exports,  because  England  is  really  a 

84 


ENGLAND  AND  FRANCE 

creditor  country  and  is  thus  receiving  the  interest 
owed  her  upon  her  investments.  But  Germany's 
surplus  of  imports  is  not  interest  payments  upon 
her  own  investments,  but  payments  to  her  of  the 
capital  of  her  own  enormous  loans.  She  receives 
the  sum  in  goods,  because  only  in  kind  can  great 
exchanges  of  value  between  nations  take  place; 
she  pays  the  interest  with  her  exports.  Germany 
is  hi  truth  economically  weak,  and  in  order  to 
finance 'so  many  public  and  private  enterprises, 
as  she  has  in  the  last  thirty  years,  has  been  com- 
pelled to  borrow  heavily.  In  fact,  in  an  economic 
sense  Germany  does  not  own  her  own  business. 
The  capital  which  created  it,  the  ready  money 
which  keeps  it  alive,  are  both  borrowed  and  are 
not  yet  paid  for.  Instead  of  devoting  a  part  of 
the  proceeds  of  the  use  of  this  capital  to  the  dis- 
charge of  a  part  of  her  capital  indebtedness,  she 
has  reinvested  all  of  it,  has  therefore  expanded 
her  transactions  at  a  rate  all  out  of  proportion  to 
the  amount  of  business  she  was  really  doing,  and 
has  therefore  exposed  herself  to  the  peril  of  being 
called  upon  suddenly  to  pay  her  debts  and  of 
being  forced  into  national  bankruptcy  because  of 
her  inability  so  to  do.  Such  financiering  is  simply 
folly,  to  the  thinking  of  England  and  France. 

The  small  national  debt  of  Germany,  too,  can- 
not fairly  be  compared  with  the  large  national 

85 


PAN-GERMANISM 

debts  of  England  and  France  as  a  sign  of  the  com- 
parative strength  of  the  three  nations.  She  owes 
her  debt  mostly  to  them.  They  owe  their  debts  to 
their  own  citizens.  A  nation's  position  in  the 
international  scale  is  not  affected  at  all  by  the 
existence  of  public  indebtedness  which  is  owed 
to  its  own  citizens,  because  the  total  national 
assets  are  comprised  of  the  public  funds  plus  the 
actual  assets  of  all  individuals,  including  all  the 
debts  owed  either  the  nation  or  its  citizens  by 
other  nations  or  their  citizens.  The  public  debts 
of  England  and  France  are  for  the  most  part  na- 
tional assets,  while  Germany's  is  almost  entirely 
a  national  liability.  If  the  English  and  French 
should  pay  their  debt,  they  would  pay  it  to  them- 
selves. In  other  words,  they  would  merely  alter 
the  form  of  recording  the  national  wealth  on  the 
national  books.  When  Germany  pays  her  na- 
tional debt,  she  will  have  to  part  with  actual 
value  which  will  accrue  to  other  nations.  Nor  do 
the  Germans  seem  to  realize  that,  from  the  point 
of  view  of  international  finance,  the  national  debt 
is  not  the  money  which  the  nation  has  borrowed 
in  its  own  name,  but  the  total  amount  of  indebt- 
edness which  the  nation  itself  and  all  its  citizens 
combined  owe  in  any  way  to  all  other  nations  and 
their  private  citizens  combined.  The  public  in- 
debtedness plus  the  private  indebtedness  is  the 

86 


ENGLAND  AND  FRANCE 

true  indication  of  the  money  which  the  nation 
may  be  called  upon  to  pay.  England  and  France, 
publicly  or  privately,  owe  very  little  money  out- 
side their  own  borders.  Germany  owes  money  in 
every  quarter  of  the  globe  on  the  transactions  of 
her  citizens.  For  these  reasons,  other  nations  find 
it  hard  to  believe  that  Germany  possesses  any 
economic  strength  at  all,  and  therefore  find  it  dif- 
ficult to  understand  why  she  promotes  such  vast 
schemes  of  aggression.  They  can  be  prosecuted 
only  upon  borrowed  capital  and  must  inevitably 
increase  her  inherent  weakness.  Certainly,  should 
she  lose,  she  can  hardly  recover  from  the  catas- 
trophe for  a  century;  and  they  cannot  see  how 
she  can  possibly  win. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE   GERMAN   VIEW   OF  THE   ECONOMIC 
SITUATION 


ERMANY  freely  admits  the  great  economic 
strength  of  England  and  Prance,  so  long  as 
peace  prevails.  Once  war  breaks  out,  their  econo- 
mic strength  will  become  weakness  and  the  posi- 
tion, which  they  depend  upon  to  secure  for  them 
control  of  the  world,  will  in  very  fact  bankrupt 
them.  Indeed,  the  weapons,  in  what  the  Germans 
are  fond  of  calling  "  The  next  war,"  will  not  be 
confined  to  armies  and  navies,  nor  do  the  Germans 
consider  that  the  state  of  war  will  be  confined  to 
actual  hostilities.  To  their  thinking,  the  war  is 
already  in  progress  and  is  being  fought  and  will 
continue  to  be  fought,  with  those  weapons,  infin- 
itely more  deadly  than  cannon  and  small  arms, 
economic  crises.  They  propose  to  destroy  Eng- 
land and  France,  not  in  the  field,  but  in  the  count- 
ing house  and  in  the  factory,  annihilating  the  basis 
upon  which  in  the  long  run  armies  must  depend 
for  maintenance. 

The  interdependence  of  the  world  is  econo- 
mically profitable  to  England  and  France,  so  long 
as  the  existence  of  peace  gives  full  scope  to  the 

88 


THE  ECONOMIC  SITUATION 

play  of  economic  forces  which  produces  that 
steady  and  uninterrupted  interchange  of  goods 
upon  which  they  rely  for  their  very  existence. 
The  extent  of  modern  economic  development,  the 
amount  of  produce  they  depend  upon  receiving 
from  abroad,  the  amount  of  manufactured  goods 
that  they  depend  upon  exporting  yearly,  is  the 
measure  of  their  economic  weakness  at  that  mo- 
ment when  a  state  of  war  makes  the  transporta- 
tion by  sea  of  their  necessities  dangerous.  In 
particular,  England  must  be  fed  from  oversea, 
and  must  bring  from  a  distance  all  the  raw  ma- 
terials which  she  needs  to  keep  her  factories  in 
constant  operation,  and  which  she  must  have  to 
keep  her  great  population  steadily  employed  and 
able  to  support  itself.  This  dependence  upon 
others  is  not  strength,  but  weakness  of  the  most 
vital  description,  for  it  makes  England's  prosper- 
ity contingent  upon  the  continuance  of  certain  con- 
ditions which  the  Germans  are  by  no  means  will- 
ing to  agree  are  normal  or  natural.  They  deny 
strenuously  that  peace  differs  from  war  in  any- 
thing except  degree.  There  is  a  large  school  of 
thinkers  in  Germany  who  insist  that  all  living  is 
war,  and  that  upon  the  continuance  of  this  battle 
the  healthy  life  of  the  community  absolutely  de- 
pends, in  support  of  which  assertion  they  cite  the 
doctrine  of  evolution  in  its  varied  forms  and 

89 


PAN-GERMANISM 

phases.  If  this  be  true,  a  nation  which  expects  to 
survive  in  this  normal  struggle  for  existence  must 
not  depend  upon  fighting  its  battles  with  other 
nations  under  what  are  really  technical  limita- 
tions. By  depending  upon  the  absence  of  any- 
thing like  physical  force  in  the  struggle  for  ex- 
istence, England  is  building  her  house  upon  the 
sands. 

Take,  too,  the  vast  capital  of  whose  existence 
England  and  France  are  so  proud  and  upon  whose 
operations  they  depend  for  the  perpetuation  of 
their  predominance.  The  fact  that  they  have  in- 
vested it  in  every  quarter  of  the  globe,  intending, 
thereby,  to  protect  themselves  from  too  consider- 
able loss  in  case  war  should  break  out  or  countries 
become  bankrupt,  has  actually  forced  them  to 
part  with  the  reality  of  their  wealth  and  to  substi- 
tute for  it  unreality.  They  have  placed  the  tan- 
gible results  of  their  investment  the  width  of  the 
globe  distant  from  their  shores,  and  therefore 
from  their  armies,  and  they  have  taken  in  ex- 
change a  promise  to  pay,  which  they  do  not  pos- 
sess the  force  to  exact,  and  whose  whole  value 
depends  upon  the  willingness  of  the  debtors  to  con- 
sider it  binding  and  to  liquidate  the  debt  of  their 
own  free  will  when  it  becomes  due.  They  have  in- 
vested their  money  everywhere  except  at  home, 
and  have  therefore  exposed  themselves  to  its  loss, 

90 


THE  ECONOMIC  SITUATION 

because  their  ownership  of  these  debts  and  invest- 
ments depends  on  the  continuance  of  the  present 
notions  of  commercial  morality.  This  is  not  in- 
vestment. This  is  speculation.  The  reality,  — 
the  railways,  factories,  mines,  —  which  represents 
the  capital  they  have  invested,  belongs  literally  to 
the  borrower.  He  has  the  only  tangible  thing  in 
existence  in  the  world,  the  only  thing  which  pos- 
sibly can  exist  in  the  world,  as  the  equivalent 
of  that  value.  Whatever  is  written  on  paper  is 
paper,  and  is  not  to  be  made  into  factories  or 
railways  or  tangible  assets  of  any  kind  by  any 
process  of  jugglery  such  as  the  mediaeval  bishop 
performed  when  he  baptized  the  roast  and  called 
it  carp.  Things  are,  and  writing  on  paper  does 
not  change  the  thing  or  its  position.  The  real 
wealth  of  England,  the  surplus  of  which  she  is  so 
proudj  comes  not  from  her  soil  nor  from  her  own 
factories,  —  in  other  words,  from  those  things 
which  no  one  can  take  away  from  her  except  by 
force  of  arms  and  which  she  necessarily  protects 
as  long  as  she  continues  her  national  existence, — 
but  from  her  income  from  the  accumulations  of 
the  past  with  whose  actuality  she  has  parted,  and 
from  which  she  has  received  for  decades  the  pay- 
ments represented  by  the  excess  of  her  imports 
over  her  exports.  The  world  has  paid  her  tribute, 
but  the  world  need  continue  to  pay  that  tribute 

91 


PAN-GERMANISM 

only  so  long  as  it  wishes.  The  moment  the  bor- 
rowers refuse  longer  to  recognize  the  validity  of 
her  claims  upon  their  revenues  and  incomes,  and 
begin  to  realize  that  they  hold,  with  a  clutch 
which  she  cannot  loosen,  the  actual  substance  of 
wealth,  then  they  will  begin  to  see  that  her 
wealth  is  not  real,  but  depends  purely  upon  their 
willingness  to  continue  to  pay  her  revenue,  which 
they  may  stop  paying  her  at  any  moment  with- 
out suffering  any  consequences.  To  be  sure,  such 
notions  as  these  presume  the  violation  of  every 
notion  of  commercial  morality  and  expediency  at 
present  existing  in  the  world,  but,  as  the  Germans 
say,  if  they  were  violated,  what  could  England  and 
France  possibly  do  to  avert  destruction.  It  is 
true,  they  admit,  that  such  a  wholesale  repudiation 
of  debts  would  undoubtedly  make  it  difficult  for 
nations  to  borrow  from  each  other  for  some  time 
to  come,  but,  they  retort,  if  such  a  repudiation 
took  place,  the  debtor  nations  would  not  need  to 
borrow  money  for  generations  to  come.1 

1  The  author  is  anxious  to  state  explicitly  that  these  paragraphs 
are  not  to  be  understood  to  imply  a  reflection  upon  German  national 
or  individual  morality,  and  he  hopes  that,  in  his  desire  to  put  this 
hypothetical  case  forcibly,  he  has  not  given  it  an  immediate  applica- 
tion, which,  if  believed,  might  be  construed  as  a  serious  prediction  of  a 
nature  which  no  historian  has  a  right  to  make.  The  point  upon  which 
the  Germans  insist  is,  what  would  happen  to  England  under  such 
circumstances,  a  statement  which  by  no  means  argues  their  intention 
to  attempt  the  repudiation  of  their  debts  to-morrow  or  at  any  other 
time.  They  do  claim  that  it  is  a  fundamental  point  in  their  favor. 

92 


THE  ECONOMIC  SITUATION 

Now  if  we  suppose  that  the  German  fleet 
should  secure  control  of  the  sea,  either  by  defeat- 
ing the  English  or  by  securing  predominance  in 
number,  it  might  promptly  cut  England's  com- 
munications with  the  rest  of  the  world  and  effec- 
tively bankrupt  her  by  stopping  the  remittances 
of  goods,  in  which  alone  the  debts  owed  her  by 
other  countries  can  be  paid.  Germany,  to  be 
sure,  would  not  get  the  property  England  owns 
elsewhere;  she  might  not  be  able  to  secure  the 
repudiation  of  English  debts  by  England's  debt- 
ors; but  she  could  quite  as  effectively  compel 
England  to  lose  the  only  tangible  evidence  of 
ownership  and  forego  the  payment  of  the  incomes 
of  thousands  of  her  private  citizens  who  would 
infallibly  be  ruined.  In  this  connection,  the  Ger- 
mans eagerly  claim  that,  if  a  nation's  debts  con- 
sist of  the  national  indebtedness  plus  the  private 
indebtedness,  it  is  not  less  true  that  the  nation's 
resources  are  the  national  revenues  plus  private 
incomes.  If  the  latter  should  suffer  severely, 
those  upon  whom  the  Government  chiefly  de- 
pends for  the  payment  of  taxes  would  be  unable 
to  respond  and  the  nation,  as  well  as  its  citizens, 
would  be  bankrupt.  To  secure  so  stupendous  a 
result  as  this  is  well  worth  the  expenditure  of 
money  for  building  a  fleet.  That  money  so  far 
as  the  German  nation  is  concerned  is  merely  in- 


PAN-GERMANISM 

vested  in  an  enterprise  from  which  they  confi- 
dently expect  returns  perhaps  one  hundred  fold. 
As  was  said  at  the  beginning  of  this  account  of 
Pan-Germanism,  the  Germans  are  acutely  con- 
scious that  their  position  in  the  world  depends 
less  upon  the  actual  force  they  are  prepared  to 
exert  and  the  actual  wealth  within  their  own 
borders  than  upon  their  ability  to  exert  more  than 
their  rivals  can.  The  existence  throughout  the 
world  of  a  state  of  war  they  believe  would  effect- 
ively bankrupt  England  and  France.  Each  na- 
tion which  owed  the  latter  money  would  be  un- 
able to  remit  the  usual  sums,  because  they  would 
be  forced  to  spend  the  money,  and  more  likely 
the  goods  already  in  existence,  upon  preparation 
for  war.  This  would  effectively  rob  England  and 
France  of  their  incomes,  of  the  only  tangible  evi- 
dence they  receive  of  their  vast  nominal  wealth. 
Failing  to  receive  the  usual  remittance  either  in 
money  or  in  goods,  they  might  themselves  be 
unable,  simply  from  the  lack  of  materials,  to 
prosecute  the  war  with  the  vigor  and  dispatch 
they  intended.  Of  course,  should  England  retain 
control  of  the  sea,  she  would  be  able  even  in  time 
of  war  to  protect  the  remittances  to  her;  but  the 
Germans  depend  upon  their  fleet  to  interfere,  at 
least  with  the  regularity  of  remittances  to  Eng- 
land, and  depend  upon  their  allies  and  upon  the 

94 


THE  ECONOMIC  SITUATION 

necessities  of  various  nations  elsewhere  to  stop 
the  remittances  at  their  source.  They  thus  hope 
to  cripple  England  and  France  temporarily  by 
the  mere  force  of  economic  factors  which  could 
be  put  into  operation  by  simply  beginning  a  war. 
The  Germans  claim  that  those  financial  fac- 
tors, which  seem  to  be  weaknesses  in  time  of 
peace,  would  be  in  case  of  war  a  tower  of  strength. 
Germany  is  almost,  if  not  quite,  self-supporting, 
and,  with  the  trade  between  herself  and  other 
European  nations  overland  in  time  of  war,  she 
could  become  entirely  self-sufficing.  Nor  is  she 
dependent  upon  her  imports  for  the  raw  materials 
to  keep  her  factories  busy  or  to  maintain  her  army 
and  navy.  Whatever  the  balance  may  be  upon 
the  books  of  the  world,  she  is  actually  rich,  actu- 
ally richer  than  England  or  France.  So  long  as 
her  army  is  unbeaten,  no  one  can  take  away 
from  her  her  factories,  mines,  and  fields.  Who- 
ever may  own  them  on  paper,  she  owns  them  in 
reality  and  will  continue  to  own  them  so  long  as 
she  is  strong  enough  to  keep  them.  Supposing 
now  that  she  should  repudiate  the  whole  debt 
which  she  owes  other  nations,  should  seize  the 
capital  out  of  which  her  economic  development 
was  created,  what  then?  Would  she  not  actually 
possess  her  economic  development  for  nothing? 
Could  she  ever  be  compelled  to  pay  for  it  by 

95 


PAN-GERMANISM 

anything  short  of  actual  conquest,  and  is  there  in 
the  world  any  nation  strong  enough  to  subdue 
her  upon  her  own  soil?  Would  not  such  an  eco- 
nomic blow  destroy  her  enemies  with  greater  cer- 
tainty than  any  conquest  by  sea  or  land?  Indeed, 
has  she  not  everything  to  gain  from  war  and 
nothing  to  lose?  So  long  as  peace  prevails  and 
she  continues  to  recognize  the  validity  of  present 
notions  of  commercial  morality,  she  must  con- 
tinue to  pay  huge  sums,  must  continue  yearly  to 
part  with  actual  wealth  in  goods  until  the  debt  is 
paid.  The  moment  war  breaks  out,  she  need  pay 
nothing.  If  she  is  defeated,  she  will  merely  be 
compelled  to  pay  what  she  was  already  obligated 
to  pay.  If  victorious,  she  need  never  pay  interest 
or  principal.  Would  that  not  be  a  stake  many 
times  worth  playing  for,  compared  to  a  war  in- 
demnity of  any  size  whatever,  and,  when  such  a 
manoeuvre  might  also  not  improbably  compass 
the  control  of  the  world's  commerce,  what  Ger- 
man would  doubt  that  the  chances  of  war  are 
better  than  those  of  peace?  Suppose,  too,  that 
the  rest  of  the  countries  who  owe  money  to  Eng- 
land and  France  should  adopt  Germany's  tactics 
and  seize  the  occasion  of  the  war  as  a  signal  for 
the  repudiation  of  what  they  owed,  and  should 
therefore  take  possession  of  their  own  industries; 
would  not  England  and  France  be  literally  de- 

96 


THE  ECONOMIC  SITUATION 

stroyed,  reduced  to  the  acres  within  their  own 
boundaries  and  to  those  few  industries  which  they 
could  prosecute  without  cooperation  from  other 
nations? 

The  securing  of  ready  money  with  which  to 
begin  this  war  the  Germans  do  not  consider  a 
vital  difficulty  despite  the  fact  that  it  must  be  in 
some  way  secured  from  their  enemies.1  Nor  do 
they  consider  it  a  vital  difficulty  that  they  can  in 
all  probability  procure  only  from  the  same  source 
the  sums  of  money  necessary  for  the  completion 
of  the  preparations  for  war.  So  long  as  the  trust- 
ing citizens  of  England  and  France  are  willing 
to  lend  their  private  fortunes  on  no  better  secur- 
ity than  the  promise  to  pay  interest  and  capital 
at  some  future  day,  there  is  every  reason  why  she 
should  continue  to  borrow  every  cent  they  are 
willing  to  lend,  for  by  that  measure  will  she  in- 
crease the  extent  of  the  ruin  which  may  in  time 
overtake  those  nations,  and  by  that  extent  will 
she  increase  the  amount  of  wealth  which  she  may 
get  for  nothing.  She  has,  of  course,  continued  to 
reinvest  in  her  businesses  the  whole  profits  which 
she  has  derived  from  her  skillful  management, 
and  she  has  not  made  as  yet  extensive  prepara- 

1  There  is  &  war  reserve  in  gold  in  the  Fortress  of  Spandau  which 
the  Government  acknowledges  contains  140  millions  of  marks.  It  is 
more  than  probable  that  this  is  to  be  kept  as  a  last  resort  in  case 
defeat  should  make  the  defense  of  Germany  itself  necessary. 

97 


PAN-GERMANISM 

tions  for  sinking  funds  to  pay  the  principal  of 
her  debts,  because  she  may  not  need  to  pay  that 
principal.  Every  debt  makes  her  stronger,  every 
loan  makes  her  enemies  weaker.  She  is  well 
aware  that  many  of  her  private  citizens  have 
invested  money  in  other  countries,  that  she,  too, 
is  entangled  in  the  network  of  international  in- 
vestments, but  she  knows  that  the  profits  will 
still  be  enormous,  even  if  her  citizens  lose  every 
penny  they  have  invested  outside  her  borders. 
She  will  get  the  cash  with  which  to  begin  the  war 
by  borrowing  from  her  enemies,  and  she  will  this 
tune  either  commandeer  the  money  in  the  banks 
before  war  is  declared,  or  she  will  make  war  too 
quickly  to  permit  any  repetition  of  the  mano3uvre 
executed  by  the  London  and  Paris  bankers  in  the 
summer  of  1911.  She  cares  very  little  who  claims 
title  to  that  money,  so  long  as  she  has  it,  so  long 
as  they  can  take  it  from  her  only  by  force.  She 
is  conscious  that  German  securities  will  every- 
where fall  in  the  foreign  stock  exchanges  when  war 
actually  begins;  she  also  knows  that  English  and 
French  stocks  will  tumble  likewise,  and,  she  be- 
lieves that  when  the  reaction  of  economic  forces 
is  complete,  the  destruction  of  values  in  England 
and  France  will  be  too  great  to  make  the  loss  of 
value  in  her  own  securities  of  any  significance. 
Besides,  who  own  her  securities?  Who,  there- 

98 


THE  ECONOMIC  SITUATION 

fore,  will  bear  the  fall  in  value?  Her  securities 
are  only  paper.  The  factories  and  fields  they 
actually  represent  are  not  changed  in  value  by 
operations  on  the  stock  market.  The  foreign 
investor  will  lose  money  and  will  bear  the  only 
ostensible  losses  and  will  thus  be  dealt  an  addi- 
tional blow.  Germany,  hi  other  words,  can  fight 
her  enemies  with  their  own  money,  and  may  ob- 
tain not  only  her  industries  for  nothing,  but  her 
army  and  navy  and  the  whole  cost  of  the  war 
as  well.  The  foreigner  may  even  provide  her  with 
the  money  necessary  to  begin  the  war. 

Once  more  the  Germans  hear  around  them 
outcries  against  the  morality  of  this  procedure. 
Once  again  the  Germans  insist  that  morals  and 
ethics  have  nothing  to  do  with  this  particular 
issue.  The  moral  code  of  the  financial  world,  like 
the  moral  code  of  the  political  world,  is  based 
upon  the  notions  of  England  and  France,  upon 
ideas  obviously  themselves  the  result  of  a  pecul- 
iar situation,  on  whose  continuance  the  welfare 
of  England  and  France  depends.  Their  moral 
code  is  based  on  their  ownership  of  the  world  and 
their  desire  to  continue  it  in  perpetuity,  and  their 
moral  code,  therefore,  condemns  Germany  to  in- 
significance. The  Germans  refuse  to  recognize  as 
moral  anything  which  jeopardizes  their  national 
existence.  They  claim  the  right  to  protect  them- 

99 


PAN-GERMANISM 

selves  by  any  weapons  which  will  secure  the  de- 
sired result,  and  they  have  no  intention  of  fore- 
going the  use  of  these  terrible  economic  weapons, 
simply  from  a  supine  acceptance  of  so-called 
ethical  notions,  whose  very  presumptions  mili- 
tate against  them.  The  international  economic 
situation  chances  to  press  less  heavily  upon  Ger- 
many than  upon  other  states,  and  thus  affords 
her  a  significant  natural  advantage  over  other 
states  which  it  would  be  suicidal  to  forego.  If 
worst  comes  to  worst  and  all  else  fails,  she  can 
resort  to  weapons  so  powerful  as  to  destroy  her 
adversaries. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

PREREQUISITES   OF   SUCCESS 

BEFORE  so  vast  a  scheme  as  Pan-Germanism 
can  be  actually  put  into  operation  many 
prerequisites  will  be  necessary  to  insure  its  ulti- 
mate success,  for  Pan-Germanism  aims  at  obtain- 
ing for  Germany  and  her  allies  control  of  the  world 
and  at  insuring  their  retention  of  that  control  for 
at  least  a  generation.  The  absolute  prerequisite 
is  necessarily  the  creation  of  a  great  fleet,  large 
enough  to  insure  freedom  of  passage  of  German 
commerce  through  the  English  Channel  under 
any  and  all  circumstances.  The  fleet  must  be 
large  enough  to  make  dubious  the  outcome  of  a 
battle  with  the  English  fleet,  in  order  to  prevent 
England  from  risking  battle.  Germany,  in  sooth, 
does  not  intend  to  use  her  fleet  for  war.  It  is  a 
purely  defensive  weapon,  intended  to  insure  the 
continuance  of  the  position  she  now  holds  and  of 
that  freedom  of  passage  through  the  Channel, 
which  is  the  prerequisite  of  all  expansion.  Until 
that  is  assured  the  possession  of  colonies,  the 
entrance  to  markets,  the  ability  to  manufacture, 
are  all  worthless.  She  must  not  permit  herself  to 

101 


PAN-GERMANISM 

remain  in  a  position  where  the  outlet  for  her  com- 
merce depends  upon  England's  good  will.  She 
intends  to  create  so  large  a  fleet  that  it  will  com- 
mand, as  a  matter  of  right,  what  Germany  desires. 
Furthermore,  unless  her  fleet  is  large  she  will  not 
be  able  at  the  same  time  to  intimidate  England 
in  the  Channel  and  Russia  in  the  Baltic.  Unless 
she  can  maintain  her  control  on  the  southern 
shore  of  the  Baltic,  all  of  the  normal  outlets  for 
the  commerce  of  North  Germany  might  be  closed 
by  Russia,  and  it  is  almost  as  essential  to  insure 
their  freedom  from  Russian  interference  as  it  is 
to  make  sure  the  English  will  not  close  the  Chan- 
nel. Germany  wishes  nothing  which  she  must 
hold  on  sufferance.  Again,  if  the  Germans  do  not 
succeed  in  building  then-  fleet  fast  enough  actually 
to  endanger  England's  predominance  in  the  Chan- 
nel, they  may  still  compel  her  to  concentrate  her 
fleet  in  the  North  Sea,  and  leave  necessarily  ex- 
posed to  the  attacks  of  Germany's  allies  the  long 
chain  of  forts  and  strategic  places  upon  which 
England  depends  for  the  protection  of  her  water 
routes  to  Asia  and  Africa. 

No  less  necessary  than  a  great  navy  is  a  great 
army,  large  enough  and  efficient  enough  to  pre- 
vent Russia  and  France  by  reason  of  its  existence 
from  thinking  of  war.  The  army  is,  as  the  Ger- 
mans claim,  primarily  defensive.  It  is  the  only 

102 


PREREQUISITES  OF  SUCCESS 

barrier  between  Germany  and  her  enemies.  It 
takes  the  place  of  the  English  Channel,  of  the 
Alps,  of  the  Pyrenees.  The  army,  too,  must  be 
large  enough  to  enable  Germany,  in  case  of  war, 
to  invade  England  without  so  much  exposing 
herself  to  France  and  Russia  as  to  invite  assault 
from  either  or  both.  Indeed,  it  is  highly  essential 
that  the  army  should  be  so  efficient  that  there 
could  be  no  doubt  of  its  repelling  a  combined 
attack  from  both  should  they  take  the  offensive. 
But  sufficient  strength  to  discourage  them  from 
fighting  is  even  more  desirable  from  the  German 
point  of  view,  for  the  Germans  do  not  wish  to 
fight.  They  wish  to  secure  the  results  of  war 
without  the  concomitant  disadvantages,  and  they 
consider  as  the  only  probable  offensive  use  of  the 
army  the  necessary  invasion  of  England.  Again, 
an  army  large  enough  to  make  possible  such 
movements  would  also  be  large  enough  to  put 
into  operation  the  economic  factors,  which  Ger- 
many expects  will  prove  so  advantageous  to  her 
and  so  fatal  to  England  and  France.  Hence, 
every  step  in  the  development  of  such  an  army 
is  a  step  toward  the  achievement  of  Germany's 
purposes  by  that  type  of  offensive  weapon  eu- 
phemistically known  as  peace. 

The  seizure  of  Belgium  and  Holland  will  very 
likely  be  the  first  German  movement  when  the 

103 


PAN-GERMANISM 

actual  accomplishment  of  Pan-Germanism  seems 
fairly  assured.  The  position  of  these  two  coun- 
tries, their  wealth,  and  the  traditions  of  European 
policy  have  gamed  them  so  much  prominence  and 
have  caused  all  nations  to  attach  so  much  im- 
portance to  them,  that  Germany  will  certainly 
not  take  possession  of  them  until  the  last  moment. 
Indeed,  it  has  been  so  long  held  that  an  attack 
upon  the  autonomy  of  Belgium  or  Holland  would 
be  the  equivalent  of  a  declaration  of  war  upon 
Europe  that  Germany  will  certainly  avoid  any 
such  outspoken  manifestation  of  her  intentions. 
Notwithstanding,  their  position  is  an  absolute 
prerequisite  of  the  ultimate  success  of  Pan- 
Germanism,  and  the  railway  lines  for  landing 
troops  in  the  proper  places  are  already  built  and 
the  canals  for  supplying  those  troops  with  food 
are  already  being  dug.  When  the  German  Em- 
peror recently  visited  Belgium  a  remark  was 
made  by  a  certain  dignitary  that  Belgium  was 
prepared,  to  which  he  is  reported  to  have  replied, 
that  they  were  wise  to  prepare. 

But  Germany  needs  the  strategic  points  which 
those  two  countries  control.  The  Netherlands 
alone  can  furnish  her  a  suitable  naval  base  on  the 
Channel  from  which  to  contest  its  possession  with 
the  English  or  from  which  to  intimidate  the  Eng- 
lish fleet  into  permitting  German  ships  complete 

104 


PREREQUISITES  OF  SUCCESS 

freedom  of  passage.  So  long  as  the  German  fleet 
must  operate  from  a  base  of  supplies  as  far  removed 
as  Kiel  from  the  naval  base  of  the  English  in  the 
Thames,  her  position  must  be  at  the  best  anoma- 
lous. The  occupation  of  Holland  would  make  it 
a  reality.  From  Holland,  too,  the  German  army 
could  most  advantageously  invade  England. 
From  Belgium,  it  can  most  easily  reach  Paris. 
With  both  countries  in  their  hands,  an  attack  on 
either  capital  would  be  equally  feasible,  and  the 
capture  of  either  would  be  equally  fatal  to  the 
Triple  Entente. 

The  commercial  significance  of  the  position  of 
Belgium  and  Holland  is  no  less  striking.  They 
control  the  outlet  of  the  Rhine,  and  therefore  can 
prevent  Germany's  complete  utilization  of  the 
splendid  natural  highway,  draining  so  large  and 
so  rich  a  section  of  her  land,  a  highway  so  easily 
connected  with  her  other  river  systems  by  a  net- 
work of  canals.  Plans  are  already  being  executed 
for  a  network  of  canals  between  the  Rhine  and  the 
Westphalian  coal  fields,  by  means  of  which  they 
expect  to  supply  the  fleet  at  its  new  base  and 
which  promise  largely  to  increase  at  once  the 
facilities  of  transportation,  and,  above  all,  to 
reduce  its  cost,  for  the  every-day  trade  of  the 
Empire.  The  possession  of  these  two  countries, 
moreover,  would  at  once  give  Germany  the  great 

105 


PAN-GERMANISM 

colonial  empire  of  which  she  dreams.  Holland 
owns  Java  and  the  Celebes,  admirably  fitted  for 
colonization,  from  whom  for  three  centuries  she 
has  drawn  a  princely  revenue;  she  owns  a  fertile 
section  of  Guiana  and  rich  islands  in  the  West 
Indies  whose  strategic  value  would  also  be  great; 
Belgium  owns  the  vast  Congo  Free  State,  one  of 
the  wealthiest  of  European  dependencies.  Here 
would  be  an  outlet  for  German  manufactures  of 
the  first  importance.  If  their  colonies  alone  could 
be  retained,  Germany  could  restore  the  autonomy 
of  those  states  in  Europe,  pay  a  heavy  war  indem- 
nity, and  yet  find  the  war  well  worth  while. 

Another  prerequisite  of  final  success  would  be 
the  seizure  of  Denmark,  Sweden,  and  Norway. 
With  them  in  her  hands,  the  Baltic  would  be  to 
all  intents  and  purposes  hers.  Russia  would  be 
squeezed  into  its  furthermost  corner.  The  Sund 
could  be  closed  at  will  and  all  Russian  access  to 
the  outside  world  effectually  prevented.  If  such 
a  catastrophe  were  not  sufficient  to  detach  her 
from  the  Triple  Entente,  it  would  certainly  pre- 
vent the  general  financial  panic,  which  would  in 
all  probability  result  in  Europe  on  the  outbreak  of 
war,  from  expending  its  force  upon  Germany  itself; 
for  the  Russians,  once  the  Baltic  was  closed, 
would  be  compelled  to  sell  their  products  to  Ger- 
many in  exchange  for  her  manufactured  goods. 

106 


PREREQUISITES  OF  SUCCESS 

Conceivably  there  might  thus  be  created  a  nexus 
between  the  two  natic  ns  which  might  permanently 
bring  about  some  relationship  freeing  them  both 
from  the  spectre  of  war.  The  annexation  of  the 
Scandinavian  countries  would  also  put  into  Ger- 
many's hands  beyond  a  peradventure  the  great 
supplies  of  iron,  coal,  and  wood  which  the  out- 
break of  war  would  make  far  more  valuable  than 
their  intrinsic  worth  in  time  of  peace.  Nor  does 
she  forget  that  Denmark  still  owns  a  valuable 
colony  or  so  in  the  West  Indies,  which  would  be 
worth  her  while.  Some  arrangement  with  Swit- 
zerland would  also  be  necessary,  although  its 
exact  nature  could  only  be  indicated  by  the  exi- 
gencies of  the  moment.  Napoleon's  phrase  that 
Switzerland  was  the  key  to  Europe  the  Germans 
constantly  bear  in  mind.  Through  Switzerland 
an  attack  could  easily  be  delivered  upon  the  Ger- 
man rear  by  France  in  case  of  war.  Germany  or 
Italy  might  profitably  utilize  it  themselves  for 
an  attack  upon  the  French  rear,  while  the  Austri- 
ans  have  not  forgotten  that  a  military  road  to 
Vienna  runs  through  Switzerland.  However,  Ger- 
many's arrangements  with  Switzerland  will  prob- 
ably be  made  rather  to  prevent  the  utilization  of 
the  Swiss  passes  by  others  than  from  an  expecta- 
tion of  utilizing  them  herself. 

A  most  essential  part  of  the  structure  of  Pan- 
107 


PAN-GERMANISM 

Germanism  is  a  confederation  of  states  in  the  Bal- 
kans either  outwardly  independent  and  secretly 
controlled  by  Germany  or  Austria  or  dependent 
in  some  way  upon  Austria  or  Italy.  The  great 
stretch  of  mountain,  tableland,  and  valley,  ex- 
tending from  the  heights  of  the  Tyrolese  and 
Transylvanian  Alps  to  the  JSgean  and  the  Medi- 
terranean, has  long  been  loosely  designated,  from 
political  rather  than  geographical  reasons,  the  Bal- 
kans. It  boasts  no  real  geographical  unity  and 
has  been  divided  for  political  reasons  into  so  many 
different  entities  at  so  many  different  times  that  it 
is  in  reality  from  every  point  of  view  nothing  but 
a  geographical  expression.  At  the  moment  of  the 
conception  of  Pan-Germanism,  the  states  of  this 
region  were  partly  autonomous,  partly  in  the 
hands  of  Austria,  and  partly  controlled  by  Tur- 
key. The  creation  out  of  them  in  some  way  or 
other  of  some  kind  of  an  entity  or  entities,  which 
the  Triple  Alliance  could  keep  under  its  control, 
is  absolutely  essential  to  the  success  of  the  most 
striking  part  of  Pan-Germanism.  For  in  those 
defiles  and  valleys  are  the  keys  to  Europe.  Down 
along  the  coast  of  the  Black  Sea  runs  the  great 
road  from  Russia  to  Constantinople  and  the  East; 
down  the  Danube  valley,  across  the  river  at  Bel- 
grade, through  the  Balkans  by  way  of  Sophia  and 
Adrianople,  runs  the  great  continental  highway, 

108 


PREREQUISITES  OF  SUCCESS 

trodden  for  a  thousand  years  by  Roman,  Barba- 
rian, Crusader,  Infidel,  leading  from  the  Rhine  and 
Danube  valleys  to  Constantinople  and  the  East. 
Round  through  Macedonia  and  Albania  runs  the 
perfectly  practical  road,  used  long  ago  by  the 
Visigoths,  leading  from  Constantinople  to  Trieste, 
Venice,  and  the  valley  of  the  Po.  At  Saloniki  is  a 
great  port  from  which  a  fleet  might  control  the 
yEgean.  The  western  side  of  the  Balkans  is  the  east- 
ern shore  of  the  Adriatic,  and  its  possession  would 
insure  to  the  Triple  Alliance  complete  control 
of  that  important  sea.  Could  they  secure,  there- 
fore, by  controlling  the  Balkans,  possession  of  the 
great  roads  between  Europe  and  Asia  and  of  the 
strategic  positions  necessary  for  controlling  the 
yEgean  and  the  Adriatic,  the  English  position  in 
the  Mediterranean  might  be  made  untenable.  At 
any  rate,  the  English  so-called  Protectorate  over 
Turkey  and  Greece  would  be  at  once  terminated, 
and  the  possession  by  Italy  and  Austria  of  naval 
bases  in  the  Adriatic  and  the  ^Egean  would  prac- 
tically render  useless  all  the  English  dispositions 
based  upon  Malta  as  a  centre.  Thus  the  Triple 
Alliance  would  secure  a  foothold  and  probable 
control  of  the  eastern  Mediterranean,  and  would 
throw  back  upon  their  base  in  the  western  Medi- 
terranean the  English  and  French  fleets,  and 
might  be  enabled  without  practical  interference 

109 


PAN-GERMANISM 

to  take  possession  of  Egypt  and  Suez.'  Even  if 
so  much  were  not  accomplished,  the  trade  route 
overland  through  Constantinople  into  the  neutral 
territory  of  Turkey,  and  so  by  way  of  the  Baghdad 
Railway  to  the  Persian  Gulf  and  India,  would 
be  a  reality,  and  it  would  be  unassailable  by  the 
English  fleet,  nor  would  it  ever  be  exposed  to  those 
dangers  which  so  constantly  threaten  the  English 
Empire  with  dissolution. 

Chiefest  of  all,  however,  the  existence  of  the 
Balkans,  their  geographical  position,  their  racial 
and  religious  character,  their  traditions  and  his- 
tory, would  furnish  Germany  with  the  necessary 
prize  to  offer  Austria  as  the  price  of  her  assistance 
in  the  execution  of  Pan-Germanism.  The  rulers 
of  Austria  have  long  seen  that  her  expansion  to 
the  north  and  east  was  improbable  and  undesir- 
able; that  her  expansion  to  the  west  was  perma- 
nently blocked  by  the  Alps,  and  that  she  could 
only  expand  to  the  south  along  the  great  plains  of 
the  lower  Danube  and  Black  Sea,  down  through 
the  valleys  of  Servia  to  the  ./Egean,  and  to  thg 
southwest  to  the  Adriatic.  Like  all  other  nations, 
she  sees  the  permanent  assurances  of  her  contin- 
ued national  existence  only  in  the  possession  of  an 
outlet  to  the  sea,  and  a  possible  share  hi  the  com- 
merce with  the  less  developed  parts  of  the  world, 
from  which  her  rivals  are  so  rapidly  obtaining 

110 


PREREQUISITES  OF  SUCCESS 

wealth  and  position.  She  early  found  in  the  Bal- 
kans no  less  powerful  a  rival  than  Russia,  one  as 
determined  as  she  to  secure  similar  opportunity 
for  expansion,  and  one  to  whom  that  opportunity 
is  not  less  essential  than  it  is  to  her.  Between  the 
two  no  compromise  is  possible.  Austria  may  keep 
Russia  out  of  the  Balkans,  but  in  the  face  of  Rus- 
sian opposition  she  cannot  unaided  take  posses- 
sion. The  necessary  assistance,  Germany  and 
Italy  proposed  to  afford  her  through  the  execu- 
tion of  the  great  schemes  for  the  aggrandizement 
of  all  three. 

With  the  Balkans  in  their  hands,  the  reorgan- 
ization of  Turkey  would  be  the  next  essential 
step.  Its  undeniable  importance  is  the  result  of 
the  very  factors  which  have  kept  the  Turk  so  long 
in  possession.  In  the  past,  Europe  considered  its 
many  strategic  points  too  valuable  to  be  owned 
by  any  nation  not  so  inefficient  and  weak  as  to 
render  their  use  improbable.  The  incurable  mal- 
ady of  the  Sick  Man  alone  caused  the  doctors  to 
allow  him  to  live.  First  of  all,  Turkey  holds  the 
bridge  between  Europe  and  Asia,  for  whose  pos- 
session throughout  the  centuries  Roman  and 
Barbarian,  Christian  and  Infidel,  had  so  vigorously 
fought.  The  Turk  also  holds  Asia  Minor,  from 
whose  rich  fields  Rome  had  drawn  a  vast  revenue, 
whose  roads  lead  into  the  great  vales  of  the  Tigris 

111 


PAN-GERMANISM 

and  Euphrates,  where  in  antiquity  stood  the 
greatest  of  the  old  empires.  In  Asia  Minor,  too, 
are  marts  of  trade  from  which  Phoenician  and 
Greek  cities  almost  without  number  had  grown 
rich  and  powerful  and  cultured.  The  whole  North 
African  littoral  owes  allegiance  to  the  Sultan; 
Tripoli  was  still  nominally  administered  by  him, 
and  would  furnish  to  the  Turk's  master  a  strategic 
point  of  the  first  consequence,  flanking  Egypt  on 
the  one  hand  and  Tunis  on  the  other,  furnished 
with  harbors  whence  a  fleet  might  assail  with  con- 
fident expectation  of  success  the  English  lines  of 
communication  with  Suez.  Above  all,  the  Sultan 
is  head  of  the  Mohammedan  religion,  ruling  still 
over  the  countless  hordes  of  Moslems  in  the  Eng- 
lish and  French  possessions  in  Africa  and  Asia, 
to  whom  they  owe  implicit  obedience  and  for 
whose  safety  they  have  often  evinced  the  utmost 
concern.  Indeed,  around  him  is  already  centering 
the  great  movement  known  as  Pan-Islam,  which 
contemplates  nothing  less  than  the  expulsion  of 
the  unbeliever  from  the  lands  of  the  Prophet's 
followers  by  a  great  Jehad  of  unheard-of  dimen- 
sions. Might  not  the  Sultan,  properly  "inspired" 
in  some  way,  be  induced  to  instigate  or  proclaim 
such  a  war  at  a  time  when  English  and  French 
authority  in  Africa  and  Asia  might  for  all  practical 
purposes  be  extinguished  by  it?  An  outbreak  as 

112 


PREREQUISITES  OF  SUCCESS 

general  and  as  powerful  might  conceivably  compel 
them  to  send  reinforcements  from  Europe  to  such 
an  extent  as  to  weaken  them  at  home  and  permit 
Germany  to  begin  the  final  stages  of  the  war  with 
every  prospect  of  complete  success.  Naturally, 
Germany  does  not  expect  to  receive  everything 
and  give  nothing.  She  has  undertaken  the  reor- 
ganization of  Turkey,  the  building  of  an  army  and 
a  navy  adequate  for  the  prosecution  of  such  enter- 
prises, and  she  has,  as  a  matter  of  course,  provided 
the  necessary  financial  backing  to  relieve  the 
Turk  of  pressure  from  his  old  supporters,  England 
and  France,  and  from  all  future  fears  as  to  deficits. 
From  the  Turk  could  be  secured  the  railway 
concession  of  vital  commercial  importance  which 
should  join  Constantinople  with  the  Persian  Gulf, 
and  whose  existence  would  alone  repay  Germany 
and  her  allies  for  all  their  expenditures  and  risks. 
It  would,  of  course,  be  adequately  protected  by  the 
new  Turkish  army  and  fleet.  To  insure  its  safety 
from  an  attack  by  Russia,  Persia  would  be  reor- 
ganized as  an  independent  nation  under  the  Ger- 
man aegis.  Thus  also  would  be  secured  the  coast 
road  along  the  Persian  Gulf  to  India  which  Alex- 
ander had  followed,  thus  also  would  be  insured  to 
Germany  the  control  of  navigation  in  the  Gulf 
itself.  Both  would  put  into  her  hands  invaluable 
points.  She  would  be  led  by  the  coast  road  into 

113 


PAN-GERMANISM 

the  valley  of  the  Indus  behind  the  great  defenses 
at  Quetta;  in  the  rear,  therefore,  of  the  British 
position.  A  fleet  emerging  from  the  Gulf  would 
enter  the  Indian  Ocean  behind  the  English  naval 
defenses,  and  see  all  India  lying  before  her,  unde- 
fended. 

The  Germans  do  not  fail  to  appreciate  that, 
although  they  are  the  originators  of  Pan-German- 
ism and  may  perhaps  not  unreasonably  expect 
to  be  the  chief  gainers  by  it,  they  cannot  hope 
finally  to  achieve  success  without  the  hearty 
cooperation  of  Austria,  of  Italy,  of  Turkey,  of 
Persia,  and,  above  all,  of  the  Balkans.  They  real- 
ize that  these  states  will  by  no  means  enter  a  con- 
flict of  this  magnitude  out  of  love  for  Germany; 
that  they  are  not  likely  to  be  held  to  any  agree- 
ments that  they  may  make  by  a  moral  sense  of 
obligation,  which  the  Germans  themselves  frankly 
deny  is  of  any  validity  in  international  agree- 
ments; that,  unless  they  are  fully  satisfied  with 
their  own  gains,  they  will  themselves  interfere  at 
some  awkward  moment  and  perhaps  prevent  the 
completion  of  the  scheme  at  all.  Therefore,  the 
ultimate  success  of  Pan-Germanism  will  depend 
as  much  upon  the  division  of  the  spoils  when  the 
victory  is  won,  as  upon  any  single  factor,  and 
upon  the  acceptance  beforehand  of  such  plans  for 
the  allotment  of  territory  as  to  satisfy  the  ambi- 

114 


PREREQUISITES  OF  SUCCESS 

tions  of  the  various  parties  without  vitally  offend- 
ing any  other  equally  essential  party.  Divide  et 
Impera.  In  all  probability,  Austria  is  to  get  the 
Adriatic,  access  to  the  sea  through  the  Balkans, 
and  Egypt  and  Palestine;  Italy  will  certainly  ex- 
pect the  rest  of  the  North  African  littoral,  while 
the  Balkan  States,  European  Turkey,  and  Persia 
will  insist  upon  a  guarantee  of  their  autonomy  so 
far  as  their  own  local  affairs  are  concerned.  Ger- 
many, therefore,  will  surrender  the  Mediterra- 
nean to  her  allies  in  exchange  for  India,  the  rest 
of  Africa,  and  the  East  and  West  India  Islands. 
Spain  might  have  to  be  paid  with  a  slice  of  west- 
ern Morocco.  Whether  or  not  the  coalition  will 
be  strong  enough  to  lay  its  hands  on  South 
America  in  defiance  of  the  United  States  will 
have  to  be  determined  by  the  circumstances  of 
their  victory. 


CHAPTER  IX 

FIRST   STEPS 

WHEN  the  historian  leaves  the  considera- 
tion of  schemes  and  plans  and  undertakes 
even  to  sketch  the  course  of  events  in  current  his- 
tory, he  finds  himself  in  the  peculiar  position  for 
a  historian  of  being  overwhelmed  with  details  of 
whose  meaning  he  is  by  no  means  certain.  Indeed, 
he  is  continually  exposed  to  the  danger  of  assum- 
ing that  all  events  have  some  meaning  and  that 
particular  events  are  of  necessity  those  truly 
significant.  While  the  archives  remain  closed 
and  the  diplomatic  correspondence  a  sealed  book, 
while  the  real  answers  to  all  those  questions  he 
most  anxiously  asks  are  known  only  to  a  few  dis- 
tressingly discreet  men,  he  can  hardly  do  more 
than  indicate  the  main  features  of  current  politics, 
which  seem,  after  mature  consideration,  to  have 
an  absolutely  unavoidable  connection  with  the 
execution  of  this  great  scheme.  Indeed,  the  his- 
torian is  in  that  extraordinary  position,  true  of  no 
other  epoch  in  history,  of  knowing  the  plans  far 
more  certainly  than  he  does  their  execution.  He 
must  in  matter  of  fact  be  constantly  prepared, 

116 


FIRST  STEPS 

always  with  due  caution,  to  interpret  facts,  which 
he  frequently  does  not  understand,  by  means  of 
the  schemes  which  he  definitely  knows  to  be  in 
the  minds  of  statesmen.  Nor  is  there  possible  in 
modern  history  anything  like  a  clear  demonstra- 
tion of  the  truth  of  any  single  proposition  by  the 
line  and  precept  familiar  to  investigators  in  other 
fields.  In  the  nature  of  things,  final  proof  of  the 
truth  of  any  single  assertion  is  impossible,  and  will 
continue  to  be  impossible  for  certainly  two  gen- 
erations and  perhaps  a  century.  The  historian, 
therefore,  is  forced  to  do  the  best  he  can,  and  must 
be  more  than  chary  of  attempting  to  deal  with 
anything  except  the  broadest  outlines  of  the  story. 
Exactly  what  relation  to  its  broad  outline  any 
single  series  of  events  may  have,  is  impossible  to 
indicate  with  accuracy,  and  the  reader  must  be 
aware  that  the  historian  is  not  attempting  to  give 
him  certainties,  but  is  forced  to  give  him  state- 
ments which  would  be  considered,  in  treating  any 
period  of  past  history,  conjectures,  but  which  are, 
in  current  history,  literally  the  best  we  have. 

The  authorship  of  the  great  scheme  which  we 
call  Pan-Germanism  is  least  of  all  a  matter  of 
certainty.  There  seems  to  be  little  doubt  that  it 
was  the  product  of  German  thought  and  of  German 
interests,  but  no  student  of  current  affairs  can 
believe  for  a  moment  that  important  aspects  of  it 

117 


PAN-GERMANISM 

were  not  the  result  of  the  views  and  interests  of 
Austria  and  Italy.  Bismarck  was  the  first  states- 
man to  see  all  its  possibilities,  though  we  are  as 
yet  unable  to  be  certain  how  much  of  what  is  now 
called  Pan-Germanism  he  is  actually  responsible 
for.  Von  Bieberstein,  Von  Tirpitz,  and  above  all 
the  present  Emperor,  are  responsible  for  much, 
and  certainly  deserve  the  credit  (or  discredit)  of 
bringing  the  scheme  to  its  present  state  of  per- 
fection. The  date  of  its  origin 1  is  an  even  more 
perplexing  question,  and  could  be  more  definitely 
settled  if  we  were  sure  that  events  of  the  past 
generation  were  all  steps  in  the  development  or 
furtherance  of  the  same  scheme  and  not  of  two  or 
three  schemes,  out  of  which  the  exigencies  of  times 
and  occasions  gradually  developed  the  present 
Pan-Germanism.  The  historian,  who  wishes  to  be 
cautious,  is  inclined  to  take  the  latter  view  and  to 
conclude  that  Pan-Germanism  is  an  outgrowth  of 
the  various  policies  advocated  by  German  states- 
men after  the  formation  of  the  present  empire. 

The  creation  of  the  fleet,  whose  existence  at 
present  is  without  doubt  one  of  the  definitive 
elements  of  Pan-Germanism,  was  probably,  as 
the  Germans  claim,  not  as  vital  a  part  of  it  as  we 

1  Cecil  Batt'me,  in  the  Fortnightly  Review,  xci,  New  Series,  1056, 
1057,  places  the  beginning  of  Pan-Germanism  between  1893  and 
1895.  Article  4  of  the  Constitution  of  1871  indicates  that  colonies 
were  foreseen  at  the  very  beginning. 

118 


FIRST  STEPS 

might  easily  suppose.  As  has  already  been  said, 
the  German  looks  upon  the  fleet  as  the  only 
means  of  insuring  to  Germany  the  continuance 
of  her  present  position,  unfavorable  as  she  con- 
siders that  to  be.  The  fleet  is  essential,  not  so 
much  to  assist  her  expansion  as  to  make  positive 
her  existence.  In  all  probability  there  have  been 
three  phases  of  German  policy:  the  first,  an  at- 
tempt to  secure  colonies;  the  second,  an  attempt 
to  obtain  entrance  into  the  markets  of  the  East 
by  the  establishment  of  a  trade  route  across  the 
Balkans  and  Turkey,  which  formed  by  interna- 
tional agreement  a  neutral  zone;  and  thirdly,  the 
determinedly  aggressive  scheme  for  the  actual 
forcible  conquest  of  the  world.  Exactly  when  the 
one  gave  way  to  the  other,  exactly  which  of  the 
many  events  in  recent  history  belong  to  one  and 
which  to  another,  is  difficult  to  indicate  with 
anything  approaching  accuracy. 

During  the  decade  between  1880  and  1890,  an 
extended  effort  was  made  to  obtain  in  various 
parts  of  the  world  suitable  colonies  for  German 
expansion.  The  land  not  already  occupied  by 
European  nations  was  inconsiderable  in  area, 
unfavorably  located,  thinly  populated,  and  not 
possessed  of  obvious  commercial  advantages; 
but  such  as  was  available  Germany  occupied,  not 
because  she  deemed  it  adequate  provision  for  her 

119 


PAN-GERMANISM 

needs,  but  because,  at  the  moment,  she  saw  no 
other  chances  for  meeting  the  exigencies  which 
she  knew  were  certain  to  arise  within  a  decade. 
The  colonies  thus  founded  on  either  coast  of 
Africa  and  in  the  South  Seas  speedily  proved 
their  unsuitability  for  colonization  by  white  men, 
and  the  improbability  of  their  affording  before 
the  lapse  of  a  century  anything  like  an  adequate 
market  for  German  manufactures.  To  be  sure, 
these  colonies  were  in  area  nearly  a  million  square 
miles,  but  their  products  were  not  greatly  in 
excess  of  five  dollars  value  for  each  square  mile, 
a  sum  too  absurdly  inconsequential  to  be  men- 
tioned. The  population  of  about  fourteen  mil- 
lions was  too  undeveloped  and  too  sparse  to  make 
the  creation  of  a  state  possible.  All  the  desirable 
land  for  colonies,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  was  already 
in  the  hands  of  other  nations,  and  the  Germans 
realized  with  bitterness  that  they  had  been  able 
to  secure  what  they  held,  simply  because  other 
nations  had  not  considered  it  of  value.  It  was 
clear  that  the  execution  of  any  schemes  for  Ger- 
man expansion  would  involve  interference  with 
other  nations. 

The  next  attempt,  probably  only  one  of  several, 
seems  to  have  been  a  variation  of  the  well-known 
European  method  of  taking  possession  of  other 
people's  property,  called  peaceful  penetration. 

120 


FIRST  STEPS 

The  nation,  proposing  to  absorb  a  district  and 
make  a  colony  out  of  it,  loans  money  to  the  ruler 
and  to  as  many  of  his  subjects  as  possible;  obtains 
as  security  for  the  money  advanced,  if  it  can,  a 
part  of  the  public  revenue;  builds  railways  in 
exchange  for  large  grants  of  land,  and,  in  gen- 
eral, "develops"  the  country.  Then,  when  the 
available  resources  have  been  pretty  completely 
hypothecated,  the  nation  claims  that  its  interests 
in  the  territory  are  so  considerable  that  it  must 
be  conceded  a  share  in  the  direction  of  adminis- 
tration and  policy,  in  order  to  insure  the  safety 
of  its  investment.  A  little  study  of  the  situation 
soon  convinced  the  Germans  that  the  French 
influence  in  Morocco,  the  English  influence  in 
Egypt,  the  English  and  Russian  influence  in 
Persia,  and  the  influence  of  the  United  States 
in  Central  America  were  due  precisely  to  these 
methods,  and  the  Germans  saw  no  reason  why 
they  should  not  "peaceably"  penetrate  some  one 
of  the  South  American  nations,  by  pleading  the 
same  highly  moral  purpose  of  developing  the 
country  for  the  use  and  behoof  of  its  inhabitants, 
who  were,  of  course,  to  be  assumed  incapable  of 
developing  it  themselves.  After  some  hesitation, 
they  seemed  to  have  pitched  upon  Venezuela  as 
the  most  favorable  scene  of  operations.  They 
succeeded  in  placing  some  large  loans,  in  buying 

121 


PAN-GERMANISM 

some  mines,  and  in  initiating  a  number  of  busi- 
ness enterprises,  and,  then,  in  most  approved 
fashion,  descended  upon  the  Republic,  anchored 
a  warship  in  its  harbor,  and  made  the  stereo- 
typed demand  for  some  share  in  the  control  of  its 
administration.  Of  course,  the  rest  of  the  world 
promptly  saw  the  trend  of  German  policy,  and, 
with  equal  promptitude,  realized  its  objective; 
the  United  States,  as  the  nearest  country,  in- 
voked against  Germany  a  new  variety  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  and  informed  the  disgusted 
Germans  that  they  would  not  be  permitted  to 
interfere  in  the  government  of  Venezuela.  They 
certainly  could  not  afford  peaceably  to  penetrate 
countries  unless  they  were  to  be  allowed  to  enjoy 
the  profits  of  the  enterprise.  Besides,  they  be- 
came aware,  with  rather  painful  force,  of  the  fact, 
which  they  had  no  doubt  always  known,  that  they 
could  obtain  access  to  such  a  colony  in  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico,  while  England  and  the  United  States 
controlled  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  only  by  the  per- 
mission of  those  two  nations,  both  of  whom  in- 
dicated with  considerable  firmness  their  distinct 
dislike  of  Germany's  proposed  action. 

The  Germans  turned  their  eyes,  therefore,  to 
Africa,  and  in  particular  toward  the  great  tem- 
perate district  of  South  Africa  as  a  zone  becom- 
ingly fitted  by  nature  for  the  use  and  behoof  of 

122 


FIRST  STEPS 

the  white  race.  The  temperate  climate,  the  pre- 
sence of  the  great  diamond  mines,  of  deposits  of 
gold  in  all  probability  huge  in  size,  the  certainty 
of  the  profitableness  of  agriculture  and  cattle- 
raising,  offered  enticing  prospects  for  the  success- 
ful development  there  of  a  great  colony,  which 
would  provide  a  considerable  market  for  German 
goods  and  would  raise  products  of  its  own  with 
which  to  pay  for  them.  German  Southwest 
Africa  would  afford  a  basis  from  which  to  act  in 
case  they  should  ever  desire  to  take  the  offensive, 
but  the  existence  of  the  Boer  Republic  made  it 
probable  that  it  would  not  be  necessary  for  Ger- 
many herself  to  take  the  field;  she  could  much 
more  easily  and  profitably  act  through  the  hands 
of  the  Boers.  The  strained  relations  between  the 
latter  and  the  English  simplified  the  problem  of 
producing  a  casus  belli  for  a  war  which  might 
easily  result  in  robbing  England  of  a  most  valu- 
able colony,  which  Germany  might  succeed  in 
annexing.  In  addition,  the  project  boasted  the 
double  advantage  of  testing  the  strength  of  the 
British  Empire,  its  defensive  ability,  the  loyalty 
of  its  subjects,  and,  whatever  the  result  might  be, 
the  information,  which  the  war  would  certainly 
afford  Germany,  would  be  well  worth  the  money 
and  arms  she  would  have  to  furnish  the  Boers  to 
get  them  to  begin  it.  Supposing  that  the  war 

123 


PAN-GERMANISM 

should  succeed,  should  reveal,  as  the  Germans 
believed  it  would,  the  disloyalty  of  the  English 
colonists  in  South  Africa,  should  make  clear  to  all 
Europe  the  weakness  of  Imperial  England,  the 
moral  results  would  be  without  question  stupen- 
dous. Its  success,  even  if  it  should  result  in  creat- 
ing a  Boer  state  too  strong  for  Germany  to  inter- 
fere with,  would  cut  the  communications  between 
the  Cape  Colony  and  the  vast  estate  of  Rhodesia, 
which  lay  adjacent  to  German  East  Africa,  as 
well  as  to  German  West  Africa,  and  which  could 
then  easily  be  annexed  without  danger  and  with- 
out cost.  To  be  sure,  it  would  be  necessary  to 
tram  the  Boers  in  modern  warfare  and  to  equip 
them  and  furnish  them  with  funds,  and  there  was 
always  the  danger  that  England  would  discover 
the  fact  prematurely  and  take  action  before  the 
Boers  or  Germany  herself  should  be  ready.  How- 
ever, some  risks  were  inevitable. 

The  Boers  took  kindly  to  the  idea.  The  immi- 
gration of  Englishmen  into  their  territory,  the 
rapid  expansion  of  the  English  colonies  to  the 
north  and  south  of  them,  had  shown  them  clearly 
that  their  own  expansion  was  problematical,  be- 
cause the  Uitlanders  were  multiplying  by  immi- 
gration at  a  rate  vastly  in  excess  of  the  natural 
increase  of  the  Boers  and  at  a  rate  which  made 
it  a  certainty  that  many  years  would  not  elapse 

124 


FIRST  STEPS 

before  the  Boers  would  be  outnumbered  to  so 
great  an  extent  that  their  real  power  would  dis- 
appear. From  their  point  of  view,  the  preserva- 
tion of  their  autonomy  depended  upon  action 
before  a  further  increase  of  strength  to  the  Uit- 
landers  should  make  action  impossible.  Every 
year's  delay  only  reduced  their  chances  of  victory. 
Moreover,  they  were  promised  bountiful  assist- 
ance and  all  the  supplies  they  should  need.  There 
is  little  doubt  they  fully  intended  in  case  of  vic- 
tory to  defy  Germany  as  well  as  England,  and,  if 
possible,  cheat  her  of  all  the  advantages  she  had 
hoped  for.  Conscious  of  the  issue,  England  ex- 
erted herself  to  the  utmost  and  inflicted  upon  the 
Boers  in  the  end  a  crushing  defeat.  Not  so  much 
the  wealth  of  her  South  African  domain  excited 
her  as  the  determination  to  make  manifest  to 
Germany  and  the  world  the  strength  of  her  im- 
perial bond.  Her  prestige  she  realized  must  be 
maintained  at  any  cost,  not  only  because  of  the 
conclusions  which  her  subject  peoples  in  India 
and  Egypt  would  draw  from  a  defeat,  but  because 
of  the  conclusions  which  European  nations  would 
draw.  She  simply  could  not  afford  to  be  defeated; 
the  loss  of  the  war  might  precipitate  a  general 
alliance  of  all  Europe  against  her.  To  the  amaze- 
ment of  the  Germans,  England  was  able  to 
finance  the  war  without  too  much  effort,  maintain 

125 


PAN-GERMANISM 

an  army  in  the  field  whose  efficiency,  even  under 
new  and  adverse  conditions,  was  astonishing,  and 
which  was  supplied,  equipped,  and  reinforced 
from  England  despite  the  distance  between  South- 
ampton and  Cape  Town.  Every  nation  in  Eu- 
rope knew  that  England  had  performed  a  feat 
which  it  could  not  perform,  and  had  demonstrated 
a  degree  of  executive  and  military  efficiency  for 
which  no  one  had  given  her  credit.  The  still  more 
crushing  defeat  of  Germany  and  her  schemes  for 
weakening  the  British  Empire  was  accomplished 
by  the  formation  of  the  South  African  Union,  in 
whose  federal  bond  are  comprised  all  the  varied 
peoples  of  South  Africa,  and  in  which  the  Boers 
have  taken  their  place  with  singular  success.  So 
far  as  can  be  seen  by  foreign  observers,  so  far  as 
can  be  told  from  the  statements  of  the  inhabitants, 
the  tact  of  the  English  administrators  has  pretty 
completely  settled  the  grievances  of  the  various 
elements  of  the  European  population,  and  has 
gone  a  long  way  toward  solving  the  perplexing 
race  issue,  caused  by  the  presence  of  so  large  a 
number  of  the  natives. 

German  statesmen,  thus  thwarted,  gave  up, 
so  far  as  can  be  learned,  for  good  and  all  their 
designs  upon  South  Africa,  and  turned  their 
attention  to  the  much  more  feasible  scheme  of 
constructing  an  overland  route  to  the  Persian 

126 


FIRST  STEPS 

Gulf.  Germany  and  Austria  very  well  knew  that 
they  did  not  own  the  territory  stretching  from 
their  own  borders  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  that 
they  could  not  hope  to  take  possession  of  it  in  the 
face  of  the  international  determination  to  pre- 
serve its  neutrality.  They  counted  upon  this  very 
neutrality  as  the  basis  for  their  scheme  of  building 
a  railway  from  Constantinople  to  Baghdad.  To 
relieve  the  fears  of  England  and  Russia,  they  did 
not  propose  to  locate  its  terminus  actually  upon 
the  Persian  Gulf.  After  some  difficulty  and  nego- 
tiation, the  concession  was  secured  from  Turkey 
and  the  acquiescence  of  the  international  concert 
was  obtained.  It  is  not  certain,  but  it  is  highly 
probable,  that  at  this  time  the  real  purpose  of  the 
railway  was  not  suspected  in  London  or  in  St. 
Petersburg.  However  that  may  be,  the  loan  for 
its  construction  was  underwritten  in  Berlin  and 
the  building  of  the  railway  was  begun  in  sections. 
The  details  of  construction  are  hardly  of  conse- 
quence here,  and  it  suffices  to  say  that  the  last  sec- 
tion of  the  road  is  just  about  to  be  begun.  After 
work  was  well  under  way,  England  and  Russia 
realized  its  purport  and  began  to  consider  opera- 
tions in  Persia  which  should  effectively  prevent 
the  railway  from  doing  anything  more  than  de- 
velop Asia  Minor. 

»•    Thwarted  thus  at  every  turn,  German  states- 

127 


PAN-GERMANISM 

men  found  themselves  fairly  driven  to  adopt  the 
comprehensive  aggressive  scheme  which  we  now 
call  Pan-Germanism.  They  began  its  execution 
at  the  point  of  least  resistance  and  by  methods 
so  far  as  possible  of  a  neutral  nature.  The  fleet 
was  already  under  construction;  the  railway  was 
rapidly  being  built;  the  obvious  step  to  take  was 
the  peaceful  penetration  of  Turkey  as  the  neces- 
sary preliminary  for  assuring  Germany  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  concession.  Turkey,  as  every  one 
knew,  was  weak,  disorganized  in  every  way,  and 
nothing  could  be  more  natural  than  an  attempt 
by  the  Sultan  himself  at  the  proper  administra- 
tion of  his  own  country  and  the  adoption  of  finan- 
cial measures  which  would  insure  the  payment  of 
his  debts  and  his  household  revenue.  The  Sultan 
eagerly  accepted  the  secret  tender  of  German 
assistance  in  the  accomplishment  of  such  ex- 
tremely desirable  ends,  and  began,  apparently 
upon  his  own  initiative  but  really  under  German 
direction,  the  reorganization  of  the  army  and 
navy,  the  reorganization  of  the  finances  of  his 
empire,  gradually  introducing  German  officers 
into  the  important  positions  in  the  state.  Men 
were  appointed  governors  of  provinces  to  intro- 
duce local  reforms  calculated  to  diminish  the 
amount  of  racial  warfare,  the  friction  between 
the  soldiery  and  the  populace,  and  to  minimize 

128 


FIRST  STEPS 

the  difficulties  arising  from  the  old  struggle  be- 
tween the  Latin  and  Greek  Churches.  Gradually, 
Germany  insinuated  herself  into  the  confidence 
of  the  Young  Turk  party,  already  long  in  exist- 
ence, and  whose  main  aim  was  to  cast  off  the 
foreign  rule  which  had  so  long  pressed  hardly 
upon  the  Turk  and  had  drained  his  country  of 
its  resources  for  the  satisfaction  of  foreign  debts 
for  whose  making  the  Turk  himself  was  not  re- 
sponsible. Eventually,  by  means  of  the  agitation 
undertaken  by  the  Young  Turks,  organized  by 
the  Committee  of  Union  and  Progress  at  Saloniki, 
a  revolution  was  accomplished  (probably  with 
the  connivance  of  the  Sultan),  a  constitution  was 
adopted,  a  new  Sultan  took  office,  responsible 
government  began,  and  Turkey  was  thus  freed 
from  the  treaty  obligations  made  by  the  older 
rSgime,  which  had  given  every  nation  except  Ger- 
many some  obvious  interest  to  defend  and  there- 
fore some  obvious  right  to  interfere.  If  Germany 
was  to  base  her  scheme  of  Pan-Germanism  upon 
the  control  of  Turkey,  she  must  certainly  control 
it  by  means  of  a  government  owing  its  very  exist- 
ence to  her.  The  price  of  the  support  of  the  Turks 
was  to  be  the  autonomy  of  Turkey  in  local  govern- 
ment, and  protection  from  the  interference  of  her 
old  "friends." 

Meanwhile,  the  Germans  diligently  investi- 
129 


PAN-GERMANISM 

gated  the  condition  of  affairs  in  the  Balkans,  in 
Morocco,  Persia,  Egypt,  and  India.  They  found 
in  all  a  native  party  of  some  considerable  strength 
and  vigor,  which  had  already  had  continuous  ex- 
istence for  a  decade  or  more,  and  whose  main 
object  was  the  obtaining  of  autonomy  and  the 
exclusion  of  the  foreigner.  Those  parties  had  been 
nourished  upon  the  democratic  literature  of  the 
Occidental  nations,  had  been  fired  with  enthu- 
siasm for  self-government  by  the  spectacle  of  par- 
liamentary and  republican  government  in  Europe 
and  in  the  United  States,  and,  in  fact,  had  as- 
sumed that  no  small  share  of  the  prosperity  of  the 
Western  nations  and  the  greater  part  of  their 
strength  were  due  to  their  form  of  government. 
The  natives  saw  that  it  would  be  profitable  and 
pleasurable  for  them  to  govern  themselves,  or, 
as  a  cynic  would  be  more  inclined  to  put  it,  for 
them  to  govern  their  less  progressive  countrymen. 
In  these  subject  countries  of  Europe,  Asia,  and 
Africa,  the  power  so  long  in  control  had  been 
alien  in  race  and  religion,  had  long  systematic- 
ally sacrificed  the  interests  of  the  people  to  the 
assumed  exigencies  of  international  politics,  and 
had  placed  upon  the  country  heavy  financial 
burdens  for  the  production  of  a  revenue  which 
the  people  themselves  were  not  allowed  to  spend, 
and  for  which  few  natives  considered  that  the 

130 


FIRST  STEPS 

people  even  received  an  equivalent.  In  Africa, 
Asia  Minor,  and  Egypt  the  majority  of  the  people 
were  Mohammedans,  who  had  long  chafed  under 
the  control  of  the  Infidel,  and  who  were  only  too 
ready  to  enlist  in  a  movement  for  a  change  of 
government,  which  would  possess  the  sanction 
of  a  religious  crusade.  The  ground,  therefore, 
was  ready  for  the  Germans,  and  the  tools  to  till 
it  were  at  hand. 

In  the  Balkans,  a  peculiar  admixture  of  races 
and  religions  had  produced  a  singularly  complex 
situation,  in  which  the  various  forces  reacted 
upon  each  other  with  continually  surprising  re- 
sults. At  the  same  time,  so  far  as  the  people  them- 
selves were  concerned,  the  two  great  issues  were 
religious,  —  the  survival  of  the  crusade  of  the 
Christian  against  the  Turk,  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  of  the  still  older  quarrel  between  the  Latin 
and  Greek  Churches.  From  both  of  these  counts, 
as  well  as  on  many  national  and  racial  issues,  dis- 
content was  rife,  and  could  in  all  probability  be 
turned  to  political  advantage  by  Germany  and 
her  ally,  Austria.  Above  all  was  this  probable 
because  the  most  evident  enemy,  the  oldest  and 
the  worst  hated  enemy  of  all  the  Balkan  peoples, 
was  the  Turk,  whose  rule  over  them  had  long 
furnished  them  with  practically  the  only  senti- 
ment they  had  hi  common,  a  vigorous  hatred  of 

131 


PAN-GERMANISM 

the  Infidel.  Now,  when  Germany  should  have 
reorganized  Turkey  and  have  gotten  the  Sultan, 
and  the  administration,  to  say  nothing  of  the 
army  and  navy,  well  into  her  hands,  what  would 
be  simpler  than  for  her  to  permit  the  Balkan 
nations  to  begin  this  war  under  her  direction, 
and  thus  secure  their  gratitude  by  the  realization 
of  the  ideals  cherished  for  so  many  centuries? 
Would  it  not  also  be  easy  to  satisfy  in  the  most 
thoroughgoing  manner  their  oft-repeated  de- 
mands for  the  freedom  from  oppression  of  their 
co-religionists  in  Macedonia  and  Albania?  It 
seemed  highly  probable  to  the  Balkan  nations 
that  they  could  not  fail  to  be  gainers  by  an  alli- 
ance of  this  sort,  and,  while  they  hesitated,  like 
the  man  in  the  fable,  to  admit  the  camel  to  their 
tent,  they  fully  realized  that  the  German  offers 
did  not  present  them  the  alternative  of  rejection. 
Should  they  not  see  fit  amicably  to  come  to  an 
agreement  with  Austria  and  Germany,  they  would 
not  unlikely  run  the  risk  of  absorption  by  force 
at  some  future  time,  when  they  would  certainly 
not  receive  such  favors  as  the  terms  suggested. 
Like  the  Trojans,  they  feared  the  Greeks  even 
when  they  came  bearing  gifts ;  but,  if  it  was  danger- 
ous to  accept  the  presents,  it  was  more  dangerous 
to  decline  them.  Under  any  circumstances,  they 
did  not  see  that  money,  munitions  of  war,  mili- 

132 


FIRST  STEPS 

tary  instruction  by  German  and  Austrian  officers, 
assistance  in  the  fortification  of  their  own  coun- 
try could  be  so  very  undesirable,  and  it  was  as 
clear  to  them  as  it  was  to  their  new  friends  that 
such  weapons  would  be  susceptible  of  more  than 
one  use.  Indeed,  the  weapons  and  instruction 
were  of  themselves  a  guarantee  of  their  new  allies' 
good  faith. 

In  Morocco,  the  Germans  found  an  even  more 
favorable  scene  of  operations.  They  learned  that 
the  Sultan  had  governed  regularly  by  forming 
alliances  with  part  of  the  tribesmen  against  the 
rest.  By  clever  diplomacy  and  the  occasional  use 
of  money,  he  had  managed  to  keep  them  jealous 
of  one  another  and  prevented  their  uniting  against 
him.  His  main  dependence,  nevertheless,  was  the 
existence  of  an  army  of  mercenaries  whose  size 
was  distinctly  limited  by  his  own  poverty.  The 
French  had  come  to  his  rescue  and  had  provided 
him  with  a  highly  trained  force  of  really  remark- 
able soldiers,  sufficiently  numerous  to  keep  him 
in  the  ascendency.  The  tribesmen  looked  upon 
the  presence  of  the  French,  therefore,  with  any- 
thing but  favor,  for  they  saw  that  the  latter  were 
rapidly  making  it  possible  for  the  Sultan  to  defy 
the  tribesmen  even  if  united,  an  eventuality  which 
certainly  meant  the  coming  of  an  era  vastly  differ- 
ent from  the  age  of  license  and  rapine  to  which 

133 


PAN-GERMANISM 

they  had  so  long  been  accustomed.  On  general 
grounds,  therefore,  they  welcomed  the  advances 
of  the  Germans,  scenting  probably  presents  of 
money  or  arms,  and  suspecting  that  the  latter 
might  aid  them  to  restore  the  conditions  to  what 
they  had  been  before  the  French  interfered.  The 
rapacity  of  the  Sultan,  his  anxiety  to  collect  the 
uttermost  farthing  due  him,  the  imposition  of 
new  taxes  from  time  to  time,  and,  above  all,  the 
actual  exercise  of  force  for  securing  obedience 
gave  the  tribes  only  too  ample  evidence  of  the  ex- 
cellent basis  for  their  fears.  The  new  French  na- 
tive regiments,  moreover,  conducted  themselves 
with  a  license  unbecoming  soldiers  and  aroused 
against  themselves  the  hatred  of  the  people.  So 
considerable  was  the  number  of  such  cases  that 
they  formed  one  of  the  chief  excuses  for  German 
interference.  Nor  did  the  Germans  forget  that 
an  army  as  large  and  as  extraordinary  in  quality 
as  the  French  force  in  Morocco  might  become  a 
distinct  factor  in  a  European  war.  They  would 
therefore  be  making  no  mistake  in  providing  this 
army  with  too  much  work  in  Morocco  to  permit 
its  departure. 

In  Persia  also  the  Germans  made  good  head- 
way. The  opposition  on  national  grounds  to  the 
encroachments  of  England  and  Russia  was  con- 
siderable, but  lacked  a  definite  aim  and  capable 

134 


FIRST  STEPS 

organization,  and  the  revolutionary  party  lacked 
the  necessary  money  to  finance  a  revolt.  The 
money,  the  Germans  were  more  than  willing  to 
provide  in  exchange  for  a  reasonable  prospect  of 
success.  The  English  and  Russians  speedily  per- 
ceived the  trend  of  the  German  plans,  and,  as  the 
Baghdad  Railway  added  mile  after  mile  in  the 
mountains  of  the  Caucasus  and  the  sentiment  in 
favor  of  Persian  independence  grew  more  and 
more  outspoken,  they  realized  the  necessity  of 
some  action.  They  therefore  sent  a  commission 
to  study  the  situation,  who  reported,  with  grave 
irony,  that  the  Persians  were  incapable  of  self- 
government,  and  suggested  that  England  and 
Russia  should  interfere  to  prevent  the  longer 
continuance  of  the  existing  state  of  anarchy.  In 
1907,  England  and  Russia  acted  in  accordance 
with  the  commission's  recommendations,  and 
two  zones  of  influence  were  demarcated,  one  in 
the  north  in  which  Russia  should  predominate, 
and  the  second  in  the  south  along  the  Gulf  where 
England  was  to  be  supreme,  and  a  neutral  zone 
between  them  whose  affairs  the  Persians  were  to 
be  allowed  to  direct  with  such  interference  as 
England  and  Russia  combined  might  see  fit  to 
interpose. 

The  Powers   could  certainly  have  taken  no 
step  which  would  have  done  more  to  strengthen 

135 


PAN-GERMANISM 

the  German  plans.  The  evident  insult  to  the 
capacity  of  the  Persians  resulted  in  a  national 
movement  of  the  capable  men  in  the  country, 
who  executed  promptly,  with  German  assist- 
ance, a  coup  (TStat  in  1909,  by  which  Persia  was 
entirely  reorganized,  a  constitution  adopted,  a 
new  Shah  chosen,  and  the  administration  and 
finances  of  the  country  put  into  the  hands  of 
foreigners,  whose  experience  in  government  and 
in  business  was  expected  to  teach  the  Persians 
how  to  conduct  their  own  affairs,  and,  what  was 
equally  important,  to  put  the  new  government 
on  its  feet  financially.  The  most  important  of 
these  officials  was  the  Treasurer,  an  American 
named  Shuster,  whose  energy,  ability,  and  firm 
belief  in  the  expediency  and  desirability  of  Per- 
sian independence,  accomplished  wonders.  To  be 
sure,  Germany  had  not  quite  looked  for  the  es- 
tablishment of  a  firm,  well-organized,  and  really 
independent  national  state  in  Persia;  there  can 
be  little  doubt  that  she  had  expected  to  supplant 
England  and  Russia  in  Persia  by  means  of  an 
ostensible  revolution;  still,  the  creation  of  a 
Persian  government,  really  strong  enough  to  ex- 
clude Russia  and  England,  would  be  almost  as 
advantageous  to  her  as  the  exercise  of  control 
herself. 

Progress  in  sowing  the  wind  in  Egypt  and  India 
136 


FIRST   STEPS 

was  also  considerable.  In  both,  to  be  sure,  she 
found  a  native  movement  among  the  Mohamme- 
dans favoring  Pan-Islam  and  the  exclusion  of  for- 
eigners, and  which  was  therefore  anxious  to  put  an 
end  to  English  influence  and  administration.  It 
seems  to  be  exceedingly  doubtful  whether  Ger- 
many ever  contemplated  anything  more  in  Egypt 
and  India  than  the  creation  of  trouble  for  Eng- 
land. Certainly,  any  promises  of  actual  assistance 
to  the  malcontents  could  hardly  have  carried 
weight.  The  knowledge,  which  she  certainly  did 
impart  to  the  leaders,  that  forces  were  at  work 
in  Europe  tending  to  undermine  the  English  posi- 
tion, that  there  were  European  states  who  be- 
lieved England  weak  and  who  sympathized  with 
the  peoples  she  ruled,  that  before  a  not  too  dis- 
tant day  England  might  be  racked  by  the  torment 
of  a  great  war  in  Europe,  all  seemed  to  the  Hindus 
too  good  to  be  true.  It  certainly  meant  that  Eng- 
land would  be  unable  to  devote  all  her  atten- 
tion to  suppressing  revolts  in  India,  and  that  it 
behooved  them  to  prepare  themselves  for  the 
dawning  of  the  day,  when  they  might  practically 
obtain  their  independence  for  the  asking.  This 
news  put  vitality  into  the  movement  of  Pan- 
Islam.  It  is  not  beyond  the  bounds  of  prob- 
ability that  German  money  was  an  important 
factor  in  this  vitality,  money  which  she  probably 

137 


PAN-GERMANISM 

borrowed    with    characteristic    nonchalance    in 
London. 

By  the  year  1910,  therefore,  the  work  was  well 
under  way  in  all  directions  for  the  creation  of 
Pan-Germanism. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE    SIGNIFICANT    POSITION    OF    THE    UNITED 
STATES 

ONCE  the  magnitude  of  Pan-Germanism 
dawned  on  the  English  and  French  diplo- 
mats, once  they  became  aware  of  the  lengths  to 
which  Germany  was  willing  to  go,  they  realized 
the  necessity  of  strengthening  their  position,  and 
therefore  made  overtures  to  the  United  States, 
which  resulted,  probably  before  the  summer  of 
the  year  1897,  in  an  understanding  between  the 
three  countries.  There  seems  to  be  no  doubt 
whatever  that  no  papers  of  any  sort  were  signed, 
and  that  no  pledges  were  given  which  circum- 
stances would  not  justify  any  one  of  the  contract- 
ing parties  in  denying  or  possibly  repudiating. 
Nevertheless,  an  understanding  was  reached  that 
in  case  of  a  war  begun  by  Germany  or  Austria  for 
the  purpose  of  executing  Pan-Germanism,  the 
United  States  would  promptly  declare  in  favor  of 
England  and  France  and  would  do  her  utmost  to 
assist  them.  The  mere  fact  that  no  open  acknow- 
ledgment of  this  agreement  was  then  made  need 
not  lessen  its  importance  and  significance.  The 

139 


PAN-GERMANISM 

alliance,  for  it  was  nothing  less,  was  based  upon 
infinitely  firmer  ground  than  written  words  and 
sheets  of  parchment,  than  the  promises  of  indi- 
viduals at  that  moment  in  office  in  any  one  of  the 
three  countries;  it  found  its  efficient  cause  as  well 
as  the  efficient  reason  for  its  continuance  in  the 
situation,  geographical,  economic,  and  political, 
of  the  contracting  nations  which  made  such  an 
agreement  mutually  advantageous  to  them  all. 
So  long  as  this  situation  remains  unchanged,  there 
is  little  likelihood  that  the  agreement  will  be 
altered,  and  there  is  no  possibility  whatever  of 
its  entire  rejection  by  one  of  the  three  parties, 
least  of  all  by  the  United  States. 

The  United  States  occupies  a  strategic  position 
defensively  strong,  but  offensively  weak.  She  is 
beyond  question  invulnerable  to  the  assaults  of 
foreign  fleets  and  armies.  To  be  sure,  her  sea- 
coast  is  vast  in  extent  and  for  the  most  part  un- 
protected. It  has  been  truly  pointed  out  that  the 
Japanese  might  successfully  land  an  army  upon 
the  Pacific  Coast,  or  the  Germans  land  an  army 
in  New  York  or  Boston  practically  without  oppo- 
sition. Sed  cui  bono?  The  strategical  and  geo- 
graphical conditions  of  the  country  on  either 
coast  are  such  that  a  foreign  army  would  occupy 
the  ground  it  stood  on  and  no  more.  The  British 
discovered  in  the  Revolutionary  War  that  the 

140 


POSITION  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

occupation  of  New  York,  Boston,  and  Philadel- 
phia put  them  no  nearer  the  military  possession 
of  the  continent  than  they  were  before,  and  that 
marching  through  provinces  was  not  subduing 
them.  However  seriously  the  capture  of  New 
York  might  cripple  our  commercial  and  railway 
interests,  the  difficulty,  even  at  its  worst,  could 
be  easily  overcome  by  shifting  the  centre  of  busi- 
ness for  the  time  being  to  Chicago,  and  the  pos- 
session of  New  York  would  certainly  not  permit 
a  foreign  army  to  conquer  the  country,  even  if  it 
were  possible  for  any  nation  to  maintain  an  army 
so  far  from  its  real  base  of  supplies  in  Europe. 
The  possibility  of  invasion  is  made  of  no  conse- 
quence by  the  simple  fact  that  no  foreign  na- 
tion possesses  any  inducement  for  attempting  so 
eminently  hazardous  an  enterprise.  The  United 
States  possesses  literally  nothing  which  any  for- 
eign nation  wants  that  force  would  be  necessary 
to  obtain,  while,  by  making  war  upon  the  United 
States,  she  would  certainly  expose  herself  to  anni- 
hilation at  the  hands  of  her  enemies  in  Europe, 
who  have  patiently  waited  for  decades  in  the  hope 
that  some  one  of  them  would  commit  so  capital 
a  blunder.  But  this  very  invulnerability  of  the. 
United  States  prevents  her  from  becoming  a 
dominant  or  even  an  important  factor  in  Euro- 
pean politics.  If  European  nations  cannot  menace 

141 


PAN-GERMANISM 

her  with  armed  reprisal  or  with  wars  for  conquest, 
she  is  equally  incapable  of  menacing  them.  The 
fact,  which  has  been  from  her  own  standpoint 
heretofore  an  unmixed  blessing,  which  has  allowed 
her  people  to  beat  their  swords  into  ploughshares 
and  their  spears  into  pruning  hooks,  becomes 
her  greatest  weakness,  once  she  is  filled  with 
an  ambition  to  play  a  part  hi  the  affairs  of  the 
world. 

Unpalatable  as  the  fact  may  be,  the  interna- 
tional situation,  the  close  balance  of  power  be- 
tween the  Triple  Alliance  and  the  Triple  Entente 
rather  than  the  position  of  the  United  States  has 
made  her  a  factor  in  international  politics.  In- 
deed, if  we  would  be  truly  accurate,  we  must  ad- 
mit that  the  inter-relation  of  the  various  parts  of 
the  European  situation,  more  even  than  its  deli- 
cate balance,  makes  the  United  States  a  factor; 
for  the  complexity  of  the  problems  of  no  one 
group  of  states,  whether  in  Europe,  in  the  Middle 
East,  or  in  the  Far  East,  could  possibly  allow  the 
United  States  to  play  a  prominent  part.  In  each, 
the  natural  antipathies  counteract  each  other. 
Only  the  fact  that  every  nation  is  anxious  to 
maintain  or  win  power  or  wealth  in  Europe  and 
Africa  and  Asia  makes  the  United  States  of  any 
value  to  any  of  them.  Indeed,  it  is  only  as  Euro- 
pean questions  become  themselves  factors  in  the 

142 


POSITION  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES 

larger  problems  of  India,  Morocco,  and  the  Medi- 
terranean that  they  can  concern  the  United  States 
at  all.  As  soon  as  European  politics  became  world 
politics  and  Asiatic  and  African  problems  became 
European,  the  United  States  began  to  be  a  factor 
in  their  solution.  She  has,  to  be  sure,  no  vital 
stake  in  any  one  of  these  fields.  She  cannot,  even 
if  she  would,  risk  in  war  the  same  stake  European 
nations  do,  her  independence;  the  Atlantic  on 
the  one  side,  the  Pacific  on  the  other,  defend  her 
more  completely  than  could  fleets  and  coalitions. 
Nothing  short  of  the  creation  of  world  politics  by 
other  nations  could  make  the  position  of  the 
United  States  of  consequence  at  all.  The  most 
vital  fact,  however,  about  the  European  situation 
is  that  no  nation  possesses  the  same  natural  allies 
in  all  parts  of  the  world.  England  and  France  are 
one  in  opposing  the  extension  of  German  author- 
ity in  Europe;  but  nothing  short  of  their  extreme 
danger  in  the  Mediterranean  at  the  time  of  the 
Crimean  War  and  the  perils  to  which  they  have 
been  exposed  in  Europe  since  the  Franco-Prussian 
War  has  buried  the  enmity  resulting  from  deadly 
strife  in  America  and,  especially,  in  India.  Russia 
is  the  firm  ally  of  both  England  and  France  in 
Europe;  she  is  their  deadliest  foe  in  the  Black 
Sea,  in  Persia,  India,  and  China;  yet,  to  oppose 
Germany,  we  see  Russia  and  England  amicably 

143 


PAN-GERMANISM 

enough  uniting  in  the  Near  East.  Germany  must 
secure  French  and  English  aid  to  defend  herself 
permanently  against  Russia  on  the  east,  but  finds 
her  natural  allies  against  Russia  her  greatest 
competitors  in  trade,  and  the  most  determined 
opponents  to  her  expansion  on  the  west.  Never- 
theless, at  the  very  moment  that  we  find  Germany 
and  England  ready  to  spring  at  each  other's 
throats  in  Europe,  we  see  them  guarding  the  rail- 
way to  Pekin  together  and  acting  in  concert  about 
the  Chinese  loans. 

The  variety  of  the  interests  of  these  nations 
makes  it  impossible  for  them  permanently  or 
entirely  to  trust  or  distrust  each  other.  England, 
who  needs  Russia's  aid  in  Europe  in  the  Near 
East,  cannot  act  too  determinedly  in  opposition 
to  Russian  advance  in  Afghanistan  and  Manchu- 
ria. Germany,  whose  quarrels  with  Hapsburg  and 
the  Pope  fill  the  history  of  the  Middle  Ages,  must 
have  their  assistance  to  protect  herself  in  Europe. 
In  all  this  the  United  States  has  unquestionably 
no  part.  Not  her  strategic  position,  not  her  mili- 
tary strength,  but  her  economic  position  makes 
her  an  ally  particularly  indispensable  to  England 
and  France.  Not  their  economic  position  but  her 
desire  for  colonies,  her  ambition  to  play  a  part 
in  the  politics  of  the  world,  makes  an  alliance 
with  England  and  France  indispensable  to  the 

144 


POSITION  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

United  States.  But  she  can  enter  world  politics 
only  with  the  consent  of  European  nations. 

The  economic  position  of  the  United  States  in 
the  modern  world  is  commanding.  Her  area  is  so 
vast  and  its  productivity  so  great,  her  natural  re- 
sources so  nearly  unlimited  and  so  great  in  variety, 
that  scarcely  a  country  in  the  world,  one  had  al- 
most said  no  continent  in  the  world,  can  hope  to 
rival  her.  While  her  population  is  not  yet  numer- 
ous enough  to  make  her  dangerous,  it  is  none  the 
less  amply  sufficient  to  render  her  in  potential 
military  strength  one  of  the  greatest  of  civilized 
countries.  She  possesses,  in  fact,  precisely  what 
England  and  France  lack  —  almost  inexhaustible 
natural  resources;  arable  land  almost  without 
limit;  food  sufficient  to  feed  all  Europe;  great  de- 
posits of  gold,  copper,  iron,  silver,  coal;  great  sup- 
plies of  cotton  sufficient  for  the  Lancashire  cotton 
mills;  hi  short,  she  possesses  the  very  resources 
needed  to  make  the  economic  position  of  England 
and  France  fairly  impregnable.  Allied  with  her, 
they  could  not  be  starved  into  submission  nor 
bankrupted  by  the  lack  of  materials  to  keep  their 
looms  running.  In  addition,  she  possesses  the 
second  greatest  steel  manufactory  in  the  world, 
which  owns  the  patents  and  secret  processes 
upon  which  Bessemer  steel  depends,  a  product 
surpassed  for  war  materials  only  by  the  Krupp 

145 


PAN-GERMANISM 

steel.  The  width  of  the  Atlantic  effectively  pre- 
vents any  interference  by  European  Powers  with 
the  continuance  in  time  of  war  of  her  agricultural 
and  industrial  activities.  Whatever  happens  in 
Europe,  she  can  continue  to  produce  the  raw  ma- 
terials and  finished  products  they  need,  and,  what 
is  more  important,  she  will  furnish  them  in  time 
of  war  a  huge  market  for  the  sale  of  such  manu- 
factured goods  as  they  can  continue  to  make. 

The  United  States,  furthermore,  is  the  third 
financial  power  in  the  world.  Not  only  is  her 
wealth  vast,  not  only  is  her  surplus  capital  con- 
siderable, but  the  organization  of  business  has, 
most  fortunately  from  the  point  of  view  of  inter- 
national politics,  concentrated  the  control  of  the 
available  capital  for  investment  in  the  hands  of 
comparatively  few  men.  The  trusts,  the  banks, 
and  the  insurance  companies  have  made  available 
for  investment  huge  sums,  only  less  in  size  than 
those  controlled  in  London  and  Paris.  It  is  highly 
essential  that  Germany  should  not  be  allowed 
to  establish  relations  with  any  such  capital.  It 
would  provide  her  with  precisely  that  financial 
backing  which  she  needs.  At  all  costs  the  United 
States  and  Germany  must  be  kept  apart.  England, 
too,  is  anxious  to  turn  this  capital  into  her  own 
colonies,  and  is  willing  and  anxious  to  invest  her 
capital  in  the  United  States,  for  both  would  gain 

146 


POSITION  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

from  this  mutual  dependence,  and  each  would 
furnish  the  other  fields  for  investment  on  whose 
reliability  they  could  both  depend.  The  English 
are  naturally  anxious  to  shift  their  investments 
from  Germany  to  some  country  where  they  will 
not  be  exposed  to  destruction  by  war  or  to  con- 
fiscation based  upon  war  as  an  excuse. 

Fortunately  for  England  and  France,  the 
United  States,  whose  economic  assistance  is  posi- 
tively imperative  for  them,  finds  their  assistance 
equally  imperative.  In  the  first  place,  the  United 
States  depends  upon  the  English  merchant  ma- 
rine to  carry  her  huge  volume  of  exports,  and, 
should  she  not  be  able  to  use  it,  would  suffer  ser- 
iously, even  if  the  inability  to  export  continued 
only  a  few  weeks.  Again,  a  market  as  certain  and 
as  large  as  that  of  England  and  France  for  her 
raw  materials  and  food  is  absolutely  essential  to 
her,  and  the  outbreak  of  a  war,  which  might  close 
those  markets  to  her,  would  precipitate  unques- 
tionably a  financial  crisis,  whose  results  could  not 
fail  to  equal  in  destructiveness  the  effect  upon 
private  individuals  of  a  great  war.  The  United 
States  has  come  to  realize,  as  have  other  nations, 
that  there  are  many  ways  in  which  a  modern 
country  can  be  forced  to  suffer  which  are  as  deadly 
and,  in  many  cases,  more  deadly  than  invasion. 
Furthermore,  she  needs  a  market  in  England  and 

147 


PAN-GERMANISM 

France  for  her  own  manufactured  goods,  and  has 
grown  to  depend  upon  receiving  from  them  in 
return  many  varieties  of  manufactured  goods. 
She  simply  cannot  afford  to  take  any  chances  of 
losing  her  markets  in  those  two  countries,  nor  has 
she  ceased  to  hope  for  privileges  of  some  sort  in 
the  English  and  French  dependencies,  which  other 
nations  do  not  have,  and  which,  should  worst 
come  to  worst,  she  could  undoubtedly  obtain 
from  them  as  the  price  of  her  continued  assistance. 
It  is  perhaps  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  the  pro- 
sperity of  the  United  States  so  much  depends 
upon  the  preservation  of  her  relations  with  Eng- 
land and  France  that  in  time  of  war  only  an  alli- 
ance with  them  would  save  her  from  almost 
certain  bankruptcy. 

England  and  France,  however,  expect  to  retain 
the  alliance  by  permitting  her  to  fulfill  her  ambi- 
tions for  control  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  Ever 
since  the  days  when  Louisiana  was  first  purchased, 
the  men  of  the  Mississippi  Valley  have  dreamed 
of  the  extension  of  the  sway  of  the  United  States 
over  Central  America  and  the  Gulf.  Aaron  Burr's 
expedition  aimed  probably  at  the  creation  of  an 
empire  out  of  the  Mississippi  Valley  and  Mexico. 
The  Mexican  War  was  certainly  fought  in  the 
expectation  that  valuable  territory  in  the  Gulf 
might  be  acquired  into  which  slaves  might  profit- 
148 


POSITION  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

ably  be  carried.  When  the  war  failed,  a  filibuster- 
ing expedition  led  by  Walker,  with  connivance  of 
the  authorities  at  Washington,  was  intended  to 
secure  for  the  United  States  possession  of  one  or 
more  of  the  Central  American  countries.  There 
was  also  the  scheme,  in  whose  existence  the  North 
believed  previous  to  the  war,  for  the  conquest  of 
the  whole  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the  creation  there 
of  a  slaveocracy  whose  wealth  and  independence 
could  easily  be  assured  by  the  production  of 
cotton,  sugar,  and  tobacco.  All  these  schemes  met 
a  determined  resistance  and  interference  from 
England  and  France  which  invariably  proved 
decisive.  Nor  could  the  United  States  hope  to 
take  possession  of  lands  separated  from  her  coast 
by  water,  with  which  she  could  communicate 
only  by  sea,  so  long  as  the  English  fleet  controlled 
the  seas  and  she  herself  possessed  no  fleet  at  all. 
The  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  was  intended  to 
prevent  the  acquisition  of  influence  in  Central 
America  by  the  United  States  without  England's 
consent,  and  mention  was  specifically  made  of  a 
canal  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.  The  inter- 
ference of  Germany  in  Venezuela,  the  evident 
fact  that  the  concentration  of  the  English  fleet  in 
the  Channel  would  make  it  impossible  to  keep  a 
sizable  fleet  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  the  absolute 
necessity  from  many  points  of  view  of  preventing 

149 


PAN-GERMANISM 

the  acquisition  by  Germany  of  land  in  South  or 
Central  America,  removed  the  objections  Eng- 
land and  France  had  hitherto  possessed  to  the 
extension  of  the  influence  of  the  United  States  in 
the  Western  hemisphere. 

There  was,  furthermore,  a  likelihood  that  Ger- 
many would  in  some  way  attempt  the  annexation 
of  the  oldest  of  European  colonial  empires,  held 
at  this  time  by  one  of  the  weakest  and  most  deca- 
dent of  European  states.  The  Spanish  colonies  hi 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  in  the  Philippine  Islands 
possessed  not  only  commercial  but  strategic  im- 
portance. The  wealth  of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico 
was  proverbial,  the  products  of  the  Philippines 
considerable,  and,  though  not  altogether  suitable 
for  colonization,  they  would  afford  Germany  un- 
deniable opportunity  for  expansion.  Moreover, 
Cuba  in  the  hands  of  Germany  would  rob  Jamaica 
of  all  naval  importance  and  might  actually  permit 
Germany  to  overrun  the  whole  Gulf.  The  Philip- 
pines as  a  matter  of  fact  controlled  one  whole 
side  of  the  China  Sea  and  contained  valuable  sea- 
ports, where  a  naval  base  could  be  established, 
safe  from  assault  by  the  Chinese  or  European 
nations.  The  islands  were  thus  ideally  fitted  to 
become  Germany's  base  of  operations  in  the  Far 
East.  To  allow  such  places  to  fall  into  her  hands 
might  entail  consequences  whose  far-reaching 

150 


POSITION  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

effect  no  statesman  could  possibly  imagine.  Nor 
was  there  the  slightest  guarantee  that  by  an  un- 
provoked assault  Germany  would  not  attempt  to 
take  possession.  At  the  same  time,  the  general 
European  situation  and  the  position  of  Spain  in 
the  Mediterranean  made  it  impossible  for  Eng- 
land or  France  to  undertake  a  war  with  her,  with- 
out setting  fire  to  a  train  of  circumstances  whose 
eventual  results  might  be  even  more  fatal  than 
those  they  were  attempting  to  prevent.  The  colo- 
nial aspirations  of  the  United  States,  her  anxiety 
to  share  in  the  opening  of  China  to  European 
enterprise,  her  traditional  hope  of  securing  con- 
trol of  Cuba,  all  pointed  to  her  as  the  natural 
guardian  of  the  interests  of  the  coalition  in  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico  and  in  the  Far  East.  Whether  or 
not  it  is  true,  as  some  assert,  —  a  view  to  which 
certain  events  lend  probability,  —  that  the  Span- 
ish-American War  was  created  in  order  to  permit 
the  United  States  to  take  possession  of  Spam's 
colonial  dominion,  certainly  such  was  the  result 
of  that  war.  To  be  sure,  the  relations  between 
Spain  and  the  United  States  were  already  strained ; 
popular  sentiment  was  aroused  by  the  conditions 
in  Cuba,  and,  if  the  war  was  "created,"  it  was  not 
a  difficult  task.  Certainly,  Germany  and  her  allies 
suspected  that  such  was  the  purpose  of  the  war, 
and  attempted  to  secure  a  general  agreement  in 

151 


PAN-GERMANISM 

Europe  to  interfere  in  Spain's  favor.  England, 
however,  whether  because  she  saw  its  advantage 
now  the  war  was  in  existence,  or  because  she  had 
caused  it  to  be  begun,  decisively  vetoed  the  sug- 
gestion of  interference,  and  her  control  of  the  sea 
made  action  without  her  cooperation  impossible. 
The  results  of  the  war  were  all  that  could  have 
been  hoped  for.  The  Triple  Entente  saw  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico  fall  into  friendly  hands  and  the  estab- 
lishment in  the  Far  East  of  a  friendly  power  in  the 
strategic  point  of  greatest  consequence.  From 
Germany's  point  of  view,  the  results  of  the  alliance 
between  England,  France,  and  the  United  States 
were  exceedingly  discouraging,  and  the  aftermath 
of  the  war  proved  even  more  decisive  than  the 
war  itself.  The  United  States  promptly  undertook 
the  peaceful  penetration  of  Mexico  and  Central 
America.  Large  loans  were  made  to  the  govern- 
ments and  secured  by  a  lien  on  the  revenues; 
American  capital  rushed  thither,  and  the  number 
of  enterprises  financed  or  owned  by  Americans 
increased  so  rapidly  that  at  the  present  day  the 
United  States,  or  its  citizens,  owns  practically 
everything  of  importance  in  the  Gulf,  and  is  wait- 
ing  only  for  a  favorable  opportunity  to  foreclose 
its  mortgages.  The  possibility  of  German  inter- 
ference has  been  reduced  to  nothing.  The  United 
States  also  proceeded,  not  improbably  by  agree- 

152 


POSITION  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

ment,  to  create  a  fleet  large  enough  to  maintain 
control  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and,  what  was  of 
more  consequence,  to  maintain  control  of  the 
Atlantic  highway  between  Europe  and  America 
in  case  of  European  war.  The  English  had  come 
to  realize  the  improbability  that  enough  of  their 
fleet  could  be  spared  to  patrol  the  seas  in  the  event 
of  an  attack  upon  their  forces  in  the  Channel 
or  in  the  Mediterranean.  Above  all,  the  United 
States  undertook  to  create  in  the  Philippines  a 
naval  base  of  sufficient  size  and  importance  to 
permit  the  maintenance  there  of  a  fleet  large 
enough  to  be  a  factor  in  the  Pacific.  England  and 
France  obviously  could  not  spare  enough  ships  to 
maintain  a  fleet  in  the  Far  East;  Japan  would  not 
tolerate  the  presence  of  a  Russian  fleet  in  those 
waters;  the  United  States  was  the  only  member  of 
the  coalition  who  could,  consistent  with  her  own 
safety  or  that  of  other  nations,  undertake  the 
creation  and  maintenance  of  such  a  fleet  in  the 
Far  East.  She  became,  in  fact,  the  offensive  arm 
of  the  coalition  in  the  Pacific,  and  promptly 
strengthened  her  position  by  annexing  the  islands 
between  her  shores  and  Asia  available  for  settle- 
ment or  coaling-stations.  She  must  not  only  pre- 
pare the  way  for  the  further  extension  of  the  coali- 
tion's power  in  the  Far  East,  but  she  must  prevent 
the  acquisition  by  Germany  of  colonies,  whose 

153 


PAN-GERMANISM 

location  or  development  would  interfere  with  the 
control  of  Eastern  commerce  by  herself  and  her 
allies. 

One  more  thing  the  United  States  undertook, 
which  England  and  France  had  hitherto  denied 
her  permission  to  do,  the  digging  of  the  Panama 
Canal.  The  canal  would  furnish  the  United  States 
with  a  new  waterway  to  the  East,  shorter  than 
the  route  she  had  hitherto  been  forced  to  employ 
via  Suez,  and  with  a  route  which  would  literally 
put  New  York  in  actual  number  of  miles  nearer 
China,  Australia,  and  New  Zealand  than  was 
London.  Thus  to  admit  the  United  States  to  the 
trade  of  the  Far  East  by  a  waterway  exclusively 
in  its  control,  England  had  not  hitherto  considered 
expedient.  The  creation  of  Pan-Germanism,  the 
fear  of  an  attack  on  the  English  route  through  the 
Mediterranean  and  the  Suez  Canal,  the  possibility 
of  the  closing  of  that  route  temporarily  or  perma- 
nently by  some  naval  disaster,  reconciled  England 
to  the  creation  of  the  Panama  Canal,  because  she 
saw  hi  that  waterway  a  new  military  road  which 
she  could  use  to  her  own  possessions  in  the  Far 
East,  and  which  the  Atlantic  Ocean  would  effect- 
ually keep  out  of  the  hands  of  Germany.  To  be 
sure,  it  would  not  be  as  short  a  road  to  India  as 
that  through  the  Mediterranean  and  Suez;  but  so 

far  as  Australia  and  New  Zealand  were  concerned  it 

154 


POSITION  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

would  not  be  longer;  and  all  such  objections  inevit- 
ably were  reduced  to  insignificance  by  its  incom- 
parable safety,  so  long  as  the  English  fleet  could 
hold  the  seas  at  all.  So  long  as  the  United  States 
and  England  combined  could  maintain  control  of 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  of  the  islands  in  the  Pacific, 
so  long  would  this  waterway  be  absolutely  safe. 
If,  then,  Germany  should  succeed  in  executing  the 
whole  of  her  stupendous  plan,  England  and  her 
allies  might  still  be  able  by  means  of  the  Panama 
Canal  to  contest  with  her  the  possession  of  the 
trade  of  the  East.  Especially  would  this  be  true 
if  the  United  States  should  be  able  to  maintain 
herself  in  the  Philippines.  Nor  have  the  English 
lost  sight  of  the  incomparable  importance  of  the 
Philippines  for  keeping  Germany  out  of  the  Cele- 
bes. If  Germany  should  move  upon  Holland,  the 
coalition  expects  to  take  possession  of  the  Celebes 
without  further  ceremony,  and  will  then  hold  a 
position  controlling  the  trade  routes  leading  from 
India  to  China  and  Japan  and  to  Europe  in  gen- 
eral, which  would  be  as  nearly  impregnable  as 
anything  of  the  kind  ever  yet  known  in  the  world. 
The  issues,  therefore,  with  which  the  United 
States  is  actively  concerned  are  vast;  the  import- 
ance of  her  adhesion  to  the  side  of  England  and 
France  cannot  be  overestimated,  and  her  possible 
part  hi  the  movements  of  the  next  two  decades  is 

155 


PAN-GERMANISM 

certainly  one  which  ought  to  satisfy  the  most 
ambitious.  She  holds  in  the  East  already  a  posi- 
tion second  only  to  that  of  England,  and  should 
the  European  nations  succeed  in  their  plans  of 
final  interference  in  China,  the  United  States,  as 
the  offensive  arm  of  the  coalition,  might  be  called 
upon  for  prompt  action  of  the  most  aggressive  sort. 
At  the  same  time,  after  all  has  been  said,  it  must 
be  admitted  that  the  United  States  is  as  yet  only 
a  potential  factor  in  the  international  situation. 
Unless  further  aggression  should  be  attempted 
in  the  Orient,  or  it  should  become  necessary  or 
expedient  to  change  the  nominal  control  over 
Mexico  and  Central  America  to  actual  possession, 
the  United  States  will  take  no  important  share  in 
hostilities,  but  will  confine  her  efforts  to  the  ex- 
ceedingly important  work,  both  to  her  allies  and 
to  herself,  of  keeping  open  the  Atlantic  highway 
and  of  protecting  the  merchant  marine  of  Eng- 
land. Nor  need  one  underestimate  the  importance 
of  this  task,  for,  should  she  fail  to  do  her  share, 
destruction  might  result  for  all  concerned. 


CHAPTER  XI 

FIRST   DEFEATS 

THE  failure  of  their  designs  in  South  Africa 
and  in  South  America  turned  German  eyes  to 
the  northern  part  of  the  former  continent,  to  the 
great  dominion  which  the  French  possessed  in 
Morocco.  The  strategic  value  of  Morocco  was 
undeniable,  for  it  flanked  the  whole  southern  shore 
of  the  Mediterranean  at  the  entrance  opposite 
Gibraltar  and  extended  far  down  the  African 
coast.  Together  with  Algeria  and  Tunis,  it  prac- 
tically gave  the  French  the  whole  of  Africa  east 
of  the  Libyan  Desert,  north  of  the  Congo  and 
of  the  Sahara  Desert.  Of  this  vast  domain  Mo- 
rocco proper  is  one  of  the  richest  and  most  valu- 
able parts.  It  is  larger  in  area  than  Germany. 
Its  exports  and  imports  are  considerable,  each 
amounting  to  about  fifteen  million  dollars  annu- 
ally. The  climate  is  temperate,  the  soil  fertile  and 
varied,  rich  in  minerals,  and  capable  of  almost 
indefinite  development;  the  sparse  population, 
amounting  only  to  about  five  millions  of  people, 
most  of  them  too  barbarous  and  indolent  either 
to  use  their  country  themselves  or  to  oppose  its 

157 


PAN-GERMANISM 

use  by  some  one  else,  would  afford  Germany  an 
admirable  field  for  colonization  and  the  develop- 
ment of  a  market.  As  has  already  been  said,  the 
Germans  had  attempted  to  rouse  the  natives 
against  the  French,  and,  more  especially  in  the 
southern  part  of  Morocco,  had  attained  conspicu- 
ous success.  The  actual  outbreak,  however,  re- 
sulting from  their  influence  was  crushed  with 
exceeding  dispatch  by  the  French,  and  the  Ger- 
mans began  to  be  aware  that  the  peaceful  pene- 
tration of  Morocco  with  French  consent  was  more 
than  improbable.  In  the  summer  of  1911,  there- 
fore, the  Germans  ventured  upon  a  decisive  step, 
and  sent  the  warship  Panther  to  anchor  in  the 
port  of  Agadir  with  the  clear  intention  of  interfer- 
ing somehow  in  the  state  of  affairs  in  Morocco. 
The  port  chosen  for  this  demonstration  seemed, 
despite  rather  conflicting  testimony,  to  possess 
great  possibilities  as  a  naval  station;  the  hinter- 
land was  reputed  to  be  exceedingly  rich  in  miner- 
als; the  river,  which  enters  the  sea  at  this  point, 
was  of  considerable  size  and  drained  a  very  fertile 
district.  Furthermore,  Agadir  was  far  enough  re- 
moved from  Fez  and  the  seat  of  French  authority 
to  make  it  possible  for  the  Germans  to  hold  it 
without  rousing  too  much  apprehension  hi  the 
minds  of  the  French  of  clashes  in  the  future.  The 
excuse  for  the  German  interference  officially  put 

158 


FIRST  DEFEATS 

forward  —  the  protection  of  the  Europeans  at 
Agadir — was  an  obvious  pretext  too  slim  to  de- 
ceive any  one.  The  number  of  Europeans  in  that 
part  of  Morocco  was  exceedingly  few,  and  they 
were  in  absolutely  no  danger.  The  really  logical 
ground  which  Germany  took  was  that  she  could 
not  recognize  the  validity  of  an  agreement,  per- 
mitting the  French  and  English  to  monopolize 
Morocco,  to  which  she  had  not  been  a  party.  She 
denied,  in  fact,  the  right  of  other  European  nations 
to  make  with  each  other  contracts  and  agreements, 
concerning  the  disposition  of  the  world  in  general, 
which  should  be  binding  upon  any  but  themselves. 
She  demanded,  therefore,  a  new  agreement  which 
should  recognize  her  obvious  interests  and  to 
which  she  should  be  a  party.  As  a  possible  equiva- 
lent, in  case  England  and  France  should  be  un- 
willing to  make  such  dispositions  in  Morocco  as 
her  interests  made  desirable,  she  demanded  the 
cession  to  her  by  France  of  a  district  adjoining  the 
small  territory  she  already  possessed  at  Kamerun. 
This  district  was  a  part  of  the  French  Congo,  the 
southernmost  part  nearest  the  river,  and  its  value 
far  exceeded  its  area.  In  fact,  it  did  in  all  proba- 
bility equal  in  actual  value  at  the  moment  the 
whole  German  colonial  empire.  In  addition,  it 
flanked  the  Congo,  and  also  was  situated  adjacent 
to  the  little  strip  of  territory  along  the  river  by 

159 


PAN-GERMANISM 

which  Belgium  obtained  access  to  her  great  do- 
main in  the  Congo  valley.  The  strategic  value  of 
the  spot  was  as  undeniable  as  its  commercial  im- 
portance. Perhaps  Germany  might  succeed  in 
cutting  off  the  Belgians  from  the  sea  and  compel 
them  either  to  pay  tolls  or  cede  a  portion  of  their 
estate  in  order  to  regain  access  to  it. 

The  movement  upon  Morocco  had  a  secret  pur- 
pose quite  as  important  as  any  other  of  its  varied 
aspects.  The  Germans  had  long  known  of  the 
existence  of  a  secret  understanding  between  Eng- 
land and  France,  but  they  had  not  been  able  to 
discover  its  exact  terms,  and  it  was  of  the  utmost 
consequence  for  them  to  know  whether  or  not  the 
arrangement  was  solely  defensive  and  applied  to 
aggressive  movements  against  either  country  in 
Europe,  whether  the  agreement  promised  either 
country  the  other's  assistance  in  case  either  should 
take  the  offensive,  or  whether  it  extended  as  an 
offensive  and  defensive  alliance  to  the  protec- 
tion of  both  French  and  English  interests  in  every 
part  of  the  world.  To  discover,  therefore,  its  pre- 
cise limitations,  the  Germans  proposed  to  raise 
an  issue  with  France,  whom  they  did  not  fear, 
which  would  promptly  bring  to  the  fore  the  ques- 
tion whether  England  should  aid  France  in  ob- 
taining a  decision  favorable  to  her  upon  an  issue  in 
which  England  had  no  direct  interest.  Whatever 

160 


FIRST  DEFEATS 

happened,  the  Germans  could  scarcely  fail  to 
obtain  some  valuable  indications  of  the  strength 
and  extent  of  the  Anglo-French  Entente,  and 
might  even  succeed  in  compelling  one  or  the  other 
of  them  publicly  to  acknowledge  its  existence  and 
perhaps  its  terms.  There  was,  therefore,  much 
that  Germany  might  gain  from  this  aggressive 
movement  at  Agadir,  and  she  did  not  seem  to  be 
greatly  in  danger  of  losing  anything. 

The  event  was  eminently  successful  in  drawing 
from  England  and  France  an  acknowledgment  of 
their  hitherto  secret  understanding  and  an  explicit 
statement  of  its  extent.  The  English  evidently 
considered  that  it  amply  covered  the  present  case, 
which  made  clear  to  the  Germans  that  the  arrange- 
ment was  by  no  means  purely  defensive,  and  that 
it  certainly  did  not  confine  itself  to  encroach- 
ments upon  the  contracting  countries  in  northern 
Europe,  —  information  of  the  utmost  importance. 
Supported  thus  by  England  and  by  the  enthusi- 
asm of  the  French  people,  the  French  Ministry 
forced  the  issue  upon  Germany  and  practically 
presented  to  the  latter  the  alternative  of  receding 
from  her  demands  or  of  undertaking  war.  In 
Germany  the  popular  feeling  in  favor  of  war  ran 
high,  and  even  the  best  and  coolest  advisers  of  the 
Emperor  seem  to  have  counseled  the  undertak- 
ing of  at  least  a  demonstration  in  force  upon  the 

161 


PAN-GERMANISM 

French  frontier,  more,  perhaps,  with  the  notion  of 
discovering  the  possible  rapidity  with  which  the 
French  army  could  be  mobilized  than  with  any 
intention  of  fighting.  Whether  the  Imperial  ad- 
visers merely  intended  to  prepare  for  all  event- 
ualities or  were  willing  to  yield  to  popular  and 
military  pressure  and  declare  war,  the  Government 
certainly  attempted  to  procure  in  Berlin  the  ready 
money  necessary  to  finance  the  mobilization  of  the 
army.  There  then  became  evident  the  fact  which 
probably  astonished  the  Germans  as  much  as  it 
did  every  one  else  in  the  world  outside  of  the  few 
men  in  London  and  Paris  who  were  responsible 
for  it.  It  seems  that  German  business  was  being 
transacted  upon  capital  borrowed  abroad,  and 
that  the  German  merchants  had  so  extended  their 
borrowing  operations  that  more  than  ninety  per 
cent  of  the  current  business  transactions  depended 
upon  call  loans  or  time  loans  secured  in  London 
and  Paris.  The  moment  the  international  situa- 
tion became  tense,  a  concerted  movement  was 
undertaken  by  the  few  men  who  controlled  finan- 
cial movements  in  those  capitals  for  the  recall 
of  these  loans.  The  result  was  as  astonishing 
and  as  disastrous  as  it  was  intended  to  be.  The 
ready  cash  in  Germany  was  promptly  moved  out 
of  the  country,  and  many  merchants  found  them- 
selves compelled  to  sell  securities  to  meet  their 

162 


FIRST  DEFEATS 

pressing  obligations.  Not  only,  therefore,  was  the 
German  nation  for  the  moment  seriously  strained 
for  gold,  but  the  sale  of  securities  was  so  consid- 
erable as  to  assume  the  proportions  of  a  financial 
panic.  The  banks  hi  Germany  were  on  the  verge 
of  being  compelled  to  suspend  specie  payments 
and  were  many  of  them  almost  bankrupt.  There 
was  no  money  to  be  had  in  Germany  with  which 
to  begin  the  war.  The  Government,  with  unheard- 
of  effrontery,  appealed  for  loans  to  the  great 
French  and  English  banking  houses,  depending 
obviously  upon  the  bankers'  greed  being  stronger 
than  their  patriotism.  The  financial  kings 
promptly  informed  the  Emperor  that  they  would 
be  only  too  glad  to  furnish  him  such  sums  as  he 
might  require  in  exchange  for  proper  securities 
and  an  engagement  in  his  own  handwriting  not  to 
use  the  loan  for  military  purposes.  The  latter 
condition  being  obviously  out  of  the  question,  the 
Emperor  appealed  to  the  American  financiers  and 
received  from  them  a  reply  substantially  the  same. 
Thus  unexpectedly  was  revealed  the  real  financial 
strength  of  England  and  France  and  the  value  of 
the  alliance  with  the  United  States.  Germany  had 
been  defeated,  for  her  enemies  had  it  in  their 
power  to  prevent  her  even  from  taking  the  field. 
Surely  no  defeat  could  have  been  more  crushing  or 
more  humiliating. 

163 


PAN-GERMANISM 

The  Germans  made  the  best  possible  out  of  a 
bad  business.  They  secured  after  long  negotiations 
the  addition  of  some  territory  to  Kamcrun,  but 
they  were  compelled  to  agree  to  the  French  con- 
trol of  Morocco,  to  recognize,  moreover,  a  control 
far  more  considerable  and  exclusive  than  before 
and  which  placed  in  the  hands  of  France  much 
more  authority  hi  administration.  Subsequently, 
France  came  to  terms  with  Spain,  who  had  shown 
a  good  deal  of  uneasiness  in  regard  to  the  changed 
conditions  in  Morocco,  and  whose  Premier  had 
officially  made  statements,  regarding  the  deter- 
mination of  Spain  to  protect  her  interests  in 
Africa,  which  were  little  short  of  defiance.  That 
Spain  was  animated  in  this  by  direct  suggestions 
from  Berlin  seemed  eminently  probable,  and, 
even  if  it  were  not  so,  and  she  was  acting  purely 
upon  her  own  initiative  and  in  her  own  interests, 
it  was  not  expedient  to  allow  her  to  continue  dis- 
satisfied at  this  juncture.  France  and  England, 
therefore,  took  pains  thoroughly  to  pacify  the 
Spaniard. 

The  victory  in  Morocco,  the  clear  evidence  that 
Germany's  financial  situation  made  war  impos- 
sible for  the  moment,  suggested  to  the  Triple 
Entente  the  expediency  of  action  in  Persia,  where 
matters  were  progressing  in  a  direction  favorable 
to  Germany's  designs,  whether  or  not  they  were 

164 


FIRST  DEFEATS 

the  result  of  her  suggestion.  The  strategic  posi- 
tion of  Persia  is  of  great  significance.  Her  terri- 
tory marches  with  the  boundaries  of  Asia  Minor 
and  flanks  the  Baghdad  Railway  and  the  rich 
district  of  the  Tigris  and  Euphrates  upon  which 
England  has  long  had  designs.  It  controls  the 
northern  coast  of  the  Persian  Gulf,  the  coast  road 
to  India,  the  most  important  harbors,  and,  from  a 
military  point  of  view,  is  absolutely  essential  to 
the  safety  of  the  English  in  India.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  roads  to  the  Black  and  Caspian  Seas 
from  India,  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  southwestern 
Asia  all  pass  through  Persia,  whose  condition 
becomes  therefore  a  matter  of  the  utmost  conse- 
quence to  Russia.  The  railway  has  not  yet  pene- 
trated this  section  of  the  world,  and  the  old  cara- 
van routes  are  still  of  great  commercial  value.  It 
is  obvious  that  Persia  is  of  vital  importance  to 
England  and  to  Russia,  neither  of  whom  is  will- 
ing to  allow  the  other  exclusive  possession,  and 
neither  of  whom  can  permit  that  territory  to  fall 
into  the  hands  of  people  unwilling  to  recognize 
their  interests.  While  less  dangerous  than  pos- 
session by  Germany,  the  creation  in  Persia  of  an 
independent  state,  with  an  efficient  centralized 
government  maintained  by  Persians  in  the  inter- 
ests of  Persia,  proclaiming  as  its  chief  raison 
d'etre  the  exclusion  of  foreigners  and  the  emanci- 

165 


PAN-GERMANISM 

pation  of  Persia  at  the  earliest  possible  moment 
from  the  financial  shackles  binding  her  to  Eng- 
land and  Russia,  would  be,  from  every  point  of 
view,  quite  as  objectionable  to  the  latter  nations 
as  any  contingency  they  could  imagine.  The 
Shah  had  been  continued  upon  the  throne,  the 
new  constitution  accepted  by  them  because  they 
had  not  expected  the  new  government  to  be  very 
different  from  the  old;  but  the  ability  of  Mr. 
Shuster,  the  Treasurer,  the  integrity  and  energy 
of  his  assistants,  their  evident  intention  to  admin- 
ister the  state  solely  in  the  interests  of  Persia,  and, 
above  all,  the  enthusiastic  response  from  the 
Persians,  proved  both  to  the  English  and  the 
Russians  that  a  state  was  in  process  of  formation 
whose  strength  was  growing  daily  and  whose 
determination  to  accede  to  no  more  demands 
from  them  grew  firmer  month  by  month.  Such  a 
Persia  might  effectively  stand  in  the  way  of  their 
important  interests.  Moreover,  neither  of  them 
considered  the  alternative  for  Persia  to  lie  between 
her  practical  ownership  by  some  European  nation 
and  her  actual  independence.  The  English  feared, 
with  probably  good  reason,  that  their  recognition 
of  the  new  state,  followed  by  the  withdrawal  of 
their  representatives,  publicly  or  secretly,  would 
be  simply  the  signal  for  the  absorption  of  Persia 
and  the  complete  destruction  of  the  new  govern- 

166 


FIRST  DEFEATS 

merit  by  Russia  or  by  Germany.  The  same  appre- 
hensions were  felt  at  St.  Petersburg.  Both  Russia 
and  England,  therefore,  agreed  that,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  Persia  herself,  it  would  be  better 
in  the  long  run  for  them  to  retain  possession  than 
to  permit  the  longer  continuance  of  a  state  of 
affairs,  which  might,  in  a  few  years,  make  Persia 
the  battle-ground  of  the  two  coalitions,  with 
results  to  the  Persians  which  could  easily  be 
imagined.  Naturally,  they  did  not  expect  the 
Persians  to  accept  this  view  of  the  situation,  and 
realized  that  the  use  of  force  would  be  indispens- 
able. 

A  casus  belli  was  easily  found  and  could  have 
been  as  easily  created.  Every  step  taken  by  the 
new  Persian  government  was  a  tacit,  if  not  an 
open,  nullification  of  the  treaty  relations  in  exist- 
ence between  Persia  and  the  two  countries.  Mr. 
Shuster  and  his  administrators,  and,  in  the  main, 
the  more  efficient  and  able  of  the  Persians,  were 
ejected  from  office,  and  the  old,  inefficient,  cor- 
rupt administration  was  restored,  in  fact  if  not 
hi  name.  The  result  upon  politics  in  the  Near 
East  was  a  defeat  for  Germany.  As  in  the  case 
of  Morocco,  her  interference  resulted  only  in 
strengthening  the  hold  her  enemies  already  pos- 
sessed. Certainly,  for  the  moment  at  any  rate, 
the  Baghdad  Railway  was  outflanked  and  the 

167 


PAN-GERMANISM 

possible  extension  of  the  German  commercial 
route  to  the  rich  markets  of  the  East  was  ren- 
dered for  the  time  being  highly  improbable. 
Until  some  considerable  change  takes  place,  the 
commercial  value  of  the  Baghdad  Railway  will 
be  confined  to  the  possibility  of  developing  the 
district  of  Asia  Minor  which  it  traverses. 

The  danger  of  ferment  in  Egypt  among  the 
native  population  and  the  military  weakness  of 
the  English  in  that  country  did  not  escape  the 
Ministry  in  London.  Accordingly  they  sent  to 
Egypt  England's  ablest  soldier,  Lord  Kitchener. 
His  mission  was  to  improve  the  military  disposi- 
tions of  the  force  already  available  and  the  prepa- 
ration of  adequate  plans  for  efficient  defense.  For 
the  nonce,  however,  his  important  work  was  con- 
fined to  the  counteracting  of  the  effects  produced 
in  the  natives'  minds  by  the  German  agents.  To 
the  educated  and  the  officials,  he  was  to  make 
clear  the  undoubted  fact  that  for  them  the  alter- 
native was,  not  the  continuance  of  the  present 
nominal  relations  between  them  and  England, 
which  left  in  their  own  hands  a  very  extensive 
authority  in  local  affairs,  or  their  complete  inde- 
pendence from  interference  by  any  one,  but 
between  the  continuance  of  the  status  quo  and 
their  annexation  by  some  member  of  the  Triple 
Alliance,  who  would  be  forced  by  the  exigencies 

168 


FIRST  DEFEATS 

of  military  occupation,  or  by  the  necessities  of 
the  defense,  to  impose  upon  Egypt  a  good  deal 
severer  a  regime  than  the  English  ever  intended 
to  create.  For  them  to  continue  schemes  for  the 
expulsion  of  the  English  would  simply  mean  that 
they  were  exposing  themselves  to  the  tender 
mercies  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  The  strategic 
position  of  Egypt,  the  extraordinary  fertility  of 
the  Nile  Valley  and  its  great  exports  of  cotton 
and  grain,  the  existence  of  the  Suez  Canal,  all 
made  it  impossible  for  Egypt  to  be  governed  solely 
in  the  interest  of  the  Egyptians.  The  rest  of  the 
world  was  too  intimately  affected  by  conditions 
in  Egypt  to  permit  the  Egyptians  to  disregard 
their  claims.  That  such  circumstances  as  these 
would  mean  nothing  to  the  bulk  of  the  population 
was  only  too  apparent.  Lord  Kitchener,  there- 
fore, inaugurated  a  series  of  enlightened  judicial 
and  agricultural  reforms,  intended  to  relieve  the 
pressure  of  the  Government  upon  the  people 
themselves,  and  thus  in  an  exceedingly  practical 
manner  remove  the  only  possible  grievances 
which  would  appear  vital  to  the  great  bulk  of  the 
population.  According  to  apparently  trustworthy 
reports,  he  has  succeeded  to  a  remarkable  degree 
in  rousing  the  enthusiasm  of  the  fellaheen  for 
English  rule.  He  has  certainly  endeared  himself 
to  the  population,  and  secured  over  them  a  per- 

169 


PAN-GERMANISM 

sonal  influence  which  may  conceivably  be  a  fac- 
tor of  importance  at  no  distant  date  in  the  des- 
tinies of  empire. 

Another  great  diplomatic  victory  seems  to  have 
been  won  by  the  English  in  India.  The  approach- 
ing coronation  of  George  V  as  Emperor  of  India 
made  possible  the  assemblage  at  Delhi  of  all  the 
potentates  of  India  and  allied  states.  Their  con- 
junction at  one  moment  might  conceivably  result 
in  the  completion  of  plans  for  concerted  revolt 
against  the  English,  if  any  such  were  on  foot, 
whether  due  to  German,  Russian,  or  native  influ- 
ence, but  their  presence  might  also  be  utilized 
for  the  execution  of  a  diplomatic  coup  of  the  very 
first  consequence.  It  would  depend,  however,  for 
its  success  upon  the  presence  of  the  King.  No 
English  sovereign  had  ever  set  foot  in  India,  and 
it  was  considered  that  the  King  would  certainly 
expose  himself  to  assassination  by  undertaking  to 
be  crowned  in  person  at  the  approaching  Durbar 
at  Christmas,  1911.  At  the  same  time,  unless  the 
information  regarding  the  state  of  affairs  in  India 
was  entirely  wrong,  the  danger  of  an  attack  would 
be  confined  solely  to  his  being  shot  or  destroyed 
by  a  bomb  from  the  crowd  during  some  public 
ceremony.  The  stake  for  which  to  play  was  un- 
doubtedly great,  but  the  Ministers  were  not  in 
favor  of  the  King's  assuming  the  necessary  risks. 

170 


FIRST  DEFEATS 

George,  however,  displayed  a  wholly  admirable 
courage  and  an  unexpected  firmness  of  decision 
by  insisting  upon  undertaking  the  difficult  task. 
His  presence  hi  India,  his  coronation  and  safe  re- 
turn would  be  the  most  dramatic  and  conclusive 
possible  refutation  of  the  tales  so  rife  in  Europe 
about  the  disloyalty  of  the  Hindus  and  the  pre- 
carious condition  of  England  in  India.  The  event 
more  than  justified  the  expectations.  The  King 
rode  through  the  streets  as  he  might  have  ridden 
through  London;  he  sat  alone  with  the  Queen 
upon  a  great  throne,  fully  exposed  to  thousands 
of  people;  he  sat  again  alone  with  the  Queen,  with 
no  guards  in  sight,  upon  a  parapet  near  the  road 
down  which  passed  a  great  stream  of  Hindus  of 
all  conditions.  The  opportunities  for  his  assas- 
sination were  many.  More  than  once  the  rumor 
spread  that  he  had  been  killed.  The  tension  dur- 
ing his  stay  was  certainly  extreme.  But  nothing 
happened.  The  moral  effect  of  the  Durbar  in 
India  and  in  Europe  was  great. 

The  real  purpose,  however,  of  the  King's  pre- 
sence hi  India  was  far  otherwise  than  the  mere 
demonstration  that  he  could  be  there  for  some 
weeks  without  being  shot.  He  undertook  the 
extremely  difficult  task  of  explaining  by  word  of 
mouth  to  the  Indian  potentates  the  intricacies  of 
the  international  situation  and  their  practical 

171 


PAN-GERMANISM 

relation  to  India.  Coming  from  him  by  word  of 
mouth  such  representations  could  not  fail  to  have 
weight.  They  would  certainly  have  never  been 
believed  had  the  rulers  learned  them  from  any 
subordinate,  however  exalted  hi  station.  Besides, 
there  can  be  little  question  that  the  King  con- 
fided to  them  many  things  which  it  is  not  con- 
sidered wise  that  most  men  should  know.  Un- 
doubtedly, he  explained  to  them  the  fact  that  the 
alternative  for  the  Hindus,  as  it  is  for  the  Egypt- 
ians and  the  Persians,  is  not  actual  independ- 
ence from  English  rule,  but  a  choice  between  the 
rule  of  England,  Russia,  or  Germany.  He  can 
have  had  no  great  difficulty  in  demonstrating 
the  honesty  and  excellence  of  English  adminis- 
tration, and  the  great  moderation  of  the  English 
Government  in  never  spending  outside  India  a 
penny  of  the  money  collected  in  India;  that  the 
only  benefit  England  has  ever  received  directly 
has  been  the  legitimate  profits  of  trade;  that 
Russia  or  Germany  would  offer  more  favorable 
terms  is  not  likely;  that  the  English  were  more 
than  ready  to  meet  the  reasonable  demands  of 
the  Hindus  halfway;  and  that  the  English  would 
consider  reasonable  anything  which  did  not  in- 
volve the  loss  of  their  trading  monopoly  or  the 
weakening  of  the  defensive  strength  of  India 
against  Russia  and  Germany.  Naturally,  these 

172 


FIRST  DEFEATS 

are  purely  conjectures  of  what  the  King  must 
have  said.  The  results  are  also  purely  conjec- 
tural, but  certainly  any  statement  at  all  of  the 
realities  of  the  situation  cannot  fail  to  have  been 
convincing.  It  is  hard  for  an  impartial  observer  to 
see  any  possible  advantage  to  the  Hindu  of  an 
exchange  of  rulers. 

The  year  1911,  therefore,  was  one  of  pretty 
conspicuous  success  in  all  directions  for  England 
and  France.  Everywhere  they  seemed  to  have 
successfully  met  Germany,  and  everywhere  to 
have  disproved  her  prophecy  that  then*  colonial 
empires  would  fall  to  pieces  'of  their  own  weight. 
However  real  the  weakness  might  be,  however 
possible  the  success  of  Germany's  schemes,  the 
weakness  certainly  was  not  apparent,  and  the 
probability  of  Germany's  success  did  not  seem 
immediate. 


CHAPTER  XII 

VICTORY  FROM  DEFEAT:  THE  TRIPOLJTAN  WAR 

r  1 1J±K  English  and  the  French  were  by  no  means 
JL  satisfied  with  the  character  of  the  measures 
which  they  had  undertaken  for  thwarting  the 
schemes  of  the  Triple  Alliance.1  Indeed,  they  had 
merely  succeeded  in  holding  their  own,  had  in  no 
sense  placed  any  barrier  in  the  way  of  the  execu- 
tion of  Pan-Germanism,  nor  could  they  do  so  by 
such  measures  as  they  had  previously  espoused. 
Something  structural  was  necessary,  basic,  fun- 
damental in  character,  going  to  the  root  of  the 
German  scheme,  which  they  very  well  realized 
was  not  in  the  least  touched  by  their  successes  in 
Persia  and  Morocco.  It  was  clear  that  Italy  was 
for  many  reasons  the  least  ardent  member  of  the 
Triple  Alliance  and  had  the  least  to  gain  from  the 
success  of  Pan-Germanism.  Her  hatred  of  Austria 
was  still  vigorous,  and  the  necessary  possession 
by  Austria  of  the  Balkans,  her  inevitable  growth 
in  naval  power,  the  obvious  advantage  to  the 
coalition  of  her  securing  control  of  the  Adriatic 

1  Individual  sentences  in  chapters  xn  and  xni  and  the  conclud- 
ing paragraphs  of  chapter  xm  have  been  taken  from  the  author's 
article  in  the  Forum  for  December,  1912. 

174 


THE  TRIPOLITAN  WAR 

and  the  JSgean,  could  not  fail  to  rouse  in  the 
minds  of  the  Italians  certain  eminently  natural 
apprehensions.  To  strengthen  Austria  along  the 
Illyrian  coast  meant  to  increase  her  strength  in 
that  very  quarter  least  acceptable  to  Italy,1  for 
Trieste  could  not  fail  to  become  a  rival  of  Ven- 
ice, and  the  increase  of  Austrian  power  in  the 
Adriatic  would  necessarily  interfere  with  Italy's 
ambitions  to  control  the  whole  commerce  of  that 
sea.  Nor  was  control  of  the  Adriatic  less  essen- 
tial to  her  as  an  outlet  for  the  commerce  of  the 
Po  Valley  than  it  was  for  Austria.  To  say  that 
Italy  could  ship  her  goods  to  the  western  seaports 
along  the  Mediterranean,  could  easily  be  met  by 
saying  that  Austria  could  also  ship  her  goods  by 
rail  wherever  she  wished.  Moreover,  Italy  had 
been  steadily  penetrating  the  eastern  shores  of 
the  Adriatic  by  the  familiar  peaceful  methods  of 
loans  and  investments,  and  had  already  large 
interests  in  Albania,  Scutari,  and  Epirus,  whose 
proximity  to  Italy  made  her  interest  in  them 
natural.  Nor  could  the  fact  that  the  present 
Queen  of  Italy  is  a  Montenegrin  princess  fail  to 
rouse  concern  at  Rome  for  the  future  of  that 

1  "Our  Eastern  frontiers,  I  said  [Crispi  speaking  to  Bismarck], 
are  extremely  exposed,  and  should  Austria's  position  on  the  Adriatic 
be  strengthened,  we  should  be  held  as  in  a  vice,  and  our  safety  would 
be  threatened."  Dispatch  from  Crispi  to  the  King  of  Italy,  1877. 
Memoirs  of  Francesco  Crispi,  n,  64.  London,  1912. 

175 


PAN-GERMANISM 

country.  There  were,  therefore,  vital  reasons  for 
supposing  that  Italy  was  not  bound  to  the  Triple 
Alliance  by  chains  of  interest  much  stronger  than 
those  which  made  her  position  in  it  peculiar.  The 
complete  success  of  the  scheme  would  not  be 
likely  to  be  thoroughly  agreeable  to  the  Italians 
because  of  the  amount  of  strength  it  would  neces- 
sarily give  to  their  traditional  foe.  In  addition, 
the  existing  dynasty  was  bound  by  strong  ties  of 
gratitude  to  France  and  England,  without  whose 
assistance  the  present  kingdom  of  Italy  could 
hardly  have  been  created.  Italy's  interests  would 
normally  point  in  the  same  direction  where  her 
natural  sympathies  might  be  assumed  to  lie. 

Her  ambitions  were  well  known  to  England  and 
France.  As  in  Germany  and  Austria,  the  uni- 
fication of  the  country,  the  development  of  its 
resources,  the  benefits  of  centralized  government, 
had  resulted  in  an  increase  in  the  population  and 
in  production,  which  required  colonies  or  markets 
to  permit  the  continuance  of  national  growth  at 
its  present  rate.  Like  Germany,  too,  Italy  found 
herself  a  debtor  country,  with  heavy  interest 
charges  to  meet,  with  the  economic  conditions 
unfavorable,  and,  consequently,  with  a  national 
budget  constantly  in  arrears.  In  one  way  and  an- 
other, she  had  acquired  along  the  Red  Sea  ter- 
ritories, large  in  area,  limited  in  resources,  with 

176 


THE  TRIPOLITAN  WAR 

a  tiny  nomadic  population,  and  a  climate  and  soil 
unsuited  for  colonization.  These  colonies  had 
already  cost  her  money  out  of  all  comparison  to 
their  value.  She  had  long  had  designs  upon  the 
great  district  lying  between  the  French  domain 
in  Tunis  and  the  English  boundary  in  Egypt,  a 
vast  area  some  four  hundred  thousand  square 
miles  in  extent,  sparsely  populated,  and  in  nearly 
every  way  admirably  adapted  to  her  needs. 
Unquestionably,  the  land  was  exceedingly  fertile, 
for  it  had  been  perhaps  the  richest  province  of 
ancient  Rome,  and  from  its  revenues  innumerable 
governors  had  grown  rich.  The  fact  that  the  pop- 
ulation was  scanty  and  the  products  small  made  it 
especially  desirable  as  a  field  for  development  by 
Italian  capital  and  labor.  Indeed,  the  statesmen 
anticipated  that  the  revenue  from  the  customs,  plus 
the  indirect  results  of  its  trade  with  Italy  herself, 
would  not  improbably  suffice  to  produce  a  credit 
balance  in  the  national  exchequer.  Long  before  the 
actual  unification  of  Italy,  the  House  of  Savoy  had 
made  known  to  England  and  France  its  desires  to 
annex  this  province,  and  had  received  from  them 
at  various  times  more  or  less  vague  promises  to  re- 
spect her  claims  to  it  or  to  further  her  designs  upon 
it.  It  had,  however,  never  been  able  to  secure  any 
more  tangible  evidences  of  their  willingness  to  give 
it  possession  than  vague  oral  diplomatic  promises. 

177 


PAN-GERMANISM 

England  and  France,  after  studying  carefully 
the  situation  in  the  Mediterranean,  concluded 
from  the  fact  of  Italy's  continued  alliance  with 
Germany  and  Austria  and  the  certainty  that 
Austria  would  claim,  as  her  share  of  the  plunder, 
the  Balkans  and  the  eastern  coast  of  the  Adriatic, 
that  Italy's  part  could  be  nothing  less,  and  was 
not  improbably  nothing  more,  than  Tripoli.  In 
any  case,  whatever  she  was  promised,  she  would 
be  compelled  to  wait  for  until  the  success  of  a 
scheme  whose  execution  was  barely  begun  and 
which  might  not  succeed  at  all.  They,  therefore, 
approached  Italy,  offered  to  insure  her  possession 
of  Tripoli  at  once  without  fighting,  without  ex- 
pense, and  without  delay;  if  she  should  put  for- 
ward some  technical  casus  belli  and  should  make  a 
vigorous  show  of  force  in  Tripoli,  she  could  then 
be  accorded  possession  by  a  treaty  with  the  Turk, 
whose  terms  the  three  conspirators  would  arrange 
to  their  mutual  satisfaction.  Incidentally  they 
would  test  the  efficiency  of  the  new  Turkish  army. 
She  would,  of  course,  in  return  desert  the  Triple 
Alliance,  and  form  an  alliance  with  them,  whose 
strength  would  secure  them  all  possession  of  every- 
thing they  desired  in  the  Mediterranean  for  some 
decades.  The  Italian  navy  added  to  the  French 
navy  would  so  far  preponderate  over  the  Aus- 
trian and  Turkish  fleets  that  the  English  Medi- 

178 


THE  TRIPOLITAN  WAR 

terranean  squadron  could  be  practically  with- 
drawn. Thus,  without  at  all  endangering  the 
security  of  its  control  of  the  Mediterranean,  the 
new  alliance  could  make  so  immediate  and  consid- 
erable an  increase  of  strength  to  its  naval  forces 
in  the  English  Channel  as  to  outnumber  the  Ger- 
man fleet  for  a  good  many  years  to  come.  Italy's 
position  flanking  the  Adriatic  would  make  Aus- 
tria's control  of  that  sea  improbable;  the  strength 
of  the  new  alliance  would  make  exceedingly  diffi- 
cult any  further  accessions  of  territory  by  Austria 
in  the  Balkans;  and  thus  Italy  would  be  secure. 
By  rendering  impossible  the  effective  use  of  the 
^Egean  by  Austria,  the  possibility  of  an  attack  by 
the  latter's  fleet  from  the  rear  of  Malta  upon  the 
English  lines  of  communication  with  Egypt  and 
India,  and  upon  the  Italian  lines  of  communica- 
tion with  her  new  possession,  would  be  eliminated; 
Sicily  and  Sardinia  would  strengthen  the  lines  of 
advance  already  centering  at  Malta  and  would 
make  the  position  of  the  allies  in  the  western  Med- 
iterranean literally  impregnable.  With  Tripoli  in 
Italy's  hands,  even  the  success  of  Germany  and 
Austria  in  creating  their  proposed  confederation, 
stretching  from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Persian  Gulf, 
would  not  be  serious.  Of  course,  while  the  Turk 
retained  even  nominal  control  of  Tripoli,  the  fact 
that  he  was  only  too  obviously  falling  deeper  and 

179 


PAN-GERMANISM 

deeper  into  the  clutches  of  Germany  and  Austria 
would  make  the  occupation  of  Tripoli  by  a  strong 
Turkish  army,  directed  by  Germany,  an  emi- 
nent possibility.  Germany  by  such  means  might 
place  a  military  force  in  a  place  very  dangerous 
to  Egypt  and  Tunis.  Once  Italy  was  fairly  in 
possession,  Germany  could  occupy  Tripoli  only 
by  force,  and  Italy's  active  participation  in  the 
struggle  would  be  assured.  Tripoli  would  bind 
Italy  to  the  Anglo-French  alliance  by  the  solid 
chains  of  self-interest. 

The  splendor  of  the  scheme  was  too  striking 
not  to  impress  the  Italians;  the  Triple  Alliance 
was  broken;  Italy  advanced  upon  Tripoli  to  the 
consternation  of  Germany  and  Austria,  who 
feared  for  a  time  that  all  was  lost.  Stimulated  by 
the  messages  from  Berlin  and  Vienna,  aroused  as 
well  by  the  new  national  spirit  in  Turkey,  the 
Government  at  Constantinople  vigorously  de- 
clared that  it  would  fight  to  the  last  gasp  before  it 
would  consent  to  the  dismembering  of  the  national 
domain.  The  obstinacy  of  the  Young  Turks  them- 
selves, the  assurances  of  support  from  Germany 
and  Austria,  made  it  impossible  for  England  and 
France  to  give  Italy  possession  of  the  new  colony 
by  the  simple  method  of  diplomatic  and  financial 
pressure.  The  Turk,  indeed,  publicly  called  upon 
them  to  redeem  the  pledges  of  support  in  the 

180 


THE  TRIPOLITAN  WAR 

existing  treaties  and  forced  them  officially  to 
record  their  support  of  Italy.  To  every  one's 
astonishment,  it  became  clear  that  England  and 
France  were  in  no  position  to  assist  Italy  openly. 
The  hostility  of  the  native  races  in  Tripoli  to  the 
proposed  arrangement  was  only  too  promptly 
shown;  the  flames  of  Moslem  indignation  ran  high 
throughout  North  Africa,  and  for  some  weeks  it 
seemed  not  improbable  that  a  holy  war  against  the 
Infidel  might  break  out.  Keen  observers  believed 
that  a  more  open  support  of  Italy  by  England  or 
France  would  be  the  signal  for  the  Jehad.  Even 
to  gain  vastly  more  than  either  nation  could  pos- 
sibly lose  by  the  delay  of  Italy's  complete  pos- 
session of  Tripoli,  such  a  contingency  was  not 
to  be  risked.  In  India,  too,  the  Mohammedans, 
already  excited  by  what  they  considered  English 
treachery  hi  crushing  the  new  Mohammedan 
state  in  Persia,  began  actively  to  express  their 
hostility  and  indignation  at  her  treatment  of  the 
Sultan,  the  head  of  the  Mohammedan  religion. 
At  all  costs,  England  felt  she  must  avoid  giving 
further  cause  for  offense.  Italy,  therefore,  found 
herself  committed  to  a  war,  which  military  critics 
agreed  would  be  expensive,  even  if  not  prolonged, 
and  whose  result  was  by  no  means  a  foregone 
conclusion.  The  prospect  was  anything  but  allur- 
ing to  a  Ministry  already  tired  of  struggling  with 

181 


PAN-GERMANISM 

an  annual  deficit,  and  was  particularly  bitter  be- 
cause of  the  former  expectation  that  possession 
of  the  new  province  would  in  one  way  or  another 
lighten  the  financial  burdens  of  the  mother  coun- 
try. Actual  conquest  by  the  sword  would  certainly 
so  embitter  the  natives  as  to  make  the  govern- 
ment of  Tripoli  expensive  and  difficult  for  years 
to  come.  The  Italians,  in  short,  had  been  placed 
by  their  friends  in  a  very  real  dilemma,  from  which 
their  friends  were  unable  to  extricate  them  and 
from  which,  indeed,  it  was  doubtful  whether  the 
Italians  could  successfully  extricate  themselves 
without  paying  a  price  greater  than  they  were 
able  to  afford. 

Under  such  circumstances,  with  such  calami- 
ties expected  and  such  hopes  unfulfilled,  the  Ital- 
ians received  from  the  Wilhelmstrasse  whispered 
communications  of  cheering  import.  If  Italy 
would  return  to  the  Triple  Alliance,  pointed  out 
the  Germans,  her  old  friends  would  be  able  to 
secure  for  her  without  cost  or  difficulty  the  pos- 
session of  Tripoli,  and  in  time  a  great  deal  more. 
Indeed,  said  the  Germans,  the  present  dilemma 
in  which  Italy  found  herself  proved  conclusively 
the  truth  of  the  German  assertions  regarding  the 
weakness  of  England  and  France.  It  proved  no 
less  astounding  a  proposition  than  that  the  Eng- 
lish control  of  the  Mediterranean  was  a  sham. 

182 


THE  TRIPOLITAN  WAR 

Italy,  in  fact,  if  she  would  return  to  the  Triple 
Alliance,  might  practically  reverse  the  situation  in 
the  Mediterranean  and  bring  Tripoli  with  her  for 
nothing;  the  strategic  positions  on  which  England 
and  France  had  based  their  defense  of  the  Medi- 
terranean would  be  vastly  weakened,  if  not  de- 
stroyed; the  naval  force,  which  they  had  believed 
virtually  preponderant,  would  be  reduced  to  a 
bare  equality  which  would  make  offensive  move- 
ments impossible  and  render  the  success  of  defen- 
sive movements  problematical;  not  a  lira  need  be 
spent,  not  a  life  sacrificed  to  make  the  conquest 
of  the  Mediterranean  an  eminently  feasible  opera- 
tion and  to  strike  a  more  deadly  blow  at  English 
naval  supremacy  than  it  had  suffered  since  the 
Seven  Years'  War.  Such  substantial  and  probable 
achievements  would  have  been  themselves  con- 
sidered the  worthy  fruits  of  a  hard-fought  and 
costly  war,  and  here  they  could  actually  be  had 
for  nothing! 

The  English  had  already  changed  their  naval 
arrangements  in  the  Mediterranean,  counting 
upon  the  presence  of  the  Italians  to  neutralize 
the  Austrian  navy  for  the  time  being,  and  the 
French  had  not  yet  executed  their  part  of  the 
agreement  by  concentrating  their  fleet  in  the 
Mediterranean.  For  the  moment,  the  Italian  and 
Austrian  fleets,  while  not  strong  enough  to  take 

183 


PAN-GERMANISM 

the  offensive,  would  be  amply  strong  enough  to 
prevent  any  offensive  movement  by  the  English 
or  French  fleets.  Nothing,  therefore,  could  be 
done  to  interfere  with  Italy's  execution  of  the 
manoeuvre.  Once  Tripoli  was  in  Italy's  hands, 
the  Triple  Alliance  would  be  in  a  vastly  more 
favorable  position  than  it  had  occupied  before  the 
issue  arose.  They  did  not  possess,  to  be  sure, 
more  power  in  the  Adriatic  than  before,  but  they 
had  secured  what  was  infinitely  more  essential, 
a  naval  and  military  base  from  which  to  use  it. 
The  difficulty  of  using  the  Adriatic  as  a  base  had 
been  that  its  exit  could  be  without  great  difficulty 
controlled  by  an  English  fleet  at  Malta.  From  the 
ports  on  the  Tripolitan  coast,  on  the  other  hand, 
a  flank  attack  could  be  directed  upon  the  English 
communications  with  Suez  which  it  would  be 
extremely  difficult  to  meet  from  Malta.  Under 
cover  of  the  war,  which  Italy  had  come  to  regard 
as  so  unfortunate,  the  new  position,  already  com- 
manding, could  be  greatly  strengthened.  Inas- 
much as  England  and  France  had  lent  public 
countenance  to  the  prosecution  of  the  war  and 
had  formally  declined  to  assist  the  Turk,  neither 
would  be  able  to  interfere  with  the  seizure  by 
Italy  of  every  island  and  strategic  point  in  the 
eastern  Mediterranean  which  acknowledged  nom- 
inal sovereignty  to  the  Sultan;  thus  the  coveted 

184 


THE  TRIPOLITAN  WAR 

Rhodes,  the  islands  of  the  ^Egean,  controlling  the 
channels  to  Constantinople,  could  all  be  occupied 
under  cover  of  this  very  war,  and  the  strategic 
control  of  the  eastern  Mediterranean  thus  secured 
without  danger  and  without  cost,  which,  under 
other  circumstances,  could  not  even  have  been 
attempted  without  precipitating  a  general  Euro- 
pean war.  In  Tripoli,  under  cover  of  the  war  with 
the  Turk,  the  allies  could  fortify  the  coast,  create 
naval  stations,  build  railways  into  the  interior 
and  along  the  frontiers,  and  thus  equip  a  base  of 
military  operations  in  Africa  from  which  they 
could  threaten  Suez  and  Tunis  at  the  same  time 
and  with  the  same  army.  The  execution  of  the 
schemes  for  the  conquest  of  the  Mediterranean 
itself  had  never  been  intended  to  precede  the 
occupation  of  the  Balkans  and  Turkey  by  the 
allies,  but  the  chance  was  not  one  to  be  lost. 

The  magnitude  of  the  opportunity,  the  extraor- 
dinary prominence  which  it  gave  the  Italians  at 
the  moment,  was  appreciated  at  Rome,  and  the 
Italian  Government  acted  with  promptitude. 
The  results  surpassed  the  most  sanguine  expecta- 
tions. The  Italian  navy  bombarded  a  few  ports, 
sank  a  number  of  Turkish  vessels,  purely  to  main- 
tain the  fiction  of  war,  and  then  seized  island 
after  island  in  the  JSgean,  announcing  to  the 
inhabitants  that  the  occupation  was  no  mere  mili- 

185 


PAN-GERMANISM 

tary  measure  but  would  be  permanent.  So  con- 
fident of  success  were  the  Italians.  The  existence 
of  the  new  naval  base  in  Tripoli,  the  possession  of 
the  strategic  points  of  the  eastern  Mediterranean 
by  a  member  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  snatched 
from  England  the  entire  control  of  the  eastern 
Mediterranean  and  threw  her  back  upon  Malta, 
whose  position  was  instantly  changed  from  that 
of  the  central  position  of  England's  defensive 
chain  to  that  of  an  outpost.  Italy's  change  of 
front  of  course  promptly  suspended  active  hos- 
tilities between  herself  and  Turkey,  though  the 
Turk  obstinately  refused  to  remove  the  new  Turk- 
ish 'army  from  Tripoli.  After  all,  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  Alliance,  this  was  not  altogether 
regrettable,  for  it  gave  a  tinge  of  reality  to  the 
military  dispositions  Italy  proceeded  to  make 
with  promptitude  on  the  coast  and  along  the 
caravan  lines  leading  into  Egypt. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE   AFTERMATH   OF   THE   TRIPOLITAN   WAR 

MEANWHILE,  the  Triple  Alliance,  thus 
reunited,  proceeded  with  the  complement- 
ary details  of  the  scheme.  The  German,  Aus- 
trian, and  Italian  naval  programmes  were  at  once 
enlarged,  the  proposed  German  fleet  was  made 
nearly  equal  in  number  to  the  proposed  English 
Channel  squadron  and  the  Austro-Italian  fleet 
was  already  the  equal  of  the  entire  French  battle 
fleet;  an  increased  activity  of  building,  therefore, 
was  expected  to  give  the  allies  in  a  couple  of  years 
something  like  equality,  if  not  actual  superiority, 
both  in  the  Mediterranean  and  in  the  German 
Ocean.  Indeed,  the  situation  had  been  so  changed 
as  to  make  it  difficult  for  England  and  France  to 
meet  the  crisis  merely  by  a  rearrangement  of  the 
existing  forces.  The  chief  reason  for  their  desire  to 
detach  Italy  from  the  Triple  Alliance  was  inter- 
preted in  Berlin  to  be  their  realization  that  they 
had  practically  reached  the  limit  of  their  resources 
and  could  no  longer  continue  to  build  at  the  same 
rate  as  before.  To  strengthen  the  Mediterranean 
fleet  by  an  alliance  with  Italy  would  have  enabled 

187 


PAN-GERMANISM 

them  to  increase  the  Channel  squadron  without 
additional  expense.  The  coup  d'etat  in  the  Medi- 
terranean changed  the  whole  naval  situation  by 
strengthening  the  position  of  the  Triple  Alliance 
in  that  sea,  and  rendered  inadequate  the  previous 
dispositions  of  England  and  France.  A  large  fleet, 
more  naval  stations,  and  very  different  equip- 
ment of  certain  stations  would  be  necessary  sat- 
isfactorily to  meet  the  crisis.  To  strengthen  the 
fleet  in  the  Mediterranean  meant  the  weaken- 
ing of  the  English  fleet  in  the  Atlantic  and  the 
considerable  reduction  of  the  number  of  vessels 
which  Germany  must  build  to  change  England's 
old  predominance  into  something  like  equality. 
This,  then,  was  the  moment  for  which  the  allies 
had  been  waiting.  There  was  now  a  fair  chance  of 
their  creating  within  a  reasonable  time  enough 
ships  to  compass  that  equality  of  armament  which 
England  had  always  declared  would  be  so  fatal 
to  her  welfare.  The  military  dispositions  of  the 
allies,  the  facilities  for  prompt  mobilization,  the 
railway  facilities  along  the  Belgian  and  French 
and  Russian  frontiers,  were  all  considered  with  a 
view  to  their  adequacy  for  actual  war.  The  work 
on  the  Baghdad  Railway  was  pushed  with  the 
utmost  energy;  the  little  band  of  able  men,  whom 
Germany  had  so  long  kept  in  Constantinople, 
busied  in  reconstructing  Turkey,  were  recalled  to 

188 


AFTERMATH  OF  THE  TRIPOLITAN  WAR 

Europe.  The  German  Emperor  began,  with  his 
usual  energy,  a  round  of  visits  to  all  the  sovereigns 
of  whom  anything  was  expected  or  from  whom 
anything  was  feared.  To  them  all  he  explained, 
no  doubt,  the  great  advantage  just  secured  and 
made,  by  word  of  mouth,  promises,  assurances, 
and  explanations,  which  could  not  have  been 
entrusted  to  subordinates.  Unquestionably,  the 
energy  of  Wilhelm  II,  his  persuasive  powers,  and 
his  faith  in  this  gigantic  scheme  have  been  of 
vital  importance  in  securing  the  cooperation  of 
Germany's  present  allies  and  in  bringing  their 
plans  to  their  present  state  of  completion. 

The  English  and  French,  astonished  and  alarmed 
at  the  unexpected  turn  of  affairs,  strained  every 
nerve  to  meet  it  by  preparations  which  should 
be  more  than  adequate  for  any  emergency.  Both 
have  felt,  however,  that  to  avow  publicly  the  ex- 
tent of  the  danger  would  produce  an  unfavorable 
effect  on  English  and  French  public  opinion, 
either  by  sapping  popular  confidence  in  the  na- 
tional strength,  or,  more  probably,  by  causing  a 
demand  for  instant  war  which  it  would  be  difficult 
to  resist.  In  some  way,  without  declaring  imme- 
diate a  danger  which  may  after  all  be  merely  con- 
tingent, the  people  must  be  made  to  realize  that 
a  crisis  is  at  hand  of  so  serious  a  nature  that  it  can 
be  adequately  met  only  by  the  immediate  adop- 

189 


PAN-GERMANISM 

tion  of  the  most  extensive  naval  and  military  pre- 
parations either  nation  has  yet  undertaken.  So 
extensive  are  the  plans,  so  long  is  the  time  which 
will  be  required  for  their  completion,  so  great  will 
be  the  financial  burden  imposed  upon  the  people* 
that  the  average  individual,  in  nations  which  have 
systematically  encouraged  him  to  have  opinions 
upon  matters  of  national  import,  is  more  than 
likely  to  deem  such  plans  justifiable  only  to  avert 
an  impending  crisis,  hi  which  the  very  national 
existence  would  be  at  stake,  and  to  demand  at 
once  financial  sacrifices  which  he  is  likely  to 
approve  only  when  the  danger  is  exceedingly  tan- 
gible. The  present  condition,  therefore,  which  the 
English  and  French  Governments  find  it  most 
difficult  to  meet,  is  the  fact  that  the  time  and 
expense  for  what  they  believe  to  be  the  necessary 
preparations  are  in  themselves  proof  to  the  aver- 
age man  that  the  emergency  is  contingent  rather 
than  immediate.  They  are  hampered,  as  the  Ger- 
mans have  always  claimed  they  would  be  under 
such  circumstances,  by  the  difficulty  of  convincing 
the  ordinary  individual  of  the  expediency  of  spend- 
ing as  much  money  in  order  to  postpone  or  avert 
a  war  as  would  seem  to  him  necessary  to  prosecute 
it.  To  tell  the  public  that  the  war  is  already  going 
on,  that  it  is  beimg  fought  with  every  variety  of 
weapon,  except  armies  and  navies,  that  England 

190 


AFTERMATH  OF  THE  TRIPOLITAN  WAR 

is  really  in  danger,  and  at  the  same  time  to  prove 
to  him  that  the  English  navy  largely  outnumbers 
the  navies  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  is  simply  to  de- 
monstrate the  expediency  of  fighting  now  before 
the  preparations  of  the  Triple  Alliance  already 
announced  destroy  England's  superiority. 

In  England,  too,  the  position  of  parties  in  the 
House  of  Commons  is  actually  hampering  the 
Government  in  its  preparations  to  meet  the  crisis, 
as  the  Germans  have  always  claimed  it  would. 
The  Liberals,  who  are  nominally  in  power,  are 
absolutely  dependent  upon  the  support  of  the 
Irish  Nationalists  and  of  the  Laborites.  The  for- 
mer group  are  exceedingly  anxious  to  secure  the 
final  passage  into  law,  without  substantial  amend- 
ment, of  the  Home  Rule  Bill  just  passed  by  the 
House  of  Commons.  The  most  important  clause  of 
that  bill  provides  for  the  payment  out  of  the  Im- 
perial Treasury  to  the  new  Irish  Government  of 
a  subsidy  annually  sufficient  hi  amount  to  pay  for 
the  construction  of  two  or  more  battleships.  The 
Irish  Budget  has  so  long  shown  an  annual  deficit, 
and  it  has  so  long  been  evident  that  the  Irish 
people  are  paying  more  taxes  than  they  can  really 
afford,  that  the  advocates  of  Home  Rule  know 
perfectly  well  that,  without  substantial  assist- 
ance from  England,  Home  Rule  is  impossible. 
The  Irish  people  are  incapable  of  paying  their  own 

191 


PAN-GERMANISM 

bills.  But  to  secure  such  a  subsidy  at  the  mo- 
ment of  moments  when  English  naval  supremacy 
is  more  nearly  in  danger  than  at  any  time  in  the 
last  two  centuries,  when  that  amount  of  money 
annually  expended  might  suffice  to  maintain 
England's  supremacy,  is,  as  they  well  know,  ex- 
ceedingly questionable.  The  pressure  of  this  very 
situation,  however,  the  absolute  necessity  which 
English  statesmen  feel  for  directing  the  affairs  of 
the  Empire  in  accordance  with  their  own  concep- 
tion of  its  needs  and  without  interference  from 
the  Irish  Nationalists,  convinces  the  latter  that 
they  have  the  best  chance  they  have  ever  had  to 
extort  Home  Rule  from  England  even  on  these 
terms. 

They  have  pointed  out  to  the  disconsolate  Min- 
istry the  fact  that  they  can  hamper  England's 
utilization  of  the  resources  she  now  possesses  to 
an  extent  which  might  be  fatal,  and  that  the 
Ministry  which  is  now  in  power  can  remain  in 
power  only  so  long  as  they  are  willing,  and,  con- 
comitantly,  that  the  Ministry  which  will  replace 
it  can  remain  in  power  only  on  the  same  terms. 
The  very  fact  that  the  alternative  lies  between 
using  what  England  has  and  the  increase  of  its 
force  is  to  them  the  most  important  weapon  in 
their  arsenal.  England  must  in  self-defense  come 
to  terms  with  them.  The  Labor  members  are 

192 


opposed  to  war  on  any  terms.  They  have  not 
scrupled  publicly  to  declare  that  they  owned 
nothing  in  England  which  the  conquest  of  Eng- 
land by  Germany  could  possibly  take  away  from 
them,  neither  land,  nor  houses,  nor  wealth.  They 
have  the  clothes  on  their  backs;  they  are  promised, 
so  long  as  they  work,  enough  food  to  keep  them 
alive.  This,  they  declare  scornfully,  is  the  sum 
total  of  their  interest  in  the  maintenance  of  the 
British  Empire.  Could  the  Germans  offer  them 
less?  Whether  because  the  Irish  and  the  Labor- 
ites  do  not  believe  the  danger  great,  or  because 
they  are  determined  to  achieve  their  own  objects, 
whatever  the  cost  to  England,  is  not  clear;  but 
the  fact  is  certain  that  they  have  effectively  pre- 
vented the  adoption  in  the  House  of  Commons  of 
as  large  an  increase  of  the  naval  appropriations  as 
the  Ministry  desired  to  make,  and  have  stoutly 
refused  to  approve  conscription  in  any  form. 

Knowing  this,  the  Germans  could  not  fail  to 
consider  a  confession  of  weakness  Mr.  Churchill's 
public  promise  to  decrease  the  English  naval 
programme  in  proportion  to  any  decrease  in 
German  plans,  and  his  hint  that  England  would 
be  willing  formally  to  guarantee  the  immunity  of 
the  Austrian  seacoast  from  attack  if  the  plans  for 
the  increase  of  the  Austrian  navy  should  be  aban- 
doned; his  scarcely  veiled  threat,  to  surpass  in 

193 


PAN-GERMANISM 

number  any  increase  they  might  attempt  to 
make,  they  greeted  with  open  derision.  They 
believed  that  they  had  powerful  allies  in  the 
English  Ministry  and  in  the  English  House  of 
Commons,  and,  so  confident  were  they  that  these 
allies  would  prevent  him  from  executing  his 
threat,  that  they  announced  a  very  substantial 
increase  in  the  German  and  Austrian  naval  esti- 
mates. Such  action  was  tantamount  to  a  direct 
challenge  to  fulfill  his  threat,  and  the  amazing 
fact  is  that  he  could  not  do  it .  The  Laborites  and 
the  Home  Rulers  flatly  refused  to  sanction  Mr. 
Churchill's  measures;  they  flatly  declared  they 
would  oppose  similar  measures  introduced  by  the 
opposite  party,  in  case  the  Ministry  should  resign ; 
and  compelled  the  adoption  of  a  compromise 
measure  providing  for  so  small  an  increase  that, 
by  the  public  admission  of  the  First  Lord  of  the 
Admiralty,  Germany  will  have  within  two  years 
twenty-nine  ships  in  the  North  Sea  to  England's 
thirty-three.  The  Opposition  both  hi  the  Com- 
mons and  in  the  Lords,  as  well  as  the  foremost 
naval  and  military  authorities,  are  insisting  in  the 
frankest  language  that  the  Supplementary  Esti- 
mates are  utterly  inadequate.  Naturally,  the 
knowledge  of  these  facts  has  not  diminished  the 
confidence  felt  at  Berlin,  Vienna,  and  Rome,  and 
it  has  so  obviously  weakened  confidence  at  Paris, 

ifti 


AFTERMATH  OF  THE  TRIPOLITAN  WAR 

that  some  of  the  influential  journals  have  actually 
begun  to  question  the  value  of  England's  support 
should  she  lose,  not  her  control  of  A  the  Channel 
by  actual  fighting,  but  her  naval  preponderance. 
Indeed,  the  contrast  is  sufficiently  striking  be- 
tween the  prompt  passage  of  a  considerable  Sup- 
plementary Estimate  without  dissent  by  a  Reich- 
stag utterly  hostile  to  the  administration,  and 
the  grudging  passage  of  so  slight  an  increase  by 
the  English  House  of  Commons  where  the  exist- 
ing Ministry  nominally  controlled  so  powerful  a 
majority  as  to  have  overridden  even  strenuous 
opposition  to  other  measures.  The  Ministry  has 
done  what  it  could  to  counteract  these  doubts  by 
secret  promises  and  assurances.  The  naval  dis- 
positions in  the  Mediterranean  have  been  care- 
fully examined;  conferences  held  between  the 
French  and  the  English  authorities;  the  English 
and  French  naval  boards  went  over  the  ground  in 
person  in  the  summer  of  1912,  and  no  doubt  ar- 
rived at  important  conclusions.  Lord  Kitchener's 
success  in  Egypt,  the  results  of  the  King's  visit  to 
India,  continued  success  in  Persia,  also  gave  the 
Triple  Entente  confidence. 

The  most  encouraging  aspect  of  the  situation 
has  been  the  prompt  and  enthusiastic  response 
of  the  English  self-governing  colonies  to  the  ap- 
peal of  the  mother  country  for  assistance.  Sev- 

195 


PAN-GERMANISM 

eral  have  adopted  naval  programmes;  their  ships 
are  already  under  construction;  they  have  pro- 
mised to  add  their  vessels  to  the  English  navy  and 
to  leave  their  direction  entirely  in  the  hands  of 
the  Admiralty  in  London.  The  Canadian  Min- 
istry has  asked  the  Parliament  to  appropriate 
money  for  three  first-class  battleships,  and  will 
in  all  probability  succeed  in  carrying  the  measure. 
This  aid  is  so  considerable  in  amount  as  to  be  of 
really  substantial  importance. 

The  English  also  have  reorganized  the  entire 
administration  of  their  fleet,  both  for  offense  and 
defense;  they  have  created  a  school  for  the  train- 
ing in  strategy  of  officers;  and  have  instituted  in 
addition  a  special  board  of  experts,  in  whose  hands 
will  be  placed,  in  time  of  action,  the  direction  of 
operations. 

France  has  officially  adopted  the  Two  Power 
Standard  in  the  Mediterranean,  which  is  under- 
stood to  mean  that  she  will  create  and  maintain 
a  fleet  sufficiently  numerous  easily  to  outweigh 
the  combined  Italian  and  Austrian  navies. 
Spain's  assistance  or,  perhaps,  neutrality  the 
allies  have  bought  with  concessions  in  Morocco. 
Russia,  frightened  at  the  prospect  of  the  loss  of 
the  position  in  the  Baltic  she  now  possesses,  has 
signed  a  naval  convention  with  France,  which 
pledges  her  to  a  rapid  and  really  considerable 

196 


AFTERMATH  OF  THE  TRIPOLITAN  WAR 

increase  of  her  Baltic  fleet  and  the  creation  of  a 
new  naval  base  almost  on  the  Prussian  frontier. 
The  existence  of  a  really  powerful  Russian  fleet 
in  the  Baltic  might  interfere  vitally  with  the 
further  execution  of  Germany's  present  plans. 
Berlin  and  all  North  Germany  would  be  exposed 
to  its  attack;  the  Kiel  Canal  might  be  destroyed; 
the  rear  of  the  Atlantic  squadron  would  be  ex- 
posed to  its  operations;  and  its  strength  might 
be  sufficient  to  compel  the  division  of  the  German 
North  Sea  fleet,  an  eventuality  which  would  so 
weaken  the  forces  available  for  an  offensive  war 
as  to  postpone  its  date  by  years,  if  it  did  not  make 
its  outcome  so  uncertain  as  to  prevent  it  alto- 
gether. 

But  the  most  significant  movement  is  the  pro- 
ject for  the  Trans-Persian  Railway  which  Eng- 
land, France,  and  Russia  have  adopted.  The  line 
is  to  run  southeast  from  Teheran  to  Bushire  in 
the  English  zone  of  influence  and  to  follow  the 
coast  of  the  Persian  Gulf  to  Karachi.  Unquestion- 
ably, a  Russian  army  arriving  in  India  by  that 
route  would  turn  the  flank  of  Quetta  and  render 
useless  all  the  fortifications  and  dispositions  yet 
made  to  keep  Russia  out  of  India.  For  England 
to  consent  to  it  is  to  abandon  the  policy  of  isolat- 
ing India  from  Europe  by  preventing  the  estab- 
lishment of  easy  communication  by  land.  Should 

197 


PAN-GERMANISM 

Russia  attack  from  Herat  and  from  the  new  rail- 
road line  at  the  same  moment,  nothing  could 
prevent  the  overwhelming  of  the  English  army. 
Russia  has  three  quarters  of  a  million  men  en- 
rolled in  her  army  who  live  within  two  thousand 
miles  of  the  Indian  frontier.  They  may  not  be 
highly  trained,  but  they  will  certainly  outnumber 
the  English  army  ten  to  one,  and  the  combined 
native  and  English  troops  four  to  one.  Lord 
Curzon  voices  the  convictions  of  many  Anglo- 
Indians  when  he  declares  that  the  construction 
of  the  Trans-Persian  Railway  is  the  death-knell 
of  the  British  power  in  India.  It  means,  further, 
the  admission  of  Russia  to  the  rich  marts  of  India, 
and  a  recognition  of  her  right  to  share  directly 
in  that  trade;  and  whatever  its  effect  may  be  on 
English  retention  of  the  sovereignty  in  India,  it 
will  at  once  end  England's  practical  monopoly 
of  Indian  trade.  To  the  British  merchant  and 
manufacturer  there  would  seem  to  be  little  left 
worth  struggling  for,  if  that  is  renounced. 

Such,  however,  are  not  the  purposes  of  that 
railway,  and  such  will  not  necessarily  be  the  results 
of  its  construction.  The  project  is  based  upon  the 
absolute  necessity  for  an  English  military  road 
to  India  in  case  Germany  and  her  allies  succeed 
in  securing  actual  control  of  the  Mediterranean. 
The  new  road  would  prevent  the  use  by  Germany 

198 


AFTERMATH  OF  THE  TRIPOLITAN  WAR 

of  the  Baghdad  Railway  and  the  Persian  Gulf  as 
an  approach  to  India.  It  would  enable  England, 
so  long  as  her  alliance  with  Russia  lasted,  to  re- 
inforce the  Indian  army  far  more  rapidly  than 
would  be  possible  by  way  of  the  Panama  Canal 
and  the  Pacific.  In  fact,  should  the  Triple  Alli- 
ance secure  control  of  the  Mediterranean,  nothing 
short  of  some  such  road  would  enable  England 
and  Russia  combined  to  place  enough  troops  in 
India  to  prevent  its  immediate  conquest  by  Ger- 
many. England  wishes  to  keep  it;  Russia  has 
always  dreamed  of  possessing  it;  but  both  would 
rather  see  it  in  the  hands  of  the  other  than  allow 
Germany  to  get  it.  Such  an  increase  of  German 
power  would  at  once  endanger  the  very  exist- 
ence of  England  and  the  continued  possession 
by  Russia  of  any  territories  in  the  Baltic  or  in 
Poland.  To  the  English  Ministry,  moreover,  the 
danger  of  losing  India  because  of  the  new  rail- 
way's construction  seems  small  beside  the  un- 
deniable military  value  of  the  road  as  an  offensive 
measure  against  Germany.  The  road  will  run 
mainly  through  British  territory;  it  will  follow 
the  coast  of  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  therefore  can 
always  be  controlled  by  an  English  fleet;  nor  will 
it  put  Russia  nearer  the  Indian  defenses  than  she 
is  already;  the  lookouts  at  Herat  can  almost  see  a 
Russian  railway  station,  and  Herat  is  the  key  to 

199 


PAN-GERMANISM 

India,  scarcely  a  fourth  as  far  from  the  frontier 
and  Quetta  as  Teheran  is  from  Karachi.  In  fact, 
say  the  English  military  experts,  Russia  already 
possesses  quite  as  favorable  a  position  for  an 
assault  as  the  railway  would  afford  her;  but 
clearly  she  does  not  wish  to  use  it,  nor  will  she 
desire  to  do  so  as  long  as  the  assistance  of  Eng- 
land and  France  is  necessary  to  prevent  Germany 
from  overrunning  the  Baltic. 

The  feasibility  of  a  military  road  to  India 
through  Russia  and  Persia  has  been  many  times 
declared.  The  route  through  Turkestan,  across 
the  Caspian  and  up  the  Russian  rivers,  was  one 
of  the  commonest  roads  followed  by  invasion 
after  invasion  from  Asia;  it  was  one  of  the  recog- 
nized trade  routes  of  Europe  during  the  Middle 
Ages,  and  was  well  worn  by  the  feet  of  merchants. 
Upon  its  existence,  the  English  Muscovy  Com- 
pany depended,  and  from  the  trade  grew  wealthy. 
Until  the  construction  of  the  Suez  Canal,  it  was 
as  practicable  as  any  land  route  and  more  rapid, 
though  more  expensive  and  dangerous,  than  the 
voyage  round  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  Through 
it  Alexander  invaded  India,  and  no  less  a  soldier 
than  Napoleon  himself  conceived  the  idea  of  fol- 
lowing the  precise  route  the  English  and  Russians 
propose  to  employ  in  case  of  need.  Napoleon  had 
the  whole  route  carefully  surveyed  and  measured, 

200 


AFTERMATH  OF  THE  TRIPOLITAN  WAR 

and  his  engineers  reported  its  entire  practicabil- 
ity. 

In  addition,  if  we  suppose  the  existence  of  a 
general  European  war  and  an  attempt  by  Ger- 
many on  India  at  a  time  when  England  could 
spare  neither  men  nor  ships  from  European 
waters,  the  new  railway  would  enable  her  to  per- 
mit a  sufficient  Russian  force  to  enter  India  to 
defeat  the  Germans  without  actually  delivering 
into  Russia's  hands  the  keys  of  the  Himalayas, 
Herat  and  Quetta.  Should  Russia  after  defeating 
Germany  turn  traitor,  the  English  in  India,  with 
the  possession  of  Quetta  and  the  aid  of  the  fleet 
set  free  by  Germany's  defeat,  might  still  make 
a  good  fight.  Should  Germany  decisively  defeat 
the  Channel  fleet  while  her  allies  were  overrun- 
ning the  Mediterranean,  the  deluge  would  have 
already  arrived,  and  India  would  be  irretrievably 
lost,  railway  or  no  railway,  and  England  would  be 
glad  to  see  a  nation  strengthened  by  the  posses- 
sion of  India  which  might  do  battle  with  the  all- 
conquering  German.  The  Trans-Persian  Railway 
is  not  necessarily  desirable;  it  seems  to  the  Eng- 
lish merely  the  best  of  a  number  of  extremely 
undesirable  and  regrettable  expedients  of  which 
unfortunately  one  must  be  chosen.  So  a  deputa- 
tion of  the  members  of  the  House  of  Commons 
and  of  London  merchant  princes  visited  Russia 

201 


PAN-GERMANISM 

and  formally  sanctioned  the  commercial  aspects 
of  the  military  agreement.  The  incident  shows 
conclusively  how  dependent  England  is  upon  her 
allies  and  how  much  trust  she  is  forced  to  repose 
in  them.  It  indicates  with  even  greater  certainty 
the  English  belief  hi  the  feasibility  of  the  German 
plans  for  securing  possession  of  the  Mediterranean 
and  Suez  Canal. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE  GREAT  REPULSE:  THE  BALKAN  CRISIS 

THE  great  success  of  the  war  in  Tripoli,  as  a 
method  of  extorting  territory  from  the  Turk 
and  of  preventing  the  interference  of  England 
and  France  with  the  execution  of  the  plans  for 
the  rearrangement  of  the  Mediterranean  without 
the  employment  of  actual  force,  promptly  sug- 
gested to  the  diplomats  and  statesmen  in  Berlin 
and  Vienna  the  prosecution  of  war  in  the  Balkans. 
The  Turk  was  unexpectedly  reluctant  to  resign 
to  Italy,  even  at  the  instigation  of  his  new  mas- 
ters, the  rich  province  of  Tripoli.  It  seemed  to 
the  Young  Turks  the  last  straw,  that,  at  just 
the  moment  when  they  were  seeking  to  rouse  in 
Turkey  a  national  spirit,  and  to  secure  control  of 
the  government  for  a  national  party,  whose  policy 
should  be  based  upon  the  interests  of  Turkey  and 
not  upon  those  of  Europe,  they  should  be  forced 
at  the  very  outset  to  consent  to  the  dismember- 
ment of  Turkey  as  the  condition  of  their  longer 
continuance  in  power.  It  seemed  to  them,  in  fact, 
that,  if  they  must  yield  in  Tripoli,  autonomy 
would  never  be  a  reality  in  Turkey,  and  the 

203 


PAN-GERMANISM 

visions  they  had  long  cherished,  and  the  material 
privations  they  had  endured  for  the  last  decade 
or  more,  would  be  all  rendered  futile.  The  Triple 
Alliance  obviously  needed  some  lever  with  which 
to  pry  Tripoli  from  the  clutches  of  the  Young 
Turk  without  the  necessity  of  actually  taking  it. 
It  was,  furthermore,  highly  essential  that  the 
Young  Turk  should  not  execute  a  coup  d'Stat  and 
desert  them  for  the  old  alliance  with  England  and 
France.  That,  above  all,  must  not  be  risked. 
Some  method  must  be  found  which  would  put 
pressure  upon  him  without  permitting  him  to 
desert  and  without  allowing  England  or  France 
an  opportunity  to  interfere.  The  obvious  method 
was  war  hi  the  Balkans,  where  the  military  move- 
ments could  be  undertaken  by  the  states,  whose 
relations  with  the  Turk  were  always  tense,  and 
whose  private  grievances  were  so  familiar  and  so 
adequate  in  the  eyes  of  Europe  as  fully  to  justify 
a  resort  to  arms.  The  Turk  would  thus  be  between 
two  fires.  With  war  in  Europe  and  war  in  Africa 
and  only  one  army,  he  would  be  compelled  to 
preserve  Tripoli  at  the  risk  of  defeat  in  Europe, 
or  to  renounce  Tripoli  and  conclude  peace  with 
Italy  on  Italy's  own  terms,  in  order  to  insure 
the  safety  of  his  dominions  in  Europe.  The  mo- 
ment also  was  most  opportune  for  an  attempt 
to  rearrange  affairs  in  the  Balkans,  and  to 

204 


attempt  the  realization  of  the  Balkan  Confeder- 
acy, on  whose  creation  the  final  success  of 
Pan-Germanism  absolutely  depended.  The  tense 
situation  in  Europe;  the  dangers  to  which  the 
English  and  French  were  obviously  exposed  in 
the  Mediterranean  by  the  inability  to  use  their 
previous  naval  dispositions  for  regaining  control 
of  the  eastern  Mediterranean;  the  time  which 
must  necessarily  elapse  before  a  force  sufficient 
to  regain  that  control  could  be  assembled  in  the 
Mediterranean,  all  these  factors  made  their 
actual  interference  improbable.  The  Germans 
calculated  that,  the  odds  being  against  England, 
she  would  not  dare  risk  action.  Therefore,  with 
the  probability  of  a  free  hand,  the  opportunity 
seemed  ripe  for  the  prosecution  of  the  schemes 
for  the  reorganization  of  southeastern  Europe. 

The  programme  was  practically  made  public 
by  Austria,  who  advocated  decentralization  in 
Turkey  along  the  lines  already  suggested,  but 
never  executed,  in  the  Treaty  of  Berlin.  The 
notion  was  to  break  up  European  Turkey  by 
creating  independent  states  in  Albania  and  Mace- 
donia and  to  make  a  new  state  out  of  the  remains 
of  Turkey  in  Europe.  These  three  states,  with 
the  older  communities  of  Rumania,  Bulgaria, 
Servia,  Montenegro,  and  perhaps  Greece,  should 
form  a  new  confederation,  governing  the  whole 

205 


PAN-GERMANISM 

of  the  district  between  the  Austrian  and  Russian 
frontiers  and  the  JSgean  and  Mediterranean 
seas.1  Asia  Minor  would  become  the  seat  of  the 
old  Turkish  Empire  and  should  be  bound  tightly 
to  Germany  or  Austria,  and,  if  that  were  not 
possible,  to  the  new  confederation,  by  bonds 
which  practically  would  compel  the  Turk  to  re- 
nounce control  of  policy  and  resources.  In  some 
way  or  other,  by  commercial  agreements,  if  no 
more  direct  method  was  available,  Austria  was 
to  secure  Saloniki  as  a  naval  base  from  which  to 
control  the  ^Egean  and  the  whole  eastern  Medi- 
terranean, and  either  Austria  or  Italy  was  to 
secure  the  remainder  of  the  eastern  shore  of  the 
Adriatic.  The  allies  calculated  that  a  little  show 
of  force  by  the  Balkan  States  would  put  enough 
pressure  upon  the  Turks  to  compel  the  cession  of 
Tripoli,  and  might  also  drive  the  Young  Turks 
from  power  and  reinstate  the  old  bureaucracy, 
whom  Austria  and  Germany  already  owned  body 
and  soul.  Then  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  could  be 
interpreted  in  such  a  manner  as  to  enable  the 
allies  to  claim  that  the  other  Powers  had  already 
given  their  consent  to  the  new  scheme  of  reorgani- 
zation, would  permit  them  to  insist  that  no  Euro- 
pean Congress  was  necessary,  and  that  the  execu- 

1  The  notion  of  a  Balkan  confederation  supported  by  the  Triple 
Alliance  seems  to  have  originated  in  1889.  Crispi,  Memoirs,  u,  384- 
885. 

206 


THE  BALKAN   CRISIS 

tion  of  the  Treaty  ought  completely  to  satisfy  all 
parties.  The  irony  of  the  situation  would  be  that 
they  would  thus  possess  the  Turk's  own  consent 
to  his  own  destruction  before  they  conquered  him. 
When  these  arrangements  were  finished,  and  it 
seemed  hardly  doubtful  but  that  they  could  be 
completed,  Pan-Germanism  would  be  practically 
a  reality.  There  would  be  much  yet  to  do,  but 
formally  it  would  have  come  into  existence. 

There  were  also  vital  reasons  for  attempting  ac- 
tion in  the  fall  of  1912.  The  death  of  the  Emperor 
Franz  Josef  has  been  expected  at  any  moment 
during  the  last  few  years  and  becomes  more  prob- 
able each  month.  Inasmuch  as  his  death  has  been 
confidently  expected  to  give  the  signal  for  a  gen- 
eral revolt  throughout  the  Dual  Monarchy,  it  was 
highly  essential  to  move  before  such  a  catastrophe 
deprived  Austria  of  the  possibility  of  action. 
Indeed,  his  death  might  force  the  allies  to  devote 
their  time  for  some  years  to  the  reorganization  of 
Austria-Hungary  before  they  could  proceed  fur- 
ther with  the  scheme.  Success  in  the  Balkans 
and  in  Turkey,  the  actual  creation  of  a  Pan- 
Germanic  chain,  would  not  improbably  so  impress 
public  opinion  as  to  insure  the  continuance  of  the 
present  arrangements  and  thwart  the  schemes  of 
the  irreconcilables.  Should  worst  come  to  worst, 
a  third  monarchy  could  be  created  out  of  the 

207 


PAN-GERMANISM 

Croatian  and  Slavonic  and  Serbonian  communi- 
ties in  south  western  Austria  which  would  have  the 
same  relations  to  Austria  as  Hungary,  would 
satisfy  the  most  dangerous  malcontents  and  en- 
able the  Empire  to  deal  effectively  with  Bohemia 
and  Galicia.  Such  an  eventuality,  however, 
raised  many  possible  questions  and  would  be  cer- 
tain to  rouse  suspicion  in  the  Balkans.  The  adop- 
tion by  England  and  Russia  of  the  scheme  for 
the  Trans-Persian  Railway,  obviously  a  military 
road  to  circumvent  the  Baghdad  Railway,  to 
retain  control  of  the  Persian  Gulf  and  render 
ineffectual  the  seizure  of  Suez,  proved  to  the 
Germans  that  no  time  was  to  be  lost,  if  the  con- 
quest of  India,  as  the  ultimate  aim  of  the  great 
confederation,  was  not  to  become  impossible. 
The  loss  of  India,  Germany  could  not  consider 
calmly,  for  the  creation  and  maintenance  of  the 
Pan-German  Confederation  would  compel  her  to 
hand  over  to  her  allies  practically  all  the  gams 
in  the  Mediterranean  and  in  Europe,  and  her 
own  share  was  to  be  India.  The  Panama  Canal, 
moreover,  another  military  road  to  the  East,  was 
nearing  completion,  would  probably  be  practical 
as  early  as  January,  1914,  and  its  completion  is 
expected  to  render  the  control  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean and  Red  Sea  infinitely  less  important  to 
England  than  before.  The  risks  of  immediate 

208 


THE  BALKAN  CRISIS 

action  did  not  seem  too  great;  the  probable  gains 
were  undeniable;  and  the  allies  therefore  decided 
upon  action. 

The  Balkan  States,  who  received  intimations  of 
the  desirability  of  war  from  Berlin  and  Vienna, 
were  astounded  to  receive,  almost  simultaneously, 
suggestions  of  the  desirability  of  war  with  Turkey 
from  London,  Paris,  and  St.  Petersburg.  The 
Triple  Entente  had  made  up  its  mind  that  the 
moment  was  opportune  for  an  attempt  to  erect 
a  barrier  in  the  way  of  Pan-Germanism  which 
should  not  improbably  postpone  its  execution  at 
least  a  decade.  Only  in  the  Balkans  could  they 
hope  in  the  long  run  successfully  to  oppose  the 
Triple  Alliance,  nor  could  there  be,  from  their 
point  of  view,  a  more  favorable  spot  for  opposition. 
The  Balkan  peoples  had  long  hated  Austria  for 
racial  and  religious  reasons,  were  determined,  if 
possible,  to  win  their  own  national  independence, 
and,  presenting,  therefore,  unusual  difficulties  to 
the  statesmen  seeking  to  amalgamate  them  with 
the  Triple  Alliance,  furnished  the  latter's  ene- 
mies the  most  favorable  field  in  which  to  work. 
The  strategic  position  of  the  Balkans,  controlling 
all  the  roads  between  Europe  and  Asia  Minor, 
controlling  the  ^Egean  and  the  Adriatic,  was 
so  necessary  to  Pan-Germanism,  that  no  more 
deadly  blow  could  possibly  be  dealt  that  scheme 

209 


PAN-GERMANISM 

than  the  creation  of  a  Balkan  confederacy  under 
the  aegis  of  the  Triple  Entente,  pledged  to  inde- 
pendence for  the  Balkan  peoples  of  both  coali- 
tions. The  stronger  the  confederation,  the  more 
independent,  the  greater  obstacle  it  would  be  in 
the  path  of  Pan-Germanism.  The  very  qualities 
and  resources,  which  would  lead  the  Balkans  to 
desire  freedom  from  entangling  alliances  with  the 
Triple  Entente  itself,  would  be  the  very  qualities 
which  would  render  improbable  any  agreement 
with  the  Triple  Alliance,  and  would  animate 
them  with  a  patriotism  and  a  determination  to 
resist  which  could  not  fail  to  work  for  the  benefit 
of  the  Triple  Entente.  For  it  is  not  necessary 
that  the  latter  should  itself  control  them.  Its 
dispositions  in  the  Mediterranean  will  be  equally 
benefited  if  their  possession  by  the  Triple  Alliance 
is  rendered  improbable.  From  the  point  of  view 
of  England  and  France,  moreover,  who  neces- 
sarily distrust  somewhat  their  ally,  Russia,  be- 
cause of  her  ambitions  in  the  Black  Sea,  the 
stronger  the  confederation,  the  more  independent, 
the  greater  would  be  their  own  safety  from  pos- 
sible treachery  on  the  part  of  Russia. 

At  the  same  time  both  nations  realized  that  the 
Tripolitan  War  had  completely  changed  their  own 
policies  in  regard  to  Turkey.  Their  objection  to 
Russia  at  Constantinople  had  been  based  upon 

210 


THE  BALKAN  CRISIS 

the  desire  to  exclude  from  the  Mediterranean  all 
possible  rivals;  but  the  loss  of  Tripoli,  the  loss  of 
Turkey,  both  of  which  had  fallen  into  the  hands 
of  their  enemies,  and  the  fear  of  the  creation  of  a 
confederacy  of  states  in  the  Balkans  under  Ger- 
man or  Austrian  protection,  thoroughly  disposed 
of  their  objections  to  Russia's  ownership  of  that 
same  territory.  If  they  must  have  a  rival  in  those 
seas,  a  thousand  times  better  that  it  should  be 
Russia  than  the  Triple  Alliance.  Russia's  Black 
Sea  fleet  has  still  to  be  made  powerful  enough  to 
be  able  to  interfere  in  the  Mediterranean;  she  is  so 
dependent  upon  their  assistance  to  preserve  her 
present  position  in  northeastern  Europe  that  she 
is  not  likely  to  take  action  elsewhere  which  would 
be  contrary  enough  to  their  interests  to  cause  a 
rupture  of  the  Entente.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
mere  possession  of  the  Balkans  by  Russia  would 
be  as  permanent  a  guarantee  as  could  well  be 
imagined  of  the  failure  of  Pan-Germanism  for  all 
time,  and  would,  more  than  any  other  one  thing, 
render  Morocco,  India,  and  even  England  itself 
safe  from  aggression.  In  the  Black  Sea,  Russia 
could  create,  safe  from  interference,  a  fleet  which 
could  issue  forth  from  the  Straits  in  time  of  need 
and  fall  upon  the  rear  of  the  Austro-Italian  fleet 
operating  from  the  Adriatic  or  Tripoli.  Should 
Russia  be  able  to  secure  possession  of  all  the 

211 


PAN-GERMANISM 

Balkans,  she  would  also  control  the  J2gean  and 
the  Adriatic,  would  occupy  in  Servia  a  post  in 
the  rear  of  Hungary,  highly  dangerous  to  the 
Dual  Monarchy,  from  which  an  invasion,  simul- 
taneous with  an  attack  through  Galicia,  could 
hardly  fail  to  have  fatal  consequences.  Russia 
in  the  Balkans,  in  other  words,  would  promptly 
compel  Germany  and  Austria  to  take  up  the  de- 
fensive and  to  do  so  under  distinct  disadvantages. 
Once  Russia  occupied  such  a  position,  England 
and  France  could  promptly  overrun  the  Mediter- 
ranean, take  Trieste,  conquer  the  Adriatic,  isolate 
Italy,  compel  her  at  the  very  least  to  cede  Tripoli. 
Thus  they  could  secure  a  firmer  hold  upon  the 
Mediterranean  than  ever  before.  From  Russia's 
point  of  view,  an  independent  confederation  in 
the  Balkans,  coupled  to  the  right  of  freedom  of 
passage  through  the  Straits  and  the  permission 
to  create  a  fleet  in  the  Black  Sea,  would  be  prac- 
tically as  advantageous  a  solution  as  she  could 
ask.  Aside  from  the  plains  of  the  Lower  Danube, 
the  Balkans  themselves  are  of  little  value  to  her, 
and  so  vitally  threaten  Austria  that  war  could 
hardly  be  avoided.  Russia  is  more  anxious  to 
open  the  Black  Sea  and  to  obtain  naval  control 
than  she  is  to  force  the  issue  with  Austria  at 
present.  An  independent  Balkan  confederation 
would  protect  the  Straits  from  Austria,  and  would 

212 


THE  BALKAN  CRISIS 

in  practice,  whatever  treaties  and  agreements 
might  say,  give  her  control. 

Should  the  war  succeed,  the  Turk  could  cer- 
tainly be  driven  from  Constantinople,  and  even 
if  it  were  expedient  to  leave  him  there  he  might 
be  compelled  or  induced  to  create  a  Khalifate  in 
Egypt  or  Arabia  to  rule  the  Mohammedans  in  the 
English  and  French  possessions.  The  latter  are 
extremely  desirous  of  quieting  the  religious  fer- 
ment which  has  so  hampered  their  actions  on 
more  than  one  occasion,  by  substituting  for  a 
religious  head  of  the  Mohammedans,  held  in  the 
clutches  of  Germany,  a  religious  head  in  their  own 
control.  They  wish  to  remove  the  excuse  for  a 
Holy  War,  or,  at  any  rate,  to  prevent  the  declara- 
tion of  a  Holy  War  by  the  Sultan  in  Constanti- 
nople which  Mohammedans  throughout  the  world 
would  feel  bound  to  recognize.  Pan-Islam  is  a 
spectre  terrifying  to  them  in  the  extreme.  More- 
over, should  the  Germans  achieve  anything  like 
further  success  in  the  reorganization,  so-called,  of 
southeastern  Europe,  it  would  become  absolutely 
necessary  for  some  member  of  the  Triple  Entente 
to  take  possession  of  Constantinople,  to  say  the 
least,  and,  not  improbably,  to  put  an  end  to  the 
nominal  independence  of  Turkey.  Such  a  blow 
at  the  Sultan  would  certainly  be  resented  in  India, 
Egypt,  and  Morocco,  and  the  statesmen  are  ex- 

213 


PAN-GERMANISM 

tremely  anxious  either  to  remove  the  Sultan  from 
the  danger  zone  or  to  shear  him  of  his  religious 
headship. 

The  Balkan  States  scarcely  believed  in  the 
verity  of  these  communications.  The  splendor 
of  the  opportunity  fairly  dazzled  their  eyes.  It 
had  long  seemed  to  them  that  there  was  really  a 
chance  to  free  themselves  from  the  shackles  of 
both  coalitions  and  of  winning  from  the  Turk, 
without  much  difficulty,  their  freedom  and  that 
of  their  compatriots  in  the  Turkish  Empire,  so 
long  as  the  two  coalitions  did  not  actually  sup- 
port Turkey.  Of  that  fact  they  were  apprehensive. 
While  the  Turk  had  been  the  Sick  Man  of  Europe, 
maintained  by  the  Powers  because  of  the  incur- 
able nature  of  his  disease,  the  sovereignty  of  the 
Turk  over  the  Macedonians  and  Albanians  was 
purely  nominal  and  the  sufferings  of  the  people 
under  his  rule  practically  confined  to  the  reprisals 
of  the  soldiery  upon  the  populace.  As  a  neighbor 
of  those  Balkan  States  who  had  achieved  nominal 
independence,  the  Sick  Man  was  not  very  danger- 
ous. His  very  incompetence  was  a  practical  guar- 
antee of  their  own  safety.  The  strengthening  of 
Turkey,  the  organization  of  a  really  efficient  ad- 
ministration and  army,  whether  by  the  Young 
Turks  or  by  the  Germans,  would  certainly  dimin- 
ish the  probability  of  securing  the  actual  auto- 

214 


THE  BALKAN  CRISIS 

nomy  which  the  Balkan  peoples  had  long  ardently 
desired.  As  fast  as  Turkish  government  grew  bet- 
ter, to  that  degree  would  disappear  the  grievances 
which  made  plausible  the  demands  of  the  alien 
peoples  for  freedom  from  his  rule.  Indeed,  if 
many  more  officers  were  appointed  of  the  stamp 
of  Hussein  Kiazim  Bey,  the  people  would  have 
very  little  to  complain  about,  and  the  Powers 
would  certainly  need  some  strong  arguments  to 
convince  them  of  the  expediency  of  permitting  the 
Balkan  States  to  change  the  existing  dispositions. 
The  continuance,  therefore,  of  the  present  situa- 
tion meant  that  the  probability  of  eventual  inde- 
pendence diminished  annually  and  might  soon 
disappear. 

The  moment,  chosen  by  the  two  coalitions  as 
opportune  for  war  from  their  point  of  view,  was 
singularly  advantageous  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  Balkans  themselves.  Turkey  was  at  war 
with  Italy;  the  real  Turkish  army  was  in  Africa 
and  would  stay  there  as  long  as  the  Italian  fleet 
controlled  the  sea;  moreover,  they  were  assured 
by  both  coalitions  of  the  nominal  character  of  the 
resistance  with  which  the  Turk  would  oppose 
them;  the  war  was  to  be  a  sham  battle  arranged 
for  theatrical  effect.  The  Turks  themselves  were 
gravely  divided  between  the  party  willing  to 
cooperate  with  the  Germans  and  the  Young 

215 


PAN-GERMANISM 

Turks,  anxious  to  strike  a  blow  for  Turkish  inde- 
pendence before  it  was  too  late.  The  Balkan 
States  had,  moreover,  been  most  kindly  supplied 
with  arms,  money,  and  instruction  in  tactics  and 
in  the  strategy  of  war  by  their  "friends,"  and 
would  therefore  enter  the  struggle  with  literally 
every  circumstance  in  their  favor.  The  ease, 
therefore,  of  playing  the  game  for  themselves,  of 
rushing  upon  the  Turk  with  all  possible  speed,  of 
dealing  him  as  many  deadly  blows  as  they  could 
as  soon  after  the  beginning  of  war  as  possible,  was 
so  apparent  that  there  was  little  doubt  in  Sofia 
and  Athens  that  the  Turk  would  be  brought  to  his 
knees  before  the  Powers  could  realize  that  they 
had  been  betrayed.  Once  victorious,  once  pos- 
sessed of  the  military  control  of  Turkey,  they 
would  have  their  greatest  chance  of  maintaining 
their  independence  that  they  ever  hoped  to  have. 
If  hah*  a  million  men,  natural  soldiers,  hi  a  natu- 
ral fortress,  well  equipped  with  other  people's  re- 
sources, could  not  maintain  themselves  against 
assault,  independence  for  the  Balkans  was  a  vision 
which  would  never  be  attained.  If  they  must 
fight  to  attain  it,  they  could  never  have  a  better 
chance  than  this.  But  they  were  fully  aware 
that  the  chances  of  their  needing  to  fight  were 
small.  The  existence  of  the  two  coalitions  and 
the  identity  of  their  plans  would  convince  them 

216 


THE  BALKAN  CRISIS 

both  that  the  Balkans  were  acting  in  their  in- 
terests, and  neither  was  at  all  likely  to  interfere 
until  too  late;  for,  when  the  truth  of  the  situation 
should  dawn  upon  them,  it  was  more  than  likely 
that  they  would  both  see  it  simultaneously,  real- 
ize that  they  had  been  hoodwinked,  and  be  too 
much  afraid  of  each  other  to  dare  to  interfere. 
At  any  rate,  diplomacy  could  be  depended  upon 
to  play  off  the  Powers  one  against  the  other.  If 
the  Balkan  States  could  only  get  into  their  hands 
the  strategic  places,  their  assistance  would  be  too 
vital  to  the  completion  of  the  schemes  of  both  co- 
alitions to  make  doubtful  their  ability  to  secure 
their  own  price.  In  any  case,  they  would  not  be 
again  subjected  to  the  Turk.  If  they  must  resign 
themselves  to  the  protection  of  one  coalition  or 
the  other,  they  could  undoubtedly  secure  for  them- 
selves infinitely  better  terms  than  they  could 
otherwise  have  had. 

Under  these  circumstances,  the  Balkan  States 
began  the  war  with  a  vigor  and  an  energy  which 
astounded  Europe,  began  it,  too,  in  the  fall,  con- 
trary to  the  advice  of  both  coalitions,  and  pushed 
it  to  a  successful  conclusion  within  a  few  weeks. 
The  first  result  was  that  anticipated  by  the  Triple 
Alliance,  peace  between  Turkey  and  Italy,  and 
the  cession  to  the  latter  of  unconditional  sover- 
eignty over  Tripoli.  The  next  results  were  unex- 

217 


PAN-GERMANISM 

pected.  The  war  was  too  realistic.  It  was  entirely 
undesirable  for  the  Balkans  to  destroy  the  Turk- 
ish army  which  the  Germans  had  created  with  so 
much  difficulty  and  expense  to  control  Constan- 
tinople and  the  Baghdad  Railway.  The  Triple 
Entente  by  no  means  desired  to  hand  over,  even 
for  a  time,  to  the  Balkan  States  Constantinople 
and  the  Straits.  The  first  successes  were  probably 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  Turk  was  not  prepared 
for  that  type  of  an  attack,  had  been  ordered  to  fall 
back  upon  Adrianople  which  was  to  be  besieged. 
He  accordingly  fell  back  on  Adrianople;  the  Bul- 
garians promptly  marched  round  him,  and  fell 
upon  the  disorganized  forces  behind,  who  were 
as  yet  unprepared  for  operations  of  such  magni- 
tude. Before  the  Turk  had  time  to  take  breath, 
before  Berlin  and  Vienna  recovered  from  the  first 
shock,  the  Bulgarians  were  almost  within  sight 
of  Constantinople,  and  their  allies  were  pushing 
the  war  in  the  west  and  south  to  a  successful  con- 
clusion with  great  rapidity. 

It  now  became  clear  to  the  Balkans  that  the 
moment  had  come  to  deal  with  the  Powers.  No 
doubt,  before  the  war  began,  the  confederates  had 
a  reasonably  clear  idea  of  the  terms  they  could 
expect  from  both  coalitions,  and  they  did  not 
need  to  contemplate  them  longer  to  see  that  the 
Triple  Entente  was  prepared  to  offer  them  vastly 

218 


THE  BALKAN   CRISIS 

more  satisfactory  conditions.  At  the  best,  all  they 
could  hope  from  the  Triple  Alliance  was  the  con- 
trol of  their  local  affairs;  the  international  rela- 
tions must  be  delivered  over  to  the  allies.  The 
Triple  Entente,  on  the  other  hand,  while  it  would 
also  expect  to  direct  their  international  policy, 
found  its  own  interests  best  suited  by  increasing 
the  strength  and  independence  of  the  Balkans 
themselves.  Pan-Germanism,  in  fact,  depended 
for  its  success  upon  their  absorption  by  Germany 
and  Austria,  while  the  defeat  of  Pan-Germanism 
by  the  Triple  Entente  would  depend  upon  the  ex- 
tent to  which  Balkan  independence  of  Germany 
and  Austria  could  be  made  a  reality.  This  was 
certainly  as  virtual  independence  as  it  was  prob- 
able that  the  possessors  of  such  important  strate- 
gic points  would  ever  be  likely  to  secure  from  the 
Powers.  The  fact  that  Russia's  right  of  free  pas- 
sage through  the  Straits  would  in  large  measure 
satisfy  her  ambitions  and  put  into  her  hands, 
without  danger  to  the  Balkan  Confederation, 
what  she  chiefly  valued,  and  what  she  would  ex- 
pect to  obtain  from  the  conquest  of  the  whole 
territory,  nay,  what  she  had  believed  could  be  ob- 
tained only  after  the  conquest  of  the  whole  terri- 
tory, would  give  them  a  greater  degree  of  assur- 
ance against  aggression  from  her,  than  they  could 
ever  have  from  Austria.  Money  was  another 

219 


PAN-GERMANISM 

desideratum.  The  supply  from  Berlin  and  Vienna 
would  obviously  cease;  there  was  no  money  in 
the  Balkans  and  no  resources  which  could  be 
turned  into  money.  To  get  the  money,  therefore, 
necessary  to  finance  their  independence,  and,  in 
particular,  the  money  with  which  to  maintain  it, 
should  they  have  to  fight  longer  for  it,  they  must 
sell  themselves  to  the  Triple  Entente.  This,  they 
proceeded  to  do  with  dispatch,  and  announced 
in  consequence  that  they  would  deal  only  with 
Turkey  and  would  deal  with  her  only  upon 
the  unconditional  acceptance  of  their  maximum 
terms.  The  King  of  Greece  was  to  become  Presi- 
dent of  the  Federation,  and  the  territory  con- 
quered from  the  Turk  —  except  for  Constanti- 
nople and  Saloniki  —  was  to  be  divided  among  the 
existing  states.  The  Bulgarians  claimed  Thrace; 
the  Greeks,  Macedonia;  the  Servians,  Albania, 
including  the  seacoast  on  the  Adriatic.  Constan- 
tinople, Saloniki,  and  the  Straits  they  expected  to 
see  internationalized,  the  Turkish  Empire  rele- 
gated to  Asia  Minor,  a  freedom  of  passage  ac- 
corded every  one  through  the  Straits.  That  these 
terms  could  finally  be  obtained,  neither  the  Bal- 
kans nor  their  new  allies  probably  believed,  but 
that  was  no  reason  why  they  should  not  be  de- 
manded. 

Undoubtedly,  the  war  has  been  a  great  victory 
220 


THE  BALKAN  CRISIS 

for  the  Balkans  themselves  in  their  long  crusade 
against  the  Turk.  They  now  hope  to  drive  the 
Infidel  out  of  Europe  and  thus  permanently  to  res- 
cue their  co-religionists  from  his  clutches,  both  of 
which  achievements  would  be  supremely  gratify- 
ing to  them.  For  the  present,  at  any  rate,  they 
are  actually  independent  and,  unless  a  renewal  of 
the  war  should  bring  with  it  unexpected  reverses, 
they  are  likely  to  remain  so. 

The  chief  results  of  the  war,  however,  have 
not  accrued  to  them  but  to  their  new  allies,  who 
have  thus  effectively  retrieved  the  disaster  in  Tri- 
poli. Not  only  will  the  Balkan  Confederation  be  a 
stumbling-block  in  the  path  of  Pan-Germanism, 
which  is  hardly  likely  to  be  moved  for  the  pre- 
sent, but  temporarily  the  alliance  between  the 
Balkans  and  the  Triple  Entente  has  restored 
the  balance  of  power  in  the  Mediterranean.  The 
Greeks  have  driven  the  Italians  out  of  most  of 
the  islands  of  the  JSgean;  Crete,  which  hitherto 
has  had  an  anomalous  existence,  as  an  inter- 
national possession,  has  been  united  to  Greece 
and  will  give  the  Triple  Entente  a  powerful  naval 
station  east  of  Malta.  Above  all,  the  loss  of 
the  islands,  the  certain  strengthening  of  the  Eng- 
lish and  French  fleets  in  the  Mediterranean,  the 
improbability  of  Austria's  taking  possession  of 
Saloniki  for  some  time  to  come,  have  greatly 

221 


PAN-GERMANISM 

reduced  the  chances  of  the  use  of  Tripoli  as  a 
military  and  naval  base.  Certainly,  until  the 
Austrians  and  Italians  are  prepared  to  contest 
the  supremacy  of  the  Mediterranean,  the  Italians 
will  have  only  such  relations  with  Tripoli  as  the 
English  permit.  The  latter  are  not  likely  to  bring 
the  question  of  Italy's  right  to  Tripoli  to  a  test  of 
force,  but  they  will  no  doubt  feel  themselves  jus- 
tified in  preventing  her  from  attempting  any- 
thing beyond  the  commercial  development  of  the 
country. 

The  interposition  of  the  Balkan  Confederation 
between  Austria  and  Turkey  has  for  the  time  be- 
ing deprived  the  Germans  of  communication  with 
Turkey  and  has  jeopardized  their  control  of  the 
Baghdad  Railway.  The  Turk,  excluded  from 
Europe,  robbed  of  his  most  valuable  possession, 
the  Straits,  would  not  be  as  available  material 
from  the  German  point  of  view  as  he  was.  The 
new  Turkish  army,  if  we  suppose  that  it  was  safe 
and  sound  in  Tripoli  and  was  not  shot  to  pieces 
in  the  war,  would  no  longer  be  as  valuable  as 
when  it  could  hope  to  guard  the  trade  route  from 
Constantinople  well  through  the  mountains,  pro- 
tecting Constantinople  itself  and  the  Baghdad 
Railway.  The  importance  of  protecting  the  rail- 
way may  still  be  great,  but  the  commercial  im- 
portance of  its  protection  can  amount  to  very 


THE  BALKAN  CRISIS 

little  so  long  as  the  trade  route  has  been  cut  apart 
in  the  middle.  Not  improbably  commercial  treat- 
ies can  be  signed  with  the  Balkans,  but  if  the  latter 
are  able  to  maintain  their  present  position  either  by 
extorting  favorable  terms  from  the  reluctant  Turk 
or  by  a  renewal  of  the  war,  such  treaties  will  be 
subject  to  rupture  at  a  moment's  notice.  The 
expediency  may  well  be  questioned  of  spending 
money  in  the  development  of  Asia  Minor  by  a 
power  which  can  obtain  access  to  the  district  only 
by  the  sufferance  of  states  hostile  to  her  ambitions. 
These  significant  changes  of  strategic  position 
led  both  the  Triple  Alliance  and  the  Turks  to 
offer  terms  of  peace  so  remote  from  the  demands 
of  the  Balkan  States  as  to  evoke  from  the  latters' 
representatives  at  the  negotiations  opened  at 
London  in  December,  1912,  the  excited  cry  that 
the  Turkish  proposals  did  not  even  provide  a  basis 
for  compromise  and  practically  ignored  the  vic- 
tories of  the  allies.  The  Turkish  proposals  were  in 
very  truth  nothing  more  nor  less  than  the  salient 
features  of  the  plan  of  the  Triple  Alliance  for  the 
reorganization  of  south-eastern  Europe  which 
would  have  been  executed  had  the  Balkan  States 
remained  faithful  and  conquered  Turkey  as  at 
first  arranged.  Such  terms  would,  indeed,  rob 
the  victors  of  the  spoils;  would  create  new  auto- 
nomous states  out  of  the  territory  just  conquered, 

223 


PAN-GERMANISM 

and,  injury  of  injuries,  would  actually  leave  the 
new  states  under  Turkish  suzerainty.  Such  offers 
were  rightly  interpreted  as  defiance,  as  unwilling- 
ness to  accept  the  most  obvious  facts  of  the  mili- 
tary situation. 

In  addition,  the  Albanians  were  persuaded  by 
Austrian  promises  of  support  to  declare  them- 
selves independent,  and  Servia  saw  her  access  to 
the  Adriatic,  the  dearest  of  her  ambitions,  her 
chief  reason  for  joining  in  the  war  at  all,  snatched 
from  her.  At  Vienna,  however,  it  was  felt  that  im- 
mediate war  would  be  preferable  to  the  surrender 
of  Albania  and  the  shores  of  the  lower  Adriatic 
to  any  such  confederation  supported  by  the 
Triple  Entente.  Vigorous  diplomatic  representa- 
tions were  followed  by  the  mobilization  of  Austrian 
army  corps  and  of  the  Danube  fleet.  In  the  face 
of  this  determination,  both  the  Triple  Entente 
and  Servia  judged  it  best  to  agree  to  the  inde- 
pendence of  Albania,  and  for  Servia  to  obtain 
access  to  the  Adriatic  by  means  of  a  railway 
whose  neutrality  would  be  secured  by  interna- 
tional agreement. 

But  upon  the  destruction  of  the  Turkish  power 
in  Europe,  the  Balkans  insisted,  and  were  secretly 
supported  by  the  Triple  Entente,  which  hoped 
thus  to  destroy  one  more  link  of  the  chain  of 
Pan-Germanism.  The  Balkan  States,  therefore, 

224 


THE  BALKAN  CRISIS 

demanded  the  surrender  of  most  of  Thrace  and  in 
particular  of  the  great  fortress  of  Adrianople,  whose 
possession  would  expose  Constantinople  to  assault 
at  any  time  and  leave  the  Turk  a  bare  foothold  on 
the  Bosphorus,  of  which  he  could  at  any  time  be  de- 
prived. Besides,  unless  Thrace  were  obtained,  there 
would  be  no  territory  to  be  won  by  the  Bulgarians, 
who  had  done  most  of  the  fighting,  for  the  Greeks 
obstinately  declined  to  share  Macedonia  with 
them.  If  Adrianople  could  not  be  secured  with- 
out further  fighting,  it  was  clearly  to  the  interests 
of  the  Balkans  and  their  allies  to  renew  the  war. 

On  the  other  hand,  for  the  Turks  to  yield 
Adrianople,  without  further  fighting,  would  mean 
for  Germany  and  Austria  the  unresisting  acquies- 
cence in  the  virtual  failure  of  Pan-Germanism  by 
permitting  the  interposition  of  a  permanent  bar- 
rier between  them  and  Asia  Minor,  which  would 
compel  them  to  relinquish  Turkey,  Constanti- 
nople, the  control  of  the  Straits,  the  Baghdad  Rail- 
way, and  the  commercial  route  to  the  East  at  one 
fell  swoop.  To  have  lost  the  Balkans  was  disas- 
trous; to  lose  Constantinople  as  well  would  be  the 
death-knell  of  Pan-Germanism.  They  are  there- 
fore in  favor  of  allowing  the  Turk  to  fight  again. 

Nor  is  the  Turk  unwilling.  The  Young  Turks 
are  well  aware  that  the  new  Turkish  army, 
trained  by  Von  der  Goltz,  has  not  yet  been  in 

225 


PAN-GERMANISM 

battle,  and,  until  it  has  been  defeated,  they  de- 
cline to  surrender  as  much  as  they  might  lose  if 
their  whole  army  had  been  annihilated  in  a  long, 
hard-fought  war.  Have  they  not  already  beaten 
the  Greeks?  Have  they  not  checked  the  Italian 
advance  in  Tripoli?  Above  all,  these  fresh  troops, 
well  equipped,  will  meet  an  army  decimated  by  its 
recklessness  in  earlier  battles,  with  resources  seri- 
ously impaired  by  a  long  campaign  and  a  long 
armistice,  and  with  its  lines  of  communication 
blocked  by  snow  and  ice. 

At  the  moment  of  writing,  therefore,  January 
19,  1913,  the  renewal  of  the  war  seems  more 
likely  to  further  the  interests  of  all  concerned 
than  the  adoption  of  any  terms  yet  proposed. 
The  actual  inability  of  Germany  or  Austria  to 
finance  the  war  for  Turkey  or  to  supply  her  with 
arms  and  ammunition  may  force  the  latter  to 
yield,  and  will  in  all  probability  prevent  pro- 
longed resistance.  Certainly,  Austria's  inability 
to  float  a  relatively  small  loan  in  Europe  and  the 
sale  of  the  bonds  in  New  York  at  an  interest  rate 
of  seven  per  cent,  demonstrates  conclusively  the 
financial  stringency  in  Austria,  Germany,  and 
Italy.  It  really  seems  as  if  the  control  of  the 
financial  world  by  the  Triple  Entente  had  again 
defeated  the  Triple  Alliance,  for  the  latter  is 
recommending  the  Turks  to  cede  Adrianople. 

226 


THE  BALKAN  CRISIS 

For  all  these  reasons,  it  is  highly  unlikely  that 
the  Triple  Alliance  will  attempt  in  the  immediate 
future  any  movement  to  alter  the  situation  by  di- 
rect intervention  in  the  Balkans.  The  Confedera- 
tion is  too  strong  in  men,  too  strongly  entrenched 
to  make  military  operations  anything  but  hazard- 
ous, even  had  they  no  aid  to  expect  from  Russia. 
The  whole  of  Europe  is  too  well  prepared  to  risk 
a  general  war  at  present.  Modern  warfare  is  of 
such  character  that  the  element  of  surprise  in  an 
attack  is  almost  certain  to  conclude  the  war  in  the 
aggressor's  favor,  while  an  attack  upon  a  nation 
fully  prepared  to  receive  it  becomes  under  mod- 
ern conditions  inevitably  hazardous.  Besides,  it  is 
by  no  means  clear  at  the  present  moment  that 
the  Triple  Alliance  is  strong  enough  in  armies 
and  navies  to  boast  an  even  chance  of  victory  in 
a  contest  with  the  Triple  Entente.  They  will, 
therefore,  if  again  defeated  after  the  renewal  of 
war,  be  likely  to  conceal  their  chagrin  as  best 
they  can,  accept  such  losses  of  strategic  position 
as  diplomacy  cannot  avoid,  and  hope  that  some 
opportunity  will  appear  in  the  near  future  of  dis- 
covering a  price,  which  they  can  afford  to  pay  the 
Balkans,  and  which  the  latter  will  consider  a 
sufficient  inducement,  to  make  it  worth  their  while 
to  change  sides.  Indeed,  the  stronger  the  Balkan 
Confederation,  the  more  independent,  the  greater 

227 


PAN-GERMANISM 

factor  it  will  become  in  European  affairs,  the 
more  difficult  it  will  become  for  either  coalition  to 
act  without  its  support,  the  more  active  will  be- 
come their  bidding  for  its  favor,  the  more  diffi- 
cult it  will  become  for  either  of  them  to  interfere 
in  that  district  by  force. 

The  vital  difficulty  in  perpetuating  the  new 
Balkan  Confederacy  is  that  the  governmental 
lines  as  they  are  now  drawn  do  not  coincide  with 
the  most  important  racial  and  religious  lines. 
Bosnia,  Herzegovina,  and  the  Illyrian  coast, 
which  are  now  part  of  Austria,  belong  racially,  re- 
ligiously, and  geographically  with  Servia.  Much 
of  Hungary  similarly  ought  to  be  connected  with 
Rumania,  while  Albania  contains  so  many  races 
and  creeds  that  it  does  not  really  belong  any- 
where. It  must  not  be  forgotten,  too,  in  consid- 
ering the  ease  of  separating  the  Balkan  Confeder- 
ation into  its  component  parts  by  the  diplomacy 
of  either  coalition,  that  the  Balkans  have  long 
been  the  scene  of  a  blood  feud  between  the  Mo- 
hammedans and  Christians,  many  of  whom  will 
inevitably  remain  in  their  present  positions,  and 
that  in  the  Balkans  continues  at  present  the 
active  struggle  for  supremacy  between  the  Greek 
and  Latin  branches  of  the  Christian  Church. 
The  hatred  of  the  Greeks  in  Servia  and  in  Bul- 
garia was  until  recently  intense,  and,  however 

228 


THE  BALKAN  CRISIS 

these  varied  states  may  have  compromised  at 
present  their  various  jarring  ambitions,  or  have 
buried  for  the  time  being  their  traditional  hatreds, 
once  the  Turk  is  thoroughly  disposed  of,  and  they 
settle  down  to  the  difficult  task  of  living  with  each 
other,  they  are  more  than  likely  to  fall  at  logger- 
heads over  the  inevitable  administrative  and  gov- 
ernmental questions  involved  in  the  institution 
of  a  permanent  settlement.  If  the  treaty  of  peace 
hands  over  Macedonia  to  Greece,  it  is  hardly 
likely  that  the  diplomats  will  succeed  in  demarcat- 
ing the  limits  of  that  hitherto  elastic  province 
in  a  fashion  which  will  satisfy  more  than  a  frac- 
tion of  those  interested.  There  are  so  many  quasi- 
logical  and  reasonable  methods  of  separating  it 
from  Servia,  Bulgaria,  and  Greece,  that  none  of 
them  are  likely  to  meet  the  wishes  of  all  concerned. 
The  present  Balkan  unity  is  based  upon  their 
hatred  of  the  Turk  and  their  fears  of  European 
interference.  When  once  their  autonomy  is  defi- 
nitely assured,  both  of  these  bonds  will  disappear, 
and  the  lack  of  geographical,  religious,  racial, 
administrative,  economic  unity  of  any  kind,  sort, 
or  description  will  inevitably  begin  to  manifest 
itself  in  ways  which  cannot  be  foreseen,  and 
which  cannot  fail  to  test  to  the  utmost  the  sanity 
and  ability  of  the  native  statesman. 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE  JUSTIFIABILITY   OF   PAN-GERMANISM 

ANY  consideration,  however  slight  or  casual, 
of  the  justifiability  of  so  f  ar-reaching  a  plan 
as  Pan-Germanism  must  necessarily  begin  with 
the  validity  of  the  standard  to  be  employed  in 
judging  it.  Even  a  comparatively  slight  acquaint- 
ance with  history  will  make  sufficiently  evident 
the  existence  in  the  world  of  politics  and  business 
of  a  different  standard  from  that  criterion  of  abso- 
lute truth  which  we  ordinarily  apply  to  the  con- 
duct of  individuals.  We  find,  in  fact,  that  same 
double  standard  in  existence  in  international  poli- 
tics which  is  so  perplexing  to  the  majority  of  men 
in  connection  with  every-day  business,  where  the 
usual  conception  of  ethics  declares  it  right  for 
one  man  to  best  the  other  by  any  means  he  can, 
short  of  actual  violence  and  the  actual  breach  of 
the  letter  of  the  law.  The  majority  of  men,  what- 
ever professions  they  are  willing  to  make  verbally, 
do  not  practice  the  Golden  Rule  or  the  Ser- 
mon on  the  Mount.  If  we  apply  to  the  situation 
in  international  politics  the  ethical  and  moral 
tenets,  frankly  professed  by  the  community,  and, 

230 


THE  JUSTIFIABILITY  OF  PAN-GERMANISM 

as  frankly,  disregarded  in  every-day  life,  we  shall 
necessarily  conclude  that  Pan-Germanism  is  not 
and  never  can  be  justifiable.  If  we  proceed,  too, 
in  attempting  to  evaluate  the  moral  and  ethical 
aspects  of  Pan-Germanism,  from  the  position  in 
regard  to  war  assumed  by  the  numerous  societies 
advocating  international  peace  or  arbitration, 
we  shall  also  be  in  danger  of  assuming  the  truth 
of  our  conclusion  as  our  premise.  The  advocates 
of  peace  declare  that  war  is  cruel,  brutal,  econo- 
mically wasteful,  and,  from  every  point  of  view, 
opposed  to  the  true  interests  of  the  community 
as  a  whole  and  of  the  individuals  who  compose  it. 
They  declaim  against  it  as  foolish;  who  would 
really  be  so  lacking  in  reason  as  to  suppose  that 
the  truth  and  justice  of  great  questions  could 
be  established  by  fighting?  Such  men  must  still 
be  dwelling  mentally  in  the  darkness  of  remote 
antiquity.  They  insist  that  war  is  void  of  good 
result;  who  can  be  so  lost  to  all  sense  of  propor- 
tion and  value  as  to  suppose  that  destruction  can 
be  constructive  ?  To  argue  from  any  such  premises 
as  these  will  be  necessarily  to  establish  that  any 
such  scheme  of  aggression  as  that  proposed  by 
Germany  is  not  only  lacking  in  morality  but  in 
sanity. 

The  candid  student,  however,  who  is  not  anx- 
ious to  support  a  propaganda,  and  who  seeks 

231 


PAN-GERMANISM 

rather  to  explain  and  expound  the  real  reasons 
which  have  led  men  into  such  paths  as  they  are 
now  following  than  to  cavil  and  blame,  will  recog- 
nize hi  Pan-Germanism  the  expression  of  a  na- 
tional determination  to  preserve  and  strengthen 
the  corporate  life  of  a  great  people.  Its  basis  is 
greed  from  one  point  of  view,  ambition  from  an- 
other, but  its  effective  cause  in  both  cases  is  the 
expression  of  nationality.  Germany,  in  fact,  has 
attained  a  national  consciousness,  a  national  in- 
dividuality, and  seeks  to  insure  the  continued  ex- 
istence of  this  corporate  individual  for  all  time. 
Pan-Germanism  is  merely  self-preservation.  This 
new  individual,  who  entered  the  world  through 
the  travail  of  the  nineteenth  century,  is  conscious 
of  his  sturdy  strength  and  of  his  growing  needs,  is 
ambitious  to  improve  his  own  condition  and  to 
leave  to  those  who  come  after  him  a  solid  guar- 
antee of  immunity  from  the  suffering  and  priva- 
tion that  he  has  endured.  Above  all,  he  is  filled 
with  an  uncontrollable  determination  to  establish 
his  economic  well-being.  With  growth  have  come 
new  economic  wants,  which  have  in  turn  revealed 
the  existence  of  hitherto  unexpected  desires, 
clamoring  for  satisfaction  and  to  be  satisfied  only 
by  the  increased  wealth  which  depends  in  its  own 
turn  upon  the  possibility  of  national  expansion. 
Unquestionably,  the  creation  of  this  corporate 

232 


THE  JUSTIFIABILITY  OF  PAN-GERMANISM 

individual  is  the  result  of  the  working  of  natural 
forces,  present  in  the  life  of  every  European  com- 
munity, and  to  whose  operation  every  nation  in 
Europe  owes  that  degree  of  prosperity  and  cor- 
porate consciousness  which  it  possesses.  To  a 
greater  or  less  degree,  all  are  actuated  by  the 
motives  which  influence  Germany.  It  is  by  no 
means  clear  that,  if  their  circumstances  were 
identical  with  hers,  they  would  fail  to  employ  all 
the  methods  of  which  she  is  ready  to  avail  herself. 
Whether  or  not  we  are  willing  to  admit  that  there 
are  moral  and  ethical  principles  of  permanent 
value,  absolutely  binding  upon  all  individuals 
and  communities  from  century  to  century,  we 
cannot  deny  that  the  record  of  the  past  amply 
proves  that  no  nation  has  yet  refrained,  because 
of  moral  scruples,  from  advancing  its  economic 
or  national  welfare  by  any  means  it  could.  If 
Germany  is  wrong,  others  too  have  been  wrong; 
indeed,  if  her  conduct  is  unjustifiable,  no  country 
in  the  world  can  establish  its  moral  and  ethical 
right  to  existence.  At  the  same  time  that  we 
recognize  the  recrudescence  of  certain  factors 
familiar  to  all  situations,  we  must  not  be  blind  to 
the  vastly  more  important  fact  that  the  present 
situation  is  literally  without  precedent  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  world. 

The  present  international  situation  is  the  result 
233 


PAN-GERMANISM 

of  the  economic  progress  of  the  last  half-century. 
The  improvements  in  agriculture,  in  manufactur- 
ing, in  transportation,  have  for  the  first  time  since 
man  began  to  write  the  record  of  his  deeds  made 
the  world  capable  of  more  than  keeping  itself  in 
existence.  The  increased  production  of  food  and 
clothes,  entirely  beyond  any  immediate  needs  of 
the  existing  community,  has  stimulated  to  an 
unprecedented  degree  the  growth  of  population, 
while  the  progress  of  industry  and  agriculture  has 
as  constantly  out-distanced  the  increasing  popu- 
lation. The  satiation  of  the  old  economic  wants 
of  the  individual,  for  food,  clothes,  and  shelter, 
produced  inevitably  new  standards  of  well-being 
which  declared  subsistence  to  be  something  more 
than  the  ability  to  keep  alive,  and  which  insisted 
upon  a  certain  excellence  of  quality  in  the  food 
and  clothes,  a  certain  amount  of  leisure  for  amuse- 
ment and  self-culture,  a  certain  degree  of  educa- 
tion. The  luxuries  of  preceding  centuries  became 
necessities.  More  economic  wants  appeared.  Men 
whose  ancestors  had  been  well  content  with  one 
good  meal  a  day  and  a  thatched  cottage  of  one 
i-oom  are  demanding  a  house  with  glass  windows 
and  three  liberal  meals  a  day,  including  fresh 
meat,  beverages,  sugar,  and  butter.  While  few 
will  claim  that  the  new  standard  is  excessive,  no 
candid  student  can  deny  the  astonishing  increase 

234 


THE  JUSTIFIABILITY  OF  PAN-GERMANISM 

in  the  number  of  economic  wants  never  before 
felt  by  so  large  a  proportion  of  the  community. 
To  continue  to  feed  and  clothe  the  growing 
multitudes,  to  meet  the  demands  imposed  upon 
industry  and  agriculture  by  the  new  standards  of 
living,  an  approximate  utilization  of  all  the  re- 
sources of  the  community  became  necessary.  In 
the  past  the  vastness  of  the  resources  of  the  globe 
had  never  been  suspected;  agriculture  had  merely 
scratched  the  ground;  mines  had  been  worked 
only  where  large  deposits  of  comparatively  free 
metal  lay  near  the  surface;  manufacturing,  so  far 
as  the  majority  of  the  community  was  concerned, 
had  been  confined  to  the  production  of  rough 
cloth  and  the  absolute  essentials  of  existence.  The 
substitution  of  machines  for  the  thousands  of 
hands  needed  in  the  past  for  the  performance  of 
the  same  task,  the  utilization  of  the  resources  of 
the  community  in  anything  like  an  adequate  way 
for  the  first  time,  enabled  a  part  of  the  community 
to  supply  the  whole  with  the  necessities  of  life, 
even  according  to  the  new  standard  of  living,  and, 
therefore,  enabled  the  remainder  to  devote  their 
time  to  less  essential  tasks.  Many  of  them  turned 
their  attention  to  meeting  the  new  economic 
wants,  others  occupied  their  time  by  still  further 
developing  the  economic  possibilities  of  the  com- 
munity. And  for  the  first  time  in  history,  it  be- 

235 


PAN-GERMANISM 

came  possible  for  vast  numbers  of  men  to  turn 
their  attention  solely  to  the  furtherance  of  the 
community's  ambitions.  Hitherto  no  standing 
army  of  considerable  size  could  be  maintained 
in  Europe,  for  the  simple  reason  that  so  large  a 
number  of  hands  could  not  be  spared  from  the 
fields  from  which  the  community  derived  its 
maintenance.  Nor  were  the  transportation  facili- 
ties adequate  to  provide  these  men  with  a  steady 
supply  of  food  and  clothes  during  the  necessary 
period  of  training.  A  standing  army  of  hundreds 
of  thousands  of  men,  who  devote  their  whole  time 
to  learning  the  art  of  war,  and  who  are  maintained 
by  the  state  during  their  apprenticeship,  is  a  phe- 
nomenon which  nothing  short  of  the  economic 
progress  of  the  last  half -century  could  have  made 
possible.  For  the  first  time  enough  men  can  be 
spared  from  the  task  of  keeping  the  community 
alive  to  devote  themselves  to  the  prosecution  of  a 
war  founded  only  in  aggression.  Pan-Germanism 
has  been  made  possible  by  the  economic  growth 
of  the  nineteenth  century. 

Paradoxical  as  it  may  sound,  the  internal  peace 
of  Europe  since  1815,  except  for  sporadic  out- 
breaks here  and  there,  has  intensified  in  degree 
this  new  phase  of  national  activity.  Hitherto,  the 
resources  of  every  country,  in  men  and  in  food, 
were  periodically  reduced  by  famine  and  pesti- 

236 


THE  JUSTIFIABILITY  OF  PAN-GERMANISM 

lence,  and,  above  all,  by  the  destructive  nature 
of  war  as  it  was  necessarily  prosecuted  before  the 
modern  railway  made  it  possible  to  supply  an 
army  from  a  distance.  The  same  lack  of  trans- 
portation, which  forced  the  soldiers  to  forage  on 
the  country,  also  forced  each  district  of  the  coun- 
try to  depend,  almost  entirely,  in  time  of  peace 
upon  its  own  efforts  for  its  own  subsistence. 
Floods,  drought,  blight,  various  diseases  of  cattle, 
produced  famine  and  the  inevitable  reduction  of 
the  population,  often  in  the  same  little  community 
not  less  frequently  than  twice  or  thrice  within  a 
generation.  Under  these  circumstances  the  abil- 
ity of  a  country  to  go  to  war,  to  put  men  into  its 
army,  to  divert  them  from  the  fields,  even  during 
the  continuance  of  the  war,  depended  upon  its 
comparative  freedom  from  these  artificial  meth- 
ods of  losing  its  strength.  The  comparative  peace 
of  the  last  century  and  the  progress  of  medical 
science,  as  well  as  the  advance  in  agriculture  and 
industry,  have  enormously  strengthened  the  na- 
tions of  the  world  by  giving  them  a  surplus  of 
men  and  materials,  which  they  can  now  devote  to 
the  prosecution  of  a  war  of  aggression  without 
endangering  the  lives  of  those  already  in  existence. 
Moreover,  this  same  peace,  which  has  greatly 
contributed  to  the  unprecedented  increase  of 
population  and  of  wealth,  and  which  has  per- 

237 


PAN-GERMANISM 

mitted  the  devotion  of  so  much  time  and  labor 
to  the  satisfaction  of  economic  wants  which  past 
centuries  would  have  considered  superficial,  is 
in  no  small  measure  responsible  for  that  very 
economic  pressure  of  population,  that  need  of  an 
outlet  for  the  swelling  surplus  of  manufactures 
which  is  driving  Germany,  Austria,  and  Italy  into 
this  great  scheme  of  aggression.  Their  present 
resources,  their  ability  to  support  themselves  by 
the  labors  of  a  fraction  of  the  community,  which 
permit  them  to  undertake  such  aggression,  are 
the  very  factors  which  make  expansion  inevit- 
able. The  interaction  and  the  interrelation  of 
these  varied  economic  factors  have  produced  not 
only  the  impulse  but  the  means  of  satisfying  it. 

The  unprecedented  growth  of  population  in  all 
countries  of  Europe,  which  has  compelled  them 
to  utilize  their  resources  as  never  before,  has  not 
expanded  their  boundaries.  Germany  has  sub- 
stantially no  more  arable  land  available  than  in 
1815.  The  erasure  of  traditional  boundaries,  the 
disappearance  of  administrative  and  legal  factors 
familiar  to  the  past,  does  not  alter  the  vital  fact 
that  the  Germanic  race  still  occupies  to  all  intents 
and  purposes  the  same  territory  it  held  in  the 
year  1500.  It  is,  in  fact,  in  the  feeling  of  limitation, 
engendered  by  the  extent  to  which  the  present 
natural  resources  of  Europe  have  been  drawn 

238 


THE  JUSTIFIABILITY  OF  PAN-GERMANISM 

upon  to  maintain  the  economic  life  of  the  com- 
munity, that  we  find  the  effective  explanation  of 
the  present  frenzied  desire  for  expansion.  The 
benefits  which  have  accrued  both  to  the  individual 
and  to  the  community  in  well-being,  mental  as  well 
as  physical,  from  this  development,  are  so  vast 
that  no  nation  can  view,  except  with  dismay,  the 
probability  of  the  retardation  of  its  present  rate 
of  growth.  They  realize  not  only  that  the  pre- 
sent rate  of  development  cannot  be  continued 
in  Europe,  but  that  it  must  necessarily  stop  alto- 
gether unless  the  various  European  nations  can 
extend  their  activities  into  other  portions  of  the 
globe.  It  is  far  from  improbable  that,  at  the  rate 
of  growth  during  the  last  century,  all  land  in  the 
temperate  zone  suitable  for  the  home  of  the  pre- 
sent European  races  may  -be  developed  within 
the  next  century  to  the  point  which  Europe  has 
already  reached.  Who  would  have  imagined  in 
the  year  1700  that  the  continent  of  North  Amer- 
ica could  by  any  possibility  have  been  brought 
within  the  succeeding  two  hundred  years  to  prac- 
tically the  same  point  of  economic,  political,  and 
social  development  which  the  European  nations 
had  attained  in  thousands  of  years?  In  fact,  it  is 
pretty  generally  felt  among  the  statesmen  of  the 
leading  powers  of  the  world  that  the  present  rate 
of  expansion  cannot  continue,  and  that  inevitably 

239 


PAN-GERMANISM 

some  nation  or  nations  must  fall  behind  in  the 
race  for  national  and  individual  well-being. 

The  progress  of  transportation,  resulting  in  an 
interdependence  of  the  world  and  an  ease  of  com- 
munication between  the  various  parts  of  it  which 
has  brought  all  countries  into  close  relations  with 
each  other,  made  possible  for  the  first  time  the 
clash  of  interests  between  nations  whose  territo- 
ries were  not  contiguous.  In  the  old  days  a  nation 
was  ultimately  concerned  only  with  the  policies 
of  its  immediate  neighbors.  France,  Germany, 
and  England  were  vitally  interested  in  the  condi- 
tion of  the  Netherlands  because  there  all  three 
found  their  common  meeting-point.  Russia,  how- 
ever, cared  little  for  the  fate  of  the  Netherlands. 
Now  the  whole  world  is  necessarily  interested  in 
the  fate  of  Belgium  and  Holland,  because  its 
parts  are  interdependent  and  are  related  to  each 
other  by  the  mere  fact  that  they  exist  on  the  same 
sphere.  There  is  no  limit  to  the  number  or  loca- 
tion of  one's  rivals.  The  spread  of  national  inter- 
ests throughout  the  world,  due  to  the  fact  that 
the  flag  has  followed  the  nation's  trade,  has  fur- 
ther increased  the  possibilities  of  disagreement; 
while  the  interdependence  of  the  economic  world 
has  multiplied  for  each  country  the  number  of 
interests  with  which  other  nations  may  easily  in- 
terfere. As  soon  as  communication  with  distant 

240 


THE  JUSTIFIABILITY  OF  PAN-GERMANISM 

parts  of  the  world  was  perfected  by  means  of  the 
telegraph,  every  nation  was  able  to  extend  its 
interests  throughout  the  globe  without  losing 
that  immediate  contact  upon  which  the  efficient 
control  of  dependencies  rests.  It  is  literally  pos- 
sible for  England  to  govern  India,  for  France  to 
rule  Morocco,  for  Russia  to  direct  affairs  in  Man- 
churia, with  a  degree  of  certainty  which  would 
have  astounded  Marcus  Aurelius  or  Louis  XIV. 
No  country,  even  the  smallest,  was  ever  governed 
before  the  nineteenth  century  with  the  degree  of 
certainty  and  efficiency  now  possible  in  regulating 
the  affairs  of  the  most  distant  dependencies.  The 
steamship  and  the  railway  have  made  it  a  simple 
matter  to  reach  these  remote  places,  with  an  ex- 
penditure of  time  and  effort  less  than  used  to  be 
necessary  for  the  prosecution  of  trade  or  war  in 
Europe.  England  provisioned  her  army  in  South 
Africa  with  greater  efficiency  and  dispatch  than 
Napoleon  fed  his  armies,  operating  in  Germany, 
from  the  fields  of  southern  France.  Transporta- 
tion, therefore,  has  not  only  produced  the  ability 
of  nations  to  quarrel,  but  it  has  allowed  them  to 
fight  their  battles  in  the  uttermost  parts  of  the 
world. 

From  these  same  developments  in  communica- 
tion and  in  transportation  has  resulted  a  great 
increase  in  administrative  efficiency  in  the  home 

241 


PAN-GERMANISM 

countries.  The  government  is  now  able  to  locate 
with  exactitude  the  whereabouts  of  all  materials 
and  men  useful  in  any  emergency.  It  can  meas- 
ure with  considerable  accuracy  the  degree  of  the 
national  progress,  the  amount  of  surplus  strength 
which  the  nation  can  probably  afford  to  expend; 
it  can  foresee  with  some  certainty  the  probable 
resources  of  the  country  for  a  considerable  num- 
ber of  years  in  advance.  Louis  XIV,  on  the  other 
hand,  who  is  the  stock  example  of  an  absolute 
monarch  employed  by  most  historians,  never 
could  tell  when  there  would  be  any  money  in  the 
treasury,  nor  knew  with  certainty  what  his  offi- 
cials were  doing  a  hundred  miles  from  Paris.  It 
is  this  possibility  of  measuring  and  f  oreseeing  that 
makes  possible  the  formation  and  execution  of 
plans  like  Pan-Germanism.  Without  the  tele- 
graph, how  could  an  army  of  a  million  men  pos- 
sibly be  summoned  to  a  certain  spot  for  a  certain 
date  a  week  distant;  without  the  railway,  how 
could  they  possibly  be  brought  there,  fed,  shel- 
tered, and  maintained  during  even  the  few  days 
preceding  action;  how  could  they  possibly  be 
maintained  without  the  services  of  the  complex 
modern  economic  fabric?  It  is  modern  science, 
in  fact,  which  makes  modern  international  poli- 
tics a  possibility. 

What  is  more,  the  telegraph,  the  printing-press, 


THE  JUSTIFIABILITY  OF  PAN-GERMANISM 

the  newspaper,  have  created  the  modern  nation 
of  whose  ambition  and  strength  these  schemes  of 
aggression  are  merely  the  expression.  The  peoples 
of  the  past  centuries  lived  in  isolation,  never  con- 
scious of  what  was  happening  at  that  same  mo- 
ment elsewhere,  rarely  able  to  act  in  concert  for 
lack  of  that  knowledge.  The  great  movements  of 
history  have  been  limited  to  small  areas,  to  a  few 
men,  because  of  the  impossibility  of  securing  the 
cooperation  of  a  greater  number.  Time  used  to 
be  absolutely  a  prerequisite  for  any  movement 
whatever,  and  there  was  no  means  of  promptly 
communicating  with  every  one,  or  of  discovering, 
soon  enough  to  be  of  practical  value,  the  senti- 
ments of  different  sections  of  the  community. 
The  intensification  of  national  feeling,  —  one 
might  almost  say  the  creation  for  the  first  time  of 
a  truly  national  feeling,  —  the  possibility  for  the 
first  time  of  so  large  an  aggregation  of  individuals 
having  anything  resembling  unity  of  thought  and 
feeling,  has  created  the  present  crisis  and  is  its 
most  salient  feature.  Each  nation,  thus  more 
acutely  conscious  of  itself  and  more  keenly  con- 
scious of  the  conditions  which  support  it,  has 
become  more  acutely  conscious  of  others  and 
has  felt  more  keenly  the  differences  in  develop- 
ment, in  economic  status,  in  intellectual  progress, 
in  artistic  achievement,  which  distinguish  it  from 

243 


PAN-GERMANISM 

its  neighbors.  The  extent  and  possible  variety  of 
interests  are  dawning  upon  the  national  conscious- 
ness for  perhaps  the  first  time  with  anything  like 
adequacy,  and  with  it,  also  for  the  first  time, 
there  is  dawning  in  the  minds  of  all  nations  some 
faint  adumbration  of  the  glorious  national  future 
before  a  people  capable,  really  and  literally,  of 
acting,  thinking,  and  feeling  as  one.  Indeed,  the 
vision  has  roused  men  from  the  contemplation  of 
their  own  petty  doings  and  lifted  them  into  a 
sphere  broader  and  more  impersonal.  For  a  great 
people,  who  had  become  conscious  of  such  a  unity 
of  feeling,  of  such  a  dependence  upon  each  other, 
and  of  the  possibilities  of  united  action,  nothing 
is  more  normal  than  to  attempt,  by  the  exercise 
of  forethought,  to  increase  the  strength,  capacity, 
and  influence  of  this  corporate  body,  to  knit  it 
more  firmly  together,  to  place  it  upon  a  still  more 
solid  basis  of  economic  prosperity.  Nor  is  it 
strange  that  the  first  ecstasy  of  national  conscious- 
ness should  have  brought  with  it  fears  for  its  own 
continuance  and  a  passionate  desire  to  insure  that 
continuance  for  all  time.  Indeed,  it  is  probably  no 
exaggeration  to  claim  that  the  present  aggressive 
schemes  of  most  European  nations  are  soberly 
intended  to  preserve  what  exists  rather  than  to 
increase  it,  even  though  by  preservation  they 
mean  no  mere  continued  existence,  but  the  abso- 

244 


THE  JUSTIFIABILITY  OF  PAN-GERMANISM 

lute  assurance  of  the  existence  of  a  prosperous, 
enlightened  nation  for  the  rest  of  time. 

One  trouble  which  most  students  seem  to  ex- 
perience in  attempting  to  judge  the  present  crisis 
arises  from  the  tendency  to  assume  that  the  great- 
est good  is  to  be  insured  by  the  preservation  of  the 
conditions  now  in  existence.  One  might  almost 
say  that  the  advocates  of  peace  tend  to  regard 
the  present  status  quo  as  the  end  and  object  of 
the  process  of  evolution.  They  seem,  in  fact,  to 
oppose,  or  at  least  to  deprecate,  the  persistent 
attempts  of  mankind  to  accelerate  the  pace  of 
civilization,  and  to  desire  to  limit  the  tools  which 
men  are  to  use  in  the  future  to  economic  weapons. 
Probably  this  phase  of  contemporary  thought  is 
a  part  of  the  natural  reaction  from  the  logical 
consequents  of  the  doctrine  of  evolution  as 
expounded  by  Spencer.  To  their  thinking,  the 
relegation  of  the  influence  exerted  by  moral  and 
ethical  forces  to  the  second  rank  proceeds  from  a 
failure  to  appreciate  their  real  force,  and  they  are 
consequently  drawn  into  an  aggressive  assertion 
of  the  superiority  of  mind  over  matter,  of  the 
spiritual  over  the  physical,  among  those  varied 
forces  to  whose  operation  the  development  of 
society  has  been  due.  One  can  hardly  study  the 
modern  situation,  however,  without  becoming 
keenly  aware  that  the  difference  between  war  and 

245 


PAN-GERMANISM 

peace,  as  the  words  are  ordinarily  used,  is  rather 
one  of  degree  and  of  outward  form  than  of  pur- 
pose. The  nations  of  the  world  have  unquestion- 
ably been  busy  for  the  last  half-century  with  the 
determined  attempt  to  surpass  each  other,  to  get 
possession  of  things  which  they  did  not  have 
already,  by  methods  which  rest  certainly  upon 
the  same  ethical  foundation  that  war  does,  and 
whose  results  upon  the  individual,  and  even  upon 
nations,  are  not  necessarily  different  in  kind  from 
those  of  actual  warfare.  To  be  sure,  the  financial 
operations  known  as  peaceful  penetration  are  not 
exactly  what  we  have  been  accustomed  to  consider 
methods  of  violent  conquest;  but  by  such  means 
large  numbers  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  smaller 
countries  have  just  as  certainly  lost  their  land  and 
the  products  of  their  labor  as  if  an  army  had 
destroyed  them.  There  is  perhaps  a  nice  discrimi- 
nation to  be  drawn  by  some  logician  between  tak- 
ing a  man's  property  away  from  him  or  stealing  a 
nation's  independence  by  means  of  an  army  and 
by  means  of  high  finance;  but  if  the  individual 
or  the  nation  suffers  the  same  loss  from  both  pro- 
cesses, and  if  the  intent  is  essentially  the  same, 
it  is  difficult  to  see  where  the  ethical  grounds  sup- 
porting them  differ.  If  it  would  be  wicked  for 
Germany  to  enter  Belgium  with  an  army  and  take 
possession  of  the  country,  seizing  the  revenues  and 

246 


THE  JUSTIFIABILITY  OF  PAN-GERMANISM 

compelling  the  Belgians  to  accept  from  them  loans 
of  money  at  such  terms  that  the  Belgians  would 
practically  lose  possession  of  their  own  govern- 
ment for  half  a  century  to  come,  why  is  it  more 
moral  for  France  to  obtain  the  same  results  in 
Morocco,  or  for  the  United  States  in  a  similar 
manner  to  secure  possession  of  Mexico  and  Central 
America,  so  that  the  inhabitants  have  scarcely 
anything  left  to  call  their  own  but  their  very  lives? 
Indeed,  there  are  more  ways  of  conquest  than 
fighting,  and  more  methods  of  robbery  than  the 
Middle  Ages  were  familiar  with. 

It  must  be  admitted  in  all  candor  that  the  im- 
pulses behind  Pan-Germanism  exist  at  present 
in  all  nations,  and  that  no  nation  is  likely  at  pre- 
sent to  forego  the  possibility  of  future  develop- 
ment because  of  even  the  most  plausible  ethical  or 
logical  pleas.  The  three  nations,  who  have  entered 
into  the  promotion  of  Pan-Germanism,  are  not 
different  from  the  others  in  morals  or  in  aims. 
Their  geographical  position,  their  peculiar  eco- 
nomic fabric,  the  traditions  of  their  past,  all  force 
upon  them  the  aggressive  part  and  make  imme- 
diate action  desirable.  England,  France,  Russia, 
and  the  United  States  already  possess  the  choice 
places  hi  the  world;  their  position  is  already 
everything  they  could  reasonably  hope  to  have  it; 
and  they  scarcely  deserve  to  be  praised  for  unsel- 

247 


PAN-GERMANISM 

fishness  when  they  insist  upon  preserving  a  situa- 
tion which  is  so  very  much  to  their  advantage. 
Obviously,  their  national  existence  and  ambition 
will  be  best  furthered  by  the  continuance  of  the 
status  quo,  because  they  will  thus  be  able  to  keep 
what  they  already  hold.  Nor  is  it  proved  that 
they  have  obtained  it  by  the  observance  of  the 
ethical  precepts  which  they  would  now  be  glad 
to  apply  to  Germany;  they  secured  their  empires, 
in  fact,  by  precisely  those  methods  which  Ger- 
many wishes  to  use  against  them.  It  is  as  selfish 
for  them  to  insist  upon  peace  as  it  is  for  the  Ger- 
mans to  demand  war.  In  reality,  the  difference  of 
opinion  as  to  the  proper  procedure  for  settling  the 
difficulty  is  not  based  upon  ethical  concepts  at  all. 
It  merely  means  that  the  Triple  Entente  prefers 
to  employ  in  the  struggle  only  the  economic  and 
financial  weapons  in  whose  use  they  are  already 
adepts  and  of  which  they  already  possess  so  many 
more  than  their  rivals  as  to  make  the  outcome  of 
the  struggle,  if  fought  on  this  basis,  practically 
positive  to  be  in  their  favor.  The  Triple  Entente, 
in  fact,  like  the  good  Doctor  Franchard,  have  de- 
rived then*  philosophy  from  their  desires,  and  have 
painted  a  picture  of  the  millennium  of  peace  whose 
lineaments  are  necessarily  those  of  their  present 
condition.  Germany,  Austria,  and  Italy,  conscious 
of  their  disadvantage  on  the  economic  plane,  are 

248 


THE  JUSTIFIABILITY  OF  PAN-GERMANISM 

anxious  to  employ  in  the  coming  duel  a  different 
type  of  weapon,  in  whose  use  they  believe  them- 
selves more  expert  than  are  their  enemies. 

One  might  almost  compare  the  two  coalitions 
with  a  trained  swordsman  and  a  countryman  who 
have  somehow  gotten  into  a  quarrel.  The  swords- 
man wishes  to  settle  the  point  of  honor  by  a  duel 
with  rapiers  under  limitations  which  require  the 
combatants  to  employ  only  one  arm  and  to  use 
only  the  point,  to  attack  only  after  due  warning, 
and  not  to  press  the  adversary  to  the  utmost. 
These  conditions  condemn  the  countryman  to 
defeat.  He  wishes  to  fight  with  his  fists,  to  hit 
wherever  he  can  and  as  often  as  possible,  to  give 
no  quarter,  and  to  continue  the  fight  until  one  or 
the  other  is  exhausted.  The  swordsman,  gazing 
upon  the  brawny  figure  of  his  opponent,  is  afraid 
that,  in  a  struggle  of  that  nature,  he  might  not  be 
successful,  and  hesitates  to  stake  his  all  upon  a 
rough-and-tumble  battle.  He  insists  upon  fight- 
ing like  a  gentleman,  and  talks  about  honor,  and 
ethics,  and  the  obligations  of  civilization.  The 
countryman  sees  plainly  enough  that  all  this  is  in- 
tended to  rob  him  of  an  advantage,  and  he,  there- 
fore, declines  to  be  bound  by  a  variety  of  ethics  or 
a  code  of  morals  which  necessarily  condemn  him 
to  defeat. 

So  of  the  two  coalitions;  the  Triple  Entente, 
249 


PAN-GERMANISM 

with  so  much  to  lose,  is  most  anxious  to  avoid  an 
appeal  to  fisticuffs,  and  wishes,  if  possible,  to  limit 
the  weapons,  and  thus  the  extent  of  defeat.  The 
Triple  Alliance,  with  little  likelihood  of  succeed- 
ing, but  with  nearly  everything  to  gain  if  it 
should  succeed,  is  a  great  deal  more  willing  to 
appeal  to  the  ultimate  arbitrament  of  war.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  they  regard  war  as  their  last 
chance.  They  have  fought  the  Triple  Entente 
with  economic  weapons  for  a  good  deal  more  than 
a  generation  and  are  not  yet  within  measurable 
distance  of  victory.  If,  then,  we  regard  the  truth 
as  a  concept  which  becomes  gradually  visible  as 
we  study  the  record  of  the  past,  if  moral  concepts 
are  not  those  which  men  proclaim  but  those  by 
which  they  live,  we  shall  be  forced  to  admit  that 
the  Triple  Alliance  is  not  morally  worse  than  the 
Triple  Entente.  Certainly,  the  validity  of  such 
standards  in  such  circumstances  as  their  adver- 
saries wish  to  apply  has  never  yet  been  admitted 
by  any  nation  within  the  ken  of  history.  The 
Germans  refuse,  therefore,  to  accept  an  adverse 
judgment  based  upon  standards  which  cannot 
claim  general  acceptance  by  the  Congress  of 
Nations. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

THE    PROBABILITY    OF   THE    SUCCESS   OF 
PAN-GERMANISM 

7.  Internal  Weaknesses 

THE  most  interesting  phase  of  the  present 
international  situation  to  the  vast  majority 
of  people  comprises  those  considerations  which 
serve  in  one  way  or  another  as  indications  of  the 
probable  success  or  failure  of  the  schemes  at  pre- 
sent advocated  by  the  two  great  coalitions.  As 
has  already  been  said,  the  success  of  Pan-Ger- 
manism will  depend  upon  the  truth  or  falsity  of  the 
German  notions  of  the  situation  hi  Europe,  upon 
the  verity  of  their  ideas  regarding  the  proportional 
strength  of  the  various  nations  and  the  adequacy 
of  the  methods  they  have  devised  for  taking  ad- 
vantage of  what  they  believe  to  be  a  superior 
position.  In  the  chapters  devoted  to  an  exposition 
of  the  German  view  of  the  present  situation,  the 
factors  in  their  favor  were  described  as  fully  as 
is  possible  in  so  brief  an  account  as  this.  Nor  is 
there  a  great  deal  of  doubt  in  the  impartial  stu- 
dent's mind  regarding  the  substantial  truth  of  the 
propositions  there  laid  down.  The  strong  points 

251 


PAN-GERMANISM 

of  the  German  case  are  naturally  those  whose 
truth  is  not  likely  to  be  contested,  and,  in  order 
to  put  the  case  forcibly  enough  to  cany  convic- 
tion to  the  ordinary  Anglo-Saxon,  it  seemed  bet- 
ter to  group  strong  facts  and  to  postpone  for  the 
time  a  discussion  of  weaknesses.  While  it  is  prob- 
able that  the  Germans  exaggerate  the  degree  of 
their  own  strength  and  the  extent  of  England's 
weakness,  while  it  is  probable  that  they  rely  too 
much  upon  the  assumed  difference  in  efficiency 
between  their  administration  and  that  of  France 
and  Russia,  it  cannot  be  gainsaid  by  a  candid 
observer  that  on  the  whole  the  Germans'  notion 
of  the  proportional  supremacy  of  the  various 
nations  and  in  particular  their  ideas  of  English 
history  are  substantially  correct.  Indeed,  no  one 
has  stated  these  propositions  with  greater  force 
than  Professor  Seeley,  whose  "Expansion  of 
England"  appeared  at  just  the  time  when  Pan- 
Gennanism  was  in  the  making.  England  is  no 
longer  defended  by  the  Channel  as  she  once  was; 
she  certainly  never  took  possession  of  her  depend- 
encies by  actual  conquest,  nor  does  she  retain 
possession  by  means  of  physical  force;  the  self- 
governing  colonies  are  manifestly  without  geo- 
graphical contiguity,  and  have  been  independent 
in  all  but  name  for  the  better  part  of  a  century. 
The  weakness  of  England's  long  chain  of  strate- 

252 


INTERNAL  WEAKNESSES 

gic  points  has  always  been  apparent  to  its  pos- 
sessor; but,  so  long  as  it  served  the  purpose  for 
which  it  was  constructed,  there  was  no  reason  for 
abandoning  it  simply  because  certain  conditions 
might  render  it  vulnerable. 

The  Germans  also  correctly  appreciate  the  fact 
that  an  English  victory  in  a  naval  war  will  simply 
maintain  the  position  which  she  already  holds;  a 
defeat  they  also  see  will  be  fatal  to  her;  in  a  naval 
war  she  has  comparatively  little  to  gain,  while 
they  may  win  everything.  To  their  thinking  this 
balances  the  scales  very  much  in  their  favor.  To 
reach  them,  the  English  must  have  recourse  to  land 
warfare  for  which  they  are  not  really  fitted,  and 
not  well  placed,  since  the  true  base  of  the  English 
position  against  Germany,  so  far  as  the  offensive 
is  concerned,  is  the  frontier  between  Germany  and 
Belgium  and  Holland.  From  a  military  point  of 
view,  the  seizure  of  these  two  countries  by  Ger- 
many at  the  moment  of  the  outbreak  of  war  would 
move  the  Germans  into  what  is  properly  speaking 
English  territory  and  demolish  important  obsta- 
cles in  the  way  of  an  attack  upon  England's  most 
vital  spot.  There  seems  to  be  some  truth  in  the 
German  view  that  Russia  and  France  are  not  as 
capable  as  she  of  utilizing  their  full  resources 
with  promptitude.  It  is  extremely  probable  that 
most  nations  in  the  world  would  be  very  glad  to 

253 


PAN-GERMANISM 

assist  in  looting  the  British  Empire.  Certainly 
the  German  scheme  for  taking  possession  of  her 
own  lands  and  factories,  which  have  been  devel- 
oped with  borrowed  money,  has  been  executed 
before  in  similar  cases  with  undoubtedly  disas- 
trous results  to  the  borrowers.  It  has  never  been 
consciously  attempted  on  so  huge  a  scale.  The 
potency  of  the  economic  weapons  which  she  be- 
lieves can  be  brought  to  bear  upon  England  and 
France  is  undoubted,  but  there  seem  to  be  a  good 
many  difficulties  in  the  way  of  putting  such  forces 
into  effective  operation.  In  short,  on  its  face  the 
German  scheme  is  not  only  feasible  but  conclusive. 
Theoretically  there  are  no  flaws. 

In  attempting  to  render  judgment  upon  so  stu- 
pendous an  enterprise,  we  must  not  forget  that, 
as  students,  we  are  really  not  in  a  position  to 
render  more  than  an  approximate  judgment,  be- 
cause we  cannot  be  at  all  certain  that  we  know  all 
the  essential  details,  or  that  we  know  the  truth 
about  factors  of  such  evident  importance  as  the 
efficiency  of  armies  and  navies,  the  real  economic 
strength  of  the  countries,  the  actual  situation  of 
forts  and  batteries.  We  cannot  in  the  nature  of 
things  have  more  than  an  approximate  idea  of  the 
scheme  itself  or  of  the  conditions  on  which  it  is 
based,  and  we  therefore  must  be  content  with  a 
very  approximate  judgment.  The  really  satisfac- 

254 


INTERNAL  WEAKNESSES 

tory  evidence  in  favor  of  the  feasibility  of  Pan- 
Germanism  is  to  be  found  in  the  obvious  fact  that 
the  statesmen  and  diplomats  of  Europe,  who  know 
more  about  the  situation  than  historians  ever 
will,  believe  that  its  success  is  probable.  There 
can  be  no  doubt  that  the  leaders  in  Germany, 
Austria,  and  Italy  have  believed  in  the  certainty 
of  its  eventual  success  for  more  than  a  generation. 
The  evident  fears  and  public  avowals  of  imminent 
danger  threatening  the  members  of  the  Triple 
Entente  is  conclusive  proof  that  they  too  consider 
it  feasible.1  Another  earnest  of  its  possibility  is 
to  be  found  in  the  degree  of  completion  already 
attained.  In  the  fall  of  the  year  1912  it  looked 
for  a  week  or  two  as  if  the  Pan-German  confed- 
eration had  actually  come  into  existence.  It  was 
certainly  within  measurable  distance  of  comple- 
tion. Than  this  no  better  evidence  is  available. 

When,  however,  we  write  of  the  success  of  Pan- 
Germanism,  we  mean  something  more  complex 
than  at  first  may  appear.  Pan-Germanism  in- 
volves the  creation  of  the  confederation  of  states 
which  it  intends  to  make  the  controlling  factor 
in  international  politics;  it  involves,  in  the  next 
place,  the  ability  of  this  confederation  to  get  con- 

1  See  the  speech  of  Premier  Borden  of  Canada  advocating  a  new 
naval  policy  and  the  Official  Memorandum  of  the  English  Admiralty 
on  England's  present  and  future  naval  position,  both  of  which  are 
printed  in  the  Appendix. 

255 


PAN-GERMANISM 

trol  of  the  world  or  at  least  to  defeat  England; 
it  further  assumes  the  feasibility  of  maintaining 
control  and  of  preserving  its  own  existence  against 
internal  as  well  as  external  foes.  The  Germans 
are  apparently  ready  to  assume  the  ease  of  creat- 
ing the  confederation  and  devote  their  attention 
chiefly  to  the  possibility  of  securing  control  of  the 
world,  should  they  succeed  in  developing  their  own 
offensive  strength  in  the  manner  proposed.  All 
the  conditions  advanced  about  England's  weak- 
ness and  the  inefficiency  of  France  and  Russia 
bear  upon  the  second  of  these  three  propositions, 
and  have  little  or  nothing  to  do  with  the  first  and 
third.  This  is  the  real  weakness  of  Pan-German- 
ism. If  we  are  not  led  astray  by  the  fact  that 
we  probably  are  not  permitted  to  know  as  much 
about  the  German  plans  for  accomplishing  the 
first  and  third  of  these  objects  as  they  are  ready  to 
tell  us  about  the  premises  upon  which  the  second 
depends,  it  is  upon  this  rock  that  the  scheme  will 
probably  be  wrecked.  It  cannot  be  too  often  said, 
however,  that  the  statements  in  regard  to  the 
weakness  of  her  enemies  have  been  promulgated 
with  a  frequency  and  decisiveness,  which  lends 
color  to  the  assumption  that  they  were  made  with 
official  sanction  for  the  sake  of  the  moral  effect 
that  they  would  have  in  Germany  and  particularly 
in  other  parts  of  the  world.  Undoubtedly,  the 

256 


INTERNAL  WEAKNESSES 

difficulties  of  creating  the  confederation  at  all  are 
better  known  in  Berlin  and  Vienna  than  we  can 
possibly  envisage  them;  the  certain  difficulties  of 
maintaining  control  of  the  world,  once  it  is  ob- 
tained, cannot  fail  to  have  caused  the  statesmen 
of  the  Triple  Alliance  many  anxious  hours.  Natu- 
rally, they  are  less  ready  to  call  attention  to  such 
aspects  of  the  plan  than  they  are  to  the  more  obvi- 
ous factors  where  the  verdict  of  history  and  the 
testimony  of  their  own  enemies  prove  them  to  be 
right. 

Pan-Germanism,  in  fact,  is  weakest  at  its  centre. 
Its  success  is  least  probable  at  home.  Without 
the  cooperation  of  Austria  and  Italy,  the  scheme 
is  impossible,  and  scarcely  two  generations  ago 
the  enmity  between  the  three  allies  led  them  into 
war  with  each  other.  Austria  and  Prussia  have 
hated  each  other  throughout  history  with  a  vigor 
scarcely  surpassed  by  the  hatred  which  Prussia 
bears  France.  Indeed,  when  Bismarck  was  first 
in  Vienna  he  doubted  his  own  safety.  The  Italians 
have  by  no  means  lost  their  distrust  of  Austria, 
and  it  is  really  probable  that  the  first  successes 
gained  by  the  alliance  may  result  in  such  acces- 
sions of  strength  to  one  or  more  of  the  allies  as 
to  rouse  the  jealousies  and  apprehensions  of  the 
others.  The  notion  of  putting  into  Austria's 
hands  the  whole  eastern  coast  of  the  Adriatic 

257 


PAN-GERMANISM 

is  extremely  distasteful  to  Italy,  and  certainly 
would  place  Austria  in  a  strong  position,  from 
which  the  conquest  of  the  Po  Valley  would  be 
undoubtedly  feasible.  There  are  vital  differences, 
therefore,  between  the  three  contracting  countries. 
Moreover,  Prussia  and  Austria  are  thoroughly 
well  hated  hi  southern  Germany.  The  comic 
papers  of  Munich  are  fond  of  printing  scandal- 
ous cartoons  and  squibs  about  the  emperors;  it  is 
popularly  supposed  that  neither  emperor  would 
dare  venture  into  southern  Germany  without  a 
large  bodyguard.  It  must  not  be  forgotten  that 
the  German  Constitution  gives  the  southern 
states  important  military  privileges,  which  could 
not  fail  to  be  of  consequence  in  time  of  war. 
Furthermore,  southern  Germany  controls  import- 
ant approaches  to  Alsace,  the  passes  through 
Switzerland,  and  the  whole  upper  half  of  the 
Rhine  and  Danube  valleys.  In  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine public  feeling  against  Prussia  is  exceedingly 
strong;  at  a  recent  public  meeting,  an  official 
openly  turned  the  Emperor's  statue  with  its  face  to 
the  wall  amid  pretty  general  and  open  expressions 
of  approval.  The  recent  erection  and  dedication 
of  a  German  statue  at  Metz,  commemorating 
battles  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  was,  to  say 
the  least,  unfortunate  in  its  effect  upon  public 
opinion.  The  incidents  given  by  Stevenson  hi 

258 


INTERNAL  WEAKNESSES 

his  "Inland  Voyage"  are  enlightening  as  to  the 
sentiments  of  the  people  who  occupy  the  strate- 
gic point  of  greatest  importance  to  Prussia:  "In 
the  morning  a  hawker  and  his  wife  went  down  the 
street  at  a  foot  pace  singing  to  a  very  slow,  lament- 
able music,  'O  France,  mes  amours.'  It  brought 
everybody  to  the  door,  and  when  our  landlady 
called  in  the  man  to  buy  the  words,  he  had  not  a 
copy  of  them  left.  ...  I  have  watched  a  forester 
from  Alsace,  while  some  one  was  singing  'Les  mal- 
heurs  de  la  France/  at  a  baptismal  party.  .  .  .  He 
arose  from  the  table  and  took  his  son  aside,  close 
by  where  I  was  standing.  'Listen,  listen,'  he  said, 
bearing  on  the  boy's  shoulder,  'and  remember 
this,  my  son.'  A  little  after  he  went  out  into  the 
garden  suddenly,  and  I  could  hear  him  sobbing 
in  the  darkness.  In  what  other  country  will  you 
find  a  patriotic  ditty  bring  all  the  world  into  the 
street?" 

The  efficiency  of  Austria  in  the  coming  genera- 
tion, the  possibility  of  maintaining  its  position  in 
Europe  and  of  contributing  strength  to  the  Triple 
Alliance,  depend  upon  the  ability  of  the  present 
rulers  to  maintain  the  present  relations  between 
Austria  and  Hungary  and  between  the  various 
sections  of  the  Austrian  Empire.  There  is  per- 
haps no  part  of  Europe  where  racial  feeling  is  so 
intense  or  where  so  many  races  are  juxtaposited. 

259 


PAN-GERMANISM 

Their  quarrels  have  filled  the  history  of  Europe 
with  discord;  the  number  of  irreconcilables,  who 
wish  to  overthrow  the  present  government  and 
to  substitute  for  it  anything  else  whatever,  is 
extremely  large,  and  seems  to  be  increasing  rather 
than  decreasing.  Hungary  hates  Austria;  Bo- 
hemia wishes  to  be  independent;  the  Slavs  and 
Croatians  in  the  southwest  have  agitated  inde- 
pendence for  generations;  the  Ruthenes  and  the 
Poles  in  the  northeast  are  equally  determined  to 
submit  to  Austrian  rule  no  longer  than  they  must. 
In  Hungary,  the  struggle  of  the  Magyars  to  retain 
their  racial  supremacy  is  of  the  keenest,  and  con- 
stantly results  in  violent  outbreaks  and  riots.1 
So  slight  a  thing  as  the  posting  of  a  sign  in  one 
language  or  another  over  a  railway  station  has 
been  known  to  result  in  a  riot  of  nearly  the  pro- 
portions of  a  civil  war.  Recently  when  the  Italian 
students  at  the  University  of  Vienna  undertook 
to  celebrate  one  of  their  national  holidays,  the 
German  and  the  Austrian  students  attempted  to 
put  a  stop  to  it  by  force.  The  police  interfered; 
were  met  by  armed  resistance  from  the  students; 
and  it  was  for  some  days  doubtful  whether  peace 
could  be  preserved  by  the  military  in  one  of 
the  greatest  capitals  in  Europe.  Surely  a  pitched 

1  "Even  in  quiet  times  the  Magyar  will  get  the  gypsies  to  play 
him  the  song,  'The  German  is  a  blackguard.'"  Bismarck,  Reflec- 
tions and  Reminiscences,  n,  257. 

260 


INTERNAL  WEAKNESSES 

battle  between  Italians,  Austrians,  and  Germans 
arising  out  of  racial  and  national  feeling,  fought 
in  the  streets  of  Vienna,  is  a  sinister  omen  in  the 
path  of  Pan-Germanism.  It  has  been  widely  pro- 
claimed by  both  the  initiated  and  the  uninitiated 
that  Austria-Hungary  has  been  held  together  for 
more  than  a  decade  simply  because  the  various 
warring  elements  have  been  waiting  for  the  death 
of  the  present  Emperor  to  give  the  signal  for  re- 
volt. Surely,  when  the  student  considers  the  re- 
lative international  weakness  or  national  strength 
of  the  countries  of  Europe,  it  will  be  difficult  for 
him  to  value  Austria-Hungary  at  anything  above 
the  minimum  figure. 

The  great  district  known  as  the  Balkans  is  an 
absolutely  essential  factor  of  the  Pan-German 
confederation,  yet  there  is  no  part  of  all  Europe 
which  lacks  more  conspicuously  geographical, 
political,  and  racial  unity.  The  Balkans  include 
all  the  land  stretching  from  the  water  parting  of 
the  Tyrolese  and  Transylvanian  Alps  to  the  Med- 
iterranean and  the  ^Egean,  —  the  rich  plains  of 
the  Lower  Danube,  the  tablelands  and  mountain 
valleys  of  Macedonia  and  Servia,  the  wild  crags 
of  Montenegro  and  Albania.  The  people  range 
from  stolid  peasantry  in  the  valleys  to  wild, 
scarcely  civilized  hillmen  in  the  west  and  the  in- 
telligent cultivated  citizens  of  Sofia  and  Athens. 

261 


PAN-GERMANISM 

The  racial  admixture  is  extraordinary  in  its 
variety  and  distribution.  There  are  many  dis- 
tricts where  no  single  race  can  boast  predomin- 
ance. For  centuries  the  Balkans  have  been  the 
seat  of  the  most  intense  religious  hatred  hi  Eu- 
rope and  are  the  only  states  where  active  war- 
fare still  continues  between  the  Christian  and 
the  Infidel  and  between  the  Latin  and  Greek 
Churches.  There  are  not  a  few  districts  where, 
as  in  Albania,  the  Mohammedan,  the  Greek 
Christian,  and  the  Catholic  live  so  near  one  an- 
other as  to  result  in  constant  reprisals  which  keep 
the  community  in  a  condition  of  alarm  and  anx- 
iety. The  problem  of  creating  amid  such  con- 
ditions, out  of  such  varied  races,  whose  religious 
and  racial  hatreds  and  antipathies  are  so  intense, 
a  strong  series  of  states  which  will  act  in  concert 
with  the  Triple  Alliance  in  the  execution  of  so 
complicated  a  scheme  as  Pan-Germanism,  would 
seem  to  the  observer  to  border  upon  impossibility. 
The  Balkans  hate  each  other  so  cordially,  the 
states  which  have  attained  politicial  existence 
contain  within  their  own  borders  so  many  ele- 
ments of  discord,  that  it  might  almost  be  claimed 
that  the  only  elements  of  unity  are  the  vigorous 
hatred  that  they  all  bear  the  Turk  and  the  in- 
tense suspicion  with  which  they  all  regard  Austria 
and  Russia. 


INTERNAL  WEAKNESSES 

Yet,  through  these  defiles  run  the  great  roads 
connecting  Europe  and  Asia,  along  which  the 
trade  of  centuries  has  passed,  and  which  must  still 
continue  to  be  the  channels  of  overland  commun- 
ication with  the  East.  The  Balkans  hold  the  east- 
ern side  of  the  Adriatic,  the  western  shore  of  the 
Black  Sea,  the  whole  lower  course  of  the  Danube, 
and  two  sides  of  the  ^Egean.  If  the  Triple  Alli- 
ance ever  expects  to  obtain  a  position  of  import- 
ance in  the  Mediterranean,  it  must  possess  them. 
Yet  the  dream  of  the  peoples  in  those  valleys  and 
plains  is  for  autonomy,  freedom  from  European 
interference,  the  exclusion  of  the  religious,  strate- 
gic, political  interests  of  other  nations,  the  recog- 
nition of  their  right  to  live  for  themselves.  To 
use  these  peoples  in  the  formation  of  the  Pan- 
German  confederation  means  and  will  continue  to 
mean  their  armament  by  Austria  and  Germany, 
the  financing  of  their  preparations  for  war,  —  in 
fact,  the  placing  in  their  hands  of  weapons  which 
will  be  exactly  as  useful  against  the  Triple  Alli- 
ance as  against  the  Triple  Entente.  The  creation 
in  the  Balkans  of  a  confederation  of  states  of  the 
type  desired  by  Austria  and  Germany  is  perhaps 
possible  and  may  be,  indeed,  feasible;  but  the 
preservation  of  the  control  of  the  Triple  Alliance 
over  those  states,  once  created,  the  ability  of  the 
statesmen  in  Berlin  and  Vienna  to  rouse  in  those 

263 


PAN-GERMANISM 

peoples  any  enthusiasm  for  Pan-Germanism, 
seems  highly  improbable.  At  the  present  moment 
of  writing,  it  looks  as  if  a  confederation  hostile 
to  the  Triple  Alliance  had  been  formed,  which 
is  probably  strong  enough  to  maintain  itself  for 
some  decades.  The  conquest  of  the  Balkans  by 
Austria  would  be  no  easy  matter.  The  land  itself 
is  a  natural  fortress,  improved  by  Austrian  and 
German  engineers  in  all  those  varied  ways  which 
modern  warfare  has  made  possible,  and  the  bat- 
teries have  been  erected  on  the  borders  between 
Austria  and  the  Balkans  as  well  as  on  the  south. 
This  was  the  price  which  the  Balkan  States  de- 
manded in  exchange  for  the  cooperation  which 
they  promised :  they  must  be  provided  with  wea- 
pons which  would  assure  then*  independence  even 
of  Austria.  The  people  are  natural  soldiers,  care- 
fully drilled,  well  equipped,  flushed  at  present 
with  victory,  and  fired  with  the  determination  to 
maintain  their  independence  against  all  comers. 
Nothing  could  possibly  be  more  detrimental  to 
the  interests  of  Pan-Germanism,  and  it  seems  to 
be  a  difficulty  which  nothing  short  of  years  can 
remove.  The  position  of  the  Balkans,  should 
they  maintain  it,  would  be  definitive  in  bringing 
about  the  failure  of  Pan-Germanism. 

The  last  link  in  the  German  chain,  the  first  one 
they  attempted  to  create,  is  Turkey.  The  natural 

264 


INTERNAL  WEAKNESSES 

ineptitude  of  the  Turkish  Government  has  be- 
come a  byword  of  statesmen;  the  Turks  are  alien 
in  race  and  religion  to  the  majority  of  the  subject 
peoples;  their  hatred  for  the  Christians  is  still  in- 
tense; and  the  difficulty,  therefore,  of  conducting 
operations  through  their  hands  is  great.  That, 
however,  might  be  overcome  had  the  Turk  con- 
tinued supine.  The  real  difficulty  which  at  pre- 
sent stands  in  the  way  of  the  establishment  of 
German  control  in  Turkey  is  the  rise  among  the 
Turks  of  a  national  party  whose  chief  aim  is  the 
exclusion  of  the  foreigner  and  the  government  of 
Turkey  solely  in  the  interest  of  the  Turk.  Under 
this  banner  have  been  enlisted  the  majority,  at 
any  rate,  of  the  Turks  intelligent  enough  to  be  en- 
trusted with  the  administration  of  their  own  coun- 
try. The  mere  fact  that  they  are  an  insignificant 
minority  of  the  population,  that  the  rest  of  the 
Turks  have  no  effective  desire  for  self-govern- 
ment and  are  certainly  not  capable  of  it,  does  not 
in  the  least  change  the  significant  fact  that  the 
only  Turks  who  might  govern  their  country,  as 
the  Germans  wish  it  done,  decline  the  task.  In- 
deed, the  Young  Turks  assisted ,  the  German 
plans  and  created  the  present  government,  with 
the  idea  that  Germany  would  allow  them  to  rule 
the  rest  of  their  countrymen.  Their  disappoint- 
ment was  exceedingly  bitter  when  they  learned 

265 


PAN-GERMANISM 

that  the  real  direction  of  policy  and  the  control 
of  finance  was  to  rest  with  the  German  officials  in 
Constantinople.  The  probable  disappearance  of 
European  Turkey  as  a  result  of  the  Balkan  War 
will  certainly  increase  the  difficulty  the  Germans 
have  already  experienced. 

The  problem  of  Pan-Germanism  in  Turkey  is 
not  as  serious  as  it  is  in  Austria,  in  Hungary,  and 
in  the  Balkans.  In  fact,  Pan-Germanism  itself  is 
a  coalition  of  coalitions  in  the  most  literal  sense  of 
the  word.  Germany,  Austria,  Hungary,  the  Bal- 
kans, Turkey,  are  none  of  them  states  where  the 
racial  lines  have  been  unified,  the  religious  antipa- 
thies even  minimized,  and  the  state  or  adminis- 
tration able  to  rely  upon  the  support  and  affec- 
tion of  the  whole  people.  Out  of  such  material, 
Pan-Germanism  proposes  to  create  another  con- 
federation, whose  basis  will  be  even  more  slender 
than  that  of  any  of  the  confederations  out  of 
which  it  is  to  be  made,  and  whose  continued  exist- 
ence will  necessarily  be  daily  exposed  to  the  as- 
saults of  internal  enemies.  A  vital  change  hi  any 
one  of  the  confederations  composing  it  would  in 
all  probability  have  fatal  effect  upon  the  greater 
entity. 

It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the  success  of 
the  whole  scheme  depends  absolutely  upon  the 
stability  and  efficiency  of  Germany  and  Austria. 

266 


INTERNAL  WEAKNESSES 

Nay,  the  continuance  even  of  the  attempt  to  exe- 
cute the  scheme  is  contingent  upon  the  continu- 
ance in  office  of  those  who  are  at  present  directing 
the  policy  of  those  states  and  upon  their  ability 
to  dictate  the  disposition  of  the  national  resources. 
The  continuity  of  policy  is  an  absolutely  indis- 
pensable part  of  Pan-Germanism;  yet  there  are 
no  countries  in  Europe  where  the  forces  strug- 
gling to  effect  fundamental  alterations  in  consti- 
tutional, administrative,  and  political  conditions, 
are  more  persistent  and  more  powerful,  and  which 
possess  greater  chances  of  success.  The  number 
of  irreconcilables,  which  means  to  the  European 
the  number  of  those  who  regard  the  very  existence 
of  the  state  as  a  fundamental  grievance  which 
nothing  except  its  destruction  can  remedy,  is  very 
large,  and  comprises  considerable  sections  of  the 
population,  who  occupy  important  strategic  posi- 
tions, and  who  elect  without  difficulty  numerous 
representatives  to  the  assemblies.  The  Socialists 
in  Germany  are  exceedingly  strong,  are  growing 
in  numbers  at  a  portentous  rate,  and  are  rapidly 
outstripping  the  other  parties  in  the  Prussian 
houses  and  in  the  Reichstag;  they  already  practi- 
cally control  the  city  of  Berlin  and  comprise  the 
numerical  majority  in  many  other  cities.  The 
Opposition  in  the  Austrian  and  Hungarian  Parlia- 
ments is  so  strong  that  the  business  of  the  session 

267 


PAN-GERMANISM 

frequently  has  to  be  suspended  for  days  and 
weeks,  and  it  has  more  than  once  been  necessary 
to  break  the  deadlock  by  calling  in  the  military 
to  remove  the  obstructionists,  before  any  busi- 
ness could  be  done.  The  system  of  representa- 
tion, provided  by  the  constitutions  of  these  na- 
tions, permits  most  of  the  people  to  vote,  but 
evaluates  the  individual  vote  on  the  basis  of  pro- 
perty and  education.  The  adoption  of  universal 
suffrage  of  the  English,  French,  or  American  pat- 
tern would  promptly  throw  into  a  hopeless  minor- 
ity the  parties  which  now  control  those  states  and 
practically  reverse  their  policies  in  every  particu- 
lar. The  official  proclamation  of  the  Socialist 
Party  in  Germany  declares  the  present  aggressive 
stand  of  Germany  wrong.  It  is  perhaps  not  with- 
out significance  that  the  most  popular  party  in 
Germany  takes  upon  the  question  of  Pan-Ger- 
manism the  attitude  of  the  irreconcilable,  and, 
because  it  involves  war,  declares  the  very  nature 
of  the  scheme  inexpedient  and  undesirable.  All 
of  these  influences  may  not  actually  be  powerful 
enough  to  prevent  the  present  rulers  from  making 
the  nominal  alliances  which  will  put  Pan-Ger- 
manism in  the  arena,  but  it  is  scarcely  probable 
that  they  will  not  have  an  exceedingly  important 
effect  upon  its  stability  and  its  continuity  of  pol- 
icy. That  Pan-Germanism  can  be  created  is  not 

268 


INTERNAL  WEAKNESSES 

perhaps  to  be  gainsaid;  that  such  a  confedera- 
tion could  perhaps  inflict  a  crushing  blow  upon 
the  Triple  Entente  is  quite  within  the  bounds 
of  probability;  but  that  Pan-Germanism,  resting 
upon  such  a  basis,  can  long  withstand  the  assault 
of  its  internal  and  external  enemies  seems  utterly 
improbable. 

The  greatest  genius  of  the  English  has  been 
their  skill  hi  diplomacy,  the  keenness  with  which 
they  have  ordinarily  analyzed  the  situation,  and 
the  great  ability  they  have  shown  hi  expounding 
its  various  possibilities  to  the  disorderly  elements 
in  Europe.  They  have  won  their  present  position, 
as  the  English  historians  have  forcibly  pointed 
out,  by  taking  advantage  of  the  mutual  jealousies 
and  rivalries  of  Europe.  Time  and  time  again  a 
great  coalition  has  been  actually  put  into  the  field 
against  them,  only  to  be  rent  apart  by  English 
diplomacy.  The  Germans  assume  that  the  pos- 
sibility of  repeating  such  feats  of  diplomacy  has 
been  dissipated  by  the  alterations  in  the  politi- 
cal structure  of  Germany,  Austria,  and  Italy,  or 
by  the  reduction  of  England's  relative  strength. 
Yet,  it  is  far  from  true  that  England  is  isolated 
in  the  world;  she  possesses  three  immensely  pow- 
erful allies  in  France,  Russia,  and  the  United 
States;  that  coalition  already  holds  in  its  hands 
the  greater  part  of  the  habitable  globe,  and  con- 
269 


PAN-GERMANISM 

trols  the  oceans,  the  major  part  of  the  economic 
resources  of  the  entire  world,  and  practically  its 
whole  financial  fabric.  The  fundamental  error 
Germany  has  committed  has  been  to  suppose, 
that  because  the  position  of  England  in  the  world 
is  vitally  altered,  because  England  can  no  longer 
be  maintained  in  her  proud  predominance  by  the 
factors  which  originally  created  it,  that  there  are 
no  factors  of  prime  importance  to  maintain  it. 
The  truth  seems  to  be  that  the  English  position 
has  been  changed  in  nature  but  not  in  essence. 
Because  she  does  not  rely  upon  factors  to-day 
which  were  conclusive  in  their  effect  upon  Euro- 
pean politics  three  centuries  ago,  their  present 
worthlessness  must  not  be  construed  as  the  total 
absence  of  all  strength.  In  this  particular,  how- 
ever, nothing  is  changed.  The  condition  of  Eu- 
rope itself,  in  which  English  diplomacy  has  so 
invariably  found  weapons  for  the  defense  of  the  is- 
land kingdom,  to-day  presents  to  as  great  a  degree 
as  ever  before  a  tangle  of  conflicting  interests  and 
traditional  antipathies,  in  which  the  English  are 
more  than  likely  in  then*  habitual  manner  to  find 
the  solution  for  their  present  difficulties.  If  it  is 
true  that  England's  strength  has  been  due  to  the 
balance  of  power  in  Europe  rather  than  to  her  own 
physical  resources,  the  prime  condition  for  the  con- 
tinuance of  her  authority  is  still  in  existence. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

THE    PROBABILITY   OF    THE    SUCCESS    OP 
PAN-GERMANISM 

77.  External  Weaknesses 

WHEN  the  Germans  prate  of  the  willingness 
of  the  world  to  join  them  in  the  hope  of 
looting  the  British  Empire,  they  seem  to  suppose 
that  the  English  and  the  French  will  tamely  sit 
still  and  allow  them  to  bring  their  plans  to  per- 
fection. Something  has  already  been  said  in  a 
previous  chapter  about  Italy's  position  in  the 
Mediterranean,  her  fear  of  Austria,  and,  in  gen- 
eral, her  lack  of  that  same  vital  interest  in  Pan- 
Germanism  which  her  two  allies  undoubtedly 
possess.  While  the  great  scheme  is  probably  the 
most  plausible  and  feasible  ever  suggested  for 
the  preservation  and  expansion  of  Germany  and 
Austria,  there  are  many  other  possibilities  before 
Italy.  She  has  already  proved  in  the  case  of  the 
Tripolitan  War  that  she  has  her  price  and  is 
by  no  means  bound  to  the  Triple  Alliance  with 
eternal  chains.  Suppose  now  that  England  and 
France  should  increase  their  offer  to  her  and 
should  be  able  to  fulfill  it,  would  she  still  cling  to 

271 


PAN-GERMANISM 

Pan-Germanism,  and  could  it  be  completed  with- 
out her  assistance  and  with  her  opposition?  Sup- 
pose France  offered  Spain  a  part  of  Morocco; 
that  England  offered  Italy  Egypt  in  addition  to 
Tripoli,  reserving  only  the  right  of  free  passage 
through  the  Suez  Canal  and  the  control  of  the 
Red  Sea;  that  the  Triple  Entente  guaranteed  the 
autonomy  of  Greece  and  the  Balkan  States,  and 
secured  from  Russia  the  suspension  at  least  of  her 
claims  to  territorial  expansion  in  that  district, 
in  exchange  for  at  least  the  right  of  free  passage 
through  the  Straits  and  the  control  of  the  Black 
Sea;  suppose  that  they  offered  the  Young  Turks 
control  of  Asia  Minor,  with  financial  support  for 
then'  government,  in  exchange  for  the  commercial 
privileges  of  the  Baghdad  Railway  and  the  right 
to  irrigate  Mesopotamia;  suppose  England  and 
Russia  offered  the  Persians  autonomy  in  exchange 
for  a  monopoly  of  trade  and  the  right  to  construct 
the  Trans-Persian  Railway;  would  not  the  situa- 
tion be  materially  altered?  Would  not  the  Triple 
Entente  be  more  than  likely  to  assure  itself  of  the 
permanent  support  of  these  states  whose  adher- 
ence is  absolutely  essential  to  Pan-Germanism? 
Would  the  Pan-German  Confederation,  even  if 
actually  created,  be  proof  against  such  offers, 
when  the  Triple  Entente  could  without  exaggera- 
tion promise  to  every  one  of  those  states  such 

272 


EXTERNAL  WEAKNESSES 

privileges  as  the  price  of  their  support,  with  the 
certainty  that  their  desertion  would  so  completely 
destroy  the  confederation  and  weaken  Germany 
and  Austria  as  to  make  actual  war  impossible? 
Truth  to  tell,  the  Triple  Entente  would  prefer  to 
keep  all  it  has;  but  is  it  not  a  purely  gratuitous 
assumption  to  suppose  that  they  will  be  so  blind 
as  not  to  see  that  by  parting  with  some  of  it  they 
might  easily  insure  their  possession  of  the  re- 
mainder for  another  couple  of  generations? 

While  the  Germans  have  correctly  read  the  his- 
tory of  the  British  Empire  and  have  appreciated 
to  the  full  the  importance  of  the  assistance  of  the 
native  races  in  creating  the  present  position  held 
by  England,  they  seem  to  believe  that  the  English 
power  at  present  has  no  other  basis  than  that 
which  it  possessed  in  the  beginning.  They  forget 
the  ability  with  which  the  English  have  ruled 
India,  the  undeniable  benefits  which  they  have 
conferred  upon  the  Hindu,  the  fact  that  the  com- 
mon people  have  for  the  first  time  been  treated 
with  what  we  should  call  decency,  accorded  jus- 
tice, and  allowed  to  retain  a  sufficient  proportion 
of  their  produce  to  live  upon.  However  true  may 
be  the  tales  of  oppression  in  India  that  Germany 
and  Russia  have  industriously  collected  and 
spread,  they  are  certainly  insignificant  compared 
to  the  oppression  and  suffering  visited  upon  that 

273 


PAN-GERMANISM 

unhappy  land  since  before  the  time  when  history 
was.  The  wave  of  democracy,  which  is  sweeping 
on  into  the  Orient,  has  not  escaped  the  Hindus; 
but  a  most  careful  investigation  of  the  question 
by  disinterested  students  has  yet  failed  to  re- 
veal any  very  considerable  number  of  Hindus 
who  believe  the  varied  races  huddled  together  in 
India  capable  of  governing  themselves.  The  Eng- 
lish have  appreciated  (and  so  far  as  we  can  tell 
with  absolute  justice)  the  fact  that  the  democratic 
movement  in  India  is  the  work  of  one  race  and 
one  religion,  which  would  be  glad  to  rule  over  the 
other  races  and  the  other  religions.  It  is  not, 
therefore,  difficult  to  demonstrate  to  the  Hindu 
of  the  Brahmin  caste  the  undesirability  of  being 
ruled  by  the  Mohammedans,  while  the  latter  are 
by  no  means  enthusiastic  about  being  ruled  by 
the  Brahmin.  Each  is  zealous  about  obtaining 
for  his  own  sect  the  right  to  govern  India;  each 
is  as  unwilling  to  be  ruled  by  other  Hindu  sects, 
who  do  not  agree  with  him  in  religion,  as  he  is  to 
have  the  present  English  rule  continued.  When 
it  is  simple  to  demonstrate  to  them  all  that  the 
departure  of  the  English  will  certainly  not  result 
in  the  government  of  India  by  any  native  race  or 
sect,  but  in  its  conquest  by  Russia  or  Germany, 
the  desire  of  the  Hindus  and  Mohammedans  for 
the  expulsion  of  the  English  is  necessarily  much 

274 


EXTERNAL  WEAKNESSES 

modified.  So  clear  have  the  English  made  these 
facts  to  those  natives  who  alone  are  capable,  either 
from  their  ability  or  from  their  position,  of  under- 
taking such  a  movement,  that  the  likelihood  of 
any  revolt  against  the  English  in  India  is  small 
and  the  faithful  support  of  the  native  princes 
firmly  assured,  at  any  rate,  so  long  as  the  pre- 
sent international  situation  continues.  Suppose 
that  the  international  situation  should  suddenly 
change,  that,  for  any  one  of  fifty  reasons,  the 
expulsion  of  all  foreigners  from  India  should  seem 
probable,  would  not  the  English  then  be  in  a 
position  to  offer  the  natives,  in  exchange  for  the 
trade  monopoly  they  have  always  had  and  to 
which  the  native  does  not  apparently  seriously 
object,  their  assistance  in  securing  and  maintain- 
ing actual  autonomy?  Would  not  the  Germans  or 
the  Russians  be  met  by  a  very  different  sort  of  a 
force  than  the  beggarly  thousands  of  Englishmen 
whom  they  affect  so  to  despise?  In  fact,  to  snatch 
India  from  a  few  thousand  Englishmen  with  the 
assistance  of  the  Hindu  is  one  thing;  to  conquer 
India  from  the  English  and  the  Hindu  combined, 
in  the  face  of  a  century  of  admirable  adminis- 
tration by  England  and  the  promise  of  practical 
autonomy  for  the  native  states  in  the  future, 
would  be  a  very  different  thing.  If  one  is  emi- 
nently feasible,  the  other  is  exceedingly  improb- 

275 


PAN-GERMANISM 

able;  and  the  facts  of  the  situation,  so  far  as  they 
can  be  learned,  seem  to  indicate  with  precision 
that  the  latter  is  the  truth. 

The  Germans  have  made  much  of  the  lack 
of  common  economic  interests  between  England 
and  her  self-governing  colonies  because  of  the 
distances  which  sunder  them.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  it  is  easier  to-day  to  carry  on  trade  with  New 
Zealand  at  a  distance  of  over  twelve  thousand 
miles  —  it  is  possible  to  send  that  distance  com- 
modities that  until  the  last  half-century  were 
never  shipped  at  all  —  than  it  was  before  the 
year  1850  to  carry  on  trade  overland  between 
Berlin  and  Munich.  Nor  are  the  freight  charges 
in  one  case  probably  much  in  excess  of  those  in 
the  other.  Certainly  the  time  consumed  does  not 
so  greatly  differ.  Most  people  forget  with  ease 
the  common  facts  of  history  concerning  the  length 
of  time  consumed  by  journeys  undertaken  with- 
out the  aid  of  the  railway.  While  the  analogy 
must  not  be  too  closely  pressed,  it  is  substantially 
true  that  the  economic  tie  between  England  and 
her  colonies  is  probably  quite  as  close  to-day  as 
the  economic  ties  between  different  parts  of  the 
German  Empire  previous  to  the  Zollverein.  To 
be  sure,  this  argument  does  not  presage  great 
strength  for  such  relations,  but  it  does  show  that 
the  mere  fact  of  the  existence  of  the  Atlantic 

276 


EXTERNAL  WEAKNESSES 

Ocean  is  not  sufficient  to  prove  that  there  is  not 
and  never  can  be  a  substantial  identity  of  eco- 
nomic interests.  But  waiving  that,  assuming  that 
the  only  bond  there  is  or  can  be  between  England 
and  her  self-governing  colonies  is  that  of  blood, 
it  will  be  difficult  for  the  student  to  deny  that  the 
racial  tie  is  more  than  likely  to  be  sufficient  to 
hold  the  Empire  together,  and  to  secure  actual 
support  from  the  colonies  in  ships  and  troops. 
Enthusiastic  response  to  the  recent  appeal  of  the 
mother  country  for  assistance  shows  conclusively 
that  there  is  a  good  deal  more  likelihood  of  the 
tie  between  England  and  her  colonies  being  suffi- 
cient to  hold  them  together  than  that  the  present 
political  tie  will  be  sufficient  to  prevent  the  com- 
plete dismemberment  of  Austria-Hungary.  If  we 
take  the  most  unfavorable  statement  possible  of 
the  British  Empire  and  the  most  favorable  state- 
ment of  the  actual  situation  in  the  Dual  Mon- 
archy, it  will  be  difficult  to  deny  that  the  British 
Empire  possesses  all  those  qualities  of  unity  of 
race,  of  language,  of  religion,  of  economic  inter- 
est, of  policy,  of  loyalty,  which  the  Dual  Monarchy 
conspicuously  lacks.  And  the  continued  existence 
of  the  Dual  Monarchy  is  a  good  deal  more  im- 
portant to  Pan-Germanism  than  the  assistance 
of  the  English  colonies  is  likely  to  be  to  the 
Triple  Entente. 

277 


PAN-GERMANISM 

In  regard  to  the  economic  weapons  upon  which 
Germany  places  so  much  reliance,  the  truth  of 
the  facts  alleged  is  not  possible  of  denial,  but  the 
inferences  drawn  from  them  seem  to  be  enor- 
mously exaggerated.  Unquestionably,  Germany 
does  possess  the  reality,  and  other  nations  pos- 
sess paper  evidences  of  their  investments,  and  if 
Germany  should  decline  to  pay  her  loans,  and  if 
she  should  be  able  to  maintain  herself  in  war, 
disastrous  results  might  be  produced.  The  possi- 
bility of  the  confiscation  of  the  English  invest- 
ments in  other  parts  of  the  world  does  not  seem 
to  be  probable.  It  has  always  been  true  that  the 
strong  man  could  rob  the  weaker,  that  the  strong 
nation  could  rob  the  smaller;  but  the  experience 
of  men  throughout  the  centuries  seems  to  have 
demonstrated  pretty  effectively,  that,  even  when 
the  thief  is  not  punished  by  the  arm  of  justice, 
there  are  economic  laws  which  somehow  seem  to 
prevent  the  attainment  of  the  degree  of  benefit 
he  expected  to  derive.  So  radical  a  disavowal  of 
the  strength  of  the  feeling  in  favor  of  commer- 
cial and  national  honesty  is  far  removed  from 
the  general  opinion  of  the  financial  world,  and 
it  seems  probable  that  the  Germans  have  very 
much  underestimated  the  strength  of  the  moral 
obligation  which  binds  the  commercial  world 
together. 

278 


EXTERNAL  WEAKNESSES 

Above  all,  this  talk  of  confiscation  as  a  last 
resort,  of  taking  possession  for  nothing  of  Ger- 
many's development,  is  all  based  upon  the  sup- 
position that  it  will  be  as  easy  to  keep  it  as  it 
is  to  get  it,  and  upon  the  equally  peculiar  notion 
that  the  financial  situation  will  remain  what  it 
was  some  years  ago  when  these  notions  were  first 
promulgated.  They  are  no  longer  secret,  nor  have 
the  foreign  investors  failed  to  take  account  of  the 
fact  that,  even  should  Germany  take  no  steps 
to  repudiate  her  debts,  the  coming  of  war  would 
for  the  time  being  at  any  rate  rob  them  of  their 
incomes.  They  are  not  investing  to-day  at  the 
rate  they  did  before  in  German  securities;  they 
will  no  longer  advance  loans  to  the  German  and 
Austrian  Governments  without  pledges  in  re- 
gard to  the  destination  of  the  money  of  such  a 
nature  as  to  make  treachery  improbable;  they 
have  already  been  at  work  for  some  years  ex- 
changing their  investments  in  Germany  for  other 
securities.  American  investors  are  inclined  to 
greet  such  a  supposition  as  repudiation  with  in- 
credulity, and  the  small  European  investor,  who 
is  not  informed  in  the  details  of  current  politics, 
is  apt  to  suppose  that  the  German  or  Austrian 
Government  is  necessarily  trustworthy;  but  the 
great  financial  heads  do  not  seem  to  be  of  that 
opinion.  An  Austrian  war  loan,  offered  in  De- 

279 


PAN-GERMANISM 

cember,  1912,  at  97,  was  not  subscribed  with 
alacrity.  None  of  the  Germans  seem  to  remember 
that  after  the  war  is  over,  after  they  have  suc- 
ceeded in  destroying  France  and  robbing  England, 
they  will  be  forced  to  have  relations  with  the  rest 
of  the  world  and  with  each  other.  The  effect  of 
the  wholesale  repudiation  of  their  debts,  private 
and  national,  however  crushing  it  might  be  at 
the  moment  to  their  creditors,  and  whether  or 
not  it  was  intentional  or  involuntary,  would 
almost  certainly  react  upon  themselves  in  the 
future  so  unfavorably  as  to  render  the  whole 
operation  scarcely  to  their  advantage.  With  such 
a  record,  how  could  they  expect  to  obtain  the 
confidence  of  the  Hindu  and  of  the  Chinese,  to 
say  nothing  of  maintaining  that  belief  in  each 
other's  honesty  and  faithfulness  upon  which  the 
whole  structure  of  Pan-Germanism  rests? 

Then*  economic  weapons,  about  which  the 
Germans  talk  so  glibly,  the  starving  of  England, 
the  depriving  her  factories  of  raw  materials,  the 
cutting-off  of  her  supplies  for  the  maintenance  of 
a  fleet,  these  depend  one  and  all  upon  the  ability 
of  the  German  navy  to  outmanoeuvre  the  English 
and  get  possession  of  the  Channel  in  such  fashion 
that  a  pitched  battle  would  be  necessary  to  dis- 
lodge it,  or  upon  its  ability  to  defeat  the  English 
fleet  in  the  first  place  in  so  decisive  a  manner  that 

280 


EXTERNAL  WEAKNESSES 

assistance  could  not  come  from  the  Mediterra- 
nean and  from  America  in  time  to  avert  the 
catastrophe.  It  is  perhaps  well  to  remember  in 
this  connection  that  the  Germans  are  not  a  nation 
of  sailors,  and  that  their  navy  has  thus  far  been 
used  only  for  manosuvres  like  those  of  the  King  of 
France  when  he  marched  up  the  hill  and  then 
marched  down  again.  It  is  true,  as  the  Germans 
say  in  defense,  that  the  English  have  never  used 
the  present  type  of  ship  in  actual  warfare;  but  it 
is  surely  exceedingly  important  to  remember  that 
the  English  invented  and  designed  the  present 
type  of  ship,  and  in  all  probability  know  more 
about  its  use  than  the  Germans  are  likely  to.  The 
latter  seem  to  lay  more  stress  upon  the  size  of 
their  fleet  than  they  do  upon  its  efficiency,  and 
seem  to  suppose  that,  if  it  were  more  numerous 
than  the  English,  victory  would  be  assured.  The 
Spanish  Armada,  to  cite  one  familiar  example 
from  many,  was  reputed  at  the  time  to  be  so 
powerful,  and  certainly  did  so  largely  outnumber 
the  English  fleet,  that  Europeans  supposed  no 
resistance  would  be  possible;  yet  in  this  action, 
as  in  many  others,  the  English  demonstrated  con- 
clusively that  knowledge  of  seamanship  and  the 
efficiency  of  the  individual  vessel  was  of  vastly 
more  consequence  than  numbers.  While  at  the 
present  day  there  is  no  great  sailor  of  conspicuous 

281 


PAN-GERMANISM 

fame  in  the  English  navy,  it  is  difficult  to  believe 
that  the  nation,  which  produced  in  moments 
of  danger  men  like  Drake,  Blake,  and  Nelson, 
would  be  incapable  in  a  similar  crisis  of  producing 
as  suddenly  from  the  ranks  some  man  of  equally 
conspicuous  talent.  It  will  be  early  enough  to 
assume  the  defeat  of  the  English  on  the  sea  when 
that  event  occurs. 

The  German  army  is  probably  more  efficient 
than  the  fleet,  but  is  very  likely  not  as  efficient 
as  the  Germans  think  it  is.  Military  critics  have 
declared  it  bound  too  tightly  with  red  tape,  filled 
with  unintelligent  officials,  too  stiff  and  mechan- 
ical in  its  evolutions  to  give  much  of  an  account 
of  itself  in  battle.  Certainly,  it  cannot  compare 
in  point  of  size  with  the  army  Russia  could  put 
in  the  field,  and  competent  judges  have  declared 
it  far  inferior  in  quality  to  the  French  army.  To 
be  sure,  none  of  these  armies  have  recently  been 
under  fire  except  the  Russian  army,  whose  experi- 
ence was  perhaps  not  a  desirable  preparation  for 
another  war.  The  condition  of  the  English  army 
in  England  is  admitted  on  all  sides  to  be  bad, 
though  the  actual  deficiencies  have  no  doubt 
been  exaggerated  by  the  eager  advocates  of  uni- 
versal conscription.  But  while  the  Anglo-Saxon 
race  has  invariably  not  shown  to  advantage  in  the 
field  before  the  war,  nor  indeed  during  the  first 

282 


EXTERNAL  WEAKNESSES 

years  of  a  long  war,  they  have  usually  won.  From 
the  point  of  view  of  strategy,  the  Duke  of  Welling- 
ton was  hopelessly  beaten  at  Waterloo;  according 
to  all  the  rules  of  tacticians,  his  thin  line  of 
redcoats  could  never  hold  such  a  position;  but 
the  critics  have  since  been  compelled  to  admit 
that  the  English  soldiers  possessed  some  qualities, 
which  other  troops  did  not  have,  that  enabled 
them  to  hold  that  position  despite  the  odds  and 
win  one  of  the  decisive  battles  of  history.  No 
doubt  all  Anglo-Saxons  are  prejudiced,  but  they 
will  not  credit  the  supposition  that  the  descend- 
ants of  the  men  who  fought  Napoleon  and  the 
men  themselves  who  won  the  war  in  South 
Africa,  when  they  meet  an  invader  upon  their 
own  soil,  will  be  unable  to  give  a  satisfactory 
account  of  themselves. 

The  really  doubtful  factor  in  the  present  situa- 
tion is  Russia.  She,  far  more  than  England,  holds 
the  scale.  She  is  likely  to  gain  in  the  long  run 
whichever  side  wins.  Should  Germany  overthrow 
England  and  France  in  Europe  and  take  pos- 
session of  the  Mediterranean,  Russia  would  cer- 
tainly reach  India  first.  If  she  should  join  Ger- 
many, the  downfall  of  England  and  France  would 
be  assured,  and  the  victors  could  divide  the  world 
at  their  leisure.  But  she  could  not  join  Germany 
without  renouncing  her  ambitions  in  the  Baltic, 

283 


PAN-GERMANISM 

without  permitting  the  Germans  to  overrun  that 
sea  and  throwing  herself  back  upon  Asia  and  mak- 
ing it  the  centre  of  a  new  empire.  The  likelihood 
of  such  a  renunciation  of  her  position  in  Europe 
is  exceedingly  small.  The  probability  that  Ger- 
mans would  believe  in  her  sincerity,  if  she  offered 
them  an  alliance  on  such  a  basis,  is  infinitely 
smaller.  Germany  is  so  exposed  that  the  treach- 
ery of  Russia  would  be  fatal.  As  the  situation 
looks  at  present,  nothing  short  of  the  breaking 
of  the  alliance  between  England,  France,  the 
United  States,  and  Russia  can  permit  the  Ger- 
man scheme  to  obtain  anything  more  than  a 
temporary  and  partial  success.  The  first  three 
of  these  allies  cannot  leave  the  alliance  without 
endangering  everything  they  hold  dear.  The 
fourth  can  do  so  only  by  the  renunciation  of  am- 
bitions which  have  been  the  very  backbone  of 
Russian  policy  ever  since  Russia  herself  emerged 
upon  the  plane  of  European  politics. 


THE   END 


APPENDIX 


APPENDIX 

THE  SPEECH  OF  PREMIER  BORDEN  OF 
CANADA  ADVOCATING  A  NEW  NAVAL 
POLICY 

WITH    THE 

OFFICIAL  MEMORANDUM  OF  THE  ENG- 
LISH ADMIRALTY  ON  ENGLAND'S  NAVAL 
POSITION 

THE  following  speech  was  delivered  by  Premier  Bor- 
den  in  the  Canadian  House  of  Commons  on  December 
5,  1912,  and  was  received  with  the  utmost  enthusiasm 
by  a  crowded  assemblage.  The  House  rose  to  its  feet, 
cheering  and  waving  handkerchiefs  for  many  minutes, 
and  sang  "  God  save  the  King  "  at  the  conclusion  of  a 
very  remarkable  demonstration.  This  speech  and  the 
official  memorandum  communicated  to  thte  House 
prove  the  extent  of  the  anxiety  in  England  over  the 
progress  of  Pan-Germanism.  The  text  of  the  speech 
given  here  is  that  printed  in  the  weekly  edition  of  the 
London  Times  for  December  6,  1912;  the  text  of  the 
Memorandum  is  that  printed  by  the  Times  from  the 
official  Parliamentary  Paper,  Cd.  6513.  Actual  official 
copies  could  not  be  procured  in  time  for  publication :  — 

During  my  recent  visit  to  the  British  Islands  I  ven- 
tured on  many  public  occasions  to  propound  the  prin- 
ciple that  the  great  Dominions,  sharing  in  the  defence 
of  the  Empire  upon  the  high  seas,  must  necessarily 
be  entitled  to  share  also  in  the  responsibility  for  and  in 

287 


APPENDIX 

the  control  of  foreign  policy.  No  declaration  I  made 
was  greeted  more  heartily  and  enthusiastically  than 
this.  It  is  satisfactory  to  know  to-day  that  not  only  His 
Majesty's  Ministers,  but  also  the  leaders  of  the  oppo- 
site political  party  in  Great  Britain,  have  explicitly 
accepted  this  principle,  and  have  affirmed  the  convic- 
tion that  the  means  by  which  it  can  be  constitutionally 
accomplished  must  be  sought,  discovered,  and  utilized 
without  delay. 

The  present  Government  assumed  office  on  the  10th 
October,  1911,  and  met  Parliament  on  the  17th  day  of 
November  following.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  point 
out  that  there  was  no  opportunity  until  after  the  close 
of  the  Session  to  visit  Great  Britain,  or  consult  the 
Admiralty  in  any  effective  way.  Shortly  after  the  Ses- 
sion closed  I  went  to  England,  accompanied  by  some  of 
my  colleagues,  and  for  several  weeks  we  had  the  oppor- 
tunity from  time  to  time  of  conferring  with  the  British 
Government,  and  consulting  with  technical  and  expert 
advisers  of  the  Admiralty,  respecting  the  whole  ques- 
tion of  naval  defence,  and  especially  the  conditions 
which  confront  the  Empire  at  present  and  in  the  early 
future.  I  desire  to  express  my  warm  appreciation  of 
the  manner  in  which  we  were  received  by  His  Majesty's 
Government,  who  took  us  most  fully  into  their  con- 
fidence regarding  great  questions  of  foreign  policy 
and  defence,  and  who  accorded  to  us  all  the  relevant 
information  at  their  disposal.  A  portion  of  this  is, 
necessarily,  of  a  very  confidential  character  which  can- 
not be  made  public,  but  the  important  part  will  be 
communicated  to  the  House  in  a  document  which  I 
shall  lay  on  the  table  this  afternoon. 

I  now  proceed  to  submit  to  the  House  the  informa- 
tion which  we  have  received  from  His  Majesty's  Gov- 

288 


APPENDIX 

eminent  which,  in  the  form  of  a  memorandum,  is  as 
follows :  — 

1.  The  Prime  Minister  of  the  Dominion  of  Canada  has 
invited  His  Majesty's  Government  through  the  Board  of 
Admiralty  to  prepare  a  statement  of  the  present  and  imme- 
diately prospective  requirements  «of  the  naval  defence  of  the 
Empire  for  presentation  to  the  Canadian  Parliament  if  the 
Dominion  Cabinet  deem  it  necessary. 

The  Lords  Commissioners  of  the  Admiralty  are  prepared 
to  comply  and  to  supplement,  in  a  form  which  can  be  made 
public,  the  confidential  communications  and  conversations 
which  have  passed  between  the  Admiralty  and  Ministers 
of  the  Dominion  Parliament  during  the  recent  visit  to  the 
United  Kingdom. 

The  Admiralty  set  the  greatest  store  by  the  important 
material,  and  still  more  important  moral,  assistance  which  it 
is  within  the  power  of  Canada  to  give  to  maintaining  British 
naval  supremacy  upon  the  high  seas;  but  they  think  it  neces- 
sary to  disclaim  any  intention,  however  indirect,  of  putting 
pressure  upon  Canadian  public  opinion,  or  of  seeking  to  influ- 
ence the  Dominion  Parliament  in  a  decision  which  clearly 
belongs  solely  to  Canada. 

The  Admiralty  therefore  confine  themselves  in  this  state- 
ment exclusively  to  facts,  and  it  is  for  the  Dominion  Govern- 
ment and  Parliament  to  draw  their  own  conclusions  there- 
from. 

2.  The  power  of  the  British  Empire  to  maintain  the  supe- 
riority on  the  sea,  which  is  essential  to  its  security,  must 
obviously  be  measured  from  time  to  time  by  reference  to  the 
other  naval  forces  of  the  world,  and  such  a  comparison  does 
not  imply  anything  unfriendly  in  intention  or  in  spirit  to  any 
other  Power  or  group  of  Powers.  From  this  point  of  view  the 
development  of  the  German  Fleet  during  the  last  fifteen 
years  is  the  most  striking  feature  of  the  naval  situation 
to-day.  That  development  has  been  authorized  by  five  suc- 
cessive legislative  enactments,  viz.,  the  Fleet  Laws  of  1898, 
1900,  1906,  1908,  and  1912.  These  laws  cover  the  period  up 
to  1920. 

Whereas  in  1898  the  German  Fleet  consisted  of:  — 
9  battleships  (excluding  coast  defence  vessels), 
289 


APPENDIX 

3  large  cruisers, 

28  small  cruisers, 

113  torpedo-boats,  and 

25,000  men, — 

maintained  at  an  annual  cost  of  £6,000,000,  the  full  Fleet  of 
1920  will  consist  of:  — 

41  battleships, 

20  large  cruisers, 

40  small  cruisers, 

144  torpedo-boats, 

72  submarines,  and 

101,500  men,  — 

estimated  to  be  maintained  at  an  annual  cost  of  £23,000,000. 
These  figures,  however,  give  no  real  idea  of  the  advance,  for 
the  size  and  cost  of  ships  has  risen  continually  during  the 
period,  and,  apart  from  increasing  their  total  numbers,  Ger- 
many has  systematically  replaced  old  and  small  ships,  which 
counted  as  units  in  her  earlier  Fleet,  by  the  most  powerful 
and  costly  modern  vessels.  Neither  does  the  money  provided 
by  the  Estimates  for  the  completed  law  represent  the  increase 
in  cost  properly  attributable  to  the  German  Navy,  for  many 
charges  borne  on  British  naval  funds  are  otherwise  defrayed 
in  Germany;  and  the  German  Navy  comprises  such  a  large 
proportion  of  new  ships  that  the  cost  of  maintenance  and 
repair  is  considerably  less  than  in  navies  which  have  been 
longer  established. 

3.  The  naval  expansion  of  Germany  has  not  been  pro- 
voked by  British  naval  increases.  The  German  Government 
have  repeatedly  declared  that  their  naval  policy  has  not  been 
influenced  by  British  action,  and  the  following  figures  speak 
for  themselves:  — 

In  1905  Great  Britain  was  building  four  capital  ships,  and 

Germany  two. 
In  1906  Great  Britain  reduced  to  three  capital  ships,  and 

Germany  increased  to  three. 

In  1907  Great  Britain  built  three  capital  ships,  and  Ger- 
many built  three. 
In  1908  Great  Britain  further  reduced  to  two  capital  ships, 

and  Germany  further  increased  to  four. 
It  was  not  until  the  efforts  of  Great  Britain  to  procure  the 
abatement  or  retardation  of  naval  rivalry  had  failed  for  three 

290 


APPENDIX 

.« 

successive  years  that  the  Admiralty  were  forced  in  1909,  upon 
a  general  review  of  the  naval  situation,  to  ask  Parliament  to 
take  exceptional  measures  to  secure  against  all  possible  haz- 
ards the  safety  of  the  Empire.  In  that  year  eight  capital 
ships  were  laid  down  in  Great  Britain,  and  two  others  were 
provided  by  the  Commonwealth  of  Australia  and  the  Do- 
minion of  New  Zealand  respectively  —  a  total  of  ten. 

4.  In  the  spring  of  the  present  year  the  fifth  German  Navy 
Law  was  assented  to  by  the  Reichstag.  The  main  feature  of 
that  law  is  not  the  increase  in  the  new  construction  of  capital 
ships,  though  that  is  important,  but  rather  the  increase  in 
the  striking  force  of  ships  of  all  classes  which  will  be  imme- 
diately available  at  all  seasons  of  the  year. 

A  third  squadron  of  eight  battleships  will  be  created  and 
maintained  in  full  commission  as  part  of  the  active  battle 
fleet.  Whereas,  according  to  the  unamended  law,  the  active 
battle  fleet  consisted  of  seventeen  battleships,  four  battle  or 
large  armoured  cruisers,  and  twelve  small  cruisers,  it  will  in 
the  near  future  consist  of  twenty-five  battleships,  eight  battle 
or  large  armoured  cruisers,  and  eighteen  small  cruisers;  and 
whereas  at  present,  owing  to  the  system  of  recruitment  which 
prevails  in  Germany,  the  German  Fleet  is  less  fully  mobile 
during  the  winter  than  during  the  summer  months,  it  will, 
through  the  operation  of  this  law,  not  only  be  increased  in 
strength,  but  rendered  much  more  readily  available.  Ninety- 
nine  torpedo-boat  destroyers,  instead  of  sixty-six,  will  be 
maintained  in  full  commission  out  of  a  total  of  one  hundred 
and  forty-four;  seventy-two  new  submarines  will  be  built 
within  the  currency  of  the  new  law,  and  of  these  it  is  appar- 
ently proposed  to  maintain  fifty-four  with  full  permanent 
crews.  Taking  a  general  view,  the  effect  of  the  law  will  be 
that  nearly  four-fifths  of  the  entire  German  Navy  will  be 
maintained  in  full  permanent  commission;  that  is  to  say, 
instantly  and  constantly  ready  for  war. 

So  great  a  change  and  development  in  the  German  Fleet 
involves,  of  course,  important  additions  to  their  personnel. 
In  1898  the  officers  and  men  of  the  German  Navy  amounted 
to  25,000.  To-day  that  figure  has  reached  66,000.  The  new 
law  adds  15,000  officers  and  men,  and  makes  a  total  in  1920  of 
101,500. 

The  new  construction  under  the  law  prescribes  the  build- 
291 


APPENDIX 

ing  of  three  additional  battleships  —  one  to  be  begun  next 
year,  one  in  1916  —  and  two  small  cruisers,  of  which  the  date 
has  not  yet  been  fixed.  The  date  of  the  third  battleship  has 
not  been  fixed.  It  has  been  presumed  to  be  later  than  the  six 
years  which  are  in  view.  The  cost  of  these  increases  in  men 
and  in  material  during  the  next  six  years  is  estimated  as 
£10,500,000  spread  over  that  period  above  the  previous  esti- 
mates. 

The  facts  set  forth  above  were  laid  before  the  House  of 
Commons  on  the  22d  July,  1912,  by  the  First  Lord  of  the 
Admiralty. 

5.  The  effect  of  the  new  German  Navy  Law  is  to  produce  a 
remarkable  expansion  of  strength  and  readiness.  The  number 
of  battleships  and  large  armoured  cruisers  which  will  be  kept 
constantly  ready  and  in  full  commission  will  be  raised  by  the 
law  from  twenty-one,  the  present  figure,  to  thirty-three  — 
an  addition  of  twelve,  or  an  increase  of  about  fifty-seven 
per  cent. 

The  new  fleet  will,  in  the  beginning,  include  about  twenty 
battleships  and  large  cruisers  of  the  older  type,  but  gradu- 
ally as  new  vessels  are  built  the  fighting  power  of  the  fleet 
will  rise  until  in  the  end  it  will  consist  completely  of  modern 
vessels. 

The  complete  organization  of  the  German  Fleet,  as  de- 
scribed by  the  latest  law,  will  be  five  battle  squadrons  and 
a  fleet  flagship,  comprising  forty-one  battleships  in  all,  each 
attended  by  a  battle  or  armoured  cruiser  squadron,  complete 
with  small  cruisers  and  auxiliaries  of  all  kinds  and  accom- 
panied by  numerous  flotillas  of  destroyers  and  submarines. 

This  full  development  will  only  be  realized  step  by  step; 
but  already  in  1914,  two  squadrons  will,  according  to  Admir- 
alty information,  be  entirely  composed  of  what  are  called 
Dreadnoughts,  and  the  third  will  be  made  up  of  good  ships 
like  the  "Deutschlands"  and  the  "Braunschweigs,"  together 
with  five  Dreadnought  battle  cruisers. 

This  great  fleet  is  not  dispersed  all  over  the  world  for  duties 
of  commerce  protection  or  in  discharge  of  Colonial  responsi- 
bilities; nor  are  its  composition  and  character  adapted  to 
those  purposes.  It  is  concentrated  and  kept  concentrated  in 
dose  proximity  to  the  German  and  British  coasts. 

Attention  must  be  drawn  to  the  explicit  declaration  of  the 
292 


APPENDIX 

tactical  objects  for  which  the  German  fleet  exists  as  set  forth 
in  the  preamble  to  the  Naval  Law  of  1900  as  follows:  — 

"In  order  to  protect  German  trade  and  commerce  under 
existing  conditions,  only  one  thing  will  suffice,  namely,  Ger- 
many must  possess  a  battle  fleet  of  such  a  strength  that  even 
for  the  most  powerful  naval  adversary  a  war  would  involve 
such  risks  as  to  make  that  Power's  own  supremacy  doubtful. 
For  this  purpose  it  is  not  absolutely  necessary  that  the  Ger- 
man Fleet  should  be  as  strong  as  that  of  the  greatest  naval 
Power,  for,  as  a  rule,  a  great  Naval  Power  will  not  be  in  a 
position  to  concentrate  all  its  forces  against  us." 

6.  It  is  now  necessary  to  look  forward  to  the  situation  in 
1915. 

In  the  spring  of  the  year  1915  — 

Great  Britain  will  have  twenty-five  "Dreadnought"  bat- 
tleships and  two  "Lord  Nelsons." 

Germany  will  have  seventeen  "Dreadnought"  battle- 
ships. 

Great  Britain  will  have  six  battle  cruisers. 

Germany  will  have  six  battle  cruisers. 

These  margins  in  new  ships  are  sober  and  moderate.  They 
do  not  err  on  the  side  of  excess.  The  reason  they  suffice  for 
the  present  is  that  Great  Britain  possesses  a  good  superiority 
in  battleships,  and  especially  armoured  cruisers,  of  the  pre- 
Dreadnought  era. 

The  reserve  of  strength  will  steadily  diminish  every  year, 
actually  because  the  ships  of  which  it  is  composed  grow  old, 
and  relatively  because  the  new  ships  are  more  powerful.  It 
will  diminish  more  rapidly  if  new  construction  in  Germany 
is  increased  or  accelerated.  As  this  process  continues  greater 
exertions  will  be  required  by  the  British  Empire. 

Four  battle  cruisers  and  four  armoured  cruisers  will  be 
required  to  support  British  interests  in  the  Mediterranean 
during  the  years  1913  and  1914.  During  those  years  the 
navies  of  Austria  and  Italy  will  gradually  increase  in  strength, 
until  in  1915  they  will  each  possess  a  formidable  fleet  of  four 
and  six  Dreadnought  battleships  respectively,  together  with 
strong  battleships  of  the  pre-Dreadnought  types  and  other 
units,  such  as  cruisers,  torpedo-craft,  etc.  It  is  evident, 
therefore,  that  in  the  year  1915  our  squadron  of  four  battle 
cruisers  and  four  armoured  cruisers  will  not  suffice  to  fulfil 

293 


APPENDIX 

our  requirements,  and  its  whole  composition  must  be  recon- 
sidered. 

It  has  been  necessary  within  the  past  decade  to  concen- 
trate the  fleet  mainly  in  home  waters. 

In  1902  there  were  one  hundred  and  sixty  British  vessels 
on  the  overseas  stations  against  seventy-six  to-day. 

7.  Naval  supremacy  is  of  two  kinds:  general  and  local. 
General  naval  supremacy  consists  in  the  power  to  defeat  in 
battle  and  drive  from  the  seas  the  strongest  hostile  navy  or 
combination  of  hostile  navies  wherever  they  may  be  found. 
Local  superiority  consists  in  the  power  to  send  in  good  time 
to,  or  maintain  permanently  in,  some  distant  theatre  forces 
adequate  to  defeat  the  enemy  or  hold  him  in  check  until  the 
main  decision  has  been  obtained  in  the  decisive  theatre.  It  is 
the  general  naval  supremacy  of  Great  Britain  which  is  the 
primary  safeguard  of  the  security  and  interests  of  the  great 
Dominions  of  the  Crown,  and  which  for  all  these  years  has 
been  the  deterrent  upon  any  possible  designs  prejudicial  to 
or  inconsiderate  of  their  policy  and  safety. 

The  rapid  expansion  of  Canadian  sea-borne  trade,  and  the 
immense  value  of  Canadian  cargoes  always  afloat  in  British 
and  Canadian  bottoms,  here  require  consideration.  On  the 
basis  of  the  figures  supplied  by  the  Board  of  Trade  to  the 
Imperial  Conference  of  1911,  the  annual  value  of  the  overseas 
trade  of  the  Dominion  of  Canada  in  1909-10  was  not  less 
than  72,000,000/.,  and  the  tonnage  of  Canadian  vessels  was 
718,000  tons,  and  these  proportions  have  already  increased 
and  are  still  increasing.  For  the  whole  of  this  trade  wherever 
it  may  be  about  the  distant  waters  of  the  world,  as  well  as 
for  the  maintenance  of  her  communications,  both  with  Europe 
and  Asia,  Canada  is  dependent,  and  has  always  depended 
upon  the  Imperial  Navy,  without  corresponding  contribution 
or  cost. 

Further,  at  the  present  time  and  in  the  immediate  future, 
Great  Britain  still  has  the  power,  by  making  special  arrange- 
ments and  mobilizing  a  portion  of  the  reserves,  to  send,  with- 
out courting  disaster  at  home,  an  effective  fleet  of  battle- 
ships and  cruisers  to  unite  with  the  Royal  Australian  Navy 
and  the  British  squadrons  in  China  and  the  Pacific  for  the 
defence  of  British  Columbia,  Australia,  and  New  Zealand. 
And  these  communities  are  also  protected  and  their  interests 

294 


APPENDIX 

safeguarded  by  the  power  and  authority  of  Great  Britain  so 
long  as  her  naval  strength  is  unbroken. 

8.  This  power,  both  specific  and  general,  will  be  dimin- 
ished with  the  growth  not  only  of  the  German  Navy,  but  by 
the  simultaneous  building  by  many  Powers  of  great  modern 
ships  of  war. 

Whereas,  in  the  present  year,  Great  Britain  possesses  eight- 
een battleships  and  battle  cruisers  of  the  Dreadnought  class 
against  nineteen  of  that  class  possessed  by  the  other  Powers 
of  Europe,  and  will  possess  in  1913  twenty-four  to  twenty- 
one,  the  figures  in  1914  will  be  thirty-one  to  thirty-three;  and 
in  the  year  1915,  thirty-five  to  fifty-one. 

The  existence  of  a  number  of  navies,  all  comprising  ships 
of  high  quality,  must  be  considered  in  so  far  as  it  affects  the 
possibilities  of  adverse  combinations  being  suddenly  formed. 
Larger  margins  of  superiority  at  home  would,  among  other 
things,  restore  a  greater  freedom  to  the  movements  of  the 
British  squadrons  in  every  sea,  and  directly  promote  the 
security  of  the  Dominions.  Anything  which  increases  our 
margin  in  the  newest  ships  diminishes  the  strain,  and  aug- 
ments our  security  and  our  chances  of  being  left  unmolested. 

9.  Whatever  may  be  the  decision  of  Canada  at  the  present 
juncture,  Great  Britain  will  not  in  any  circumstances  fail  in 
her  duty  to  the  Oversea  Dominions  of  the  Crown. 

She  has  before  now  successfully  made  head  alone  and  un- 
aided against  the  most  formidable  combinations,  and  she 
has  not  lost  her  capacity  by  a  wise  policy  and  strenuous  ex- 
ertions to  watch  over  and  preserve  the  vital  interests  of  the 
Empire. 

The  Admiralty  are  assured  that  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment will  not  hesitate  to  ask  the  House  of  Commons  for  what- 
ever provision  the  circumstances  of  each  year  may  require. 
But  the  aid  which  Canada  could  give  at  the  present  time  is 
not  to  be  measured  only  in  ships  or  money.  Any  action  on 
the  part  of  Canada  to  increase  the  power  and  mobility  of  the 
Imperial  Navy,  and  thus  widen  the  margin  of  our  common 
safety,  would  be  recognized  everywhere  as  a  most  signifi- 
cant witness  to  the  united  strength  of  the  Empire,  and  to  the 
renewed  resolve  of  the  Overseas  Dominions  to  take  their 
part  in  maintaining  its  integrity. 

10.  The  Prime  Minister  of  the  Dominion  having  enquired 

295 


APPENDIX 

in  what  form  any  immediate  aid  that  Canada  might  give 
would  be  most  effective,  we  have  no  hesitation  in  answering, 
after  a  prolonged  consideration  of  all  the  circumstances,  that 
it  is  desirable  that  such  aid  should  include  the  provision  of 
a  certain  number  of  the  largest  and  strongest  ships  of  war 
which  science  can  build  or  money  supply. 

Mr.  Borden  continued:  — 

Do  Canadians  sufficiently  realize  the  disparity  be- 
tween the  naval  risks  of  our  Empire  and  those  of  any 
other  nation?  The  armies  of  Continental  Europe 
number  their  men  by  the  million,  not  by  the  thousand. 
They  are  highly  equipped  and  organized,  the  whole 
population  have  undergone  military  training,  and  any 
one  of  the  countries  is  absolutely  secure  against  inva- 
sion from  Great  Britain,  which  could  not  send  an  expe- 
ditionary force  of  more  than  one  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  men  at  the  highest  estimate.  Such  a  force 
would  be  outnumbered  by  twenty  to  one  by  any  of  the 
great  European  Powers.  This  Empire  is  not  a  great 
military  Power,  and  it  has  based  its  security  in  the 
past,  as  in  the  present,  almost  entirely  on  the  strength 
of  its  Navy.  A  crushing  defeat  upon  the  high  seas 
would  render  the  British  Islands,  or  any  Dominion, 
subject  to  invasion  by  any  great  military  Power;  loss 
of  such  a  decisive  battle  by  Great  Britain  would  prac- 
tically destroy  the  United  Kingdom,  shatter  the  British 
Empire  to  its  foundation,  and  change  profoundly  the 
destiny  of  its  component  parts.  The  advantages  which 
Great  Britain  could  gain  from  defeating  the  naval 
forces  of  any  other  Power  would  be  non-existent  except 
in  so  far  as  the  result  would  insure  the  safety  of  the 
Empire.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  practically  no 
limits  to  the  ambitions  which  might  be  indulged  in  by 
other  Powers  if  the  British  Navy  were  once  destroyed 
or  disabled.  There  is,  therefore,  grave  cause  for  concern 

296 


APPENDIX 

when  once  the  naval  supremacy  of  the  Empire  seems  on 
the  point  of  being  successfully  challenged. 

The  great  outstanding  fact  which  arrests  our  atten- 
tion in  considering  the  existing  conditions  of  naval 
power  is  this :  Twelve  years  ago  the  British  Navy  and  the 
British  Flag  were  predominant  in  every  ocean  of  the  world 
and  along  the  shores  of  every  continent.  To-day  they  are 
predominant  nowhere  except  in  the  North  Sea.1  The  para- 
mount duty  of  insuring  safety  in  home  waters  has  been 
f  ulfilled  by  withdrawing  or  reducing  squadrons  in  every 
part  of  the  world,  and  by  concentrating  nearly  all  the 
effective  naval  forces  in  close  proximity  to  the  British 
Islands.  In  1902  there  were  fifty-five  British  warships 
on  the  Mediterranean  station;  to-day  there  are  nine- 
teen. There  were  fourteen  on  the  North  American  and 
West  Indies  station;  to-day  there  are  three.  There 
were  three  on  the  southeast  Coast  of  South  America; 
to-day  there  is  one.  There  were  sixteen  on  the  Cape  of 
Good  Hope  station;  to-day  there  are  three.  There  were 
eight  on  the  Pacific  station;  to-day  there  are  two. 
There  were  forty-two  on  the  China  station;  to-day 
there  are  thirty-one.  There  were  twelve  on  the  Austra- 
lian station;  to-day  there  are  eight.  There  were  ten  on 
the  East  Indies  station,  to-day  there  are  nine.  To  sum 
up,  in  1902  there  were  one  hundred  and  sixty  ships 
on  foreign  and  Colonial  stations  against  seventy-six 
to-day.  Do  not  imagine  that  this  result  has  been 
brought  about  by  any  reduction  in  expenditure,  for  the 
case  is  practically  the  reverse.  Great  Britain's  total 
naval  expenditure  in  1902  was  less  than  $152,000,000 
(£30,400,000).  For  the  present  fiscal  year  it  exceeds 
$220,000,000  (£44,000,000).  Why,  then,  has  the  naval 
force  of  the  Empire  been  so  enormously  reduced 
1  The  italics  are  not  in  the  original. 
297 


APPENDIX 

throughout  the  world  while  at  the  same  time  the  ex- 
penditure has  increased  nearly  fifty  per  cent?  For  the 
simple  reason  that  the  increasing  strength  of  other 
navies,  and  especially  of  the  German  Navy,  has  com- 
pelled Great  Britain  not  only  to  increase  her  Fleet,  but 
to  concentrate  it  in  the  vicinity  of  the  British  Islands, 
and  there  has  been,  of  course,  a  substantial  increase  in 
the  strength  in  home  waters.  In  short,  the  strain  of 
meeting  changed  conditions  has  been  so  heavy  and 
unceasing  that,  in  spite  of  the  largely-increased  expen- 
diture and  every  possible  exertion,  the  Admiralty  has 
been  compelled  by  the  pressure  of  circumstances  to 
withdraw  or  diminish  the  forces  throughout  the  world 
which,  in  time  of  peril,  safeguarded  the  security  and 
integrity  of  the  King's  Dominions,  and,  in  time  of 
peace,  were  the  living  and  visible  symbol  of  the  tie  that 
unites  all  the  subjects  of  the  Crown. 

It  is  neither  necessary  nor  desirable  in  this  place  to 
debate  or  discuss  the  probability  or  imminence  of  war. 
The  real  test  of  our  action  is  the  existence  or  non-exist- 
ence of  absolute  security.  We  cannot  afford  to  be  sat- 
isfied with  anything  less  than  that,  for  the  risk  is  too 
great.  //  should  neter  be  forgotten  thai  icithout  war,  with- 
out firing  a  shot  or  striking  a  blow,  our  natal  supremacy 
may  disappear,  and  with  it  the  sole  guarantee  of  the  Em- 
pire's continued  existence.  I  especially  desire  to  empha- 
size this  consideration^  for  all  history,  and  especially 
modern  history,  conveys  to  us  many  grave  warnings 
that  the  issue  of  great  events  may  be  determined,  and 
often  is  determined,  not  by  actual  war  resulting  in  vic- 
tory or  defeat,  but  by  the  mere  existence  of  an  unmistak- 
able and  pronounced  naval  or  military  superiority  on 
either  side.1 

1  The  italics  are  not  in  the  original  . 

298 


APPENDIX 

The  fact  that  trade  routes,  vital  to  the  Empire's  con- 
tinued existence,  are  inadequately  defended  and  pro- 
tected by  reason  of  the  necessary  concentration  in 
home  waters  is  exceedingly  impressive,  and  even  start- 
ling. Even  during  the  present  year  the  battleships  of 
the  British  Mediterranean  Fleet,  based  on  Malta,  have 
been  withdrawn  and  based  on  Gibraltar,  in  order  that 
they  might  become  more  easily  available  for  necessary 
aid  hi  home  waters.  The  Atlantic  Fleet,  based  on 
Gibraltar,  has  been  withdrawn  to  the  vicinity  of  the 
British  Islands  for  the  same  reason.  Under  such  condi- 
tions the  British  Flag  is  not  predominant  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean, and  with  every  available  exertion  of  ike  whole  Em- 
pire it  may  be  impossible  to  regain  the  necessary  position 
of  strength  in  that  great  highway  before  1915  or  1916.1 
Austria-Hungary,  with  only  one  hundred  and  forty 
miles  of  seacoast  and  absolutely  no  colonial  possessions, 
is  building  in  the  Mediterranean  a  formidable  fleet  of 
Dreadnoughts  which  will  attain  its  full  strength  hi 
about  three  years,  and  which  will  be  supported  by 
strong  battleships  of  the  pre-Dreadnought  type,  and 
by  cruisers,  torpedo-craft,  and  other  necessary  auxil- 
iaries. The  fleet  of  Italy  hi  the  same  theatre  will  be 
even  more  powerful  and  more  formidable. 

The  withdrawal  of  the  British  Flag  and  the  British 
Navy  from  so  many  parts  of  the  world  for  the  purpose 
of  concentration  in  home  waters  has  been  necessary, 
but  unfortunate.  Our  Navy  was  once  dominant  every- 
where, and  the  White  Ensign  was  the  token  of  naval 
supremacy  in  all  seas.  Is  it  not  time  that  the  former 
conditions  should,  hi  some  measure,  be  restored?  Upon 
our  own  coasts,  both  Atlantic  and  Pacific,  powerful 
squadrons  were  maintained  twelve  years  ago.  To-day 

1  The  italics  are  not  in  the  original. 
299 


APPENDIX 

the  Flag  Is  not  shown  on  either  seaboard.  I  am  assured 
that  the  aid  which  we  propose  will  enable  such  special 
arrangements  to  be  consummated  that,  without  court- 
ing disaster  at  home,  an  effective  fleet  of  battleships 
and  cruisers  can  be  established  in  the  Pacific,  and  a 
powerful  squadron  can  periodically  visit  our  Atlantic 
seaboard  and  assert  once  more  the  naval  strength  of 
the  Empire  along  these  coasts.  I  do  not  forget,  how- 
ever, that  it  is  the  general  naval  supremacy  of  the  Em- 
pire which  primarily  safeguards  the  Oversea  Domin- 
ions. New  Zealand's  battleship  is  ranged  in  line  with 
the  other  British  battleships  in  the  North  Sea,  because 
there  New  Zealand's  interests  may  best  be  guarded  by 
protecting  the  very  heart  of  the  Empire. 

In  presenting  our  proposals  it  must  be  borne  in  mind 
that  we  are  not  undertaking  or  beginning  a  system  of 
regular  and  periodical  contributions.  I  agree  with  the 
resolution  of  this  House  in  1909  that  the  payment  of 
such  contributions  would  not  be  the  most  satisfactory 
solution  of  the  question  of  defence. 

Upon  the  information  which  I  have  disclosed  to  the 
House,  the  situation  is,  in  my  opinion,  sufficiently 
grave  to  demand  immediate  action.  We  have  asked 
His  Majesty's  Government  what  form  of  temporary 
and  immediate  aid  can  best  be  given  by  Canada  at 
this  juncture.  The  answer  has  been  unhesitating  and 
unequivocal.  Let  me  again  quote  it:  — 

We  have  no  hesitation  in  answering,  after  a  prolonged 
consideration  of  all  the  circumstances,  that  it  is  desirable 
that  such  aid  should  include  the  provision  of  a  certain  num- 
ber of  the  largest  and  strongest  ships  of  war  which  science 
can  build  or  money  supply. 

Upon  inquiry  as  to  the  cost  of  such  a  battleship 
we  were  informed  by  the  Admiralty  that  it  is  approxi- 

300 


APPENDIX 

mately  £2,350,000,  including  armament  and  the  first 
outfit  of  ordnance,  stores,  and  ammunition.  The  total 
cost  of  three  such  battleships,  which  when  launched 
would  be  the  most  powerful  in  the  world,  would  be, 
approximately,  $35,000,000,  and  we  ask  the  people  of 
Canada,  through  their  Parliament,  to  grant  that  sum 
to  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland 
and  of  the  Oversea  Dominions,  hi  order  to  increase  the 
effective  naval  forces  of  the  Empire,  to  safeguard  our 
shores  and  our  sea-borne  commerce,  and  to  make  secure 
the  common  heritage  of  all  who  owe  allegiance  to  the 
King. 

Those  ships  will  be  at  the  disposal  of  His  Majesty  the 
King  for  the  common  defence  of  the  Empire.  They 
will  be  maintained  and  controlled  as  part  of  the  Royal 
Navy,  and  we  have  the  assurance  that,  if  at  any  time 
in  the  future  it  be  the  will  of  the  Canadian  people  to 
establish  a  Canadian  unit  of  the  British  Navy,  these 
vessels  can  be  called  by  the  Canadian  Government  to 
form  part  of  the  Navy,  hi  which  case,  of  course,  they 
will  be  maintained  by  Canada  and  not  by  Great  Britain. 
In  that  event,  there  will,  necessarily,  be  reasonable 
notice,  and,  indeed,  Canada  would  not  desire  or  suggest 
the  sudden  withdrawal  of  so  powerful  a  contingent  from 
any  important  theatre  in  which  the  naval  forces  of  the 
Empire  might  be  exposed  to  severe  and  sudden  attack. 
In  the  mean  time,  I  am  assured  that  special  arrange- 
ments will  be  made  to  give  Canadians  an  opportunity 
of  serving  as  officers  in  these  ships. 

There  have  been  proposals,  to  which  I  shall  no  more 
than  allude,  that  we  should  build  up  a  great  naval 
organization  in  Canada.  In  my  humble  opinion  nothing 
of  an  effective  character  could  be  built  up  in  this  coun- 
try within  a  quarter  or,  perhaps,  half  a  century.  Even 

301 


APPENDIX 

then  it  would  be  but  a  poor  and  weak  substitute  for 
that  splendid  organization  which  the  Empire  already 
possesses,  and  which  has  been  evolved  and  built  up  by 
centuries  of  the  most  searching  experience  and  the  high- 
est endeavour.  Is  there  really  any  need  that  we  should 
undertake  the  hazardous  and  costly  experiment  of 
building  up  a  naval  organization  especially  restricted 
to  Canada  when  upon  just  and  self-respecting  terms 
we  can  take  such  part  as  we  desire  in  naval  defence 
through  the  existing  naval  organization  of  the  Empire, 
and  in  that  way  can  fully  and  effectively  avail  ourselves 
of  the  men  and  the  resources  at  the  command  of 
Canada? 

Where  shall  these  ships  be  built?  They  will  be  built 
under  Admiralty  supervision  in  the  United  Kingdom 
for  the  reason  that,  at  present,  there  are  no  adequate 
facilities  for  constructing  them  in  Canada.  The  addi- 
tional cost  of  construction  in  Canada  would  be  about 
twelve  million  dollars  for  three,  and  it  would  be  impos- 
sible to  estimate  the  delay.  No  one  is  more  eager  than 
myself  for  the  development  of  the  shipbuilding  indus- 
tries in  Canada,  but  we  cannot,  upon  any  business  or 
economic  considerations,  begin  with  the  construction 
of  Dreadnoughts,  and  especially  we  could  not  do  so 
when  these  ships  are  urgently  required  within  two  or  three 
years  at  the  outside  for  rendering  aid  upon  which  may 
depend  the  Empire' 's  future  existence.1  According  to  my 
conception,  the  effective  development  of  the  shipbuild- 
ing industries  in  Canada  must  commence  with  small 
beginnings  and  in  a  businesslike  way.  I  have  discussed 
the  subject  with  the  Admiralty,  and  they  thoroughly 
realize  that  it  is  not  to  the  Empire's  advantage  that  all 
shipbuilding  facilities  should  be  concentrated  in  the 

1  The  italics  are  not  in  the  original. 
302 


APPENDIX 

United  Kingdom.  I  am  assured,  therefore,  that  the 
Admiralty  are  prepared  in  the  early  future  to  give 
orders  for  the  construction  in  Canada  of  small  cruisers, 
oil  tank  vessels,  and  auxiliary  craft  of  various  kinds. 
The  plant  required  is  relatively  small  as  compared 
with  that  which  is  necessary  for  Dreadnought  battle- 
ships, and  such  an  undertaking  will  have  a  much  more 
secure  and  permanent  basis  from  the  business  stand- 
point. For  the  purpose  of  stimulating  so  important  and 
necessary  an  industry  we  have  expressed  our  willing- 
ness to  bear  a  portion  of  the  increased  cost  for  a  time  at 
least.  I  see  no  reason  why  all  the  vessels  required  in 
future  for  our  Government  service  should  not  be  built 
in  Canada,  even  at  some  additional  cost. 

These  ships  will  constitute  an  aid  brought  by  the 
Canadian  people  to  His  Majesty  the  King  as  a  token 
of  their  determination  to  maintain  the  integrity  of  the 
Empire  and  assist  in  repelling  any  danger  which  may 
threaten  its  security.  It  is  most  appropriate  that  the 
opportunity  should  have  come  when  the  Crown  is 
represented  in  Canada  by  His  Royal  Highness  the 
Governor-General,  who  has  rendered  such  valuable 
and  eminent  service  to  the  State,  and  who  takes  so 
deep  and  splendid  an  interest  in  all  that  concerns  the 
welfare  and  safety  of  every  portion  of  His  Majesty's 
Dominions.  Canada  is  sending  these  ships  to  range 
themselves  in  the  battle-line  of  the  Empire  with  those 
of  the  Mother  Country,  Australia,  and  New  Zealand. 
They  will  be  three  of  the  most  powerful  battleships  in 
the  world,  and  they  will  bear  historic  names  associated 
with  this  country. 

But  if  we  should  neglect  the  duty  which  I  conceive 
we  owe  to  ourselves,  and  if  irreparable  disaster  should 
ensue,  what  will  be  our  future  destiny?  Obviously  as 

303 


APPENDIX 

an  independent  nation  or  as  an  important  part  of  the 
great  neighbouring  Republic.  What  then  would  be  our 
responsibilities,  and  what  would  be  the  burden  upon  us 
for  a  protection  on  the  high  seas  much  less  powerful 
and  less  effective  than  that  which  we  enjoy  to-day? 
Take  the  case  of  one  nation  whose  territory,  resources, 
population,  and  wealth  may  fairly  be  compared  with 
those  in  Canada.  The  naval  estimates  of  Argentina 
for  the  four  years  from  1909  to  1912  inclusive  amounted 
to  $35,000,000  (£7,000,000).  No  information  is  avail- 
able as  to  the  exact  proportion  of  the  last-mentioned 
sum  which  has  been  appropriated  for  naval  purposes, 
but  it  is  understood  that  the  far  greater  portion  is  for 
naval  construction.  It  is  safe,  therefore,  to  estimate 
that  during  the  past  four  years  Argentina  has  expended 
for  naval  purposes  not  less  than  from  $65,000,000  to 
$70,000,000  (£13,000,000  to  £14,000,000).  The  Fed- 
eral and  State  expenditure  of  the  United  States  com- 
prises a  total  outlay  for  armaments  of  between 
$250,000,000  and  $300,000,000  (£50,000,000  and 
£60,000,000),  or  at  the  rate  of  $2.75  per  head.  Similar 
expenditure  by  Canada  would  mean  an  annual  out- 
lay of  some  $20,000,000  to  $25,000,000,  or  between 
$80,000,000  and  $100,000,000  during  the  same  period. 

From  1853  to  1903  Great  Britain's  expenditure  on 
military  defence  in  Canada  runs  closely  to  $100,000,000. 

Has  the  protection  of  the  Flag  and  the  prestige  of 
the  Empire  meant  anything  for  us  during  all  that 
period?  Hundreds  of  illustrations  are  at  hand,  but  let 
me  give  just  two.  During  a  period  of  disorder  in  a 
distant  country  a  Canadian  citizen  was  unjustifiably 
arrested  and  fifty  lashes  were  laid  on  his  back.  An  ap- 
peal was  made  to  Great  Britain,  and  with  what  result? 
A  public  apology  was  made  to  him  and  £50  were  paid 

304 


APPENDIX 

for  every  lash.  In  a  time  of  dangerous  riot  and  wild 
terror  in  a  foreign  city  the  Canadian  religious  com- 
munity remained  unafraid.  "Why  did  you  not  fear?  " 
they  were  asked,  and  unhesitatingly  came  the  answer: 
"The  Union  Jack  floated  above  us." 

I  have  alluded  to  the  difficulty  of  finding  an  accept- 
able basis  upon  which  the  great  Dominions  cooperat- 
ing with  the  Mother  Country  in  defence  can  receive 
and  assert  an  adequate  voice  in  the  control  and  mould- 
ing of  foreign  policy.  We  were  brought  closely  in  touch 
with  both  subjects  when  we  met  the  British  Ministers 
in  the  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence.  That  com- 
mittee is  peculiarly  constituted,  but  in  my  judgment 
is  very  effective.  It  consists  of  the  Prime  Minister  of 
Great  Britain  and  such  persons  as  he  may  summon  to 
attend  it.  Practically  all  the  members  of  the  Cabinet 
from  time  to  time  attend  its  deliberations,  and  usu- 
ally the  more  important  members  of  the  Cabinet  are 
present.  In  addition,  naval  and  military  experts  and 
the  technical  officers  of  the  various  departments  con- 
cerned are  in  attendance. 

While  the  committee  does  not  control  policy  in  any 
way  and  could  not  be  undertaken  to  do  so  as  it  is  not 
responsible  to  Parliament,  it  is  necessarily  and  con- 
stantly obliged  to  consider  foreign  policy  and  foreign 
relations  for  the  obvious  reason  that  defence,  and 
especially  naval  defence,  is  inseparably  connected  with 
such  considerations. 

I  am  assured  by  His  Majesty's  Government  that 
pending  a  final  solution  of  the  question  of  voice  and 
influence  they  would  welcome  the  presence  in  London 
of  a  Canadian  Minister  during  the  whole  or  a  portion 
of  each  year.  Such  Minister  would  be  regularly  sum- 
moned to  all  meetings  of  the  Committee  of  Imperial 

305 


APPENDIX 

Defence  and  be  regarded  as  one  of  its  permanent  mem- 
bers. No  important  step  in  foreign  policy  would  be 
undertaken  without  consultation  with  such  represent- 
ative of  Canada.  This  means  a  very  marked  advance 
both  from  our  standpoint  and  from  that  of  the  United 
Kingdom.  It  would  give  us  the  opportunity  of  con- 
sultation and  therefore  influence  which  hitherto  we 
have  not  possessed.  The  conclusions  and  declarations 
of  Great  Britain  in  respect  of  foreign  relations  could 
not  fail  to  be  strengthened  by  the  knowledge  that 
such  consultation  and  cooperation  with  the  Overseas 
Dominions  had  become  an  accomplished  fact. 

No  thoughtful  man  can  fail  to  realize  the  very  com- 
plex and  difficult  questions  that  confront  those  who 
believe  that  we  must  find  a  basis  for  permanent  coop- 
eration in  naval  defence  and  that  any  such  basis  must 
afford  the  Overseas  Dominions  an  adequate  voice  in 
the  moulding  and  control  of  foreign  policy.  It  would 
have  been  idle  to  expect,  and  indeed  we  did  not  expect, 
to  reach  in  the  few  weeks  at  our  disposal  during  the 
past  summer  a  final  solution  of  that  problem,  which  is 
not  less  interesting  than  difficult,  which  touches  most 
closely  the  future  destiny  of  the  Empire,  and  which  is 
fraught  with  even  graver  significance  for  the  British 
Islands  than  for  Canada.  But  I  conceive  that  its  solu- 
tion is  not  impossible,  and  however  difficult  the  task 
may  be  it  is  not  the  part  of  wisdom  or  statesmanship 
to  evade  it.  So  we  invite  the  statesmen  of  Great  Britain 
to  study  with  us  this  real  problem  of  Imperial  existence. 
The  next  ten  or  twenty  years  will  be  pregnant  with 
great  results  for  this  Empire,  and  it  is  of  infinite  import- 
ance that  questions  of  purely  domestic  concern,  how- 
ever urgent,  shall  not  prevent  any  of  us  from  rising  "to 
the  height  of  this  great  argument."  But  to-day,  while 

306 


APPENDIX 

the  clouds  are  heavy  and  we  hear  the  booming  of  dis- 
tant thunder  and  see  lightning  flashes  above  the  hori- 
zon, we  cannot  and  will  not  wait  and  deliberate  until 
the  impending  storm  shall  have  burst  upon  us  in  fury 
and  with  disaster.  Almost  unaided,  the  Motherland, 
not  for  herself  alone,  but  for  us  as  well,  is  sustaining  the 
burden  of  a  vital  Imperial  duty  and  confronting  an 
overmastering  necessity  of  national  existence.  Bring- 
ing the  best  assistance  we  may  in  the  urgency  of  the 
moment  we  come  thus  to  her  aid  in  token  of  our  deter- 
mination to  protect  and  insure  the  safety  and  integrity 
of  this  Empire  and  our  resolve  to  defend  on  sea  as  well 
as  on- land  our  Flag,  our  honour,  and  our  heritage. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

THE  daily  output  of  books,  pamphlets,  magazines,  and 
newspapers  upon  the  present  international  crisis  is  appalling; 
most  of  it  is  concerned  more  or  less  directly  with  Pan-Ger- 
manism; the  great  bulk  of  it  is  pretty  clearly  of  no  permanent 
value,  for  such  of  it  as  has  not  been  written  with  a  purpose  is 
obviously  not  based  upon  a  full  knowledge  of  the  facts.  This, 
indeed,  is  inevitable,  and  is  partly  a  result  of  the  popular 
demand  for  "timely"  articles  and  partly  a  consequence  of 
the  very  proper  determination  of  statesmen  and  generals  to 
keep  their  plans  secret.  Articles  written  long  enough  after 
the  event  to  contain  a  careful  sifting  of  trustworthy  evidence 
are  rarely  printed  in  the  more  popular  magazines,  and  never 
appear  in  the  newspapers  and  weekly  journals,  because  the 
lapse  of  time  necessary  to  write  and  publish  them  makes  it 
impossible  to  get  them  before  the  public  while  the  war  is  still 
happening  or  the  event  fresh  in  mind,  and  hence  robs  them  of 
that  immediacy  in  which  "timeliness"  chiefly  consists.  Not 
only  do  we  know  that  the  war  correspondents  in  Tripoli  and 
the  Balkans  saw  little,  and  that  little  of  no  importance,  but 
the  undoubted  exaggeration  of  the  brutality  and  cruelty  of 
the  Italian  army  in  Tripoli  and  the  numerous  bitter  contro- 
versies over  many  details  of  the  campaigns  will  warn  the 
reader  to  attach  little  importance  to  whatever  he  sees  in  such 
dispatches,  either  in  the  newspapers  or  in  book  form,  until 
they  have  been  confirmed  and  generally  accepted.  Nor  has 
the  average  citizen  yet  learned  that  travelers,  foreign  army 
officers,  and  natives  of  the  country  concerned  are  not  ipso 
facto  satisfactory  authorities  for  the  policy  of  European 
Powers  and  the  strategy  of  campaigns.  A  moment's  consid- 
eration will  show  the  reader  the  futility  of  assuming  that, 
because  he  has  always  lived  in  the  United  States,  he  is  cor- 
rectly informed  about  the  future  policy  of  the  National 
Government  in  regard  to  intervention  in  Mexico,  and  will 
therefore  prove  to  him  the  absurdity  of  supposing  that  Ger- 
mans necessarily  understand  Pan-Germanism  or  that  Eng- 

311 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

lishmen  are  informed  upon  naval  equipment.  In  fact,  there 
are  in  every  nation  many  groups  of  individuals  holding  very 
diverse  views  of  policies  and  conditions,  all  of  which  have 
readily  found  voice  in  the  press.  In  Germany,  there  are 
administrative,  diplomatic,  naval,  and  military  views;  lit- 
erary, historical,  and  philosophical  notions;  industrial  and 
socialistic  propaganda;  Ultramontane,  moderate  Catholic, 
and  Protestant  ideas,  all  held  by  groups  which  possess  few 
premises  in  common,  and  which  therefore  reach  the  most 
diverse  conclusions  in  regard  to  the  present  situation.  Of  all 
this  literature,  the  student  must  beware,  for  most  of  it  was 
written  to  influence  his  opinions,  and  very  little  of  it  was 
meant  simply  to  inform  him  of  the  sober  truth. 

The  publications  of  the  German  Navy  League,  the  naval 
monthly,  Uberall,  Harden 's  magazine,  Die  Zulntnft,  are  filled 
with  the  propaganda  of  Pan-Germanism,  and  all  have  a 
semi-official  status.  Undoubtedly,  the  baldest  and  frankest 
statement  of  Germany's  "rights"  is  to  be  found  in  General 
Bernhardi's  Deutechland  vnd  der  Nachste  Krieg,  of  which  a 
good  English  translation  has  just  appeared.  More  compre- 
hensive statements  are  England's  Weltherrschaft  und  die 
Deutsche  Luxusflotte  and  Deutschland  Sei  Wach.  The  former 
appeared  in  February,  1912,  rumored  to  be  from  the  pen  of 
a  distinguished  Admiral,  was  extravagantly  praised  by  the 
press,  and  reached  the  fourteenth  edition  within  a  few  weeks; 
the  latter  was  issued  somewhat  later  by  the  Navy  League. 
The  best  statements  in  English  seem  to  be  the  articles  pub- 
lished during  the  last  two  or  three  years  in  the  Fortnightly 
Review,  some  of  which  are  certainly  semi-official.  There 
seems  to  have  been,  however,  as  yet  no  systematic  attempt 
in  Germany  or  in  England  to  treat  the  issue  comprehensively 
from  the  objective  and  historical  point  of  view  assumed  in 
this  volume. 

The  American,  who  has  not  grown  up  in  the  atmosphere 
of  European  politics,  finds  that  the  writers  of  books  and  arti- 
cles assume  a  familiarity  with  the  basic  facts  of  national 
policy  which  he  does  not  possess,  and  often  do  not  even 
allude  to  the  important  premises  on  which  their  arguments 
and  descriptions  rest.  The  ordinary  compendious  accounts 
of  the  history  of  the  nineteenth  century  fail  to  lay  enough 
stress  upon  the  broader  aspects  of  the  situation  to  render  him 

312 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

much  assistance.  Indeed,  he  will  find  indispensable  to  an 
intelligent  perusal  of  the  European  literature  on  the  subject 
a  careful  study  of  the  secret  correspondence  of  the  last  three 
centuries,  in  particular  that  of  Napoleon,  Metternich,  Bis- 
marck.Cavour,  Crispi.Gladstone,  Beaconsfield,  and  Salisbury. 
The  following  books  comprise  those  most  valuable  for  the 
study  of  conditions  and  events:  — 

"  VEHITAS,"  The  German  Empire  of  To-day.  London,  1902. 
Clearly  semi-official;  a  recognized  authority. 

G.  BLONDEL,  Les  Embarras  de  I'Allemagne.  Paris,  1912. 

A  serious  study  based  upon  personal  investigation  of 
economic  and  social  conditions. 

COLONEL  ARTHUR  BOUCHER,  La  France  Victorieuse  dans  la 
Guerre  de  Demain.  Paris,  1911. 
A  detailed  study  of  military  strategy  and  tactics. 

SIDNEY  WHITMAN,  German  Memories.  London,  1912. 

DR.  LUDWIO  STEIN,  Editor,  England  and  Germany.  London, 
1912. 

The  English  translation  of  the  series  of  essays,  written 
by  leading  English  and  German  statesmen  for  the 
magazine,  Nord  und  Sud.  They  give  authoritative 
expression  to  the  official  view,  but  do  not  afford  much 
information. 

C.  SAROLEA,  The  Anglo-German  Problem.  London,  1912. 
The  author  is  a  Belgian,  a  wide  traveler,  and  close 
student;  he  declares  the  German  plans  unreasonable 
and  unpractical. 

LORD  ROBERTS'S  Message  to  the  Nation.  London,  1912. 

An  authoritative  statement  of  the  bad  condition  of 
the  English  army  in  England. 

R.  W.  SETON- WATSON,  The  Southern  Slav  Question.  Lon- 
don, 1911. 

AUBIN,  Maroc.  Paris,  1903. 

A  descriptive  work,  based  upon  thorough  personal  in- 
vestigation. It  was  crowned  by  the  French  Academy. 
There  is  a  good  English  translation. 

M.  SHTJSTER,  The  Strangling  of  Persia.  New  York,  1911. 

CHAILLEY,  Administrative  Problems  of  British  India.  Lon- 
don, 1910. 

The  result  of  years  of  investigation. 
313 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

The  most  accurate  statistics  and  the  most  recent  record  of 
events  will  be  found  in  the  Encyclopedia  Britannica,  Eleventh 
Edition-,  in  the  Statesman's  Year-Book,  in  the  Annual  Register, 
and  in  the  official  publications  of  the  various  governments. 
The  American  Review  of  Review  prints  each  month  a  reason- 
ably accurate  detailed  chronology  of  the  month  just  past. 
Its  permanent  value  is  lessened  by  the  fact  that  it  is  neces- 
sarily based  upon  the  newspaper  reports. 


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